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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a political study of the Umayyad Caliphate during 
the reign of f Abd a I -M a lik  ibn Marwan, 65 -86 /684 -705 . The first 
chapter deals with the po litica l, social and religious background of ‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik , and relates this to his later policy on becoming caliph.
Chapter II is devoted to the ‘ Alid opposition of the period, i .e .  
the revolt of al-Mukhtar ibn Abi ‘ Ubaid al-Thaqafi, and its nature, causes 
and consequences.
The ‘ Asabiyya(tribal feuds), a dominant phenomenon of the Umayyad 
period, is examined in the third chapter. An attempt is made to throw 
light on its causes, and on the policies adopted by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to contain 
it.
The fourth chapter is concerned with the c iv il war between Abd 
a l-M a lik  and Ibn a l-Zubair. The underlying factors leading the people of 
a l-H ija z  to support Ibn al-Zubair are examined, to elucidate the nature of 
the Zubairid opposition movement in general.
Chapter V deals with the revolts of Ibn al-Jarud, and of the Zanj; 
the insurrection of the Azd in ‘ Uman; and the far more dangerous revolt of 
‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash‘ ath. These revolts are compared to see if they spring 
from similar discontents, and whether they are in response to the policies of 
al -H a jja j.
Chapter V I treats the Kharijite movement, which reached its height 
of activity in this period, in its political aspect, as a source of opposition 
to ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  caliphate. The minor, scattered revolts are described 
as well as the better-known major K harijite  revolts. This chapter also 
examines the link between the revolt of M utarrif ibn al-M ughira, and the 
movement of Shabib ibn Yazid and the Kharijites in general.
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INTRO DUCTIO N  
SURVEY OF THE SOURCES
Since most of the extant sources dealing with our period have come
down to us from the time of the * Abbasids,  ^ those inveterate enemies of
the Umayyads, it is extremely difficult to do justice to the Umayyad cause:
it gets scarce sympathy from an historical tradition which was the product
of the period following their fall from power. Apart from the pious
caliph, *Umar I I ,  a ll the Umayyads are represented as irreligious and
frivolous. The anti-Umayyad historians exploited to the utmost the fact
that the Umayyads were the immediate successors of the Orthodox Caliphs,
and judged them by the same standards; they disregarded the fact that a
vast empire like that of the Umayyads could not be administered by the
. 2
same primitive methods as in the early years of the Caliphate.
However, there are slight traces of a less unsympathetic tradition
3in the Syrian sources found in Christian writings, as well as in scattered
1. Two books only are said to have come to us from the Umayyad 
period. The first is called "Kitab al-SaqTfa", attributed to 
SalTm ibn Qais (d.90 A .H . )7 published Iby al-Haydariyya Press, 
N a ja f. See N . A. Dawud, Nasjj^ at al-SbTf a al-Im am iyya,
pp .22-23* The second book is "Kitcib a]-Zuhd“ by Asad ibn Musa 
al-UmawT (d. 133 A .H . ). This work is still in manuscript form in 
Berlin, no. 1553. See Brockelmann, Geschzichte der Arabischen, 
Literatur, S. I . , p .257, & p .351; Mcckensen, Arabic Books ancT 
Libraries in the Umayyad Period, Part I ,  p .250, in AJSL, v o l.52, 
1936.
2 . Arnold, The Caliphate, p. 26, London, 1965.
3 . Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p . x i v f f . , Beirut, 1963.
17*
narratives in the general histories of Islam. Only by considering these can 
one attempt to reconstruct a more balanced picture of the Umayyad 
caliphate under which "Islam had established itself as a universal religion."^  
For the period under consideration our sources are annals, literature, 
local histories, geographies, religious literature, coins and inscriptions.
In each chapter of this study is provided a comparison of the different 
narratives with some critical remarks, and attention has been drawn to the 
fact that the later sources simply repeat and re-edit the information pro­
vided by the earlier sources. Their major value is in clarifying points which 
remain obscure in the earlier sources. There remains only to provide a 
quick survey of the basic and major sources used in this study, with special 
emphasis on those not previously accessible to historians of the Umayyad 
period.
-  3 «
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Shabab (d .240 /854-5 ), a Basran historian and
traditionist. His Tarikh_ represents the oldest annals of the history of Islam
4that have survived. It begins with the first year of H ijra and ends with the
1 • E. I.  ^# (Umayyads).
2. Kister, Notes on the Papyrus Text about Muhammad's Campaign against
the Banff a l-N a ^ tr, p p .233-6 , A O , 32, 1964; idem, Notes on the 
Account of the Shura appointed by * Umar B. a l-K hattab , pp. 320-6 , 
JSS, IX , no. 2,“ 964.
3. Two editions of both the TarTkh and the Tabaqat of Khalifa are
available* The first is edited 'by S. Zakkffr and published in Damascus, 
1966-7. The second is edited by A. aMUm arT and published in N aja f 
and Baghdad, 1967. Being a study of Khalifa's works as well as editing 
them, tKe Iraqi edi tion is more useful in that it contains an important 
introduction and valuable notes.
4 . A M  AFT, in his introduction to the Tarikh of Khaltfa, p. 11.
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year 230 /844-5 . Being himself a traditionist as were his father and grand­
father, Khalifa adopted the method of the traditionists in his TarTkh by 
quoting a chain of authorities. For the Umayyad period and more especially 
for the reign of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , Khalifa quotes a chain of authorities con­
taining among others, ‘ Awana ibn al-Hakam , Abu'l-YaqdSn, Ibn al-Kati'bT, 
Abu ‘ Ubaida, al-M ada* in", al-Asma‘ T, Ibn ‘ Ayyash and his grandfather, 
Khalifa. Some of the narratives in the TarTkh are, in fact, Umayyad, such    i •1
as that of al-M uhaliab ibn Abi Sufra", reported on the authority of Ibn
‘ Ayyash, predicting ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  future as caliph because of his piety
and family connections.  ^ While Khalifa deals very briefly with the Sh_i‘ i
revolts during ‘Abd a l-M alik 's  reign, such as al-Tawabun and the movement 
-  2of al-M ukhtar, he shows great interest in the revolt of Ibn a I -Ash( ath, wh ich
3
he reports on the authority of Abu'l-Yaqdan. The latter is a great
4 -sympathiser of the Umayyads. Khalifa also gives us important information
about the revolt of ‘ Amr b. Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq, from which we can learn
5
some of the terms of agreement between him and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Moreover,
1. TarTkh, I, pp .257-8 .r 1 1
2. Ib id ., I, pp .258, 259, 260.
3. Jb id ., I ,  pp .279-290.
4 . A I - ‘ Umari in his introduction to the Tabaqat of KhalTfa, p .22.
5. TarTkh, I, p. 263.
19.
apart from this moderate Umayyad sympathy revealed in the Tarikh, it is 
an invaluable source for the lists of governors, Qadis, chief of police 
and directors of the Diwans, with which Khalifa concludes the account 
of the reign of each caliph; the list of the Qurra* who participated in 
the revolt of Ibn ai-Ash*ath is also of outstanding value. ^
In his Jabaqat, Khalifa gives both the patrilineal and matrilineal 
genealogy of each person, also mentioning his place of residence, his 
travels, the date of his death, and his participation in the conquests and 
campaigns, as well as the administrative post he occupied, especially if 
he was a Qadi or a governor. In addition to this important information, 
the Jabaqat contains valuable information on the Kh_iTat of al-Basra. Thus 
both the Tarikh and the Tobaqat are indispensible sources for the early 
history of Islam.
2. A l-M a 'a r if  by Ibn Qutaiba ‘ Abdallah ibn Muslim al-D inawari 
(d .276/889). This work has an encyclopaedic character, and contains 
important information on ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  reign. It provides material on 
the early life of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , as well as giving a short account of the 
major events of his reign. Like Jahshiyari, Ibn Qutaiba does not mention 
his authorities in his account of ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  reign.
1 . Ib id ., 1, pp .286-288.
20.
3 . A b u 'l- ‘ Abbas, Ahmad ibn Yahya al-Baladhuri (d .279/892), one
of the most useful Arabic historians. His Ansab al-Ashraf is a rich and
valuable source for the history of the Umayyad period: over a third of
the manuscript, which contains 1227 folios, is devoted to the Umayyad
history, of which 130 folios are concerned with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , with
another sizeable chapter of 40 folios on a l—l^ iaj ja j .  ^ To this should be
-  2added the long chapters on Ibn al-Zubair and on al-M ukhtar. What is 
more important than the length of the chapters is their quality as history: 
Baladhuri is one of the few to deal objectively with the Umayyads.
His basic authorities on this period are: Hisham ibn Muhammad a l-  
Kalbi and his son ‘ Abbas, MadaMni, Abu M ikhnaf, ‘ Awana ibn al-Hakam  
and W aqidi. The narratives of Abu M ikhnaf and ‘ Awana are reported by 
al-Baladhuri: to have reached him through Hisham ibn a l-K a lb i and his son, 
'Abbas. Baladhuri does not, however, mention Abu Mikhnaf's sources of
information, beyond referring to them by such phrases as o j  or
* 3 — .
. This shows either that Baladhuri used the writing of Abu
Mikhnaf directly or via Ibn a l-K a lb i, or that the writings of previous
historians were well established by Baladhuri's tim e.^
See the introduction of the Jerusalem edition of Ansab al-Ashraf, 1936.
See Ansab, V ,  pp. 188-379 and pp. 204-269.
Ib id ., IV , i i ,  pp. 155-157 & V , pp .218-220.
Introduction of Ansab al-Ashraf, Jerusalem, 1936; Duri, Bafcith fi 
Nash*at ‘ j|m al-TarTkh ‘ Inda1! - ‘ Arab, p .49, Beirut, 1960.
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Concerning ‘ Awana's narratives in the Ansab, they can be easily 
detected by their brief, non-continuous character. Interestingly enough, 
in dealing with the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id a I -Ashdaq, Baladhuri mentions 
four different narratives but omits that of ‘ Awana reported in Jabari. ^
This was no doubt due to the fact that ‘ Awana clearly takes the side of 
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  in this revolt, and his account contains references to the 
idea of "Jabr". It seems that ‘ Awana was not an objective enough source
t 2
for so conscientious an historian as Baladhuri.
The most often quoted authority in a I-Ansab for the reign of ‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik  is M adaM ni. In contrast to Jabari, wbo quotes MadaMni only
im ***
on events concerning Basra and the Eastern provinces, Baladhuri uses him
for many different events in varying places: thus showing Baladhuri*s
superior wisdom of making greater use of a reliable source.
Next to MadaMni, Waqidi was the most frequently quoted source
used by Baladhuri. Most of the quotations in his name are in the form of
short reports. He is a particularly important authority on the fa ll and death 
3
of Ibn a l-Zu bair. The fact that a l-H ija z , the centre of Ibn al-Zubair's
»
activities, was the birth place and home town of W aqidi, is significant in 
this respect.
1. Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 138-146.
2. J a b ., II, pp.783-789.
3. Ansab, V , pp .355-374.
A comparison of Tabari's text with the information given by 
Baladhuri*s Ansab clearly shows the latter's superiority. Baladhuri takes 
pains to give a complete picture of the Kharijite opposition under ‘ Abd a l -  
M a lik , and pays great attention to the tribal feuds which were a dominating
factor of the reign. On the other hand, Tabari neglects important events 
such as the revolt of Ibn al-Jarud and of the Zanj in Basra, and is imprecise 
on the nature of the revolt of Mutarrif ibn al-M aghira, among other things.
In his Futub al-Buldan Baladhuri furnishes indispensibie information 
on the administrative aspects of the conquered provinces, dealing with 
such issues as taxation, the introduction of Arabic money and of Arabic 
as an official language throughout the Empire. Moreover, Futub al-Buldan 
contains scattered historical information which, taken with the adminis­
trative accounts, gives a more coherent picture of our period.
4 . Al-Akhbar a l-J iw a l, by Abu IJanifa Ahmad ibn Dawud al-Dinawari
(d. 282/895). In his treatment of the Umayyad period, al-D inawari
devotes most attention to the political and religious movements in the
]
eastern part of the Empire. As far as the reign of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn 
Marwan is concerned, he concentrates on the revolt of al-M ukhtar, the 
wars of the Azariqa and the revolt of Ibn al-Ash ‘ ath* He has a strong 
tendency to exaggerate the role of the mawali in the revolt of ai-M ukhtar, 
and he went as far as to represetnt the war between Mus ‘ ab ibn al-Zubair
2 -
1. E. I. f (al -Dfnawari).
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and al -Mukhtar as a war between Arab and Persian.  ^ His pro-mawali
attitude is probably due to both his Persian origins, arid to the sources he
utilized , which were mainly Persian. Similarly, his account of the
revolt of Ibn al~Ash‘ ath is inaccurate and misleading and is unconfirmed
by other sources. He believed the revolt to have been started in Kufa as
a result of propaganda by Ibn al-Ash‘ ath among the Ourra* and religious 
3men. However, some of his work is historically valuable, as for example,
4
his accounts of the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id a I -Ashdag, and the Azairqa.
These two accounts complement, and are confirmed by, other sources. As
a final comment on al-D inaw ari, I should mention that he has no critical
5
attitude to  his sources, nor does he name them.
5. A l-Y a ‘qubi, Ahmad ibn Abi Ya'qub (d .284/897), Arab historian 
and geographer.^ His account of this period is concise and reveals a 
moderate pro-' Alid sympathy, which sometimes turns anti-Umayyad. For 
example, when dealing with the accession of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to the throne, 
a l-Y a ‘ qubi mentions that his two grandfathers were expelled by the
1. a I-Akhbar a i-T iw a l, pp. 296, 298, 300-302, 306 and especially p. 310.
2  -  „
^ / (al-Dinawari).
3. See Chapter V , p. 2 7 0 .
4. a I-Akhbar a l-J iw a l, pp. 285-289, 294-295.
5. Ibid. , p .298.
E. I . ^, (a l-Y a ‘ qubT)*
2 4 .
Prophet,^ and he also reports the tradition which considered ‘ Abd
2  -  -ra l-M a lik  as much a tyrant as the Pharaoh. A l-Y a ‘ qubi also shows 
himself strongly against a l-H a jja j in describing his policy in both al -
3ijaz and Iraq. Moreover, his pro-‘ Alid feelings led him to repeat
some of the anti-Zubairid tradition, especially when the relationship
between Ibn al—Zubair and Ibn al-H anifiyya and Ibn ‘ Abbas was not 
4cordial. Another occasion when he was anti-Zubairid was in his report­
ing of the massacre which Mus‘ ab inflicted on the Shi‘ i supporters of 
-  5al-M ukhtar: he portrays this as "one of the most memorable betrayals
of the 'aman1. "
However, despite his obvious distortions, some of his information
is original and valuable: for example, on the underlying economic factors^
governing the support the Medinese gave to Ibn a l-Zubair; the troubles 
 7
in Khurasan; and the lists of governors and theologians he provides at the
1. Tarikh, II, p. 320.
2. Ib id ., p .336. See Also Mushakalat a l-N as li Zamdnihim, p. 18*
3. Torikh, II,p p .325 ,326;Mushakalat a l-N as li Zamanihim, p. 18.
4 . TarTkh, I I ,  pp .311-313, 320.
5. Ib id ., p .315.
6 . Ibid. , pp. 297-8 .
7 . Ib id ., pp .320-324, 330,
end of the account of each caliph. From the list of authorities he gives
at the beginning of the second volume of his Tarikh , one can detect
1that some of them were actually c Abbasid. This throws some light on his
-  2flattering accounts of Ibn ( Abbas during our period.
6 . Tarikh aURusul wa'1-Muluk by Abu Ja* far Muhammad ibn Jarir
a l-Tabari, (d .310/923), the most detailed and comprehensive collection
of narratives on the Caliphate in general. In dealing with the Umayyad
period, he concentrates largely on events in Iraq and the eastern provinces,
which can be explained by the fact that these areas, being the centre of
opposition to the Umayyads, were the scene of the most interesting events:
the history of the Umayyads is, in fact, the history of Iraq and the East.
As a traditionist, Tabari strongly emphasises his chain of authority, and
3abstains from criticising their contents. Therefore, some general remarks 
on Tabari's authorities are of special importance in this connection. For ( Abd 
a l-M a lik 's  reign, Tabari's authorities are: Abu M ikhnaf, * Awana ibn a l -  
Hakam, M ada'ini and Waqidi, The most prominent among them is Abu 
M ikhnaf, on whose authority almost all the affairs of Iraq, and more especially
1. Duri, Bqhth ft Nasj/at e ilm al-Tarikh * Indo *J-f Arab, p. 52.
2. TarTkh, H, p .313.
3. Duri, The Iraq School of History to the Ninth Century -  a Sketch,
p .53 in Historians of the Middle East, ed. M .P . Holt and B, Lewis,
Oxford, 1964.
w .
of Kufa, are reported. On the whole, Abu Mikhnaf*s narratives are 
unbiased, although in some of them appears a sympathy for the Al ids, 
and for Iraq and Kufa; and occasionally, he glorifies the Azd, his own 
tribe. ^
While Abu M ikhaf is Tabari's authority on Iraqi affairs, * Aw ana
ibn al-Hakam was the one on whose authority are reported Umayyad and
Syrian affairs. Like Abu M ikhaf's, ‘ Awana's narratives are handed down
by Hisham ibn a l-K a lb i, but Tabari mentions no chain of authority for this.
* Awana is quoted only four times throughout the period of ( Abd a l-M alik 's
reign, each time for events in Syria, one of them concerned with the inner
circles of the Umayyad family. ‘ Awana is quoted in dealing with the army
sent by Marwan ibn al-Hakam (at the end of his reign) under f Amr b.
Sa( id al-Ashdaq against Ibn a l-Zubair; the army of Hubaish ibn Dulja sent
against H ijaz , and fina lly , the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq and his
2murder by 4 Abd a l-M a lik . Some of 4 Awana*s accounts use the concept of
"Jabr" (predestination) in public affairs, propagated by the Umayyads.
Examples of this are his mention of the wife of Ka‘ b al-Ahbar predicting
that * Amr would die; and the story of when 4 Amr saw s Uthman in a dream,
3who clothed him in his own shirt.
1. Tab ., II, pp .497-576, 707-14; Duri, The Iraq School of History to the
Ninth Century, a Sketch, p .49, in the Historians of the Middle East, ed. 
M . P. Holt and B. Lewis, London, 1964.
2. Tab ., II, pp. 576, 578-9 , 642-3 , 784-96.
3. Tab ., II, pp .784-796.
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In dealing with events in Basra and Khurasan, Tabari depends
exclusively on the narrative of Mada* ini, an indisputed authority on the
events in these two areas. Mada* ini's narrative has come down to us most
frequently through ‘ Umar b. Shabba. The latter is, like Mada* in i, a
Basran and greatly interested in the history of his native city and of
Khurasan.  ^ M ada’ ini is a trustworthy man, and “his accuracy has been
2
confirmed by modern investigation." However, in some of his narratives,
such as those on the tribal feud in Khurasan following Yazid's death, and on
  3
Musa ibn ‘ Abdallah b. Khazim, he relies noticeably on tribal traditions
and legends.
A ll the quotations from Waqidi, except for one which deals with 
‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  attempt to depose his brother ‘ Abd a l-A z iz  from the 
succession to the throne, are concerned with the affairs of Ibn al-Zubair in
-  4a l-H ija z  and his brother Mus ‘ ab in Basra. Waqidi's accounts, generally 
speaking, are not partisan, but at times he shows Zubairid leanings, such
-  5as in the war between M us‘ ab ibn al-Zubair and ai-M ukhtar. There is,•  H1 r
1. Pellat, C . , Le M ilieu  Basrien et la Formation de G ah iz , p. 14, no.3.
2. G ibb, H .R ., Studies on the C ivilization of Islam, p. 115.
3. T ab ., I I ,  pp. 1145-1164; 489.
4 . T ab ., I I ,  pp .74 8-9 , 781-3 , 796-7 , 804-6 , 829-831, 844-852.
5. Tab ., I I ,  pp .847-9 .
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however, no evidence to confirm Ibn al-Nadim 's accusation of 6 Alid 
partisanship. ^
7. Abu Muhammad, Aljmad ibn A ‘ tham a l-K ufi a l-K indi (d .314/926),
2the author of Kitab al-Futub* The first volume of ai-Futuh, which contains
270 folios, begins with the caliphate of ‘ Uthman ibn ‘ Affan and ends with
the revolt of al-Mukhtar ibn Abi ‘ Ubaid al-Thaqafi 66 /685 . The second
volume consisting of 278 folios, continues the account of al-Mukhtar *s
revolt and ends with the suppression of Babak's revolt in the reign of a l-
3
M u‘ tasim 218-227. As it is only available in manuscript and until 
recently unknown, a l-K ufi's  Futub has not been utilized previously in the 
study of the Umayyad period. Ibn A ‘ tham's authorities are given in the 
introductory paragraph to the first volume asMadaMni, W aqidi, Zuhri,
Abu M ikhnaf and Hisham ibn a l-K a ib i, as well as others of lesser importance.
!■ Fihrist, p. 144; see also introduction to Kitab al-M aghazi of a l -
W aqid i, Oxford, 1966, p. 18.
2. Brockelmann, op. c i t . ,  I, p. 150; Supp., 1, p. 220. However, 
judging from the statement made by Ibn A ‘ tham in his list of 
authorities, whoch makes him a contemporary of a l-M ad a’ ini
(d ,225/840), Dr. M .A . Sha‘ ban regards him as belonging to the 
2nd-3rd/ 8 th-9th centuries. See The Social and Political Background 
of the ‘ Abbasid Revolution in Khurasan, Ph.D . Thesis, Harvard, pp«VHI- 
X II I ,  and E. T. , (ibn A ‘ tham a l-K u fi).
3. Two editions of this work are in oourse of preparation, one by 
Dr. M .A . Shctban and the other by al-M aym ani.
4 . It is rather difficult to account for the assertion of Professor A .N .
Kurat that many of Ibn A'tham's authorities are unknown. See Abu 
Muhammad Ahmad b. A ctKam a l-K u ff‘s Kitab al-Futub and its 
importance concerning the Arab conquest in cenfraT Asia and the 
Khazars, p. 277, AU DTCFD, V I I ,  1949.
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However, Ibn A ‘ tham combined all these traditions in one single narrative, 
and for this reason, he did not refer to his authorities in the course of 
the book.
Kufi's Futub is one of the most important sources for the revolt of
al-M ukhtar. He shows very clearly that it was the Southern tribes (Yemenites)
who played the decisive role in the revolt, rather than the mawali.^ His
account throws much light on the disputed matter of the relationship between
-  2Ibn al-Zubair and al-M ukhtar. One should point out here that al-Futuh
contains no mention whatsoever of the Khashabiyya, the Kaisaniyya and the
"Kursi", which were so characteristic of al-Mukhtar's revolt: perhaps this
is due to his sympathies towards the A!ids and al-M ukhtar leading him to
"hush up" the discrediting extremist wing of the movement. Al-Futu.b
is also one of the major sources for the history of the Arabs in Khurasan
during the reign of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , and provides useful material on such
provinces as Arminya, and on Arab-Byzantine relations, some of which
3cannot be found in the other sources.
However, Ibn A ‘ tham shows a strong ‘ Alid bias whenever the
4 .Al ids are mentioned in the events of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  caliphate.
1. Kufi , I, fols. 246a-270b? and II, fols. la -29b .
2. Ib id ., I, fols. 236b, 261b.
3. Ibid, I, fols. 245b; II, fols. 58a-60b, 72a-b , 116a-129a.
4. Ibid, 1, fols. 187b, 190a-b, J93a-b, 204a, 207b, 213b, 220b-221b;
II, fols. 12a, 20a, 29b, 31a, 56a-b.
3 0 .
Finally, his accounts reveal rather bitter feelings against a l j a j ,
. 2
as well as some measure of glorification of his tribe, Kinda.
8 . Abu f Abdallah Muhammad ibn ‘ Adbus ai-Jahshiyari (d *331/
-  3942), the author of ql-Wuzara* waM-Kuttab* This work, which mainfy 
deals with administrative matters, contains valuable information on political 
affairs. Its importance for the reign of *Abd a l-M a lik  lies not only in the 
administrative account it provides, but also the information given on * 
‘ Asabiyya and on the policies of a l-H a jja j in Iraq; the latter reveals an a n ti-
4
Hajjaj bias. On the whole, Jahshiyari's account is brief, and he does not 
mention his authorities in the period concerned.
9. A l-M as‘u d i, Abu'l-Hasan ‘ AM ibn al-Husain (d .345/956), a
* *
renowned historian and scholar of the fourth century. Out of the thirty five
works which he claimed to have written, only Muruj al-Dhahab and a l-
t -  5Tanbih w a'I-lshraf survive. In his Muruj al-Dhahab, he expresses a strong
...j-..... ..............-   - r r — r  -
1. Kuf!, I I, fols. 53b-54a, 57b, U 3b-115b.
2. Ibid, I, fo l. 242b.
c  ,  1  /  ,  ,  .  -  - V
• (Jahshiyari).
4 . Jahshiyari, pp .42 , 43.
5. It is doubtful that the published book entitled Akhbar al-Zaman
wa ma Abadahu'l-HadaHian (Cairo 1938) is the same Akhbar a l -  
Zaman as Mas^ Odi's: for not only do the contents of this published 
volume not agree with a l-M as^dVs references to his own work, 
but it also differs in its style from Mas'udi's* Another treatise 
ascribed to a l-M as‘ udi is Ithbat al-W asiyya liHlmam ‘ Al? ibn 
Abi Talib, published in N aja f by al-Muktaba al-Murtadawiyya.
It is regretted that I was unable to get access to this work. See 
N .A , Dawud, Nash?at al-ShHq al-lmamiyya, Bibliography.
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pro-‘ Alid sympathy. Mas‘ udi‘s information on the ‘ Al ids is reported
„  1 
on the authority of men with Shi‘ Ite inclinations. Moreover, in his
assessment of ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  personality, a l-M as‘ udi quotes verbatim
from a l-Y a ‘ qubi‘s essay on the caliph, entitled Mushakalat a l-N as U
— . 2 zamanihim, without acknowledging his source. In his lengthy chapter on
-  t  . 3a l-H a jja j, Mas‘ udi portrays him most unfavourably^ here again, reports
on the authority of men like al-M inqari and ibn ‘ Alisha, who are known to
? . 4  -  Thave had ShI‘ ite leanings. One can also find in Mas4 udi's Muruj
clear anti-Umayyad feelings. Examples of this are when he reports the death
of al-Hasan ibn ‘ A li, and his account dBthe battle of a l-H arra , and the
-  . 5death of M u‘ awiya II.
Mas‘ udi seems to have been interested in anecdotes and legends
current at the time, which he reports to us in his M uruj. This, rather than
6
serving "to impair the trustworthiness of the accounts", is more an indication 
of the social and intellectual life of some of the people of the time.
However, a l-M as‘ udi in his Muruj provides us with valuable
1. See M uruj, V , pp. 179, 184-5, 196, 219, 227-9 .
2. Compare , V ,  p. 210, and Mushakalat, p. 18.
3. M uru j, V ,  pp .288-360; p .382.
4. ]b id ., V ,  pp .326 -8 , 331 -6 , 338-9 , 343; also pp.290-302.
5. Jlbid., V ,  pp .79 -81 , 167, 169.
6 . F. Omar, The ‘ Abbasid Caliphate, p .35. (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
London, 1967.)
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information on al-Mukhtar's relationships with Ibn a l-Zu bair; with both
Ibn al-Hanafiyya and Ibn ‘ Abbas; and with 4 Al i ibn al-Husain.  ^ This
?2information, together with that given by Balodhuri helps us to a better 
understanding of these otherwise obscure proceedings. Another important 
point revealed in a I-Muruj is the reason for the support given by southern
Arabs to Marwan in the battle of Marj Rahit, and also the treason of ‘ Umair
-  3ibn al-Hubab in the battle of Khazir. This information throws much light
on tribal conflicts during the reign of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  Ibn Marwan.
In Mas‘ udi's Tanbih, which is a "resum6 of his previous works",
we find fresh and important information: the date of the battle of Khazir,
Ibn al-Ash‘ ath '$ adoption of the titles of al-G ahtani and Nasir a l-M u ’minin,
the list of the "Kuttab", "Hajibs", and Oadis at the end of the account of
4 -  -  -each caliph. It is interesting that al-M as‘ udi makes it clear in his Tanbih
that he had seen some Umayyad sources, which he criticised as being biased
-  -  -  5and anti-Hashimite (Talbids and ‘ Abbasids).
1 0 . Kitab al-Aghani by Abu'l-Faraj al-l$bahani, ‘ A li ibn al-Husain
(d. 3 5 6 /9 66 -7 ), Arab historian, litterateur and poet.^ Although this work
1* M uruj, V , pp. 170-3, 176-9 , 184-190.
2. See Chapter I I,  p. / ( f  of this thesis.
3. M uruj, V , pp .200-1 , 223.
4 . Tahbih, pp .313, 314.
5. Ibid. , pp .335, 336.
6 . E. \?t (Abu11 -Fanaj al -Is bahani
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primarily deals with the one hundred songs chosen by order of the caliph
Harun al-Rashid, it gives abundant material on po litical, administrative
and social life in the period concerned. Next to Baiadhuri's Ansab,
Kitab al-Aghani is the most important source for the tribal feuds of 4 Abd
al-M alik 's  reign,  ^ which he reports on the authority of a l-M ad a 'in i, ‘ Umar
ibn Shabba and Abu ‘ Ubaida. 4 Abd a l-M alik 's  court life and his attitude
-  -  2
towards songs and wine are reported in the Kitab a l-A ghani. He gives
information on political events, such as the war between 4 Abd a l-M a lik  and
3Mus4ab ibn a l-Zubair; and also useful facts on 4 Abd a l-M alik 's  governors
-  -  4in a l-H ija z  and Khurasan. Abu'l-Faraj very often states his authorities,
T . 5but as he is a Shi4 ite , some of his accounts should be considered with care,
as, for instance, that on 4 Abd a l-M alik 's  attitude towards singing.
7
1 1 . The Christian (Syriac) sources. These are a ll, with the exception 
of only two, late sources which repeat the accounts of the early Arab 
historians. Where they do more than repeat, in providing original information^
1. Agh,., V I I ,  p p .176-7; X I, pp .57-63; X V II,  pp .111-6 .
2. See N . 4A kel, Studies in the Social History of the Umayyad Period9
(Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London, 1960), pp. 306-316.
3. Agh. , X V II,  pp. 161-4.
4 . Ib id ., I l l ,  pp.100, 102, 107, 110, 113, 1 2 3 ;v o l.X , p .61; 
v o l.X II I ,  p .56.
5. 4A keI, op. c it . , pp. 15-16; E. l / ,  (Abu'l-Faraj al-lsbahani).
6 . A g h ., II, p p .86 -8 . On the authenticity of this account, see 
Chapter I, p.t>Z. of this thesis.
7 . Dinoysius, Chronique de Denys de Tell M ahre, translated by J. B.
Chabot, Paris, 1895; Sa47d ibn BatrTq, al-Tarikh al-M ajm u4 ~
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their work is unreliable as far as the major political events of the time 
are concerned, since it is the product of *’a minority community isolated 
from the courts of kings and princes"^ by its political inferiority. N ever­
theless, there are areas in which the Christian sources can prove useful, 
in matters concerning the administration of Christians in the Muslim world, 
especially their taxation (Jizya and Kharaj); as by-product of this, they 
give information on the general administrative practices of the caliphate.
They are also useful sources for Arab-Byzantine relations. More specially  
for our period, they are useful in providing a non-hostile view of the 
Umayyads, to act as corrective to the more biased ( Abbasid sources.
12. Literary Works: the most important of these are the Diwans of poets
such as Ibn Qais al-Ruqayyat, A'sha Hamdan, Suraqa al-Bariqi, a l-A khta l,
Jarir and al-Farazdaq. Next to these Diwans come Naqa, id Jarir w a‘1- 
Farazdaq and Naqa’ id Jarir w a 'I-A kh ta l. These poetical works which are 
contemporary with the events, are important in that they contain verses 
relating to many political events, such as the e A.sabiyya, the c iv il war between 
*Abd a l-M a lik  and Ibn a l-Zu bair, the campaign against the Byzantines, the
ss 4 A la 'I-Tabqiq , Beirut, 1909; Ibn al-Muqaffa* , Tarikh al-Batariqa
al-M igriyyq, Cairo, 1943; Ib n a M lb r i ,  Tarikh Mukhtasar a l-D uw al,
Beirut, 1890; idem, The Chronography of Gregory Abu*l Faraj, ed. and 
trans. by E .A , Wallis Bridge, Oxford, 1932; Chronique de M ichel le 
Syrian, ed. J.B . Chabot, Brussels, 1963; Theophanes, Chronographya, 
M igne, 1857.
t .  J .B . Segal, Syriac Chronicles, p .251, in Historians of the Middle East,
ed. B. Lewis and M . P. Holt, Oxford, 1964; Noldeke, Zur Geschichte 
der Araber im 1 . Jahrh .d ,H . aus Syrischen O uellen , pp .76 -98 , ZD M G ,
29, 1876; idem, Zur Geschichte der Cmaijden, pp .683-91, ZD M G 7"53", 1901.
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Kharijite opposition and the revolt of ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn a I -Ash* ath.
They can be used to confirm the accounts of the historical sources.
]
13. Religious Literature (Heresiography): most of these books are late 
and deal mainly with the sects, their origins and development. As most of 
them are written by Sunni authors, concerned with the theological aspect 
of the sects, with examining their heresies and errors: thus they are biased 
sources. Even those written by Kharijite or Shi‘ i authors are prejudiced 
against any sect other than their own.
However, they do contain sporadic historical information on the 
Kharijite wars, the origin of various sects such as al-Khashabiyya and al -  
Kaisaniyya, and their connection with the revolt of al-M ukhtar; they also 
tell us of the nature of the latterls support in Kufa. But even so, these 
heresiographies are often confusing to use, since being late sources, they 
sometimes muddle the names of persons and places.
14. Coins and Inscriptions: the coins are important in providing con­
firmation for the written sources, as well as new information for the period
1. Nawbakhti, Firaq a l-S h i‘ a, Istanbul, 1931, N a ja f, 1959; a l-A h ( ari, 
Maqalat al-IslamiyyYn, Istanbul, 1930; a 1-M a lo t ial-Tanbth w a‘T-Rqd 
‘ A la  Ah I a l-A h w a?w a'l-B ida<, Istanbul, 1936; al-Baghdadf, al-Farq 
baina1!-F iraq, Cairo, 1910; Ibn Hazm, al-Fi^al F iM -M ila ! w a 'I-N ih a l, 
Cairo, 1317-20; al»$hahrastani, a l-M ila l w a 'I-N ih a l; Leipzig, 1923, 
Cairo, 1951; Bar rad?, a I -Jaw ah ir al-M untaqat, Cairo, 1884; Shammakhi, 
Kitab al-S iyar, Cairo, 1884.
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in question; for example, that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  called himself Khaflfatu'llah
(the caliph of God)^ on the coins he minted» This information cannot be
found in the written sources. The fact that the Kharijite ‘ AHyya ibn
al-Aswad struck coins in Kirman, is confirmed by the coins that survived
2
from that year 72 /691.
The inscriptions on buildings provide important information on the 
date of construction, or restoration and the name of the caliph responsible^ 
it is from the inscription on the Dome of the Rock that we know that ‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik  was its original builder, since the date of the inscription survived 
to prove false the attempt to credit it to the ‘ Abbasid caliph a i-M a ?mun.
1. Curiel, Arabo-Sassanids Money, V I I I ,  p .328, f'CRN, 6 e series, 1966.
2 . M iles, Some New Light on the History of Kirman, p. 90, W O I, 1959.
CHAPTER I 
THE LEGACY OF THE EARLY YEARS
There is much information in the sources, particularly in the late 
ones, on the early life of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan; but since much of 
this information is repeated from legends and myths, it is difficult to form 
a very satisfactory idea of his personality or of how his early life influenced 
his later policy on becoming caliph. Yet only by adopting a critical and 
analytical approcah to the sources, is it possible to clarify fact from 
fiction.
According to one account^ he was born in the year 23/643;
2
according to another, it was 26/646. As for the month, it is agreed on 
as being Ramadan, though no exact day is given. His birth-place is
F c
mentioned by Khalifa ibn Khayyat as the house (Dar) of his father Marwan 
T  3in M edina. It is said that he was prematurely born, which led some of his 
critics to give this assertion evil connotations, implying the weakness of
1 . Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .293; Ansab, X I,  p. 264; Tab ., II,
p. 1173 (citing MadqMnt); Ghurar, fols. 81 -82; ‘ Iqd, IV ,
pp .399, 421; ‘ Asakir, X , fol. 254a; TahdhTb, IV , p .423 (quoting 
KhalTfa). However, another account in t a b . , I, p. 2671, gives the 
year 2 2 .
2. Sa‘ d, V ,  p. 166; Tab ., I I ,  p. 1173 (citing Waqidi); Kamil, IV , p .411
‘ Asdkir, X , fol. 254a; TahdhTb, V I,  p .423 (quoting Ibn Sa‘ d);
SuyutT, p. 143.
3. TarTkh, I, p .293.
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his claim , vis-a-vis his rival, for the Caliphate.  ^ His father was the
caliph Marwan ibn al-Hakam ibn A b i'l- ‘ As ibn Umayya ibn ‘ Abd
2  -
Shams ibn ‘ Abd Manaf ibn Qusayy. His mother was ‘ A9 isha bint
M u ‘ dwiya ibn al-MughTra ibn A b i'l- ‘ As ibn Umayya ibn ‘ Abd Shams 
3
ibn ‘ Abd Manaf. His “Kunya" was AbuM-Walid, his favourite son 
and successor.^ Since the ‘ Abbasids were the first to adopt regnal 
titles, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  like the rest of the Umayyad caliphs had no t it le ,  
"Leqab". Some late historians have ascribed the practice to the Umayyad
5caliphs and even aduced specific titles to them. However, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  
was called, as a nickname, "the one who squeezes water from a stone"
1 . Bayan, I, p .!7 7 ;A b s a b , X I,  p. 152; Ghurar, fo l. 82; ‘ Iqd, IV ,pp .31-32; 
§ i n a ‘ a t a i n ,  pp. 15-16; Khulafa*, I I ,  folT 97b; ‘ Asakir, X , fol. 163a; 
Kamil, IV , p. 158; TahdhTb,~ I , p .423; SuyutT, p. 144.
2. Sa*d, V ,  p .165; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tabaqat, p .240; Ansab, X I,  
p. 151; Tab ., II, p.TT73; ‘ Iqd, IV , p .398; BatrTq, V I I ,  p .3 9 ; ‘ Asakir,
X , Fol."252b; K am il, lV7p7314; Biddya, IX" p. 16; Inafa, I, p. 126; 
Dhahab, p. 27; Tahdhib, V I ,  p .422, Suyutt, p. 134.
3. Sa‘ d, V , p. 165; ZubairT, p .399; Khalifa ibn Khayyat , Tabaqat, p .240;
Bakkar, p .421; Ansdb, X I,  p. 151; Y a ‘ qubT, IT7 p. 320; Tab., II, p. 1173 
‘ Iqd, IV , p .399; BatrTq, V I I ,  p .39; Tanbih, p .312; Khulafa*, II, fol. 
9 7 b .; Jamharat, p .80; Kam il, IV , p .413; Bidaya, IX , p .62; Indfa,
I ,  p .  1 2 6 ;  TahdhTb, V I ,  p . 4 2 3 .
4 . Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tabaqat, p .240; M a ’drif, p. 155; Tab., II, 
p. 1173; ‘ iq d ~ V , p.398rfanbTh, p .312; K h u M a ’ , l l / f o l .  97a;
‘ Asakir, X , fo l. 252b; KamTI, IV , p .413; Biddya, IX , p .61; Tahdhib, 
V I,  p .422.
5. Tanbih, pp .335-7; MafatTh, p. 105; Subh/ V ,  p .4 7 7 ff .; indfa, I, p .2 2 ;
Some modern writers have been misled by this point and ascribed to 
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  the title  of al-Muwaffaq bi Amir'lah. See Abu'l-N asr, 
‘ Abd a I-/Vial ik ibn Marwan, p. 252, Beirut, 1962.
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(Rashh a l -  Hajar), on the grounds of his alleged miserliness.  ^ There
is reason for thinking that such an allegation was unfounded since there
was a tendency among Muslim historians to call 'miser1, any caliph
who, through efficiency, kept a tight rein on expenditure. His son
the Caliph Hisham and the ‘ Abbasid Caliph a I-Mansur were also called
mean where objective sources would describe them as efficient financiers.
The generous way in which ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  rewarded victorious generals
returning from campaigns, and patronized poets and religious men, shows
that he did not have that aversion to parting with money which is the
2
sign of a mean man. And could it be that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  opponents
called him 'miser' to counter his own accusation of Ibn a l-Zubair: "he
3has every qualification for a caliph were it not for his miserliness"?
When he was only ten years old he witnessed the storming of the 
house of the Caliph ‘ Uthman ibn ‘ Affan in Medina, in which the caliph
1. M a ‘ a rif, p. 155; Ansab, X I, p .152 (citing W aqidi); Y a ‘ qubi, II,
p .335; Mushakalat a l-N as li Zamanihim, p. lb ; M uruj, V , p .210; 
Bad*, V I ,  p .26; A a h ., X V , p. 156; Khulafa*, II, fo l. 97b; Kamil, 
IV , p .415; Sharif, I, p .53, Nihaya, III, p .315; Mukhtasar, I, p .20; 
Suyuti, p. 15?. "
2. Sa‘ d, IV , p .40 , V , p .171 (citing Waqidi); pp. 171 -2 ; Mafcasin,
pp. 9-10; Ansab, X I, pp. 167-8 (citing ‘ Awana); ‘ Iqd, I , pp. 294-5; 
pp.360-1 ; M uruj, p. 253, pp .380-1; Agh . ,  V I I I ,  pp. 29-30 (citing 
al-Zubair ibn Bakkar); ‘ Asakir, V I I ,  p .375.
3. Ansab, X I,  p. 18 (citing Mada’ ini); Y a?qubi, li, p .327; Tab., II, 
pTTT76.
was killed .  ^ No wonder that this event had a lasting effect on him, as
clearly shown in the distrust expressed in his address to the people of
2Medina after he became caliph. This early mistrust was further
aggravated by the attitude of the people of Medina towards the Umayyads
in general. In the year 63 /682 , the Medinese expelled the Umayyads
3
from their city and revolted against the Caliph Yazid I . 1 Abd a l-M a lik  
lived through this event and was one of those expelled. The Medinese 
hostile attitude reached its culmination in the support they gave to Ibn
4al-Zubair against ( Abd a l-M a lik  himself. Wellhausen rightly pointed 
out that 1 Abd a l-M a lik  seems to have borne this history of anti-Umayyad 
feeling in Medina in mind in his choice of governors for the city.
When the Caliph ( Uthman appointed his father fKatlb* in Medina,
1. Sa‘ d , V ,  p. 166; Bayan, II, p. 171 (citing M ada'in i); Ansab, X I,
p. 190 (citing Mada Trn); T ab ., II, p. 1173 (citing Waqidt); Bidaya,
IX , p .62.
2. Sa‘ d , V , p. 172 (citing Waqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh , I, 
p .270; Ansab, X I ,  pp. 177-8, Ya*qubi, II, pp .3 2 6 -7 ; Muruj, V ,  
pp .281-2; Agh. , IV , p .53 (citing al-Zubair,ibn Bakkar); Kamil, 
IV , p .317; Bidaya, IX , p .64.
3» Sa*d, V , p. 166 (citing W aidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat , Tarikh, I,
p .228; Irnama,!, pp. 172-3; Ansdb, V , pp. 126-7 (citing Mada’ inT) 
T ab ., II, pp .405-6 (citing Abo Mikhnaf); A gh ., I, pp. 13-4 (citing 
M ada’ im ); Kamil, IV , p p .95-6; pp. 119-20; Bidaya, IX , p .63.
4 . The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .215, Calcutta, 1927, and
Beirut, 1963.
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‘ Abd a l-M a lik  acted as his secretary in the Diwan of a l-M edina.  ^ As
governor of al-Bahrain for the Caliph ‘ Uthman, Marwan appointed his son,
2‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to the governorship of Hajar.
Under M u ‘ awiya, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  continued to hold offices. When
Zaid ibn Thabit died, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  succeeded him as 'K atib1 of the
_  -  3
Diwan of af-M edina. In the year 42 /662 , he was at the head of the troops
of Medina in the caliph's naval campaign against the Byzantines, in
4which he distinguished himself.
During the caliphate of Yazid I, he became more involved in the 
politics of the time! in the year 61 /680 the Caliph Yazid I tried to reconcile 
Ibn al-Zubair and the people of a l-H ija z  by sending a mission headed by 
Ibn ‘ Idah al-Ash‘ ari. in Medina on their way to M ecca, they met Marwan,
1. Tab ., II, p .837; ( lqd, IV , p. 164; K h jla fa*, II, fo l. 10a.
•  i i' i ■" < i ■ i
M a*arif, p. 155; Ansab, X I,  p. 152 (citing Waq rdi); Bad’ , V I,
p .  2 6 .
3 . M a ?a rif, p. 155; Ansab, X I,  p. 152 (citing W aqidi); Bad* , V I ,  
p725I
4. Sa‘ d , V , p. 166; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 196 (who gives 
the year 50); Ibn ‘""Abd al-Hakam , Futulj Ifrtqiya wa'I-Andalus,
pp .56-58; A gh., X I I ,  p .95 (citing ‘ Umar b. Shabba); M u‘ jam, III ,
pp. 107-8; Ibn al-Abbar, a l-ljuH at a l-$ayara?, p. 383; Bidaya, IX, 
p .63 (quoting Khalifa). The date given by Ibn ‘ Abd al-ljakam  and 
Ibn al-Abbar is 34. This seems unconvincing since at this time he 
would be only eleven years old.
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who sent his two sons ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  and ‘ Abd a l - ‘ Aziz with them.
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  and his brother on their father's instructions recited
certain verses in front of Ibn al-Zubair encouraging him to be more
firm and not to yield to the demands of Y azid .  ^ Marwan was at this
time supporting Ibn al-Zubair against Y azid , not through any genuine
friendship, but as an expression of his discontent at M u ‘ awiya's intro-
2
duction of the hereditary principle, so resented by the ‘ Arabs. When 
Yazid's negotiations with Ibn al-Zubair and the people of a l-H ija z
failed,the Umayyads were expelled from Medina by the rebels; ‘ Abd a l -
3M a lik  had to leave the town with his father. On their way, they met 
the Syrian army which Yazid had sent against Ibn a l-Zu bair, under the 
command of Muslim ibn ‘ Uqba a l-M urri. Marwan and his son ‘ Abd a l-  
M alik  joined the Syrian army and came back to M edina. When Muslim 
ibn ‘ Uqba asked for information concerning the position of the town and 
its defences, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  gave him the exact details required, for which
4he received the admiration and the respect of the leader. This was followed
1. Tab., I I ,  pp .397-8 (citing a l-Zuhri); Khulafa*, II, fol. 8 8 a;
Biddya, V I I I ,  p .212; E. I , (al-Harra). W. Muir says that ‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik  accompanied his father Marwan in the negotiations with 
Ibn a l-Zubair in this mission in Mecca; see The Caliphate, p .355 
Beirut, 1963. However, it should be remarked here that there is no 
evidence that Marwan had taken direct part in these negotiations.
2. ‘ Uyun, I, p. 277.
3. Sa‘ d, V ,  pp. 166-7 (citing Waqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh,
I, p .228; Ansab, V , pp. 126-7 (citinglviaddMnT); Jab ., I I ,  pp.405-6  
(citing Abu M ikhnaf).
4 . Sa‘ d, V , pp. 166-7 (citing WaqidT); Tab., II,p p .410-12 (citing Abu 
Mikhnaf); Khulafa’ , I I ,  fo l. 89a; Kamil, IV , p p .9 5 - 6 ; FakhrT, p .112 .
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by the battle of a l-H arra , Dhul-Hajja 6 3 /August 683, which ended in a 
complete defeat for the Medinese.
During the short Caliphate of his father MPrwan, (64-65/683-684), 
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  held two offices, at least nominally. A l-M ada’ ini says 
that he received the governorship of Palestine, but he remained in Damascus, 
and sent Rawh ibn Zinba^al-Judhami as his deputy there.  ^ In the year 
65 /684 , when his father Mrawan left Damascus and went to wrest Egypt 
from the control of Ibn a l-Zubair, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  was his deputy in the 
capital. All these references to his early office-holding suggest that the 
choice of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to succeed to the caliphate from among his brothers 
was because of his political ability and his knowledge of state-craft and 
provincial administration. His gradual advance in holding important posts 
at quite an early age, by caliphs other than his father, shows this political 
fla ir, and his later successes also bear witness to his abilities. During the 
reigns of M u ‘ awiya and his son Y azid , stories about ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  lik e li­
hood of succession to the throne have been told to us* Most of these stories 
are either Umayyad propaganda or in the form of myths, found mainly in 
the late sources; in both cases, their authenticity is suspect. To mention 
but some, there is a story which makes al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra predict 
‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  future as caliph because of his piety and family connections.
1. Ansa b, V , pp. 149-50.
2. jb id .,  V , pp. 148-49.
3. K halifa  ibn Khayyat, Tarikhr I, p p .257-8 (citing Ibn ‘ Ayyash).
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The Cali ph ‘ Uthman according to another account, is supposed to have
put his head cloak (burnu§) over the boy's head, saying that he could see
A b u 'I-‘ As reborn in ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .^  Finally, the Caliph Yazid is
2
recorded as having prophesied that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  would be caliph.
In the same way, we also find in the sources statements and sayings 
telling of ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  ability  and strong personality. In his list of
men claimed by the Umayyads as rare in their '^Ra^y11 and "Tadbir"
_ 3  „
(management), a l-Jah iz included ‘ Abd a l-M alik . A I-M ada*ini says
that though M u ‘ awiya was the more flexible as a politician (ahlam), yet
4
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  was the more resolute (ahzam). ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  is also
considered among the three statesmen of the Umayyad dynasty, together
-  . -  5with M u‘ awiya and Hisham. However, the proof of ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's
abilities is not to be found in these stories, but by examining his achieve­
ments in the political and administrative fields.
To turn now to ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  accession to the throne, one should 
go back to the circumstances of his father's succession, since these are crucial to 
an understanding both of ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  accession and of such later 
developments as the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq.^ Following the
1. Ansab, V ,  p. 140, (citing ‘ Awarw).
2. Ib id ., X I ,  pp. 161-2 (citing M ada’ in i); Futufc, p .35 (citing Mada’ inT);
M uruj, V , pp. 155-6.
3. Rasa*il, p .93 (ed. Sandubi).
4 . ‘ Iqd, IV , p .401,
5. M uruj, V ,  p .497 (citing Mada‘ inT and al-Haytham ),
6 . See Chapter IV , p. 2.2.
death of Caliph Yazid I, and according to the agreement reached at a l -  
Jabiya between the leaders of the Umayyad family and their supporters,
Marwan was proclaimed caliph on the condition that his successors would
T -  1be Khalid ibn Yazid ib n M u ‘ awiya and ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq, After
the battle of Marj Rahit (64/683) between Marwan and the supporters of
Ibn a l-Zu bair, which ended with a complete defeat for the latter, Marwan
realised that he had gained his title  by right of conquest. Consequently,
he planned to exclude Khalid and ‘ Amr from the succession, Khalid was
as yet too young to be caliph, and Marwan further obstructed his chances
2
of succession by making a politic marriage with Khalid *s mother. In the 
same year he died, at the age of 63, having meanwhile nominated his son 
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to succeed him, with his second son ‘ Abd a l - ‘ Aziz next in 
line of succession; this was in answer to the claims of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id that
3he would be the next caliph, because of the agreement of a l-Jabiya. The
new succession was declared in the year 65 /684 , and was made effective by
-  4the help of the Kalbite leader Wassan ibn M alik  ibn Bahdal and people paid
1 . Imama, II,  pp. 12-3; Y a ‘ qubi, II, pp .304-5; T ab ., II, p .476 (citing 
‘ Awana).
2. Tab.,ll,p.577 (citing WaqidT), pp .577-8; Chejne, Succession to the 
Rule in Islam, p .35, Lahore, 1960.
3. ha Iff a ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I ,  p. 257, Imama, 11, p. 13; Ansab, V ,
pp. 149-50 (citing MadaM ni); X I,  pp. 164-5 (citing Mada* inf); Y a ‘ qubT, 
II, p .306; T a b ., II, p .576 (citing ‘ Awana); M uruj, V , pp .205-6; 
Kamil, IV ,*pp. 156-7; Bidaya, V I I I ,  pp.255,"2507TX, p .62;
Suyuft, p .143; Chejne, op. c it. , pp .31 -2 .
4 . Tab ., I I ,  p .576 (citing ‘ Awana).
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homage to the nominees as such. It seems that Marwan had seen in this 
agreement the safest way to keep the caliphate in his line and to put 
an end to the rivalry of the many claimants to the throne among the
Umayyads themselves. He had learned his lesson from what followed the
2 ? death of M u*aw iya II* On the other hand, < Amr ibn Sa* id found in it
3
a breach of oath and -  as we shall see -  rebelled against ( Abd a l-M a lik .
As for the date of 6 Abd a l-M alik 's  succession, it is almost unanimously
4given as Ramadan 6 5 /April 685. His death has also been unanimously
5agreed on as occurring in Shawwal 86/O ctober 705, so that he reigned for 
twenty one years.
1. Ansab, V , p p .149-50 (citing Mada*ini); Ya'qubT, I I ,  p .306; Tab., II, 
p .57 6 .(citing i Awana); Kamil, IV , p .156.
2. Dun, Mugadima ff Tartkh $adr al-Islam , p .67, Beirut, 1961.
3. See Chapter IV , p ,2 2 £t£j:.
4 . Sa‘ d , V , p .30; Khalifa ibn Khayyat,TarTkh,|7p ,257j kh& arlf, p .155; Ansab,
V , p .159 (citing"al-HaythamTFVa *quibt, 11, p .321; Tab., II, p .577; 
Ghurar, fo l. 79; * Iqd, IV , p .399; BatrTq, V I I ,  p .39; M uruj, V , p .209; 
KtndT, I, pp .4 8 -9 ; Bad*, V I ,  p .26; Khulafa*, II ,  fo l. 97a; Kamil, IV,
p. 158; * Asakir, X , fo l! 257; e IbrT, p. 193; FakhrT, p. 110; Mukhta$ar, I,
p .205; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .260; Indfa, I, p. 127; PFTahab, p .27;
Shadharflt, 'f, p., 73. However, DtnawarT mentions the year 6 6 , (Akhbar, 
p .294)"; BaiadhurT gives RabT'l (Ansab, X I, p. 151); Mas* udt gives Rajab 
(Tanbth, p.3T2).
5. Sa*d, V , pp. 174-5 (citing Waqidt); Khalifa ibn Khayyaf, Tarikh, I,
p. 293; Ibn * Abd al-Hakam , op. c it. ,  p .8 6 ; M a*grif, p. 156; Ansab,
X I,  pp. 152-264; DtnawarT, p .328; Ya*qub7, I I ,  p .335; Tab ., II, p .1172, 
(citing Waqidt and Abu Ma*shar), 1173 (citing M ada’ int); Ghurar, 
fols. 79 -80 ; c Iqd, IV , p .420; Tanbth, p .316; M uruj, V ,  p .210; Kindt,
II, p .58; Bad*, V I ,  p .27; Khulafa*, fo l. 97b; * Asakir, X , fols. 257ar 
266a; Kamil, IV , p .411; *lbrT, p. 194; Mukhtasar, I, p .209; DhahabT, i l l ,  
p .236; Biddya, IX , pp .68 -9 ; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 1 2 8 / Inafa, 1, p. 128;
Tahdhtb, V I ,  p .423; SuyutT, p7l44; Shadharat, I,  p .97.
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It is generally accepted that * Abd a l-M a lik  during his early life
was very pious, indulged little  in pleasure, and showed a deep interest
in religious studies. In Medina where he was born and reared, there were
two intellectual climates. The first was that of Q ur’anic study, and
more especially, study of the HadTth. The second was the field of poetry,
songs and music. He chose the former and thus was educated in a religious
atmosphere. Although there is much evidence and information of * Abd a l -
M alik's early piety, leaving no doubt that he did display great interest
in religion, yet here again one should be aware of myths or propaganda.
An example of such is the account in Khalifa ibn Khayyat's TarTkh,  ^ on the
authority of al-M uhallab b. Abi Sufta, (first Zubairid and then Umayyad
sympathiser), which depicts * Abd a l-M a lik  as one of the Gurra’ (Readers
of the Q ur’an). Another is the account of Abu'l-Yaqdan reported by
Baladhuri, which says that * Abd a l-M a lik  took great painS to be sure
that the money on his privey purse, used for paying the dowries of his
2
wives, did not come from any corrupt practices or unjust extortion. More 
reliable seems the account of Ibn Sa*d, that * Abd a l-M a lik  used to sit 
with theologians and men of religion who taught him the tradition of the
3Prophet, though he paid little  attention to narrating what he learnt.
1 . I, p. 258.
2. Ansab, X I ,  p. 195.
3. Sa*d, V , p . 167.
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The author of al-lmarog wa'I Slyasa states that * Abd a l-M a lik  was known
to have been truthful, of good reputation, and knowledgeable and strict 
] « « 2
in his religion. Waqidi regards him as aMuhaddith (Traditionist), on
the authority of ‘ Uthman ibn ‘ Affan, Abu Huraira and Abu Sa‘ id a l-
Khudri. We are also told that prior to his caliphate he was so involved
in praying and reciting the Qur’ an in the Mosque of M edina, that he was
-  3
nicknamed “the pigeon of the mosque” (yamamat a l-M asjid ). It is also 
reported that, because of his piety and scrupulousness, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
4did not accompany his father in the battle of Marj Rahit 64 /683 . This
account is attested by the fact that we do not hear any account of him in
this battle, while the name of his brother ‘ Abd a ! - ‘ Aziz is occasionally 
5
reported. It is against this religious background that one might proceed 
to examine ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  policies after he became caliph.
As is the case with almost all the able and efficient caliphs, the 
hostile sources tend to under-emphasise ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  significant 
achievements and stress any minor events that they can use to discredit him,
1 . Imama, I I ,  p. 13.
2. Ansab, X I,  p. 152.
3. Ib id ., X I ,  p .1 6 3 ; ‘ Iqd, I I ,  p. 350; Khulafa’ , I I ,  fo l. 97a;
FakhrT. p. 110; NuwairT, IV , p. 115.
4 . Abu Tammam, Naqa’ i j  JarTr wa'I-Akht.al, p. 21; Ansab, X I,  p. 136
(citing al-Haythqm ibn ‘ AdT).
5. Tab ., II, p. 279 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
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He was accused of being a mean, treacherous and blood-thirsty person. 
Given the fact that his religious background and early piety was well 
established, no wonder therefore that the sources tried to depict him 
as having a complete change of face after becoming a caliph, turning 
his back on his early religious way of life . Modern scholars, such as 
Wellhausen for example, accept this interpretation; and Wellhausen says 
"certainly from that time onwards, he subordinated everything to p o f Ic y . . . ,, 
It is true that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  at times was forced to act according to the 
political situation in which he found himself, and this sometimes seems to 
conflict with his previous religious ideals, but this must not be overstressed.
I shall try here to examine how far ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  actions during his 
caliphate were coloured by his religious background and his continuing 
religious faith.
A crucial point to be discussed is the siege of Mecca and the 
storming of a l-K a ‘ ba, because these were used most to discredit him - 
especially since ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  himself had previously been so shocked 
when Mecca was besieged and the Ka‘ ba was stormed under an earlier 
caliph. ^
Op. c i t . , p .215.
2. Sa‘ d , V ,  p. 167; KhalTfa ibn Khayyat, Tartkh, I, p. 224; Ansab,
V , p .360 (citing W3qidi“) ; X I ,  p .43 (citing Waqidt); p. 164 (citing 
M ada’ inT); Kamil, IV , p .95; FakhrT, p. 1 10; Suyutt, p. 145.
There is no doubt that the storming of al-Ka* ba did take place 
and that 6 Abd a l-M a lik  did consent to it , but it seems this can still be 
reconciled to his religious beliefs. Firstly, there is evidence that he 
was extremely unwilling to send an army to the holy places of Mecca and 
Medina. It is reported^ that when a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi was 
dispatched by ( Abd a l-M a lik  at the head of a Syrian army against 
6 Abdallah ibn a l-Zu bair, he made a l-T a ’ if and not Mecca his residence,
t 2on the caliph's orders. Al-Baladhuri makes this point even clearer, 
stating that a l-H a jja j did not approach Medina nor the road leading to it.
He took the way of al-Rabadha on his way to al~Ta? if. Tabari says that 
a l-H a jja j went by the way of Iraq, deliberately avoiding Medina and the 
Medina road. This last piece of information is also repeated by Ibn a l-
Athir. 4
It is also interesting to mention here what instructions e Abd a l-M a lik
gave a l-H a jja j on sending him to a l-H ija z  to fight e Abdallah ibn al-Zubair.
? 5According to Baiadhuri and Ibn A‘ tham, al-Haytham ibn al-Aswad
1* imamq, II, p. 24; Dinawari, p .319; Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 52b; < Iqd, IX , 
p .4 14 ;M u ru j, V , p. 254.
2. Ansab , V , p .357 (citing Waqidi); X I,  p .38 (citing Waqidi).
3. Jab, II, p .829 (citing Waqidi).
4. Kamil, IV , p .284.
5. Ansab, V ,  pp .357-8 (citing *A w a n a );X I, pp .39-40 (citing ( Aw ana)
KofT, I I ,  fols. 52b-53a.
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ql-Nakhc^i previously came to 4 Abd a l-M a lik  and said, "O  commander
of the faithful, order this Thaqifite youth (Ghulam) to respect the Ka4ba,
not to desecrate its sanctity, nor to touch a single stone of its sacred walls,
nor to disturb even the birds that roost there; order him only to block the
mountain passes (Shi4ab) and the tunnels (Anfaq) to M ecca, to isolate Ibn
al-Zubair until either he dies of hunger or leaves Mecca dethroned".
4 Abd a l-M a lik  acted on this advice on his orders to a l-H a jja j, instructing
him to avoid the shrine (al-Haram) and to reside in a l-T a ‘if. These
instructions show the respect the caliph had for the holy shrine.
This avoidance of the holy places by 4 Abd a I -M a lik ’s armies has
been interpreted as a tactical move, but this view is not borne out by the
facts. For 4 Abd a l-M a lik  had already sent Tariq ibn 4 Amr and ordered
him to station somewhere between Ay la and W ad i'l-Q u ra , with the
instructions to check the activities of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir’s governors, to protect
the land lying between his camp and Syria, and fin a lly , to cope with any
1situation that might develop. Would it not be more advantageous, from 
the m ilitary point of view,for a l-H a jja j to join Tariq ibn 4 Amr, to re-inforce 
his army and use Medina as a base from which he could advance against 
Ibn-al-Zubair?  This is almost exactly what happened later, when Tariq 
ibn 4Amr was given the orders to enter M edina, to drive out the governor of
1. Ansab, V ,  p .356; X I,  p .36; 4 Asakir, V i i ,  p .40 (citing Khalifa ibn 
Khayyat & lbnSa4d); Kamil, IV , p .284; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  pp .87^5.
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Ibn al-Zubair and to advance from there towards Mecca to join A l-H jja j.^
The question this provokes is, why 4 Abd a l-M a lik  gave such orders 
a year later when he was not prepared to do so earlier, when it was equally 
strategic for him to advance from /v\edina on Mecca? Could the answer be 
that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  by this time was aware that 4 Abdallah ibn al-Zubair 
was exploiting the sanctity of the holy cities for political ends, banking on 
the fact that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  could not attack them without provoking Muslim 
reaction? And also 4 Abd a l-M a lik  realized that 4 Abdallah ibn al-Zubair's  
occupation of the holy shrine was threatening to divide the unity of Islam, 
since 4 Abd a l-M alik 's  supporters were prevented from performing pilgrimage, 
and even more fundamentally, since it is impossible to have two caliphs in 
Islam. In this light we can say that whereas religious motivations 
originally prevented 4 Abd a l-M a lik  from attacking Medina or Mecca, 
eventually they very well have led him on to such an attack.
Turning now to the actual event of the storming of a l-K a 4ba, religious 
motives can even here be traced in 4 Abd a l-M alik 's  action. Having recon­
ciled himself to the political and religious necessity of besieging 
4Abdallah ibn al-Zubair's stronghold, it appears that, in giving his orders, 
to a l-H a jja j to storm the Ka4ba, he took into consideration that part of 
the building which was not in existance during the Prophet's lifetime, and
1. Sa4d, V , p. 169 (citing Waqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .265; 
Ansab, V , p .357;(citing WaqidT);"5n, p .42 (citing Waqidi); Gudat, I, 
p. i 24; Tab ., II, p .830 (citing Wagidt); Kam il, IV , pp .284-5.
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therefore not traditionally sacred, having been built by his rival Ibn a l-
Zubair. Evidence supporting the view that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  respected the
original building appears in the account of the fourth century geographer 
? 1Muqaddisi, a native of Jerusalem. He reports that "When al-H aj j aj 
came to M ecca, ibn al-Zubair took refuge in the shrine (Haram). Con­
sequently, al-Hajjaj ordered a catapult to be set up on the mount of Abu 
Gubais, which was to storm only that additional part of the shrine which 
Ibn a l-Zubair had built. The men in charge of the catapult followed this
instruction and stormed that part of the building known as al-H atim ".
-  -  2This same information we find in the book of another geographer, Yaqut, 
who seems to have received it from Muqaddisi's book; but this, however, 
does not reduce the importance of this report, even if it does not confirm 
it.
it is very significant that immediately after 4 Abdallah ibn al-Zubair
was k illed , 4 Abd a l-M a lik  ordered a l-H a jja j to tear down all the innovations
to a l-K a 4ba built by Ibn a l-Zubair, and to restore the original form of the
3
building as it stood in the lifetime of the Prophet.
1 . Muqaddisi, pp .74 -5 .
2. M u 4 jam, IV , p. 284.
3. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh, I ,  p .268; Azraqi, I, p. 137; M a 4 arif,
p .156; FutuBT pp .26-7; Ansab, X I,  pp .67-8  (citing WaqicFTj; 
DTnawart, I, p*296, Y a 4qubl^ II, p*325; HamadanT, p .20; A 4 lQq, 
p .30; Tab., I I ,  p .854; KufT, II, fol* 55b;M uruj, V , pp. 192-4; 
M u 4jam, IV , p .284; Kamil, IV , p .296; M ir *a t , V I ,  fo l. 8 a; 
Mukhtasar, I ,  p. 208; Dhahabl, I I ,  p. 365; I I I ,  p. 115; Bid ay a , IX , 
pp. 2 -3 ; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  pp .88-9; Muqadima, pp. 623-5 .
The poet Jarir wrote of this:- “You restored the house of God
as it was at the time of the Prophet, you corrected what the sons of a i -
Zubair had corrupted."
Another example of 4 Abd a l-M alik 's  care for religion is his action
in building the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat al-Sakhra). There is no doubt
that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan was its builder, and the attempt to credit
it to the 4 Abbasid caliph a l-M a Jmun could not disguise this, since the
date of erection escaped the alteration; it stands a firm witness to 4 Abd
a l-M a lik  as its original builder.
According to a statement in Y a 4qubi's Taukh. repeated by Sa4 id
-  2ibn Batriq, ibn al-Jaw zi and Ibn Kathir, the reason for the erection of 
the Dome of the Rock was 4 Abd a l-M alik 's  attempt to keep the Syrians at 
home in order not to be won by his political rival 4 Abdallah ibn al-Zubair 
in M ecca. The latter tried to u tilize the obligation of pilgrimage to 
defame and slander 4 Abd al M a lik  and the Umayyads. When the people 
complained at being prevented from performing their religious duty, 4 Abd 
a l-M a lik  invoked the tradition which permits the pilgrimage to the Aq§a
. 3Mosque, on the authority of a i-Zu hri. Goldziher accepted this state­
ment, and maintained that all the traditions, whether in favour or not, of
1. N aga'ld , I, p .486.
2. Y a 4qubi, II, p .311; Batriq, V I I ,  p .39; M irya t, V I ,  fol. lb ;
Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .280.
3. Mu hammed anisch Studien, I I ,  pp. 3 5 -7 , H a lle , 1890.
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the religious importance of Jerusalem were no more than weapons in the
war between 4 Abd a l-M a lik  and his rival Ibn a l-Zubair. Wellhausen
refers to the erection of the Dome of the Rock and says that 4 Abd a l-
M a lik  was trying to put Jerusalem In the place of M ecca, a plan he
1abandoned as soon as he overcame his rival. H itti follows the same line
and accepts the view that the aim was to divert the pilgrimage from
2Mecca to Jerusalem. The critical study of Goitein has shown that
Ya*qubi*s report is not trustworthy, because of his Shi4 ite leanings; and
that the assertion that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  tried to divert the pilgrimage from
3Mecca to Jerusalem is not supported by third century Muslim historians.
Furthermore, as proved by J .W . Hirschberg, the traditions concerning
Jerusalem did not originate in 4 Abd a U M a lik ’s time, but went back to
an earlier date, since beliefs and legends of the sanctity of Jerusalem were
4
current among the inhabitants of Palestine and Syria. A l-Z u h ri, on 
whose authority 4 Abd a l-M a lik  is alleged to have invoked the tradition 
permitting pilgrimage to Jerusalem, appears to have been at this time
1 . op. c it . , p. 214.
2. History of the Arabs, p .220, New York, 1964.
3. The Historical Background of the Erection of the Dome of the Rock, p. 104,
JAOS, 70, 1950, idem. Studies in Islamic History and Institutions,
pp. 136-7 , Leiden, 1966.
4 . The Sources of Muslim Traditions Concerning Jerusalem, p .317, RO,
X V II,  1953. ”
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very young and unknown to the caliph or to the inhabitants of Syria 
generally,^
Since Syria was an ex-Byzantine province, there is no doubt 
that the Muslims there had seen the imperial Byzantine monuments, for 
example, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and possibly they were 
very highly impressed by them. Therefore, the erection of the Dome of 
the Rock can be interpreted as showing 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's  consideration for
the feelings of his Syrian subjects and their wish to emulate, to the glory
■" 2  of Islam, the religious monuments they saw around them. That the Dome
of the Rock was inspired by religious motives appears to be confirmed by
the fact that it continued to be one of the most exalted holy places in
Islam after Mecca and Medina, even after 4 Abd a l-M a lik  had overcome
his political rival 4 Abdallah ibn al—Zubair. In the light of this, it would
seem unlikely that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  would ever have thought of substituting
Jerusalem for Mecca; since each of them has its special importance in
the eyes of Muslims.
Another example of 4 Abd a l-M a lik  trying to extend the glory of
Islam through building in Syria is his attempt to add the Church of St. John
1. D m , a l-Zuhr!, pp. 10-11, BSOAS,X IX , 1957; Nasb’at 4llm al-Tarfkb 
4 Inda1! - 4 Arab, p. 99.
2. Muqaddisi, p. 159; G oitein , op. c i t . , p. 108; Lambert, Les Crigines 
de la Mosqu6e et L*Architecture Religieus des Omeiyades, p .61, SI, 
V I,  1956; M .S . Briggs, Architecture, p .160, in The Legacy of IsTsm, 
ed. by Th. Arnold & Guillaume, London, 1960; H .A .R . G ibb, 
Studies on the C ivilization of Islam, p .51, London, 1962.
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1in Damsacus to the mosque beside it. He failed to achieve this, but 
the attempt alone gave him the support of the pious men and increased 
his popularity.
We can also trace religious influence in some aspects of 4 Abd
al-M alik 's  foreign policy: as soon as he was secure enough at home to
turn his attention to an aggressive foreign policy, he continued the
previous struggle with the Byzantines, by waging the Jihad against the
2
infidels almost every year. This served the double purpose of, on
the one hand fu lfilling the most important religious duty of the caliph
in the eyes of Muslims and, on the other hand,keeping the Syrian army
up to the mark through its continual experience of war.
3
Baladhuri informs us that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  also wished his sons to 
be as interested in the Q ur’an and Traditions as he was himself; when he found 
the tradition of the campaigns of the Prophet in the form of a book in the 
hands of some of his sons, he ordered it to be burnt and advised his sons to 
read the Q ur’ an, and to know the Sunna of the Prophet in order to act in 
accordance with it.
Other accounts as well as these show that contrary to his critics1 
accusations, he did not lose his interest in religious studies and theological
1. Futufr, p .125; Batriq, V I I ,  p .39; Wellhausen, op. c it . ,  p»216.
2. Akhtal, Diwan, pp. 20-21; Khalfifa ibn Khayyat, TdrTkh, I,
pp. 344-80.
3. Ansab, X I,  p. 172 (citing a l-Zuhri).
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questions on becoming caliph, nor did he lose contact with theologians
1and men of rel igion. He surrounded himself with a group of theologians
including such men as Qabisa ibn Dhu^aib, f Urwa ibn a l-Zubair, Raja?
ibn Haywa, a l-$h a*b i, and others. To those who were outside Damascus
2
in Medina he continued to send handsome presents and gifts. He also 
carried on a correspondence with al-Hasan al-Basri, a famous theologian
of the tim e, about theological questions, such as free w ill and pre-
3 4destination. We are also told that in one of i Abd a l-M alik 's  per­
formances of pilgrimage, he sent for the eldest Sheikh from Khuza^a, 
another Sheikh from Quraish and a third from Banu Tamim, and ordered 
them to renew the 11 Ansab " of al-Haram , following the practice of the 
Prophet and his companions, like the caliphs Umar I, * Uthrnan ibn 
( Affan and M u ‘ awiya I.
1 . Tab. , I, p. 1104 (citing WaqidT); p. 1180, 1284, 1634, 1770.
t
2. Saf d , V , i i ,  p .40, p. 171 (citing W agM l); M ia*arif, pp. 197-8.
3. Risalat Mukatabat { Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan wa'l Hasan ibn
A bi‘ l-Hasan al-Ba$rf, fols, 1-13; Ritter, Studies Zur Geschichfe 
der Islamischen Formmigkeit, pp .66 -82 , D l, X X I, 1933;
Obermann, Political Theory in Early Islam, pp. 132-62, JAOS, 55, 
1935; Murtada, pp. 19-20; M ila l, pp .6 6 -7 .
4. WaqidT, Maghazt, I I ,  p .842;K ufT , I I,  fo l. 55b.
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With such accounts, it is obvious that a fair examination of the facts 
does not reveal * Abd a l-M a lik  as turning his back on religion when he 
succeeded to the caliphate.
Other evidence which has been used to support the view of ( Abd a l-  
M alik's volte-face on becoming caliph, are stories of his predilection 
for wine and songs. It is essential to note here that there is no single 
reference in the sources which can be taken as indicating that c Abd a l-  
M a lik  used to drink and listen to songs before he became caliph. On the 
other hand, several statements and stories suggest that he developed these 
habits during his caliphate; but these are contradictory and some of them 
unreliable.
In a conversation with the famous theologian of M edina, Sa* id ibn
al-Musaiyab, * Abd a l-M a lik  admitted that he drank wine after he became
caliph.  ^ This same conversation has also been reported between the caliph
and the famous woman theologian Urn a l-D arda*, whose circle * Abd a l-M a lik
2used to attend even after becoming caliph. It is also reported in the Kitab
-  T 3al-AglianT that in talking to the Christian poet a l-A khta l, e Abd a l-M a ltk  
described the taste and effect of wine to discourage him from drinking it -  
does this suggest that t Abd a l-M a lik  knew of its effects from bitter experience -
1. Ansab, X I,  p p .215-6 (citing Mada’ inT); t Iqd, I I ,  p .351; Nuw airi,
T 7 7 p ".115.
2. f Asakir, X , fo l. 262b; Bidaya, IX , p .6 6 ;SuyutT, p. 144.
3. A g h ., V I I I ,  pp. 290-1 (ed. Dar al-Kuttub); X X I, p .5.
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1as N . tf Akel says -  or does it simply reflect what he had himself been told
by religious teachers in discouraging him from taking wine?
There is evidence of another occasion when the caliph is said not only
to have spoken against wine to the Christian poet, but also tried to convince
2
him to give it up by tempting him with a large sum of money. On yet 
another occasion, he threatened al-Akhtal with the penalty of death, because
3he asked one of the Palace servants for wine to drink.
From these contradictory reports and statements it is d ifficult to give 
a final answer to the question whether * Abd a l-M a lik  was a wine drinker or
-  - 4
not. It would appear from his own confession, reported by ai-M ada'in i
that i Abd a l-M a lik  had tasted wine, but there is no evidence to suggest
that he ever made a habit of drinking, or that he drank to excess: for
example, no sources mention drinking parties held by him or his drinking 
5companions. It is also apparent from these accounts that if he did drink, 
he did so privately, while in public he went to great pains to discourage 
wine and to maintain an orthodox position.
1. Studies in the Social History of the Umayyad Period as Revealed in the 
Kitab al-AghhanT, pp .312-3 , Ph.D. Thesis, London, I960 .
2 . A gh., V I I I ,  pp .290-1 (ed. D5r al-Kutub), X X I, p .5 .
3 . Agh., X I,  p .294.
4. Ansab, X I,  pp. 215-6.
5. It is reported in the Kitab a l-T a j, (pp. 151-2), that * Abd a l-M a lik  used
to drink once a month; but since there is no confirmation for this in 
other sources, it seems difficult to accept it.
Similar contradictory reports circulated about his attitude to songs 
and musicians. It is reported^ that on one occasion ‘ Abdaallah ibn Ja‘ far ibn 
Abi Talib paid a visit to the caliph ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , who was at that time 
suffering from sciatica. To relieve him from this pain, Ibn Ja ‘ far advised 
the caliph to invite somebody who was gifted in story-telling and Iitcyrofe/g, 
to amuse him. The caliph refused this advice. The next day Ibn Ja ‘ far came 
again to see the call ph accompanied by his mawla Budaih the singer, saying 
that he was a physician. However, Budaih did nothing but sing before the 
caliph who was so pleased that he rewarded him lavishly. That ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  
was known to disapprove of GhinaJ can be seen clearly in the fact that 
‘ Abdallah ibn Ja ‘ far had to pretend that Budaih was a physician and not a
2 -  . T
singer. But this is contradicted by another story told by a l-M ad a’ in i, who
tells how ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  once said: "I have never seen this bellied lute
(Bufrbut) that everybody talks about". This remark provoked two responses in
those hearing it : -  one group said, "Yes that is true, but he does know the
Janbur", and others said, ‘ "He is lying, he has not only seen the Barbut, but
3
he can even play it. " Both of these imply that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  was fond of 
music and known by the people to be so.
1. Agh. , X IV , p. 10; Mustadraf, II, p. 295.
2 . ‘ Akel, op. c it . , p ,311.
3. Ansab, X I ,  p .261.
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Another story depicting ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  as music-lover is from a 
less reliable source: a story found in the Kitab al-Acjhanr tells how the fame 
of ibn Misjah, a musician living in Mecca in the time of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , 
spread so rapidly and he became so popular, that the strict Muslims com­
plained to the governor that Ibn Misjah was seducing them by his profane 
art. When this complaint reached the caliph ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , he ordered that 
Ibn Misjah should be summoned to the capital. On his arrival there we read of 
him singing many different songs before the caliph. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  not only
pardoned him but sent him back to Mecca with handsome presents, ^
2Following this account of al-Aghgnf, Von Kromer, who seemed to 
be greatly impressed by it, accepted it as true without frying to examine
3its re liab ility . As has been pointed out by N . ‘ Akel, Duhman al-Ashqar,
on whose authority this story was told, and who claimed to be the governor
of Mecca for ‘ Abd a l-M a ltk , was a "mawla singer of the late Umayyad and
early ‘ Abbasid period, and was mentioned as late as the ‘ Abbasid caliph
al-MahdT and al-Fadl ibn Yahya the Barmakide in the eighth century A.D . 11
Therefore, "he most probably was not born when ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  reign came 
4
to an end. "
1. Agh., I l l ,  pp .86 -7 .
2. The Orient under the Caliphs, p .45, Calcutta, 1920.
3. op. c it . , p. 254.
4 . Ib id ., pp .308-9 .
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In conclusion, as with the accounts of his wine drinking, it is 
difficult to decide between such conflicting accounts, but if one accepts 
the view that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan was a music-lover (and a l -  
MadSMnT, who argues this, is the most reliable authority), one still finds 
it hard to accept Farmer's account that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  was a patron of 
musicians: “Both Ibn Misjah and Budaih, the best known musicians of the time, 
were patronized by him. There is no reason to believe that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  
showed an inordinate interest in music, in a way to conflict with his religious 
upbringing, or with his position as a sovereign of a Muslim State.
1. Farmer, A History of Arabian Music, p .61, London, 1929,
CHAPTER II 
THE ‘ALID OPPOSITION  
THE REVOLT OF AL-MUKHTAR IBN ABl * UBAID AL-THAQAFl
Gne of the most important events of the first century of Islam was the revolt 
of al-M ukhtar ibn Abi ‘ Ubaid al-Thaqafi in Kufa 66 /685 . It contributed to a 
large extent to the development of the Shi‘ a as a sect and also had its sig­
nificance in both the political and the social history of the Umayyad period and 
of Islam in general.
The early Arabic sources are remarkably rich in information about the
revolt and the developments which followed it. Tabari provides the fullest
account; the narratives of Baladhuri and Ibn A ‘ tham a l-K ufi are almost as fu lL
It is worth mentioning here that these three historians all utilized the earlier
histories of Abu Mikhnaf, M ada’ in i, Ibn a l-K a lb i, ‘ Awana ibn al-Hakam and
Waqidi, Tabari relies almost entirely on the narrative of Abu M ikhnaf, whose
importance lies in the fact that he uses the accounts of eye-witnesses such as
Hamid ibn Muslim a l-A zd i, al-Sha‘ bi and ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Al i'l-K anudr  • _  *
On the whole, Abu M ikhnaf, though at times showing an Iraqi (Kufan) and ShiH 
sympathy, is generally accurate in his information and more reliable than other 
sources. In contrast, Ibn A ‘ tham shows clear pro-‘ A lid  sympathies and should 
therefore be read carefully; he provides us with a means of balancing the other 
sources. In some respects, such as the beginning of the revolt, he gives a more
detailed account than found elsewhere. Khalifa ibn Khayyat in his Tarikh 
which is very brief on the revolt, shows moderate Umayyad sympathies. A l-  
Dinawari, has his own distinctive approach: his accounts are at times con­
fused and unconfirmed by early sources. He has a tendency to exaggerage: 
the numbers he gives for those in the armies, the participants in the revolt, 
and more especially the number of the mawali, are considerably higher 
than any other source. Gn the other hand, some of his information is 
original. A l-Y a ‘ qubi's very brief account of al-Mukhtar's revolt reveals 
moderate pro-‘ Alid sympathies. Al-Mubarrad and Ibn ‘ Abd Rabbih are both 
anti-M ukhtar in their writings. With the former, this may be due to Kharijite 
inclinations and the latter's antipathy may spring from his close connection with 
the Umayyad court in Spain. A l - ‘ Iqd of Ibn Abd Rabbih is more important for its 
literary than historical qualities, and the information it contains on the social 
conditions of the mawaii should not be taken at its face value. A l-M as‘ udi's 
Muruj reveals a pro-‘ A lid , and at times anti-Umayyad feeling, but on the 
other hand it provides us with some important dates which are lacking in the 
other sources. He shows clearly the connection between al-M ukhtar and 
Muhammad ibn al-H anafiyya. The later historians, such as Ibn a l-A th ir and 
Nuw airi, add little  new material; they mostly re-edit and summarize the 
narratives in Baladhuri and Tabari. The Shi‘ ite biographers, such as Kashshi 
and Tusi, provide valuable information about both the doctrine and the 
personalities of the Shi‘ a. They provide a useful Shl‘ i background to the
revolt, most useful since the history of al-Mukhtar has come down to us
mostly from non-Shi‘ i sources. Even the eye-witnesses mentioned in
Tabari, were men who, although formerly allies of a l-M ukhtar, deserted 
•
him and fought against him. The historical tradition to which we owe
our information grew up in Kufa, especially in the milieu of the Ashraf
and therefore is anti-M ukhtar. ^
Modern scholars differ in their views on al-M ukhtar and the nature
2of his revolt* Van Gelder considers him to be a man of remarkable 
abilities, but so unscrupulous that he would pursue any means to achieve
3 m
his goal of seizing political power. Van Vloten says that al-M ukhtar
gained the support of the mawali in Kufa as a result of sponsoring their
claim to equal share in the MFai’ " as the Arabs: this, however, led to a
4
decline in the number of his ‘ Arab supporters. Wellhausen regards a l -  
Mukhtar as the first to work towards the removal of the social differences 
of his time. He admits that al-Mukhtar exploited the name of Ibn a l -  
Hanafiyya but considers him (al-Mukhtar) as sincere in his ideas and 
not to be convicted of bad faith* Levi Della Vida follows Wellhausen's
1 . E. I ■ ^, (A l-M ukhtar).
2. Muhtar de Falsche Profeet, pp. 142-3, Leiden, 1888.
3. Reacherches Sur la Domination Arab, p ,1 5 , Amsterdam, 1894.
   |P 1 1 ’ "■■■— i n . "  ■ ■■- * ■ ■ '  .........  M —
4. Die Religios-Folitischen OppositionSpartelen im alten Islam, pp .87 -9
and 94 -5 , Berlin, 1901.
5. E . l . \  (A l-M ukhtar).
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argument when he says that al-Mukhtar's exploitation of Ibn al-Hanafiyya's
name, and his double-deeding with the Ashraf were "tactical expedients"
necessary for thp triumph of his cause;and not the product of bad faith.
He adds that al-Mukhtar "sincerely believed in his mission and ecjualitarian
ideas about the m aw ali.. .  " Professor M . Hodgson^ regards al-M ukhtar as
compromising the ShT‘ ite movement "with the toleration of such varied elements
*2as ‘ Arab divination and equality for the mawali". S. Moscati considers 
that al-M ukhtar was an "inspired prophet", and saw the significance of his 
movement as lying in the more extremist religious cults arising at the time, 
introducing a new political element, that of the m awali, into the Shi‘ ite
-  r  3 -  -movement, Al-Kharbutli considers al-M ukhtar as an enthusiastic Shi‘ ite ,
and his movement as a r^al reflection of the social, political and religious
conditions prevailing at the time. Finally, Dr. K .A . Fariq thinks that a l - . ’
4Mukhtar was an opportunist and a false prophet. The following study is an 
attempt to a better understanding and assessment of a l-M ukhtar‘s personality 
and his revolt.
Al-Mukhtar's father was Abu ‘ Ubaid Mas‘ udi ibn ‘ Amr ibn ‘ Umair 
ibn ‘ Awf from the tribe of Thaqif. His mother was Dawma bint ‘ Amr ibn Wahb
1. How Did The Early Shi‘a Become Sectarian, p .3 , JA O S, 75 , 1955.
2. Per Una Storia Dell'antica Si‘ a , pp .256-7 , RSO , X X X , 1 955.
3. A l-M ukhtar al-Thqqafi, p .5 , Cairo, 1963.
4. The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p. 121, S ll, no .3, 1966.
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ibn Munobbih, another Thaqifite.  ^ He was born in the first year of H ijra
in Ta*if, 622 A, D, Little is known about his early life; the first important
information is that when he was thirteen years old he accompanied his father,
2
an army leader, in the battle of the Bridge. His father lost his life in this 
battle. Al-Mukhtar's uncle, Sa‘ d ibnM as‘ ud al-ThaqafT, was governor of 
Mada’ in for the Caliph ‘ A li, and we find al-Mukhtar enjoying his uncle's 
confidence, being entrusted with two important tasks. The first was to act as
- .  . . -  . . 3deputy governor while his uncle left M ada’ in in pursuit of a Kharijite group.
The second occasion was when he was entrusted with a sum of money sent by
his uncle Sa‘ d from M ada’ in to the Caliph ‘ AM in Kufa.^
In his youth, spent in Medi na after the death of his father, al-Mukhtar
_ 5
was known to be an ‘ Alid sympathizer and devoted to the Banu Hashim. Yet 
there is a story which depicts him as an ti-$h i‘ i (‘ Uthmani), based on the advice 
he gave to his uncle at the time when al-Hasan, son and heir of ‘ A ll, was carried 
wounded to M ada’ in. The advice was that al-Hasan be handed over to M u ‘ awiya
1. Zubairi, p. 113; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 92; M a ‘ a rif, p .175; 
Futufr, p .250; Ansab, V ,  p .214; NasaE>, fo l. 155b; Ja b ., I ,  2 1 7 5 f f .;
I I ,  p .735; Jamharat, p .2 5 6 ff,; ‘ Asokir, X V I, fo l. 269b; Usd, IV , p .336, 
V , 248ff.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .214; Tab ., 1, p.2174ff; Usd, IV , p .336; Lisan, V ,  p .6;
isaba, I I I ,  p. 1066. ”
3. Dinawari, p. 218; T a b ., I, p .3366.
4 . isaba, i l l ,  p. 1067. K .A . Fariq presumes that al-M ukhtar was occupying
a financial post under his uncle in M ada’ in, The Story of an Arab Diplomat, 
p ,5 4 ,j> N , no, 2 , 1966.
5. ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l,269b (‘ Abdallah ibn Rabi‘ a al-M akhzum i); Dhahabi, I I ,  
p.380ff. (citing Ibn Sa‘ d & WaqidT).
in order to win the latter’s favour. His uncle refused this advice and 
-  1cursed al-M ukhtar. This contradiction has been explained by historians
2In various ways. Wellhausen avoids the issue: he simply quotes the story
without comment in a footnote, end follows it by another story depicting a l-
Mukhtar as a Shi4 i sympathizer refusing to sign the accusation against Hujr
ibn ‘ Adi a l-K ind i. Dr. Fariq^ takes the view that al-M ukhtar was an
opportunist and “sought to exploit the grave situation". Al-Kharbutly
explains al-M ukhtar’s advice by saying he was infuriated by al-Hasan's
acceptance of a peaceful settlement wi th M u‘ awiya. Historical tradition seems
to be in favour of this last conclusion. It is reported by Abu Mikhnaf and 
-5
al-Zuhri that when al-Hasan received the homage of the people of Kufa,
*
he stipulated that they should make peace with whom he chose to have 
peace, and fight whom he chose to fight; this made them suspect that he was 
preparing to negotiate with M u‘ awiya. These suspicions were confirmed when 
for two months al-Hasan neither mentioned war against M u ‘ awiya nor marched
1. Ansab, V , p .214, fo l. 223b; Tab ., II, p p .2 &  520; Ib n a l-J a u z i, Tadhkirat 
al-Khawds, p p .196-7 (citing al-Sha‘ b7).
2. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositiort&parteien im alten Islam, p .74.
3. The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p .56, S ll, I I I ,  no .2, 1966.
4. op. c i t . ,  p. 52,
5. Ansab, fo l. 222b (citing Abu Mikhnaf & ‘ Awana); Tab ., II, p .5 (citing 
al-ZuhrT); Bayasi, fo l. 31b (citing a l-Zuhri).
against Syria. It is also reported by al-Baladhuri  ^ that al-Hasan was 
harshly criticised by his prominent Shi‘ i followers for concluding a settle­
ment with M u ‘ awiya. His Shi‘ i critics included al-Musayyab ibn Najba  
al-Fazari, Sufyan ibn Layl al-Hamdani, Hujr ibn ‘ Adi and Sulaiman 
ibn Kathir a l-K huza‘ i. Thus the advice given by Al-M ukhtar to his uncle 
might have been influenced by the same motives, and the realization that
al-Hasan was not the man of the hour for the Shi‘ a. Moreover, if a l -  * -
Mukhtar intended in giving this advice to his uncle, to go over to the side of 
M u‘ awiya, he had his opportunity soon afterwards. The advice reached 
M u‘ awiya's ears and he would doubtless have welcomed al-Mukhtar as an 
ally ; but al-Mukhtar did not defect, which makes it d ifficu lt to accept 
Fariq's conclusion.
Al-M ukhtar continued to show himself as a Shi‘ i, or at least a n ti-  
Umayyad, until the end of his life . In 51 /671, when Ziyad ibn Abih, the 
governor of a l-K ufa for M u ‘ awiya, accused Hujr ibn ‘ Adi al-K ind i of having 
attempted to revolt against the caliph, he asked the Ashraf of al-K ufa to sign 
the accusation as witnesses. While all were keen to do so to show their loyalty 
to the governor, al-M ukhtar did not commit himself in this affair, managing to
1. Ansab, fo l. 225a; T ab ., I I ,  p. 9; lmta‘ , I I ,  p .64; N ihaya, I ,  p .73;
Siyar, p. 57.  ^ ,
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1avoid signing it.
Muslim ibn ‘ A qil, sent by al-Husain ibn ‘ A li ibn Abi Jalib as his
personal representative to the 5hi‘ a of Kufa in 60 /679 , chose the house
2of al-Mukhtar as his residence. As a result, al-Mukhtar's house became 
the centre of Muslim's and the Shi‘ as* activities, until the arrival of 
‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad as governor of Kufa for the Caliph Yazid ibn 
M u‘ awiya. This choice of al-Mukhtar's house shows that Muslim must have 
been sure of his attachment to the Shi‘ a cause, or at very least, certain that
he was anti-Umayyad. Another reason for the choice was that al-Mukhtar
-  T -  T 3was the son-in-law of a l-N u ‘ man ibn Bashir al-Ansari, who was still
-  - -  •
the governor of Kufa, a fact which enabled the Shi* a followers to act 
freely. Had al-Mukhtar really been a ‘ Uthmani, what better opportunity 
would he have had of jeopardizing the Shi* a cause by betraying Muslim to the 
governor?
When Muslim ibn * Aqil was forced to revolt prematurely in 60 /679, al 
Mukhtar was outside Kufa in his estate in Khutraniyya, Being informed of 
Muslim's revolt, he hurried back to Kufa at the head of his mawali to support
1. Ansab, fo l. 403a (citing Abu Mukhnaf); Tab ., I I ,  p. 134 (citing Abu 
Mfkhrlaf): Agh. ,  X V I, p .8 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
2. Ansab, V , p .214; Dmawari, p .244; Tab., I I ,  p .237 (citing Abu 
Mikhnaf) & p .502; Kufi, I, fols. 196a; Irshpd, p .205.
3. Ansab, fo l. 155a; Dinawari, p .247; Tab ., I I ,  p .264 (citing Abu 
Mikhnaf); Irshad, p. 207.
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him.^ He arrived too late to assist Muslim, deserted by his followers,
and killed by the governor. He was, however, summoned to the governor's
presence, and reproached for his implication in the revolt. When a l -
Mukhtar denied any part in it, the governor struck him in the eye with
a stick, and sent him to prison. He remained there until after the battle of
Karbala’ 10th Muharram, 6 1 /1 0th October, 680, when he was released
by the intervention of his brother-in-law ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Umar ibn a l -
2Khattab; but he was ordered to leave the city within three days.
On the third day after his release, he left Kufa for a l-H ija z ; on his 
way there he met Ibn a l - ‘ Irq, a mawla of Thaqif, who asked him what had 
happened to his eye. A l-M ukhtar told him that ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad 
struck it and swore that he would cut "his fingers, hands and limbs into 
pieces" as revenge. He confirmed this when Ibn a l - ‘ Irq doubted it, and then 
asked him about Ibn a l-Zubair. He was told that "Ibn al-Zubair has taken 
refuge in the sanctity of al-Haram (the shrine of a I-K a ‘ b a ) . . . People say 
that he receives homage secretly. He w ill come into the open as soon as 
he has gathered sufficient followers". A l-M ukhtar replied: "Ibn al-Zubair
1. Ansab, V , pp. 214-15; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .307; Tab ., I I ,  pp. 220-1 (citing 
Abo Mikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p. 139.
2. Ansab, V , pp .215-6; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .307; Tab, II, pp .522-3 (citing 
Abu Mikhnaf); KufT, I, fols. 235b-236a.
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is the man of the ‘ Arabs; if he follows my plans and listens to my advice,
I w ill be the man to take the responsibility of securing the people's support 
for him. Otherwise, w e ll, I am equal to any other ‘ Arab. The time of 
troubles is about to begin; one day you w ill hear that al-M ukhtar and his 
followers are seeking revenge against those who slew al-Husain and by God,
I shall k ill as many as were slain in vengeance ofYahya ibn Zakariyya". ^
These veiled hints are the first indication of his ambitions for the 
future. He must have realised that, after the fall of al-Husain, Ibn a l -  
Zubair had become the centre of opposition to the Umayyad rule, since 
there was no active ‘ A lid claimant. This was presumably the reason why a l -  
Mukhtar went to a l-H ija z , rather than elsewhere. It would seem that he 
turned to Ibn al-Zubair not so much for love of his cause, but for a common 
Umayyad antipathy, combined with his ambition to achieve an important post. 
His claim that he could secure the support of the people for Ibn a l-Zubair was 
based on the increased anti-Umayyad feeling in Kufa due to al-Husain's death: 
al-Mukhtar knew that this could easily be exploited for Ibn ai-Zubair's cause, 
or for his own use. To gain such popular support in Iraq (especially in Kufa), 
it would be necessary to depict the cause as one of vengeance for al-Husain: 
such revenge would need the sanction of an ‘ A lid , especially ‘ A li ibn a l -  
Husain, or Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya.
Ansab, V , pp .215-6; Tab., II, p .524 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); K u fi, I, 
fol s. 263a-263b. The name given here is al-Su‘ qub i"En Zuhair and not 
Ibn a l - ‘ irq.
The sources give accounts of correspondence between al-Mukhtar
and both these ‘ Alid claimants. ‘ A li ibn al-Husain was more favourable
■
for al-Mukhtar's purpose, since he was seeking to avenge his father's
death. ‘ A li at this time was a young man, about 24 years old, and was
keeping aloof from politics, perhaps because of witnessing the massacre of
his father and his family in the battle of Karbala* 10th Muharram, 6 1 /1 0th
October, 680. It was to Ibn al Haniftyya, however, that the eyes of the
Shi‘ a were turned after the death of al-Husain, for none of the ‘ Alids of the
Fatimid line was of a suitable age.  ^ But he also was politically inactive
and held strongly to the idea that a sovereign should be unanimously chosen.
2
He showed unwillingness to accept the Caliphate on any other terms. A l-
Mukhtar wrote to ‘ A li to show his loyalty to him, and asking if he could
rally the Kufans for him. He sent with the letter a large sum of money. ‘Ali
refused this offer and declared al-Mukhtar to be a liar who was trying to exploit
3
the cause of "AhI A l-B ait" for his own interests.
Having failed to gain the support of ‘ A li ibn al-Husain, al-Mukhtar 
turned to his uncle Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya. Al Mukhtar sent him a letter 
similar to that he had sent to ‘ A li ibn al-Husain and also sent a sum of money.
1. B. Lewis, The Origin of lsmar il?sm, p .26, Cambridge, 1940.
2. Sa‘ d, V , pp .66-86.
3. Ansab, V , p .272 (citing Ahmad ibn Ibrahim); V. \ , V , p. 172*^
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When news of this reached ( Aii ibn al-Husain he urged his uncle not to 
accept al-Mukhtar's offer, and to declare him an impostor. The latter, 
before taking any decision, consulted ‘ Abdallah ibn tf Abbas, who advised 
him not to comply with ( A ll's  advice, on the grounds that Ibn al-Hanafiyya  
did not know how he would fare with ibn a l-Zubair who had just been 
recognised as caliph in Mecca. ^
Since no chronology is given, nor place names, for these two letters, 
it is impossible to be certain whether they took place before or after a l-  
Mukhtar had arrived in Kufa. However, judging from the fact that he sent 
with each letter a large sum of money, one might guess that they were sent 
after he had gained a source of income, that is, after seizing Kufa. The fact 
that al-Mukhtar gained success in Kufa by using the name of Ibn a l-  
Hanafiyya can be explained in the light of a meeting which had taken 
place between them before al-Mukhtar was left Mecca to go to Kufa. On 
this occasion al-M ukhtar told Ibn al-H anifiyya that he was going to avenge 
his relatives and acquire power for him. Ibn al-Hanafiyya, however, gave 
al-M ukhtar only a non-committal reply: he neither approved nor disapproved
of al-Mukh tar's intention to avenge al-Husain, and only warned him against 
2
bloodshed. A l-M ukh far took this attitude as consent, and exploited Ibn 
al-Hanafiyya*s name for his own interest in Kufa: but wishing to gain a more
1. Ansab, V , p .218; Muruj, V ,  pp. 172-3.
2. Ansab, V , p. 218.
reliable 6 Alid recognition, he contacted * A li Ibn al-Husain, only to be
*
refused. He therefore wrote to Ibn al-Hanafiyya, but he never succeeded
in gaining explicit recognition from him. In the event, the hestiation and
political inactivity of Ibn al-H anifiyya encouraged al-M ukhtar more and
more to exploit his name for his own interest.
In Mecca al-Mukhtar went to Ibn al-Zubair who inquired about
affairs in Kufa. After giving him full information about the situation there,
al-M ukhtar offered his homage to Ibn al-Zubair and said, "G ive me your
1hand and receive my homage, and try to meet my desires. " Thus al-Mukhtar's
homage was not given unconditionally: he was attempting to exploit Ibn al~
Zubair's need for support in order to gain his own ends. But he over-estimated
his need; Ibn al-Zubair refused his aid, angry at his indiscretion in speaking
of such serious matters in public. Not finding in Mecca what he wanted, a l-
2Mukhtar left for a i-T a?if, his native c ity , where he remained for a year.
The sources are all silent about his activities during this year in al-Ta* if.
3Van Gelder presumes that during this time he was in contact with Ibn a l -  
Hanafiyya in Medina. Dr. K. Fariq^ says that "he made periodical visits 
to Mecca and Medina and met Ibn al-Hanafiyya and ( A li ibn al-Husain to read 
their minds and win their good-w ill."  But there is no evidence to support either
1. Ansab, V , p .216; Tab ., II, pp .525-6 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I,
fo l. 236b. ’ —
2* Ansab, V ,  p .216; Tab., II, p .226; KufT, I, fo l. 236b.
3. op. c it . , p. 29,
4 . The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p .62, $11, I I I ,  no. 2 , 1966.
of these views. Finally, al-Kharbutly says that he wanted to escape from 
Ibn a-Zubair's observation.  ^ It seems likely that al-M ukhtar was 
watching the political situation from al-Ta* if, and that during this retirement, 
the political and religious ideas later connected with his name began to take 
shape. ^
A year later, al-M ukhtar appeared suddenly in M ecca, By this time, Ibn 
al-Zubair had been publically recognized as Caliph, but al-Mukhtar stayed 
aloof at first. It was through the mediation of ‘ Abbas ibn Sahl that a meeting 
was arranged between the two. A l-M ukhtar paid homage to Ibn al-Zubair  
on the following conditions: that Ibn al-Zubair consult him in ail his 
decisions, that he give him audience before everybody else, and award him a 
high post as soon as he had been unanimously recognized as Caliph. Ibn 
al-Zubair replied that he would receive al-Mukhtar's homage only in accordance r 
to the Book of God (Qur’ an) and the Sunna of the Prophet. A l-M ukhtar 
refused to give homage on such terms, claiming that Ibn a l-Zubair was not treating
4him with the distinction he deserved. Ibn al—Zubair, on Abbas' advice, 
accepted al-Mukhtar's terms. These serve to demonstrate very clearly his po li­
tical ambition and also confirm what he had already stated in his first meeting with
1. op. c it . , p. 92.
2. E. I. \  (al-Mukhtar).
3. Ansab, V ,  pp. 216-7; T a b ., II, p .526ff. (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I,
fois. 237a-237b; Bad*) V I ,  p. 15. —
4. Ansab, V ,  pp .216-7; Tab., I I ,  p .526; K^fT, I, fols. 237a-237b; Bad', V I ,
p. 15. ’
Ibn a l-Zubair -  and even before that, in his conversation with Ibn a l - f Irq. ^
Why was Ibn al-Zubair now prepared to accept al-Mukhtar's terms after
before refusing them? The answer seems to be that Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, realizing
al-Mukhtar's ambitions, decided not to risk creating trouble for himself in a l-
H ijaz or in Iraq by antagonizing him. It may also be that al-M ukhtar, by
this time, had become an important man, whose political qualities were
indispensible. Or it could have been due to political diplomacy, as a way
of flattering ‘ Abdallah ibn ( Umar, a son-in-law of al-M ukhtar's, whose
o
support Ibn a l-Zubair greatly needed.
From this time until the death of Yazid I, 64 /683 , we find al-Mukhtar
closely attached to Ibn al-Zubair • When Yazid I sent a Syrian army against
Ibn al-Zubair 64 /683 , al-M ukhtar distinguished himself in fighting the
Syrians and defending the Ka( ba. He remained in H iiaz until the withdrawal
•  1
of the army at the death of the caliph Yazid in the same year.^
Five months passed after the Syrians withdrew from Mecca and still 
al-Mukhtar waited for Ibn al-Zubair to give him the promised post (probably
1. See pp,7Zr£*
2. Ansab, V ,  pp,195-7 (citing Made? ini); Agh. ,  I, p. 12; Sharh, I, p .326;
X X , p. 149 (quoting Agh. ); Kharbutl? , op. c it . ,  p. 100.
3. ZubairT, p .269; Imama, II, p. 10 (citing AbJ Ma'shar); T ab ., II, pp .528-9 .
(citing Abu Mikhhaf)J; KufT, I, fols. 238b-239a, 239b, 243b; M q d ,, IV ,
p. 393 (citing Abu Ma'shar); Muru[, V , pp. 165-6; Bad’ , V I ,  p.TS; ‘ Asdkir,
, fol > 269b (citing <Abdallah ibn AbT Rab7*a al-M akhzum i). It is
reported (Tab., H, p .529) that during the seige of al-Ka< ba by al-Husain
• •
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the governorship of Kufa), with no success. Therefore not prepared to 
trust Ibn a l-Zubair any more,he made up his mind to go to Kufa.  ^ In 
order to find out about the situation there, he kept asking everybody who came 
from Kufa for news. He was informed that the people there had accepted the 
authority of Ibn a l-Zubair, although a considerable number of them were 
waiting for a man who would rally them in support of their own cause, beyond 
the simple anti-Umayyad position of Ibn a l-Zubair. If they could find such a
leader, he could, with their support, rule the whole Islamic world. At this
-  . -  -  . 2 news, al-M ukhtar said, "I am Abu Ishaq. I am their man and no one e ls e .11
Therefore, he left Mecca for Kufa, very cautiously, in order not to arouse
the suspicions of Ibn a l-Zubair who might prevent him from leaving and hamper
3 -
his project. Contradicting this, it is reported that al-M ukhtar left Mecca for
= ibn Numair, al-Mukhtar was fighting with a group of Kharijite who 
came to Ibn al-Zubair to defend the Kaf ba. It is probably for this 
reason that he was called a Kharijite (Mubarrad, I I I ,  p .264). Dozy 
in his book Essai Sur L'lslamisme, p ,223, Paris, 1879, refers to this, 
and depicts al-M ukhtar as being a Kharijite. The fact that al-Mukhtar
fought with the Kharijites to defend al-K a*ba does not make him a 
Kharijite; this becomes very clear when we consider the other elements 
who participated in the defence of the Kaf ba. In addition to the 
Kharijites there were the people of Mecca and M edina, and also an 
Abyssinian group headed by Ibn al-Zubair. If we consider al-Mukhtat" 
a Kharijite on these grounds, we must also regard all these groups, including 
IbrTal-Zubair, as Kharijites too. The fact that the Kharijites deserted 
Ibn-a l-Zubair, after the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Mecca, reveals 
the reason why they joined Ibn a l-Zubair. Moreover when al-Mukhtar 
seized Kufa we neither find him supporting the Kharijite nor being supported 
by them.
Ansab, V ,  p .217; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .307; T ab ., I I ,  pp .530-531.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .217; Tab ., II ,  pp .530-532 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); KufT, I,
folsT"257a, 257b, 558a.
3. Ansab, V ,  pp .271-2 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir); M uruj, V ,  pp. 170-71.
Kufa with the permission of Ibn al-Zubair and not on his own accord. He
sent him there to rally the people of Kufa and prepare them for war
against the Syrians. This would seem to be unlikely, for if Ibn al-Zubair
was confident of al-Mukhtar and ready to offer him such an important post,
the latter would not have deserted him, but would continue to be on his
1side. Dr. K. A. Fariq gives two contradictory accounts, stating that Ibn
al-Zubair did not trust al-M ukhtar, this being the reason why he did not
give him a post; while at the same time he says that Ibn al-Zubair sent
al-Mukhtar to Kufa “to enlist the support of the Kufans for the new caliph
2 .
and rouse them to war against the Syrian army". As we have seen it was
now that al-Mukhtar contacted Ibn al-Hanafiyya for the first time.
-  _ 3
Al-M ukhtar reached Kufa on Friday 15th Ramadan, 64/6th May, 664.
He entered the city passing deliberately through the quarters of the S h i'a ,
showing himself to be a precursor (Bashir) of a new era of prosperity. He
saluted every one he met and promised them prosperity and success, inviting
4them to see him at his house that same evening. Then he went to the mosque 
and performed his prayer before going home. By announcing predictions of 
success and prosperity in such a vague way, al-M ukhtar tried to rally to
1. The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p .63, S II, I I I ,  N o . 1, 1966.
2. See p. 7 5
3. Tab., 11, p .509.
4 . Ansab,V, p .2 1 7 ;T a b ., II, pp .532-33 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); KufT, I,
fols. 257b-258a. ' —
himself as many of the Shi‘ a of Kufa as possible. Even those who were not 
thinking of associating themselves with him, for one reason or another, 
would have been curious to know what he had brought them, or for whom he 
was working, especially in such a troubled period. ^
When the Shi‘ a assembled at al-Mukhtar's house that evening, they told 
him that the majority of the Shi‘ a had joined Sulaiman ibn Surad al-Khuza* i 
who was about to march against ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Z iyad, to stop his advance 
on Iraq, and to avenge al-Husain. Then al-M ukhtar, already well-informed 
about Sulaiman before arriving in Kufa, said that "he had been sent to them 
by the Mahdi (the rightly-guided one), the son of the Wasi (legatee) 
Muhammad ibn * A li, as his confidant (Amin), minister (Wazir) and officer 
(Am ir), with orders to fight al-M ulhidun, to avenge the Mahdi's family and
1. It is reported in Tab., II, p .532, on the authority of Abu Mikhnaf, 
that when al -Mukhtar passed by the quarter of Banu Badda’ , he 
met ‘ Ubaida ibn ( Amr al-Baddt from the Kinda tribe. This man, 
beside being a brave warrior and a zealous partisan of *AlT, was 
known also as a good poet, who indulged in wine to an excess. 
After saluting him al-Mukhtar conveyed to him the good news of 
prosperity and success and promised him God's pardon because of 
his love to i AIT and his family. ‘ Ubaida, taking the most hopeful 
view of al-Mukhtar's announcement, asked for an explanation. But 
al-M ukhtar asked ‘ Ubaida to meet him with the other people of his 
quarter in al-Mukhtar's house that same evening. It seems that 
al-M ukhtar, realising the importance of the poet to his cause, 
made fKTs concession to ‘ Ubaida.
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to defend the weak (Du‘ afa?)" , He also told the S h ica that " . . .  Sulaiman
is .. .  too old, has had no experience in political matters or in wars.
By the weak he meant those who were socially weak, i .e .  the slaves, the
mawali and some * Arabs too, to whom his appeal was directed; perhaps
it is for this reason that we find many ( Arabs joining him in his first revolt.
The jursistsof later period classified the mawali into three categories:
mawla*Rahim, that is, a blood relation; mawlcT‘ Ataqa, that is, a freed
man, who is often born free but enslaved in war, and through emancipation
becomes a mawla of his former master; finally mawla al~‘ Aqd, that is by
2kinship. The second and third kind are of interest to us in this study.
AI-M ukhtar is credited with being the first to develop the idea of Mahdi
3 -as a religious Messiah. The idea of Mahdi which al-M ukhtar here emphasized,
in talking of the weak, was directed at the socially deprived groups, who
looked at Ibn al-Hanafiyya as their "Saviour", the one to establish a reign
of justice. A l-M ukhtar was the first to understand, and to try to remedy, the
existing distinctions in social, economic and political rights between ‘ Arabs
1. Ansab, V ,  p p .207-218; Y a 'q u b i, II, p .308; T a b ., I I ,  pp .351-52
(citing Abu M ikhnaf): KufT, I, fo l. 258a.
2. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, p. 102 (ed. S .M . Stern), London, 1967;
M . W att, ShTe7sm Under the Early Umayyads, p. 163, JRAS, 1960;
A i-*A lT , al-TanzTmat gl-ljtim d* iyya wal Iqtisadiyya fil Basra fil Qarn 
al-Awwal a l-H ijr t , p. 63, Baghdad, 1953,
3. B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, p .72, London, 1964; Margoliouth, 
On MahdT and Mahdisim, p .4 , PBA, X V , 1915; E. 1.1, (al-MahdT).
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and mawali.  ^ As for the question of whether Ibn al-Hanafiyya agreed
2
to be called a l-M ah d i, our sources, apart from the report of Ibn Sa*d, 
are silent. This report says that Ibn al-Hanafiyya had no objection to it, 
but he preferred to be called by his name Muhammed or his "Kunya"
Abu'l Qasim. It seems, therefore, that al-Mukhtar applied this title  for 
Ibn al-Hanafiyya against the latter's w ill.
Al Mukhtar found in Sulaiman ibn Surad a great riva l, for he was the 
first to call vengeance for al-Husain; and owing to Sulaiman's age and past, 
it was difficult for al-Mukhtar to gather the Shi* a round himself. Neverthe­
less, he did not yield but carried on with his plans. He began to alienate 
the Shi*a from Sulaiman by emphasizing his own mission from Ibn a l-
Hanafiyya, and pointing out that Sulaiman was now old and without e x -  
»
3
perience of war. “ If they followed Sulaiman, he would kill them and himself." 
These tactics were successful and as a result, only four thousand out of the 
sixteen thousand men who paid homage to Sulaiman assembled in his camp
. - 4prior to his march against Ibn Ziyad. Although both al-M ukhtar and
1. Wellhqusen,Die Religios-Politischen OppositionAparteien *m alten  
Islam, p. 95.
2. Sa*d, V , pp. 68 -9 .
3. Ansab, V ,  p .218; T a b ., I I ,  pp .509-510 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Ibn a i -  
JauzT, Tadhkirat al-Khaw as, p. 283. Sulaiman was an STd companion 
of the Prophet, who after the death of the latter resided in Kufa and 
became a champion of ‘ AIT, accompanying him in nearly all his wars. 
He was also an influential figure in the Khuza*a tribe. See Sa*d, IV , 
p .30; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Jabaqat, pp. 107 & 137; M a*a d , fo l. 62b; 
Jamharat, p. 226; Usd, 11, p. 359; l§aba, I I ,  p. 253; TahdhTb, IV ,
pp .200-201; Baghdadi, Tarikh Baghdad, I, p .200ff.
4 . Ansab, V ,  p .208; Tab ., I I ,  p .539 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, fols. 
25§E^259a. —
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Sulaiman were claiming to avenge al-Husain, yet they were working in 
different directions. Because of a tribal relationship between Sulaiman's 
followers and the AshrSf of Kufa, he refused to seize K^fa and kill those 
who participated in the massacre of al-Husain. He claimed that only 
Ibn Ziyad and the Syrians were guilty of al-Husain's slaughter. A l-  
Mukhtar, on the other hand, was preparing to seize Kufa, an important 
factor in winning some of Sulaiman's supporters to his side.
Al-Mukhtar was, however, unwilling to take any violent action 
against Sulaiman, for the majority of the Sh^ia were with him. It was 
impossible for him to risk arousing the antipathy of the Shi‘ a , if his scheme 
was to be successful. To this one might add that al-Mukhtar was almost 
sure of the failure of Sulaiman's movement and therefore left him to face his 
end. These tactics paid off, for SulaimSn’s failure led the Shi‘ a to re­
consider al-Mukhtar's offer of leadership, and eventually they turned 
towards him.
On the 22nd of Ramadan 64/14th of May 684, only one week after 
al-Mukhtar's arrival in Kufa, ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zu bair sent ‘ Abdallah ibn
YazTd a l-K  hat arm as Governor to a l-K u fa . With himwas Ibrahim ibn
'  -  2
Muhammad ibn Talha ibn * Ubaidallah, as collector of Kharaj. This however 
*  •  "
1. Ansab, V ,  p .209 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); J a b ., I I ,  p.541 (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf).
2 . Ansab, V ,  p .207; T a b ., I I ,  p .509 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I, 
ISTT258; Kam il, IV , p. 134.
was an unfortunate choice on the part of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, for Ibrahim's
father and grandfather had been killed in the battle of the Camel, which
made it extremely unlikely that there would be cordial relations between
him and the Kufans. Moreover, the relationship between the Governor
and the Kharaj collector was also strained, and in both cases the situation
could be exploited by al-M ukhtar. ^
After Sulaiman's departure, al-Mukhtar's activities aroused the
suspicions of the Ashraf of a l-K u fa , most of whom had participated in the
battle of Karbala*, Muharram 61/October 680 against al-Husain. They• *
reported him to the governor to warn him against the movement, saying that it
was more dangerous than that of Sulaiman; for al-M ukhtar wanted to revolt
2
against the governor in his own city. Consequently, al-M ukhtar was 
seized and imprisoned, where he remained until the return of the remnant 
of Sulaiman ibn Surad's followers from the battle of 1 Ain al-W arda 63/685; 
Sulaiman had been killed in this battle.
During his imprisonment a committee of five , a ll of them Yemenites,
3were acting on his behalf and accepting homage for him. Al-M ukhtar
1. Ansab, V , pp .207-8; Tab., I I ,  p .515 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil,
IV , pp. 134-5; Kharbutli, op. c i t . , 140.
2. Ansab, V , p .218; Tab,, I I ,  p .535 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
3. They were: al-Sa*ib ibn M a lik  a l-A sM ari, Yazid ibn Anas al-Asadi, 
Ahmar ibn Shumait al-Ahmasi, Rifa<*a ibn Shaddad a l-F ityan i, and
c Abdallah TEn Shaddad al-Jumahc. It is very interesting to point out 
that all these leaders belong to*the Yemenite Tribes alone. Khalifa 
ibn Khayyat, Jabaqat, pp. 152-3; Nasab, fo l. 58a; M a<ad, foT. 50b; 
Tab., I I ,  p .601; Jamharat, pp. 182 & 367.
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himself was working actively from his confinement proclaiming in rhymed
prose propaganda emphasizing that his aim was to k ill every tyrant with the
help of his followers, whom he called Ansar (Helpers), in order to regain
the unity of the Muslims and to avenge the apostles; and for this end he
did not mind death or the loss of worldly glory.  ^ He also wrote to the
routed followers of Sulaiman ibn Surad, praising them for their efforts and
wishing on them the mercy of God; he said that Sulaiman was not their
man but he (al-Mukhtar) was the one sent to be their leader and asked
them to be ready and hopeful. He summoned them to the "Book of God",
2
the Sunna of the Prophet and the defence of the weak. He was fully  
aware of what the Shi*a of his time wanted and he played with their 
sentiments accordingly, through these announcements.
A l-M ukhtar was released only after the request of his brother-in- 
law, * Abdallah ibn *Umar and on the guarantee of ten influential men; 
he gave a strong religious vow not to engage in any subversive activities 
against the governor and the collector of the Kharaj as long as they were
3in power. However, al-M ukhtar was quite prepared to dishonour this vow 
for the realization of his cause -  although in the event he did not need to
1. Tab ., I I ,  p .536; Kami I, IV , p. 143.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .219; Tab., I I ,  p .569 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I,
fo l. 264a. * —
3. Ansab, V ,  p .219; Tab., II, p .600 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
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do so -  and laughed at the stupidity of the governor and his associate.
Meanwhile, A bdallah  ibn al—Zubair, considering the danger of
al-Mukhtar and his movement, appointed a new governor for a l-K u fa ,
* Abdallah ib n M u ti* , 27th Ramadan, 6 5 /6 th M ay, 685, and presumably
ordered him to be more cautious and prduent than his predecessors.^ The
coming of the new governor enabled al-Mukhtar to act more freely since
he has no commitments towards him.
In his first speech Ibn M uti* told the Kufans that he would adopt
the policy of *Umar ibn aU K hattab and *Uthman ibn *Affan and
2warned them against disunity and creating troubles. Here again ibn a l- 
Zubair was unfortunate in choosing this man for the governorship of a l-  
Kufa, the centre of the Shi*a movement at that time. His speech shows 
clearly his ignorance of both the political situation and the feelings of the 
Shi*a towards * Umar and *Uthman and their financial policy. The Kufans 
were looking back to the days of the Caliph *A li,  where Kufa was the 
capital of the Islamic Empire and the place of the central treasury, and their 
Fai* was distributed among them. No wonder, therefore, that the governor's
1. Ansab, V ,  p .220; Tab., II, p .602; Kufi, I, fo l. 264a.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .220; Tab., I I ,  p .603; Kufi, I, fo l. 264b.
3. Tab ., II, p.603 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Wellhausen, Die Religios-
Poiitischen Oppositioa&pqrteien im alten Islam, p .76.
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speech stirred up his audiences who opposed him openly and strongly, so 
that he was forced to announce at the end of the speech that he would 
adopt any policy to please them. ^
This opposition to the new governor showed clearly the latter's 
weakness and the attitude of the ShM a towards Ibn a l-Zu bair, and also 
how strong al-M ukhtar and his followers had become.
However, this strength of al-Mukhtar did not escape the shrewd 
eyes of I'yas ibn Mudarib a !-* I j l i ,  who was at the head of the Shurta 
(police); he warned the governor by informing him that those who opposed 
him were the followers of al-Mukhtar. He also advised him to imprison 
al-M ukhtar, for news had come to him that the latter was planning to seize
— 2  — r-‘j  _
al-K ufa . Consequently Ib n M u ti*  sent Za ida ibn Oudama gl-Thaqafi, 
a kinsman of al-M ukhtar, and Husain ibn ( Abdallah al-Bursumi from the tribe 
of Hamdan, to ask al-M ukhtar to come and meet the governor. Za ida ibn 
Oudama, who was an intimate friend of al-Mukhtar and remained faithful 
to him even after his death, hinted to al-M ukhtar, by reciting a certain 
verse from the Q ur'an, not to go. Al-M ukhtar pretended that he was sick 
and asked the two men to inform the governor of this and apologise on his 
behalf.^
1. Ansab, V ,  p .221; Tab., I I ,  p .604; Kufi, I, fo l. 264b,
2. Tab ., I I ,  p .604 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, I, fo l. 264b.
3. Tab., II, p .604; Kufi, I, fo l. 264b.
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At this time al -Mukhtar began to prepare to seize a l-K ufa in
Muharram 66 /August 685 and sent for his followers to gather in the houses
around him. But as he was busy planning, a group of Shi* a among his
followers began to suspect his claim of being sent to them by Ibn al-Hanafiyya
and decided to go to Mecca to question the latter about the authenticity of
al-Mukhtar's claim. Ibn a l-ljanafiyya  answered that he wished for God to
take his revenge on his enemies, through whatever instrument He liked. ^
The delegation considered this vague and non-committal answer from ibn
al—Hanafiyya as permission from them to support al-M ukhtar, on the grounds • 1
that if  Ibn al-Hanafiyya did not approve al-Mukhtar's activity he would
have ordered them not to join him.
A ll this inquiry was taking place without the knowledge of al-Mukhtar,
When he learnt of it, be became very worried, fearing that Ibn al-Hanafiyya
might have given them a reply which would be injurious to his plans. He
therefore wished to revolt before the coming of the delegation but was not 
2
able to.
After a month the delegation came back and told al-M ukhtar that Ibn
1. Ansab, V , p .222; Ya*qubi , I I ,  p .308; Tab., II, pp .305-6 (citing Abu
Mikhnaf); Kufi, I, fols 265a-265b. The* delegation were :*  Abd al-Rahman 
ibrTShuraih al-Sh ibam i, 5a*id ibn Munqidh al-Thaw ri, Si*r ibn AbTSi*r 
al-HanafT, al-Aswad ibn Jarad al-KindT and Qudama ibn M alik  a l-  
JushamT. Here again all of them were Yemenites.
2. Tab., I I ,  p .608 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
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Ibn al-Hanafiyya ordered them to support him. A l-M ukhtar, in re lie f, 
summoned the Shi* a for a general meeting at which he announced the 
approval of Ibn al-Hanafiyya of his mission. This was confirmed by the
head of the delegation and his companions, who delivered speeches on this
. 1 occasion.
It cannot be doubted that the favourable reply of Ibn al-Hanafiyya
brought by the delegation enhanced al-Mukhtar's prestige and increased his
followers. For it encouraged those who were in doubt of al-Mukhtar's claims
to be an agent of Ibn al-Hanafiyya to come to his camp, or at least to
sympathise with him. The celebrated traditionist al-Sha*bi and his father
Shurahbil were among those hesitators who responded to al-M ukhtar after 
2
this event.
In order to face the governor Ibn Muti* and the Ashraf of Kufa,
al-M ukhtar had to win the support of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar. The latter was
the son of M a lik  ibn al-H arith  al-Ashtar, one of the noblemen of the tribe
• 1 1 ■■■
of al-tNakha* from M adhhij, and a great supporter of ( A li. Like his father, 
Ibrahim was a man of great influence among his tribe's members. He was with 
his father on Al i's side in the battle of Siffi n and remained faithful to ‘ AM 
and his family. It is not easy to account for the failure of Ibrahim to
1. Ansab, V ,  pp .211-2; Tab ., II, pp .608-609 (citing Abu Mikhnaf);
Kufi, I ,  fo l. 265b. * —
2. Jab ., i l ,  p .609 (citing al-Sha* b l); KufT, I, fo l.265b.
associate himself with Sulaiman ibn Surad's movement or with that of a l -
1M ukhtat at the beginning. Wellhausen suggests that Ibrahim "did not
believe in Shi* ism as it was at that time. " It is probably because Ibrahim
did not trust either leader and considered himself at least their equal, if
not more competent than both. This view is confirmed by the answer he
gave to the followers of al-Mukhtar when they asked him to join the latter's 
2
movement . A l-M ukhtar had sent to him notables of the Shi*a and in­
fluential men among his followers, among whom was the famous al-Sha'bi 
and his father. When they asked Ibrahim to join them he agreed only if 
they would place the leadership in his hands. The delegation considered 
this an impossible demand* since al-Mukhtar had been sent to them by a l -  
Mahdi. But a l-M ukhtar, hearing of Ibrahim's terms, wished to make a 
compromise with him, and could only do so, given his followers' belief in 
his mission, in an indirect way. After only three days, he and some of his 
followers went to Ibrahim, bearing a letter purporting to be from Ibn a l -  
Hanafiyya to Ibrahim. In the letter Ibn al-H anafiyya, calling himself 
a l-M ah d i, asked Ibrahim to recognize al-Mukhtar and support him. In 
return, besides God's reward, Ibrahim would have the command of the cavalry
1* Die Religios Poiitischen Qppositiorvfrparteienim alten Islam, p .77.
2. Ansab, V , p .222; DTnawari, p .296; Tab., II, p .609 (citing A l-  
Sha*bT); KufT, I, fo l. 266a.
3. Ansab, V ,  p .222; Tab. ,1 1 , p .609 (citing al-Sha*b i); Kufi, I ,  fo l. 
226a (citing al-Sha*b7).
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and Invading armies, and all the lands lying between Kufa and Syria,
which would be conquered by him. If he did not comply with this letter, he
would meet a terrible fate. ^
-2Ibn Sa'd and Dinawari , however, give a somewhat different version 
of this event. They mention only one meeting, in which the letter was 
presented by al-M ukhtar to Ibrahim. Dinawari inserts here that the lead 
seal of the letter was new, as if if had been sealed the night before. They 
also write that a ll those with al-Mukhtar bore witness to Ibrahim that they 
saw Ibn al-Hanafiyya writing the letter; and the latter accepted it without 
any objection. Moreover, in the version of a l-D inaw ari, the beginning of
the letter makes no mention of the title  Mahdi. It seems that the detailed
3 _
accounts of Tabari and Ibn A* tham are taken from Baladhuri, the more
accurate version, since it is more likely that al-M ukhtar would not have
written any letter to Ibrahim had the latter not refused the first time.
There are many reasons to make us doubt the authenticity of this letter,
4although Wellhausen has accepted if as genuine. Firstly, there is the 
offer which Ibn al-H anafiyya made to Ibrahim, giving almost the same terms
1. Ansab, V ,  pp .222-3; Tab ., I I ,  pp .610-11; Kufi, I, fols. 266a-266b.
2. Sa*d, V , pp .72 -3 ; Dinawari, pp .296-7 (citing al-Sha‘ b7).
3. Tab., I I ,  p.6Q9ff. ;  Kufi, I, fol. 266a.
4 . Die Religios-Politischen OppositionAparteien im alten Islam, p .77.
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as Ibrahim had demanded for his support to al-M ukhtar. Another factor
is the brief span of time which lapsed between the first meeting with
Ibrahim and al-Mukhtar's presentation of the letter. Moreover, the
wording of the letter itself was suspicious even to Ibrahim, who asked a l-
Mukhtar for an explanation; he also made a l-$ha*b i approve the 
1witnesses' claim that the letter was written by Ibn al-H anafiyya. The 
witnesses and al-Mukhtar's explanation satisfied Ibrahim, and he placed 
his services in the hands of al-M ukhtar, by attending meetings in the 
latter's house.
2Al-Mubarrad says that before giving his support to al-Mukhtar 
Ibrahim wrote to Ibn al-Hanafiyya for his approval, and the latter -  as 
usual -  answered him in a vague way, which Ibrahim interpreted as
1. Ansab, V ,  £"223 (citing al-Shq*bi); Tab ., I I ,  pp .611-12 (citing a l -  
Sha*bt); Kufi, I, fols. 266a-267b, DTnawarT (pp .297-98) reports that 
al-Sha‘ bi wanted to make sure whether the evidence given by witnesses 
was right or not, and he therefore asked them one by one; they all con­
firmed that they saw Ibn al-Hanafiyya write the letter. Unsatisfied 
with this, he went to Abu *Amra Kaisan. On asking him the same 
question, he said that he did not see Ibn al-Hanafiyya writing the 
letter, but they believed al-Mukhtar to be trustworthy. At this, the 
story says, a i-S h a ^ i became sure that the letter was fabricated by a l-  
Mukhtar, and therefore left Kufa for H ijaz , and did not take part in 
the wars of al-M ukhtar. However, the fact that a l-Sha( bT did not 
leave Kufa, but remained there until the end of al-Jvfukhtar, makes us 
doubt the story, which W . Rajkowski, (Early ShT< ism in Iraq, p. 174, 
Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1955), accepted as true; while K. Fariq 
accepted the first part of the story only. See The Story of an Arab 
Diplomat, p .77, S ll, I I I ,  no .2, 1966.
2. Mubarrad, I I I ,  p .267.
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permission to join a I -Mukhtar. it seems difficult to accept this account since 
it is not confirmed in either the early or the late sources. Moreover, the 
answer which Ibn al-Hanafiyya is said to have written to Ibrahim is the same 
as that he gave to the Kufan delegation when they inquired about al-Mukhtar's 
claim, to represent him, which makes us think that al-Mubarrad had confused 
the two events.
The date of the revolt had been decided by al-M ukhtar and his
followers, as being Thursday 14 th Rab7‘ a l-A w w al, 66/Tuesday 19th October
685. Al-Mukhtar's preparations for the revolt again did not escape the eyes
of lyas ibn Mudarib, the police officer of the governor Ibn M u ti* , but it seems ;r,
he did not know the exact date. He advised the governor to send a reliable
2
man to every “Jabbana" in Kufa to secure the city; he sent his own son
Rashjd ibn lyas toal-K unasa, the Hamdan Jabbanat al-Subai‘ , KhatMam
Jabbanat Bishr, Kinda their own Jabbana, A l-A zd Jabbanat al-Sa* idiyyTn,
Murad their own Jabbana, Shamir ibn dhul Jawshan Jabbant Salim and 
T  4Shabath ibn Rabf i to al-Sabkha. If is only Madhhij and Asad who did not 
join the forces of the governor; the former, perhaps, because of Ibn al-Ashtar,
1* Ansab/ V ,  p .223; Tab., I I ,  p .613 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I, fol. 267a;
Kamil, IV , p. 178.*
2. Places in Kufa were used as cemeteries. Each tribe had its own Jabbana.
See Nihgyq, l> pp .236-237; ibn Manzur, Lisan a l - ‘ Arab, X I I I ,  p .85; 
AI-ZubaidT, Taj a l- f Arus, IX , p. 159; K. Al-JanabT, TakhfTt a l-K ufa , p. 93, 
Baghdad, 1969.
3. A name of a place in Kufa. Ibn Manzur, op. c i t . , IV , p .199; A l-Zuba id i,
op. c i f . , IV / p .235.
4. A name of a place in Kufa. Ibn Manzur, op. c it . ,  I l l ,  p .24; AI-ZubaidT,
op* c i t . ,  I I ,  p .261.
while being in the same "Khums"^ w ith Madhhij led Asad to take the same 
position. A ll these measures were taken on Monday, three days before the 
exact date of the revolt.
On Tuesday evening 12th Rabi ‘ a l-A w w al, 66/17th October, 685, Ibrahim, 
accompanied by about a hundred of his followers hiding their weapons went, as 
usual, to al-Mukhtar's house. He made no attempt to avoid the governor's 
forces, perhaps to show off his bravery. On his way there he met lyas ibn 
Mudarib with the Shurta, who tried to prevent him from passing and demanded 
his surrender to the governor. Ibrahim answered this by killing the police officer, 
lyas, and his police followers were dispersed. Ibrahim continued to march 
towards al-Mukhtar's house. There he reported the death to al-Mukhtar and 
showed him the head of lyas; al-M ukhtar was pleased to hear of it. But this 
action caused him to declare the revolt one day earlier than planned. A l-  
Mukhtar informed his followers that the revolt was already starting, by ordering 
a fire to be lit  in the reeds, and by the shouting of the slogan: "Ya Mansur 
A m it" ,(  ^ -_ ^j> ) and "Ya Li Tharat al-Husain"^ ( o —*— ^  ^  UJ L-).
The fact that a I -Mukhtar used as his war-cry "Ya Mansur Amit" is not 
without significance. Al-Mansur is a messiah awaited by the Yemenites to restore
1. Tribal organization made by Z iyad ibn Abih. See Masignon, Explication  
Du Plan de Kufa (Iraq), p .345, M M , I I I ,  1935-40.
2. Ansab, V , p .225; Jabr , I I ,  pp .215-16 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, II, 
fols. 2 a -2 b.
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their power.  ^ Since the Yemenites were the dominant element among the
supporters of al-M ukhtar, this war-cry was therefore an appeal to  their
2messianic aspirations.
The death of lyas ibn Mudarib aroused the Rabija tribe and they
threatened to avenge him by killing Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar. But it would
-  3appear from the verses of Suraqa ibn Mirdas, that the Yemenite tribes were 
strong enough to protect him.
Al-M ukhtar tried to cause as little  blood-shed as possible. This 
strategy can be seen clearly in his instructions to Ibrahim. He ordered 
him to try his best to bypass the governor's forces, and to fight only when he
4
was attacked. On Wednesday morning 13th Rabi* a l-A w w al, 66/ l 8 th 
October, 685, al-M ukhtar with his followers were stationed near "Dair 
Hind" in the Sabkhal His army contained about five hundred mawali under 
their own Am ir.^
To counter him the governor sent Shabath ibn Rab* i al-Tamimi with
i)
three thousand men to al-Sabkha, and Rashid ibn lyas with four thousand
1. Shams, p. 103; A l-H am dani, Ik l i l , V I I I ,  p .58.
2. B. Lewis, The Regnal Titles of the First ‘ Abbasid Caliphs, p. 17,
ZHPV, 1968.
3. Diwan, pp .82 -3 ; Ansab, V , 267 (citing Mada, in i).
4 . Tab ., II, p.617 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
5. Ib id ., I I ,  p p .62 2&  627 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fol. 3b.
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from the Shurta to Jabbanat Murad. Consequently al-M ukhtar sent Ibrahim 
with nine hundred men to meet Rashid, N u( aim ibn Hubaira with three hundred 
cavalry men and six hundfed infantry against Shabath, and Yazid ibn Anas 
with nine hundfed men as his vanguard. Shabath's troops began to retreat 
in front of al-Mukhtar's forces. In order to incite them Shabath shouted 
. ,  Why are you fleeing from your slaves?" Hearing this, the soldiers came 
back and fought hard against the mawali who were in the army of al-M ukhtar. ^
They put to death any of the mawali whom they captured while they allowed the
2 -  ‘ Arab captives to flee , and therefore al-Mukhtar's army found itself in a
difficult position. At this time the governor sent re-enforcements, two thousand
under Yazid ibn al-H arith  ibn Ruwaim. Al-Mukhtar's cavalry was under Yazid
ibn Anas, while he himself was leading the infantry.
Meanwhile, Ibrahim had defeated Rashid ibn lyas and killed him, and
then came to the help of a l-M ukhtar. This had the effect of ^ncourayiny
the followers of al-Mukhtar and discouraged those of Shabath. Then the
Governor sent Hassan ibn Fa* id ibn Bakr aMAbsi with about two thousand 
«
men to help his troops in preventing Ibrahim from reaching al-M ukhtar. But
Hassan was defeated and Ibrahim continued his march. As soon as Ibrahim •
appeared, Shabath's troops began to retreat until they reached ibn M u ti‘ , 
who was in despair after receiving the news of the death of Rashid ibn lyas.
1. Tab., I I ,  p .623 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, I I, fo l. 3b.
2. Tab., II, p .623; Kufi, II, fo l. 3b,
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Then the defeated forces gathered again in the Kunasa, but were again
defeated by Ibrahim. The governor and the Ashraf flew to the palace where
they were besieved for three days. On the evening of the third day, Ibn-
M u ti‘ left the palace and went to the house of Abu Musa ,a l-A sh ‘ ari, where
he hid himself,^ while the Ashraf asked Ibrahim for "Aman". They were
granted if and submitted themselves to al-M ukhtar.
A l-M ukhtar spent the night in the palace and next morning ascended
the minbar in the mosque where he delivered a speech, after which he received
the "bai'a" from the Ashraf and the others. This “bai‘ a" was based on the Book
of God (Qur’ an) and the Sunna of the prophet; the revenge of “Ahl a l-B ait";
war against "a l-M u h illin "  (those who regard the blood of the Prophet's family
as lic it , i .e .  the Umayyads and their supporters); the defence of the weak;
the war with those who sought war with him, and peace with those who sought 
2
peace with him.
Kufa was a suitable place for a revolt at this time. Its population was
a mixture of different elements: ‘ Arabs, mainly from South Arabia, Persians,
3
Syria.cs, Nabateans, Christians and Jews. The ‘ Arabs also differed among 
themselves. While the Tamim and Tay were Beduins, Rabi‘ a (Bakr and Asad) 
were semi-Beduin and Christian-influenced, while ‘ Abd a l-Q a is  were Persian
1. Ansab, V ,  pp. 226-28; T a b ., II, pp.625-31 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, 11,
fols. 3a, 3b, 4a , 4b, 5a, 5b and 6 a.
2. Ansab, V , p .228; T ab ., I I ,  p .633; K u fi, I I ,  fo l. 5b.
3. Futuh , p .280; N ihq ya , IV , p .208; V ,  p. 9 , Ibn Manzur, op. c i t . , V I I ,
p .411; A I-ZubaidT, op. c i t . ,  V ,  p .329; M a la t i , I I ,  p .2034; 
Muntakhabat, p. 101; K. al-JanabT, op. c i t . ,  p .41 ff.
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influenced.^ To these differences in culture must be added the differences
in creeds. No wonder, therefore, that the population of Kufa was turbulent,
-  2dissatisfied and opposed to the Government and the Ashraf.
As for the nature of the support which al-M ukhtar received in Kufa,
at this stage of his revolt it was mainly from the W abs. Members from nearly
all the CArab tribes of al-K ufa participated in it. Members of a l-N akh a ‘ ,
Hamdan, Banu Nahd, Shakir, Khath‘ am, Shibam, Asad, Hanifa, ‘ Abs,
3Waliba of a l-A zd , M uzaina, Bakr and Ahmas, are said to have been his 
supporters.
This major ‘ Arab support was due not only to their Shi‘ a sentiment but also
to their opposition to the Ashraf. It was only a small number of the mawali who
-  . 4joined al-M ukhtar at this time, only five hundred. This small number of
mawali supporters may have been due to the strong hold of their masters, the
Ashraf, upon them. This becomes clear when we consider that their support to
al-M ukhtar grew rapidly after the seizure of al-K ufa and the “bai‘ a 11 of the
Ashraf. Moreover, they were doubtless encouraged by his success in gaining
5power. It is not true, though, as Brocklemann has said, that this victory in
1. Masignon, op. c i t . ,  p .342, M M , II I ,  1935-40.
2. B. Lewis, The Origins of isma^ilism, pp. 25-26.
3. Ansab, V ,  p .227; Tab ., II, p .619ff; K jf l ,  I I, fols. 2a-5b.
4 . Tab., I I ,  p ,627 . Their number at this time in Kufa was forty thousand.
See DTnawari, p. 307.
5. Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, p .79, London, 1964.
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Kufa represents the victory of the Persians over the ‘ Arabs. Even in the 
later stages of the revolt, al-M ukhtar did not defend the mawali because
they were Persians, but because they had many social grievances (Du‘ afa’ )
which al -Mukhtar could rectify to gain their support for his own ends.
Since he took hold of a l-K ufa he tried to reconcile all parties and show
justice and peace to everyone. To Ibn M u ti‘ , who was hiding himself, a l -
Mukhtar sent one hundred thousand dirhams and asked him to leave Kufa. ^
This however may have been due to the fact that he was a relative of ‘ Umar
ibn a l-K hattab , whose son ‘ Abdullah was married to Safya, the sister of a l-
Mukhtar. It is probabt y to gain the moral support of his brother-in-law ,
or at least his silence, that al-M ukhtar sent expensive gifts to Ibn ‘ Umar.
It may be added that Ibn M u t i ‘ and al-M ukhtar had been friends during the
time that al-M ukhtar was in a l-H ija z .
In the treasury of Kufa he found nine million dirhams. He gave those
who took part in the seizure of the palace five hundred each: they were three
thousand, eight hundred men. For six thousand who joined him later, he gave two 
2hundred each.
In his attempt to show toleration to all parties, he did not allow his
1. Ansab, V , p .228; Dinawari, p .299; Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  p .308; Tab., II, p .633
(citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 6 a (he makes it ten thousand only).
2. Ansab, V ,  p .228; Tab ., I I ,  p .634 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
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followers to k ill anyone,  ^ He tried his best to make himself popular 
to the Ashraf by offering them the most important posts. He appointed 
‘ Abdallah ibn Kamil a l-Shakiri, as a police officer (‘ Ala'Shurtathi), 
Muhammad ibn ‘ Umair ibn ‘ Utarid he appointed as governor of 
Adhrbijan; ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ id ibn Qais, governor of Musil;
Ishaq ibn Mas‘ ud governor of al-M ada* in and Jukhi, Qudama ibn 
Abi ‘ Isa ibn Rabi‘ a a l-N a s ri- .a confederate of Thaqif — governor of
Bihqubadh q l-A ‘ lcT; Sa‘ id ibn Hudhaifa ibn al-Yam an, governor of
T _ _ 2  
Halwan; Habib ibn Munqidh af-Thawri, governor of Bihqubadh ai-A sfal,
? - -  -  3and Yazid ibn Najba a l-Fazari, governor of Ray and Dastihti. He
4
also gave the Ashraf pre-eminence in his court and even asked Muhammad
5ibn al-Ash‘ ath to work as a judge for him.
1 . Al-Mundhur ibn Hassan al-Dabbi after paying homage to a l -  
Mukhtar, was killed with his son by one of al -Mukhtar *,s 
enthusiastic followers on the grounds that he was one of the 
Jabbarin (tyrants). When al-Mukhtar heard of this, he very 
strongly opposed it. See Ansab, V , p. 228; T a b ., I I ,  p .633 
(citing Abu Mikhnaf).
2 . This, however, either did not take place or was of a short duration, 
for we see him on the 22nd Dhul H ajja , 66 / 20th. July, 6 8 6 , on 
the "Rub* of Hamdan in the army of IbrahTm ibn al-Ashtar, who 
went to fight Ibn Ziyad.
3. Ansab, V ,  p .228; DTnawarT, p .300; T a b ., I I ,  p .634-35. However, 
the list of DinawarT differs from that of Tabari in these respects: he 
gives the governorship of Arjan to Muhammad ibn ‘ Uthman a l -  
TamimT, and makes ‘ Abdallah ibn al-H arith  the governor of Mahin  
and Hamadan, He mentions the name of lEn M a lik  al-Bakraw! as 
the governor of Halwan and Masbdan, and Zahr ibn Qais as the 
governor of Jukhi.
4 , T a b ., I I ,  pp .633.
5* Ansab, V , p. 229.
102.
Nevertheless, al-M ukhtar also worked to defend the weak, as
he had stated in his "baMa-11. According to Islam all Muslims are equal
regardless of their nationality or race.^ In practice, in this period the
‘ Arabs did not allow the non-* Arab Muslims the rights which Islam granted
them. The * Arabs monopolized the high posts in society, such as the
2
offices of judge, or of leadership in the army or in prayer. They con­
sidered only the army and commerce as fit professions for themselves; 
the mawali, on the other hand, were mainly engaged in manual labour, 
in agriculture or industry. Although the mawali were used as infantry in 
the army, they were not enrolled on the register (Diwan), and therefore 
not usually paid. Even when they were paid, it was at a rate far below that
3 - ?of their ‘ Arab masters. The social inferiority of the mawali was regularized
by the custom that they should not be addressed by a uKunyaM, but by their
4
own name or “ Laqab11, with a few exceptions. Neither were they allowed 
to marry ‘ Arab women, and the children of an ‘ Arab man and a mawala woman 
did not receive an equal inheritance to that of the pure-‘ Arab children; 
according to the principle of "K a fa 'a r,the ‘ Arabs were equal only to the ‘ Arab
1 . Q u r'a n , X L IX , 13.
2. ‘ Iqd, I I I ,  pp .412-13 .
3. Futub, p .457; Y a ‘ qub7, II, p. 213; KufT, II, fols. 159b-160a,
Agh. , V I ,  p .5 , N ihqya, I, p .363; lmta‘ , I I I ,  p. 183.
4 . ‘ Iqd, I I I ,  p .413.
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and the mawali to the mawali.  ^ The mawali must ask their patron's con­
sent before choosing a w ife. The exemption from the* A ta ', and the inferior
social status of the mawali under the Umayyads, made many of them ready
to join any opposition movement against the regime and the ‘ Arab sovereignty,
in a claim for equality and justice. They, as well as some ‘ Arabs, especially
those unprivileged ones, not only participated in the Shi‘ i movements but
2  -  t  3also associated themselves with the Kharijites. Professor a l-D uri , how­
ever, thinks that these examples in our sources which show an inferior social 
status for the mawali were the exceptions rather than the rule, and therefore 
do not represent the reason for their resentment to ‘ Arab rule. The real cause 
in his view was born of an a n t i- ‘ Arab, racial pride, in their Persian descend 
(Shu‘ ubi). While not denying this factor, especially in the ‘ Abbasid and 
later Umayyad periods, it is d ifficult to see it as the main reason in the 
period under consideration. The fact that the ‘ Arabs did allow the odd 
mawali in the diwans, and the rare examples of them holding the office of 
army leader or judge were of a short duration only, and not without opposition 
on the part of the ‘ Arabs. That only a few managed to achieve a high position 
is clear on the consideration that the number of mawali in Kufa was
1 . A l-H in d i, Kanz al ~* Ummal, V I I I ,  pp. 247-48; Sarakhsi, al-M abgut,
V ,  p p .22 -9 ; also ‘ Iqd, I I I ,  p .417; Mubarrad, IV , p. 16; Agh. , X IV , 
p. 150 (citing al-Zubair ibn Bakkar); N ihayo, I I I ,  p. 112.
Ansab, fol. 216; Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  p. 262; Goldziher, op. c i t . , p. 130.
3. Al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyya lil Shu‘ ubiyya, p. 1 5 ff ., Beirut, 1962.
104.
forty-thou sand. ^
These social disabilities had a religious offshoot, very relevant
in this context. The almost universal attraction of oppressed peoples to
2messianic and millenarian ideas operated here also: both * Arab and non-
‘ Arab (mawali) among the unpriveleged groups turned to their pre-Islamic
beliefs and grafting them on to their new faith, gave rise to the belief in
a Mahdi who would “fill the earth with justice and equity as it is now filled
3 -
with tyranny and oppression11. A l-M ukhtar exploited this religious need with
1 . The number of the mawali at the time when Kufa was built, was 
four thousand. Prior to the battle of SiffTn their number increased 
to eight thousand. During the time of al-M ukhtar and especially 
before the battle of Jabbant al-Subai4, they were forty thousand.
See Futob , p .279; DTnawarl, p .307; Tab., I I ,  pp .371-72. There
is a chance narrative in Baladhur! (Ansab, fo l. 499a, citing M ada’ ini) 
and repeated by Ibn < Abd RaEEih (* Iqd, H I, p .314), which makes it 
possible that for once that DTnawarT Is not exaggerating. The 
narrative says that the number of the mawalT became so large that it 
raised the attention of both the caliph M uf awiya and his governor 
Ziyad. The figure must have been of a big proportion of the popula­
tion, when we consider that the number of the Muqatila in the city 
was only eighty thousand, according to Jab ., (II, p .433, citing 
i Umar ibn Shabba).
2. Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed, p .4 . (Translated by Lisa
Sergio), London, 1963; M . Weber, The Sociology of Religion, p. 108; 
(translated by Ephraim Fischoff), London, 1966; Norman Cohn, The 
Pursuit of the Millennium , p .2 0 ff . , London, 1962.
3. B. Lewis, An Apocalyptic Vision of Islamic History, p .308, BSOAS, 
X I I I ,  1950.
105.
his claims to represent Ibn a l-H an ifiyya , as the Mahdi; this he backed up
by attempting to reform the social situation.
Al-M ukhtar made it legal for the mawali to share the fai* with
1the ( Arabs, and to ride on horses; He even appointed a mawla of ‘ llraina,
*  2  Kaisan, Abu ‘ Amra, as the leader of his personal guard. This was possibly
because he trusted him more than the others and because he was the most
influential of his mawali supporters. A l-M ukhtar also declared that any slave
5who came to him would be free. No wonder, therefore, the number of the 
mawali and slaves among his supporters became very large. After starting
4as only five hundred at the beginning of the revolt, nearly all of the mawali 
had joined him at the height of his power. Credit must be given to a l-
Mukhtar for his early understanding that the mawali were an important
5 -  -  6  -political element in the society. A l-M ada^ni reports that al-M nghira ibn
1. Tab ., I I ,  p p .649 ff. (citing Abu Mikhnaf) & 724; Kufi, II, fo ls .!5b ,
1 8a.
2 . Ansab, V , p .229; Tab., I I ,  p .634 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
3. Ansab, V , p. 267 (citing Mada* ini).
4 . See p. Y1
5. Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Cppositioa&parteien im alten
Islam, p. 95.
6 . Ansab, V , p. 223.
Shu* ba was the first to attract the attention of al-Mukhtar to the Persians' 
pro-*A lid  sympathies and to the fact that by addressing them by the name of 
the family of the Prophet, he could make out of them a great political power.
Why did al-M ukhtar, after proclaiming his desire to revenge the 
killing of al-Husain, abandon this on achieving power, and instead work to 
reconcile both the Ashraf and the mawali ? It seems that al-Mukhtar was more 
concerned to achieve a stable state of affairs in the c ity , than he was to carry 
out the revenge. For the Syrian army under < Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad was 
advancing towards Musi I, and he was threatened by Ibn al-Zubair both 
from Basra and H ijaz . It would have been political myopia to involve himself 
in a c iv il war by attacking the Ashraf, in addition to these outside threats.
There was a contradiction, however, in an attempt to reconcile 
both the Ashraf and the mawali. By relying on the mawali and considering 
them as equal to their masters, al-Mukhtar was undermining the whole social 
structure on which Ashraf domination was based. The vested interests of a l-  
Ashraf were opposed to the mawatPs interests and al-M ukhtar could only 
reconcile the former by betraying the latter and dishonouring his promises. 
When al-m awali noticed al-Mukhtar trying to reconcile the Ashraf, they 
resented it , and communicated this to Abu * Amra Kaisan, their chief and the 
head of the personal guard of al-M ukhtar, saying, "(al-M ukhtar) is too 
courteous to the * Arabs (Ashraf) and see how indifferent he is to us.” When 
this reached al-M ukhtar, he answered, "Tell them not to be upset, for you
belong to me and I to you. 11 Then he recited the following verse from the
Q ur'an: MWe shall punish the criminals1' ( a/ ^  This
answer satisfied the mawali for his hostile intentions to the Ashraf. A l-
Mukhtar realized that he could not for long ingratiate himself with both sides.
Shabath ibn Rab i^ communicated the grievances of the Ashraf to al-M ukhtar
prior to the battle of Jabbant al-SubaK 66 / 6 8 6 : the most important of these
- - 2was that al-M ukhtar had made the mawali and slaves equal to the Ashraf.
When al-M ukhtar replied with the question, that if he gave them back their
mawali and again distributed the fa i' among them alone, would they promise
to fight Ibn a l-Zubair and the Syrians with him, they refused to do so. This
indication of the hostility of al-Ashraf towards him confirmed him in his choice
of relying on mawali support, rather than on al-Ashraf. It seems it was the
political circumstances which determined al-Mukhtar's choice to take the side
of the m aw ali, and not any genuine conviction on his part, as Levi Della Vida  
3
presumes.
There are two accounts of al-Mukhtar's activities in Basra: the
4 -  -  -  5first is that of Baiadhuri, and the second that of Mada' ini in Tabari which
1. Tab ., I I ,  p .634 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
2. Tab ., II, p .650; Kufi, II, fol. 15b.
3. E. I, \  (al-M ukhtar).
4 . Ansab, V , pp. 244-45.
5. Tab ., I I ,  p p .680-83 (citing a l-M ad a 'in i).
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is repeated briefly by Ibn a-A th ir and Nuw airi.  ^ According to
T  “  . . T  2Bqladhuri, al-Muthanna ibn Mukhatfiba a l-*  Abdi met al-M ukhtar
after the return of the Tawwabun from the battle of * Ain al-W arda, in K ufa,
where he paid homage to him. He told him that he had supporters in Basra,
and if al-M ukhtar agreed, he would go there to enroll them for him.
According to Tabari, al-Muthanna himself took part in the battle of * Ain
al-W arda. When he returned from the battle to Kufa, he found al-Mukhtar
in prison, and he paid homage to him there. On al-Mukhtar's release, he
ordered al-Muthanna to go to Basra to rally the people for him. AI-Muthanna's
answer to the call of Sulaiman to participate in the battle, although he arrived
too late,is  probably the reason for a l-M ada'in i saying that he actually fought
at * Ain al-W arda. Whether it was al-Mukhtar's or al-Muthanna's idea that
the latter should go to Basra to rally the people, is not an important point, for
in either case it was certainly with al-Mukhtar's approval.
1. Kam il, IV , p p .201-2; Nuw airi, X IX , fols. 25 -6 .
2. Al-Muthanna ibn Mukharriba a l-*  Abdi (from the tribe of *Abd 
al-Q aisJ, was an old partisan of *A li who fought for him in the 
battle of the Camel and supported him against Mu* awiya. He 
also joined the movement of al-Tawwabun, but like the Shi*a of 
M ada'in  did not reach the baffle field in due time. See”Ansab, 
fol. 176a (citing Abu Mikhnaf); fols. 179a, 207b; V ,  p .211 
(citing Abu M ikhnaf); Tab*., I I, p .568 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
Baladhuri then writes that al-Muthana went to Ba§ra, and took 
a mosque as the centre of his activities there. Tabari writes that he made 
his camp near Madinat al-R izq, a place not mentioned by name in Baladhuri. 
Both narratives then say that the governor, a l-jjjuba*, hearing of the sub­
versive activities of al-Muthanna sent against him *Abbad ibn ai-Husain a l-
Habti, a police officer from the tribe of Tamim, with a troop of horsemen.
» •
Tabari also states that *Abbad was accompanied by Q ais ibn al-Haitham , 
who stationed himself in the Sabkha. in Baladhuri's account, *Abbad was 
defeated btj one of al-Muthanna's generals. In Tabari, al-Muthanna and most 
of his followers left their camp and stationed themselves opposite *Abbad's 
forces. The latter left Qais ibn al-Haitham there, while he and a small group 
of followers went to Madinat al-R izq, and managed to place thirty of his men 
on the roof of the city w ail. He ordered them to wait until they heard the 
shout", "Allahu Akbar", a sign that battle had begun. Then * Abbad returned 
to al-Sabtfkha to join Qais ibn al-Haitham , and attacked al-Muthanna. M ean­
while those on the roof of Madinat a l-R izlj, hearing the shouting, attacked the 
remnant of al-M uthanna‘s forces there. This led to the defeat and flight of a l-  
Muthanna's followers both in Sabkha and Madinat al-R izq.
To return to Baladhuri's narrative, after ‘ Abbad's defeat, the 
Governor sent another general against al-Muthanna, a l-A hnaf ibn Qais, the 
Tamimite chief, with men from Mudar, hostile to the tribe of *Abd a!-Q ais , 
a Yemenite tribe. This action caused tribal rivalries to flare up again, and
the situation became critical when two tribes sided with al-M uthanna; 
the tribe of Bakr ibn Wc?M led by M alik  ibn Misma*, and a l-A zd led by 
Ziyad ibn i Amr al 4 Afrkl. This support was not because of their sympathy for 
al-Muthanna's cause but because of tribal passion and the loyalty (Hamiyya) 
felt by them towards the tribe of e Abd al-Q ais .^  The ‘ Abd a l-Q ais  and 
Bakr were living near to each other in the north of Basra. But 4Abdallah 
ibn Muti * and e Amr ibn 4 Abd al-Rahman ibn a l-H arith  ibn Hisham a l -  
Makhzumt (the two ex-governors of Ibn a l-Zubair in Kufa) intervened as 
peace makers between the two opposing parties and a settlement was 
reached, specifying that al-Muthanna should leave Basra and return to Kufa.
According to Tabari, this settlement was reached as a result of 
the Governor sending al-Ahnaf ibn Qais and ‘ Amr ibn 4 Abd al-Rahman a l -  
Makhzumi to al-M uthanna, after Ziyad ibn ‘ Amr a l - ‘ AfkT had threatened 
the governor*s forces with attack by the Azd if  he did not withdraw from 
the quarter of 4 Abd a l-Q a is . The government's forces under ‘ Abbad were 
advancing on this quarter where al-Muthanna and his followers had taken 
refuge after their defeat by 4 Abbad.
The account of Tabari would seem to be more likely than that of 
Baladhuri in the matter of whether or not e Abbad was defeated: al-Muthanna's
1* This perhaps was because of the "H ilf" (alliance) between a l - ‘ Azd
and Bakr. Naga* ?J, II, p. 729; Ansab, IV , p. 105; Tab., I I ,  p .446 
(citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).
2. A I - ‘ Al7, Khftat a I-Basra, p .291 , Sumer, V I I I ,  i i ,  1952.
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forces were numerically far weaker than the governor's, and the tribes,
apart from the small ‘ Abd a l-Q a is , were all anti-Sh i‘ i; which makes
Baladhuri's account of ‘ Abbad's defeat seem suspicious. Moreover, a l -
Mada* ini is a reliable authority on matters concerning the region of Basra
1and the Eastern Provinces, while the narrative of Baladhuri comes to us 
without any chain of authority.
As for the nature of the support which al-Muthanna found in Basra,
it is stated in Baladhuri that when al-Muthanna made the mosque the centre
T  2 Tof his activities, the Shi‘ a gathered round him. Tabari, however, says
that those who came to him were only his own people from the tribe of ‘ Abd
3  _
a l-Q a is , Neither of our sources mention any mawali support for al-Muthanna's
movement: this may be because the 4 Arabs had a strong hold on them in Basra.
Basra in its political attitude was described as ‘ Uthmanite, that is, a n ti- ‘ A lid .
This anti^Alid feeling was made very clear by al-A hnaf ibn Qais, the head
of the Tamim tribe, the most influential tribe in Basra. "We have tried Al
Abi Talib, and found that they neither have any experience of government,
4nor strategy in war. Also it is impossible to get money from them ." This,
1* E. I. ^, (al-Mada* ini); J . ‘ AM, Mawarid Tarikh al-Tabari,
p. 157; I..M I1 , 1, i, 1950. “  *
2. Ansab, V , p. 244.
3 . T ab ., II, p .681 (citing Mada* ini).
4. Jahiz, a l - ‘ Uthmaniyya. p .96; Ansab, fol. 499b (citing Mada* ini);
about al-Ahnaf ibn Qais and the Umayyads, see Tab., II, pp .96-7 .
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however, does not mean that the Basrans were pro-Umayyad or even sincerely
pro-Zubairid, as Dr. Fariq thinks.  ^ It seems that they were ready to give
their support to whoever paid the most. Ziyad ibn ‘ Amr a l - ‘ A tki, the
head of the Azd tribe, received a letter from al-M ukhtar promising him a
reward in this life and the next if  he would support him; Ziyad replied, “We
2do not fight on credit, but with whoever pays cash, " When ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  
paid the Basrans more than Mus‘ ab ibn al -Zubair, they betrayed the latter, 
the tribes of a l-A zd , Bakr ibn Wa^il and Banu Tamim going over to ‘ Abd a l-  
M a lik .^
The tribes of Basra at this time, were: Ahl a l - ‘ A liya , (among
whom was Bahila which was known for its a n ti-‘ Alid feeling), Tamim,
4Bakr ibn Wa* i l ,  a l-A zd and ‘ Abd a l-Q ais . Only the latter, a numerically
weak, politically unimportant tribe, was pro-‘ A lid .
A l-M ukhtar endeavoured to seize Basra for many important
reasons. By seizing Basra with its dependences, ai-M ukhtar would be master
of the whole of Iraq and the Eastern Provinces, thus depriving Ibn al-Zubair
of the rich resources of the area, and confining him to the poor country of
a l-H ija z , which could hardly support itself, Egypt had already been lost for
Ibn a l-Zu bair, being controlled by the Umayyads. The conquest of Basra would
op- c i t . , p .50, SU , IV , no. 1 , 1967.
Ansab, V , p .245; Tab ., 11, p .683 (citing M ada’ in i).
3. T a b ., II, p .218.
4 . A I - ‘ A li, al-Tainzim at a l- ljt im a ‘ iyya wal Iqtisadiyya fil Basra fil
Qarn al-Aw w al af-HijrT; / Idem, Khitat al-Bcisra, p. 288, Sumer,
V I I I ,  1771952; *
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give al-M ukhtar new followers to increase his .military forces which might 
have enabled him to face both Ibn al-Zubair and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . It was a 
favourable time for an attempt by al-Mukhtar to seize Basra for the city was 
continually threatened by the Kharijites so that the governor's position there 
was constantly undermined. Moreover, Ibn al -Zubair was unable to send 
forces against al-M ukhtar because he was hard-pressed by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , 
and was preparing to face him. Finally, the seizure of Basra was part of the 
strategy of a l-M ukhtar, for it would be expedient for him to create new d if­
ficulties for Ibn a l-Zu bair, without the necessity of distracting his attention 
from consolidating his power in Kufa.
However, he did not succeed: al-Muthanna was driven out of the 
city along with his followers. But the event was not without significance. It 
proved to al-M ukhtar that the centre of his power was Kufa, where the majority 
of the Shi‘ a were. It also enabled him to understand the attitude of the tribal 
chiefs in Basra. It is therefore in this light that we must see the letters a l-  
Mukhtar sent to al-A hnaf ibn Q ais, M alik  ibn Misma‘ and Ziyad a l - ‘ A tki,^  
in which he offered them a reward in this world and the next for their support.
In order to pave the way for his complete sovereignty over a l-lraq , 
it was necessary to avoid open hostility with Ibn a l-Zubair. A l-M ukhtar, 
therefore, entered into a secret diplomatic correspondence with him. First,
1 . Ansab, V , p .2 4 5 ;T a b ., I I ,  p.683 (citing Mada’ in i).
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al-Mukhtar tried to justify his act of expelling ‘ Abdallah ibn M u ti‘ , by
accusing him of working in the interests of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .  ^ He also wrote
to Ibn alZubair reminding him of the terms on which he paid him homage,
saying that he had kept his promises, although Ibn al-Zubair did not. If
Ibn a l-Zubair still wanted his support, al-M ukhtar was still ready to offer 
2
it to him.
Ibn a l-Zu bair, however, wanted to test the sincerity of al-M ukhtar, 
so he sent a new governor to a l-K ufa . He was ‘ Umar ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn 
al-H arith  ibn Hisham al-M akhzum i. When the news of this appointment reached 
al-M ukhtar through one of his spies at M ecca, he sent Z a ’ ida ibn Qudama 
with five hundred cavalry men under the command of Musafir ibn Sa‘ id a l-  
N a ‘ it i ,  and seventy thousand dirhams, twice what the new governor had spent 
on his journey. He told Qt&dama to order the new governor to take the money 
and go back to Ibn a l-Zu bair. If he refused, he was to show him the cavalry
3and tell him there were another hundred such squadrons in the rear. At first 
‘ Umar refused to take the money and tried to carry out Ibn al-Zubair's orders, 
but when he saw the cavalry, he consented, took the money and went to Basra
t 4as Ibn M u ti‘ had done.
1. Sa‘ d , V ,  p. 1 10; Ansab, V , p .266 (citing Mada* in i).
2. T ab ., M, p. 687 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p. 203;
N uw airi, X IX , fol. 26.
Ansab, V , pp .243-44; Tab ., II, p .687 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
4 . Ansab, V ,  pp .243-44; Tab., I I ,  pp .287-88 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
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Political circumstances once again forced al-M ukhtar to act in an 
underhand way, in asking for the friendship of Ibn a l-Zubair and at the same 
time, trying to undermine the latter's authority. Since he feared that his 
double-dealing with Ibn a l-Zubair would provoke him to send an army from 
Basra against him, al-M ukhtar tried once again to win Ibn al-Zubair's con­
fidence, especially since he was also threatened with the advance of the 
Syrian army* ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan had sent an army to a l-H ija z  to 
liquidate Ibn a l-Zu bair. Al-M ukhtar tried to exploit this opportunity by 
writing to Ibn a l-Zubair offering him his help against ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Ibn 
al-Zubair's reply to this was, " If you are loyal to me, then I do not mind your 
bringing an army to my country. But you should first bring me the homage of 
the Kufans. When I receive this, then I shall believe in your loyalty and w ill 
refrain from attacking your territory. Send me your army quickly and order it 
to proceed to Wadi a l-Q ura  and to fight the army of Ibn Marwan.
A l-M ukhtar then sent three thousand men, among whom only seven
hundred were Southern ‘ Arabs, the rest being mawali, under the command of 
an ‘ Arab leader, Shurahbil ibn Wars, from the tribe of Hamdan, also a
2 . T
Southern tribe. He ordered him to proceed to a l-M ed ina , station himself 
there, and then to write to al-M ukhtar. Al-Mukhtar intended that when Ibn 
WarS* army had occupied M edina, he would then send a governor for the city
1. Ansab, V ,  p. 246; T a b ., II, pp .688-89 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
2. T ab ., I I ,  p .689 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
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and order Ibn Wars to proceed towards Mecca to lay seige to the city. But 
Ibn a l-Zubair saw through this double-dealing. He sent * Abbas ibn Sahl 
ibn Sa‘ d with two thousand men and ordered him to recruit more men on his 
way from the‘Arab tribes dwelling there. He ordered him to annihilate 
al-Mukhtar's army if they did not comply with his orders. The two armies 
met at al-Raqim near Medina. Ibn Sahl asked the commander of al-Mukhtar's 
army to proceed to Wadi a l-Q u ra  to fight the Syrian army. Ibn Wars answered 
naively that he had been ordered to go first to Medina and then report to his 
master for further instructions. It seems that Ibn Wars was either completely 
ignorant of al-Mukhtar's plot,or else that he was not clever enough to act 
out the deception when faced with Ibn Sahl. In both cases, al-M ukhtar can 
be blamed for his choice of general. Ibn Wars* answer was enough for e Abbas 
ibn Sahl to understand the strategy of al-M ukhtar, and he therefore led a 
surprise attack on the army of Ibn Wars. Most of the army, and ibn Wars
himself, were k illed . Most of those who fled died of thirst or hunger on their
- 1  . ~ way back to Kufa. Following this defeat, al-M ukhtar wrote to Ibn a l -
Hanafiyya, saying that he had sent an army to defend him against his enemies
and to conquer the countries for him. But the army of a l- 'M u lh id 1 ibn a l -
Zubair had deceived them and taken them by surprise. He asked the permission
of ibn a l-tjanafiyya to send another army to Medina to fight Ibn a l-Zubair if  he,
1. Ansab, V ,  p p .246-47; Tab., I I ,  pp .689-91 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
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Ibn a l-H anafiyya, would make it clear to the people of Medina that al-Mukhtar
was working with his consent. As usual, Ibn al-Hanafiyya's reply to al-Mukhtar
was cold and non-committal: he said that he did not approve of bloodshed, and
advised him to obey God instead of causing war. If he (Ibn al-Hanafiyya) did
want to fight, he would find the people ready to rally round him without a l-
Mukhtar's help.^ This answer certainly disappointed a l-M u kh ta r, who was
hoping to get recognition from Ibn al-Hanafiyya to legalize his authority.
However, he did not let himself become discouraged by this answer and told
the Shj‘ a that al-M ahdi had asked him to follow a policy which would bring
2them prosperity and righteousness, and wipe out all treachery and impiety.
Nevertheless, circumstances eventually forced Ibn al-Hanafiyya  
to ask help from al-M ukhtar. When Ibn al-Zubair proclaimed himself Caliph 
in 64 /683 , Ibn al-Hanafiyya and ( Abdallah ibn * Abbas, with their followers, 
refused to pay him homage on the grounds that he had not yet been unanimously 
recognized as Caliph. For the same reason they did not pay homage to Ibn a l-  
Zubair's riva l, { Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan. When a ll attempts to make Ibn 
al-Hanafiyya change his mind failed, Ibn al-Zubair decided to obtain the 
"baHa" from him by force. In the year 66 /685, Ibn a l-Zu bair detained Ibn 
al-Hanafiyya and his fam ily, with seventeen men from his supporters among the
1. Ansab, V , p p .246-47; Tab., II, p .689ff. (citing Abu Mikhnaf);
Kamil, IV , pp .204-5 .
2. T a b ., I I ,  p. 693.
the notables of a l-K ufa , inside al-Haram and threatened them with death
*
if they did not pay homage within a specified time. ^
Why did Ibn a l-Zubair decide at this time to threaten Ibn a l-  
Hanafiyya with death, if he would not pay him homage? It would seem that 
he was afraid that the paople in H ijaz and Iraq would pay homage to 
Ibn al-H anafiyya, especially after success achieved by al-M ukhtar in Kufa 
using his name.
Ibn al-Hanafiyya sent a letter to al-Mukhtar informing him of the 
situation and asking his urgent help. Al-M ukhtar was waiting for just such 
an opportunity and used the request for help as a demonstration of his recog­
nition by Ibn al-H anafiyya. A l-M ukhtar summoned the Shi‘ a of Kufa and 
showed them Ibn al-Hanafiyya's letter. He immediately sent four thousand 
men to rescue him, and to give him a large sum of money. But he was careful 
this time, and did not let Ibn al-Zubair know of this expedition, to avoid a 
repetition of the disaster of Ibn Wars, and also to prevent Ibn a l-Zubair from 
killing Ibn al-H anafiyya and his followers before they could be rescued. He 
wished also to avoid any unnecessary military engagement with Ibn al-Zubair  
in order to save his strength to meet the Syrians.
1. Sa‘ d , V ,  pp .73 -4 ; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh/ 1/ 258
(he gives the year 65 /384 and makes the place of detention 
ShHb Banu Hashim); Akhbar, fols. 43b-44a; Ansab, fols. 261a- 
261b; Ya^qObT, II, pp .311-12; Jab ., I I ,  p .693ff. (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fols. IQa-lOb; * Iqd, IV , p .514; M uruj, V ,  p. 179 
(citing 4 Umar ibn Shabba); Aah . .  V lTI, p*32; ‘ Asakir, X V , fol. 369b. 
(citing Khalifa).
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Wellhausen,  ^ arguing exclusively on the evidence that the
forces sent by al-M ukhtar to rescue Ibn al-Hanafiyya held wooden clubs
in their hands on their entry into al-Haram , concludes that they were
mawali, though led by Arabs. But we are told that the holding of wooden
clubs instead of swords was according to Ibn al-Hanafiyya's instructions,
2since he would not tolerate the use of weapons in the Holy Shrine. This 
is supported by the fact that Ibn al-Hanafiyya had always spoken against the 
use of violence, and also that it was only on their entry into al-Haram that
3 4they held these wooden clubs. They also carried hidden swords. This
however, does not mean that they were all Arabs; it only means that one
cannot argue that they were mawali simply because they carried clubs. More
w ill be said about these clubs in the context of the Khashabiyya.
The first hundred and fifty men who reached Mecca succeeded in
saving Ibn al-H anafiyya. But Ibn al-Zubair did not yield until the rest of a l-  
*
Mukhtar's men reached M ecca. Ibn al-Hanafiyya forbade his followers and 
those who came to his aid , to fight Ibn al-Zubair and distributed the money 
he had received from al-M ukhtar amongst them. Ibn al-Hanafiyya then left
1. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositiorvj^parteien im alten Islam, p .81.
2. Akhbar, fol. 47a; T ab ., II, p .694 (citing Abu M ikhnaf): Kufi, II,
fol. l ib ;  Kamil, IV , p .207. —
3. Sa<d, V , p .78; Ansab, V ,  pp .246-47; Tab ., II ,  p .692 (citing 
Abu Mikhnaf); Kuff, I I ,  fol. 12a; Kamil, IV , p .205.
4. Akhbar, fols. 47a;47b; Tab ., II, p.694 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); 
Ansab, fol. 262a; Kuff, II, fol. l ib .
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Mecca and went to al-Ta* if. It seems that he did not go to Kufa*
because he distrusted al-Mukhtar and his ambitions to gain power. It may 
be that he was afraid to come to Kufa, since al-M ukhtar, fearing that Ibn 
al-Hanafiyya would arrive and put an end to the activities of his more 
extreme followers, had spread a rumour around the city that a true Mahdi 
could not be harmed if  struck with a sword.  ^ Besides, it may have been that 
Ibn al-H anafiyya did not want to incur the hostility of both Ibn a l-Zubair and 
4 Abd a l-M a lik , especially since the future of al-M ukhtar was still uncertain. 
Furthermore, he no doubt suspected the Kufans1 support after the terrible 
experiences his father and his brothers had had with them.
After the battle of ‘Ain al-Warda 65/6B4, in which Sulaiman ibn 
Surad and his Tawwabun were massacred, 4Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad continued to 
march against Iraq. He engaged with Zufar ibn al-H arith  a l-K ila b i, who was 
holding al-Jazira,first against Marwan ibn al-Hakam and then against Marwan's 
son, 4 Abd a l-M a lik . After a seige of about a year, Ibn Ziyad failed to conquer 
a l-Jaz ira , and marched on towards al-M usil on his way to Kufa. 4 Abd a l-  
Rahman ibn Sa4 id ibn Qais al-Ham dani, the governor of a l-M usil, reported 
this to a l-M ukhtar, informing him that, because of his lack of men, he had
!• Sa4d, V , p .74 (citing 4 Atiyya a l- 4 Awfi); Zubairi, pp.43 -4  (but
he gives the name of 4Ubaidallah ibn 4 A li instead of Ibn a l -  
Hanafiyya); 4 Uyun, p .242 (citing al-Asma47); Ansab, V , pp .269-70  
(citing al-Asma4t ) ;  Bagh., pp .33-4; af-RazT, Htigadat Firag1!-  
ShJ4a , p. 62; Dhahabt7~!ll, pp .296-97.
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left Musil to go to Takrit, and was awaiting al-Mukhtar's orders. On 
receiving this news, al-M ukhtar sent three thousand cavalrymen, a ll of them 
€ Arabs, under the command of Yazid ibn Anas al-Asadi.^ They met the 
Syrian army on 19th of D hu 'l-H ajja , 66/17th of July 6 8 6 , at dawn about five 
"farsakhs" from Musil. The result of the battle was victory for Yazid ibn 
Anas, despite the fact that he was ill at the time and that his army was half 
the size of that of the Syrians. However, Yazid died that evening, after 
ordering all the Syrians captured in the battle to be k illed . His death 
greatly demoralized his followers, who thought it wise to withdraw because 
their small number would not be able to stand against the eighty thousand
1. Ansab, V , p .230; Dinawari, p. 300 (he gives the army of Yazid
as 20 ,000). But.they withdrew after Yazid's death because of their 
small number, and the fact that Ibn Ziyad sent against them double 
of their number, makes us discount Dinawari's view. Moreover, 
apart from the exaggeration in number, his narrative is brief and 
unconvincing, for he writes that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  fought Yazid and 
killed him and his followers, while none of the other sources gives 
the slightest hint of this. See Tab., I I ,  pp. 642-4  (citing ‘ Awana 
and Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, II, fols. 13b-14a, (here the number is given 
as 4 ,000  because ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ Td Ibn Qais al-Hamdani 
with 1,000 men joined the army of Y azid .) It is important to point 
out here that the army of Yazid consisted only of ‘ Arabs without 
any mawali. (Kufi, II, fol. 14a. ^ yCcJvi ^ )
The account of T ab ., ( II ,  p .647), confirms this, although 
Wellhausen, referring to it, but misunderstanding the text, writes 
that the army was mostly mawali. See Die Religios-Politischen 
Qpposition/£parteien imalten Islam, p. 81.
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Syrian troops marching against them, ^
This withdrawal of the Kufan army had a serious reaction in Kufa.
Rumours spread that ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad had defeated al-Mukhtar's army,
killed his leader, Yazid ibn Anas, and with his huge army was advancing on
Kufa. Hearing this, al-M ukhtar ordered his general, Ibrahim ibn al-Ashfar,
to march against Ibn Ziyad with an army of seven thousand men, and ordered
-  2him to join up with the army of Yazid . The situation of al-M ukhtar, with 
the Syrians advancing against him and a large number of his troops away to 
fight them, encouraged the Ashraf to defy him and prepare to overthrow his 
rule. They condemned al-M ukhtar for appointing himself ruler without their 
consent, for raising the status of their mawali by mounting them on horses, 
giving them salaries and letting them share in their revenues (fa i*).
Shabath ibn Rabf i al-Tam im i, a senior tribal chief, was their spokesman, 
and carried these complaints to al-M ukhtar. The latter promised to remove 
every grievance brought to his attention. Shabath complained about the slaves 
who had deserted their masters and joined him, and the mawali, saying, "You 
have taken away from us our mawali whom God conferred upon us as booty with 
this country, whom we freed hoping for God's reward. But you went far beyond
1* T ab ., I I ,  p .648 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kuff, 1-1, fol. 15a; Kamil, IV ,
p. 190. —
Anscib, V , p .231; T ab ., II, p .649 (citing Abu?M ikhnaf); Kufi, II, 
fols. 14b-15a.
3. Dinawari, p .306; T ab ., II, p .649 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,
fols. 15a-15b; KamiI, IV , p. 190.
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this, and made them share in our revenues". A l-M ukhtar answered, " If  I 
give you back your mawali and distribute the revenue between you alone, 
w ill you then fight with me against the Umayyads and Ibn a l-Zubair?  W ill
e 1
you make a solemn agreement to this effect in God's name?" The Ashraf
T T  2refused to do this. A l-D inaw ari, however, has a different account of this 
occasion. He says some of the Ashraf met al-M ukhtar and reproached him for 
his policy towards the mawali. A l-M ukhtar answered them, "When I showed 
you honour, you became supercilious; and when I made you governors, you 
embezzled the revenue. I found these Persians (‘ Ajam) more obedient, loyal 
and honest thanyou." Even allowing for Dinawari's Persian prejudices, this 
account shows al-Mukhtar's opinion of both the mawali and the Ashraf, while 
Tabari's account indicates the total lack of trust in al-M ukhtar felt by the 
Ashraf.
Was al-M ukhtar sincerely prepared to make those concessions to the 
Ashraf, in order to get their confidence, and dispense with his faithful mawali? 
It seems that in making this offer, al-M ukhtar was banking on their hostility to 
him leading them to refuse. He was using the concessions as an expedient 
to appease the Ashraf temporarily, while so many of his troops were away. We 
shall see him using the same tactics when the revolt of the Ashraf came into the 
open.
1. Tab., II, p .650 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fol* 15b; V an V lo ten , 
op. c it . , p. 16.
2 . Dinawari, p .306.
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While the Ashraf were speculating on the possibilities of revolting, 
one of them, ‘ Abd al-Rahman Ibn Mikhnaf, advised against it at that time, 
for he said, * A l-M ukhtar is bound to be overthrown either by the Syrians 
or the Basrans. Besides, you are disunited, and his side unites the mawali 
with many of the ‘ Arabs. Your mawali and slaves hate you more than him, 
and therefore, if you attack al-M ukhtar, you w ill have to face the bravery of 
< Arabs and the hatred of the Persians. His advice was rejected and ■ 
eventually he joined them in revolt against al-M ukhtar. His advice, 
however, does show the presence of many ‘ Arabs on al-Mukhtar's side.
Following the departure of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar to fight the Syrian
army under ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad, the Ashraf rose in arms and occupied the
-  -  -2 important places in the city . ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ id ibn Qais al-Hamdani
*
with the tribe of Hamdan occupied Jabbanat al-Subai‘ ; Zuhr ibn Qais a l-  
Ju‘ fi and Ishaq ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ash‘ ath seized Jabbanat Kinda; Ka*b 
ibn AbT Ka*b joined with Bashir ibn Jarir ibn ‘ Abdallah and the Bajila to occupy 
Jabbanat Bishr; * Abd al-Rahman ibn Mikhnaf occupied Jabbanat Mikhnaf; 
Shamir ibn dhul Jawshan occupied Jabbanat banu Sailul and Shabath ibn Rab‘ i 
occupied al-Kunasa, joined by Mudar. Hajjar ibn Abjar a l - ‘ Ijli and
1 . Tab., II, p .651 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, II, fols. 15b-16a; Kamil,
IV , p. 191; NuwairT, X IX , fol. 18.
2. Previous governor of al-Mukhtar in Musil. This explains how strong were 
the tribal feelings among the ‘ Arabs of the time.
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Yazid ibn af~HaritH ibn Ruwaim with the Rabi( a tribe occupied al-Sabkha,
T . -  1
and 4 Amr ibn a l-H a jja j al-Zubaid i occupied Jabbanat Murad. To face
al-Mukhtar's horsemen, the tribes of Kinda, a l-A zd , Bapla, a l-N a k h a ‘ ,
Khath*qm, Qais and Taim al-Rabbab gathered in Jabbanat Murad; while
T T . -  2RabH a and Tamim gathered in Jabbanat al-Hashshashin. This gathering
of the tribes in two places was a favourable opportunity for al-M ukhtar, for
it enabled him to concentrate his rather small forces against only two fronts.
Al-M ukhtar succeeded in recalling Ibn al-Ashtar with his forces to Kufa,
but while he awaited his arrival, he spared no effort to reconcile the Ashraf.
He sent to them, promising to comply with their wishes. When they demanded
his abdication, on the grounds that his claim to represent Ibn al-Hanafiyya
was false, al-M ukhtar suggested that they should send a deputation to Ibn
3al-H anafiyya to ask him about this point. By this, he tried to achieve two 
important things; first, to cause a difference of opinion between them and 
secondly, it was an attempt to make time until Ibn al-Ashtar arrived. (Never­
theless, a I-Ashraf did not accept the proposal, and decided to take their 
chance to get rid of him. On the other hand, al-M ukhtar adopted the strategy
1. Ansab, V , p p .231-2; Tab., II, pp .651-2 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Kufi, II, 
fol. 16a.
2. Dinawari, p .307; Tab ., II, p .652 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).
3. Tab., I I ,  p .653 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); KufT, II, fols. 16a-16b; Kamil,
Iv, pp. 192-3; NuwairT, X IX , "fol. 18.
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of increasing the hatred between the mgwgli, (40,000 at this time) and their 
masters, by telling them that they were fighting for their own cause, identical 
with his. He told the mawali that the Ashraf would never have risen in arms 
against him, had he not adopted their cause and worked to improve their con­
ditions. ^
Only three days after his departure, Ibrahim returned to Kufa. The next
2 -
day, Sunday the 24th D hu 'l-H ajja  66/22nd July, 6 8 6 , the Ashraf gathered
their forces in three places: Mudar was in al-Kunasa, ahl al-Yemen in
Jabbanat al-Subai* and RabHa in the Sabkhq. A l-M ukhtar, aware of tribal
rivalries, asked Ibrahim to fight Mudar in al-Kunasa, while he himself went
to fight Ahl al-Yem en, for he thought Ibrahim might well, balk at fighting
3his own people, the Yemenites.
A l-M ukhtar stationed himself near Jabbanat al-Subai* and sent Ahmar
ibn Shumait a l-B a jli al-Ahmasi and ‘ Abdallah ibn Kamil al-Shakir? to
Jabbanat al-Subai* from different directions. He also informed them that
4
Shibam would attack al-Jabbana from behind. Ibrahim was able to defeat
1. Dinawari, p p .306-7 .
2. Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Qpposition/Sparteien im glten Islam, 
p. 83.
3. Ansab, V ,  p .232; T a b ., I I ,  p .655 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 16b.
4 . From the Yemenite tribes there were only Hamdan fighting al-M ukhtar, 
for Madhhij lbrahtm*s tribe did not take part on either side, while Shibam 
was w itfTal-M ukhtar. See Wellhausen, Pie Religios-Politischen Opposition  ^
%>arteien im alten Islam, p .83.
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Mudar while Rabf*a left the b a ttle -fie ld , either because of the defeat of • *
Mudar and al-Yemen or because of their bai*a to al-M ukhtar.  ^ Then 
Ibrahim came to the rescue of a l-M ukhtar, whose forces were in a d ifficult 
position.
The rivalry and jealousy between the Ashraf soon came into play, as Ibn
Mikh naf had expected, and contributed to the victory of al-M ukhtar. It is
. . - 2
reported by Abu M ikhnaf in Tabari that when Ahl al-Yemen gathered in
Jabbanat al-Subai<, they disagreed about who would lead the prayer, for no
tribe liked to pray behind a man from another tribe. In the battle of Jabbanat
a l-S uba i*, ‘ Abdallah ibn Qurad a l-K hath jam i, though he remained faithful to
3al-M ukhtar, yet he refused to spill the blood of his fellow tribesmen. Moreover, 
when Abu'l-Qulus and his followers from the tribe of Shibam entered Jabbanat 
al-Subai( shouting, "Ya Li Tharat al-Husain" as their slogan, Yazid ibn ‘ Umair 
ibn Dhu Murran al-Hamdani answered this by shouting, “Ya Li Tharat * Uthman11. 
This had the effect of rallying the Shi‘ a among the Ashraf to al-Mukhtar's side. 
For example, Rifa*a ibn Shaddad a l-F ityan i, who had once been a follower 
of a l-M ukhtar, but who was with the Ashraf in this revolt, on hearing the 
‘ Uthmanite slogan, became extremely angry and said, “I w ill not fight on the
1. Ansab, V ,  p .232; Dinawari, p .307.
2. Tab., II, p .654.
3. Ib id ., I I ,  p .6 5 7 .
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same side as those who seek the vengeance of ( Uthman." But in the end,
his tribal feelings were stronger than his Shi4 i feelings and he carried on
fighting against al-M ukhtar.  ^ On the other hand, we find i Abd a l-M u ’ min,
the son of Shabath ibn R ab 'i, fighting courageously with al-M ukhtar against 
2his father.
At last had come the time to annihilate the killers of al-Husain. In
doing so, al-M ukhtar achieved two goals. The first and most important was that
he fu lfilled his promise to avenge al-Husain, according to which homage had
been paid to him. The second was that he inflicted punishment upon those
Ashraf who revolted against him after all his attempts to reconcile them had 
3
proved abortive. Furthermore, he was encouraged by the remark said to have 
been made by Ibn al-Hanafiyya criticizing al-M ukhtar: "It is surprising that 
al-Mukhtar claims to be the avenger of our family and yet the killers of a l-
4Husain are his associates and companions." A l-M ukhtar killed all those he
could find who had taken part in the murder of al-Husain, and tore down the
*
5
houses of those who managed to flee to Basra. At first, many innocents were 
attacked either due to personal antagonisms, or because of the hatred felt by
1 . Tab ., II, p .659.
2. Ib id ., I I ,  p .654.
3. Ib id ., p .667 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
4 . Imama, I I ,  p. 19; Ansab, V ,  p .237; Dinawari, p .300; Tab ., I I ,  p .604 
(citing Abu M ikhnaf); K uff, II, fo l.8 b.
5. Tab., I I ,  p .660; KufT, II, fol. 17a; kX - j ,  V , pp. 173-4.
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the mawali to the Ashraf; but al-Mukhtar took over the supervision of
1prisoners and killed only those who were truly guilty of al-Husain's death.
Whatever his reasons, al-M ukhtar did perform his duty by annihilating
the killers of al-Husain, among whom were Shamir ibn Dhu'l-Jawshan, * Umar 
t  -  2ibn Sa*d ibn Abi Waqqas , and many others. This campaign of revenge had
two important consequences. On one hand, ten thousand Ashraf and non-
Shi * 1 *Arab leaders managed to escape to Basra, where Mus*ab ibn a l -
Zubair was the governor for his brother * Abdallah; these Ashraf played an
important part in inciting Mus*ab against al-Mukhtar and was an effective
factor in accelerating his death. On the other hand, it increased his
popularity among the Shi*a and also pleased Ibn a l-H anafiyya, whose recognition
3al-Mukhtar was seeking.
4A story is reported in many sources but differently phrased, about a poet
1 . Tab., II, p .660.
2. It is reported that when al-M ukhtar killed * Umar ibn Sa*d, he hired female 
mourners and ordered them to wail at the door of his house, to prepare the 
public opinion for the next step. Imama, II, p. 19; * Iqd, IV , pp.404-5 . If 
this account is true, it shows how al-Mukhtar used such matters as a means 
of propaganda. When he razed to the ground the houses of Muhammad ibn al 
Ash * ath al-KindT and of Asma* ibn Kharija al-FazarT, he used the building 
materials of the two houses for rebuilding the houses of Muslim ibn * AqTI 
and Hujr ibn *AdT al-KindT. See Tab., I I ,  p .680; Kufi, II, fols. 12b-13a. 
Certainly this act was highly appreciated by the Shi*a of his time.
3. Kufi", II, fo l. 8 b.
4 . Suraga ibn Mirdas, DTwan, p .7 4 f f .; Mabasin, p. 128; *Uyun, p .244-5; 
Ansab, V ,  p .234; DTnawarT, p .309; Tab. ,1 1 , p .663 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); 
KalT, I I,  fols. 17a-17b; * Iqd, II, pp. 170-71; Agh. , V I I I ,  pp .31 -2 ; * Asakir, 
V I,  p .69; Kamil, IV , pp. 196-7.
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named Suraqa ibn Mirdas al-Bariqi, who was seized as a prisoner after the 
battle of Jabbanat a l-S ubai*. The story says that when Suraqa was brought 
to a l-M ukhtar, he denied that he was captured by the followers of a l-M ukhtar, 
but by the angels whom he claimed to have seen fighting on white horses at the 
side of al-M ukhtar. The latter ordered him to announce this publicly from the 
pulpit. Then al-M ukhtar summoned Suraqa and told him that he knew very 
well that he had seen nothing and he ordered him to leave Kufa. Suraqa left 
for Basra where he composed satirical verses against al-M ukhtar. If this story, 
which looks like a piece of imaginary literature, is true, it should be considered 
as one of al-Mukhtar*s expedients to strengthen his cause among his followers, 
especially the mawali who were more readily prepared to believe in anything 
told them by al-M ukhtar.
On the 24th Dhul Hajja, 66/22nd July, 6 8 6 ,^ two days after he returned 
from the battle of Jabbanat, a I-S ubai*, al-M ukhtar despatched Ibrahim ibn
al-Ashtar with an army against *Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad, who was now advancing
- 2  -  -  -  with his army from Musil towards Kufa. Al-M ukhtar instructed Ibrahim, saying,
"Fear God in all your acts public and private, be quick in your march and attack
1. According to Tab ., (II, p .667), the battle of Jabbanat al-Subai* was bn
the 24th Dhul H a jja , 6 6 . On the other hand, he says (p .701), that a l-
Mukhtar sent IbrdRtm only two days after the battle, that is 26 Dhul Hajja
6 6 . A gain (on p .700), he says that Ibrahim left Kufa on the 22nd Dhul 
H ajja . This, however, is corrected by the narrative in BaladhurT (Ansab,
V , p .248), where he states clearly that Ibrahim left Kufa onlhe 24th Dhul 
Hajja 6 6 .
2. The number of his army has been differently given. According to Baladhuri 
(Ansab, V ,  p .248), it was of nine thousand men; according to DTnawart (p .301),
131.
1your enemy on reaching him without delay". A l-M ukhtar also accompanied
the army until it reached the Euphrates and promised them victory. The army
  - - 2
of Ibrahim was predominantly composed from the mawali, although there
t -  3were also * Arabs from the tribes of Madhhij, Kinda, Asad, Tamim and Hamdan, 
apart from Tamim they are all Southern * Arabs. The two armies met on the 
river Khazir about five "farsakhs" from Musi I. The date of the battle is
-  4given by Ibn Gutaiba and confirmed by al-Dhahabi and Ibn Kathir, as the
10th Muharram, 67/6th August, 6 8 6 . The army of al-Mukhtar eventually
won a victory over the Syrians, and ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad, the one most
responsible for al-Husain's murder, al-Husain ibn Numair al-Sakkuni,• • •
Shurahbil ibn Dhul Kila* and many other Syrian notables, were killed while 
those who fled were drowned.
Several factors contributed to the victory of Ibrahim, though his army was 
small compared with that of Ibn Ziyad. Apart from Ibrahim's bravery and military
= it was of thirty thousand men. Finally, KufT (II, fol. 9a), makes it 
seventeen thousand, ten thousand of whom were horsemen and the rest 
were infantry. Since the figures given by DlnawarT are always exaggerated, 
and as it is stated in Tab., (II, p .705), that Ibrahim's army was small, 
BaladhurT's figure seems more convincing.
1 . Tab ., II, p .702 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, II, fol. 19a.
2. DlnawarT, p .302; Mubarrad, I I,  pp .61-2; Tab., II, p .709 (citing Abu 
Mikhhaf); If the account of KufT (II, fo l. 19a) is true, the ten thousand 
cavalry said to have been with Ibrahim, were not necessarily all ‘ Arabs, 
for al-Mukhtar allowed the mawali to mount on horses.
3. Ansab, V ,  p .248; Tab ., I I ,  p.701 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, II, fol. 24a.
4. M a *a rif, p. 152; Dhahabi, I I ,  p .375; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p. 283.
genius, there was the religious fanaticism of the Shi* a face-to -face with 
Ibn Ziyad, the k ille r of al-Husain; this fanaticism was enf lamed by a speech 
delivered by Ibrahim before the beginning of the battle.^ Another reason
for the victory was the treason of the Qaisites in the army of Ibn Ziyad. It
2 . „  _ -  -
is reported that *Umair ibn al-IJubab al-Sulam i, who was with the Qaisites
on the left wingof Ibn Ziyad's army, visited Ibn al-Ashtar and informed him that 
because of the battle of Marj Rahit, they had no love for the Marwanids. 
Therefore, «Umair promised Ibn al-Ashtar to flee when the war began. But
the sources do not agree when this treason took place. According to Baladhuri,
? T  . T  3Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir and Nuwairi , *Umair only fled when he saw the Syrian
army about to be routed, while at first he fought courageously. Tabari,
inserts here that when *Umair saw the retreat of the Syrians, he sent a
message to Ibrahim, "Shall I come to your help now?" Ibrahim answered,
"Not before the zeal of the Shi*a against the Syrians has calmed down".
On the other hand, another account in Baladhuri, Dinawari, Mubarrad and
-  t 4 . .Mas’udi report that when the war began *Umair shouted "Ya Li Tharat Marj
1. Ansab, V ,  p .249; Tab ., I I ,  pp.710, 713 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I , 
TSfTTSa. * ~
2. Ansab, V ,  pp. 248, 268 (citing M ada’ in i); Dinawari, p .310; Mubarrad, 
I I I ,  p .2 6 8 ;T a b ., I I ,  p.708 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, II, fol. 23b; 
M uruj, V ,  p .223 (he states that *Umair was on the right wing and not on 
the left); Kam il, IV , p .215; Nuw airi, X IX , fol. 33.
3. Ansab, V ,  pp .249-50; T ab ., II ,  p .713 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , 
p .217; NuwairT, X IX , fo l. 34.
4 . Ansab, V ,  pp .313-4  (citing *Awana); Dinawari, p .202-3; Mubarrad, I I I ,  
p .269; V._ I ; ,  V ,  p .223.55
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Rahi{ “ and left the battle field with the Qaisites, and thus gave the battle
to the Iraqis. However, Ibn A* tharn  ^ has yet another account of this event.
He reports that when the two armies camped near each other Ibrahim sent to
* Umair ibn al-Hubab to come to his side, offering him security “aman" and
promising him a reward. Therefore, ‘ Umair deserted Ibn Ziyad with one
thousand men from his Qaisite kinsmen and their mawali, joining Ibn a l -
Ashtar, who warmly welcomed him and distributed money among his followers.
Though this account of Ibn A*tham is not confirmed by any other source, and
it is not in itself convincing,yet it agrees with other accounts, confirming
that *Umair betrayed Ibn Ziyad and helped to bring about the victory of the
Iraqis. Moreover, the narrative of Abu Mikhnaf in Baladhuri, Tabari and its
repetition by Ibn a l-A th ir and N uw airi, represents the Iraqi tradition which
tried to show the victory of Ibrahim as being achieved without any outside
intervention, especially from the Syrian side. This view could be seen very
clearly in the narrative of Mada* ini in Baladhuri, and also the account of
Dinawari, Mubarrad andM as*udi.^  Furthermore, Baladhuri, Dinawari and 
-  3Ibn a l-A th ir preserve an important piece of information, which confirms 
our argument that such treason did take place; it says that after the battle of
1. Kufi, II, fo l. 23b.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .268 (citing Mada* in i); Dinawari, p p .202-3 ; Mubarrad, I I I ,  
p .269; M uru j, V ,  p. 223.
3. Ansab, V ,  p. 251 (citing al-Haytham ibn * Adi); D inawari, p .304; Kamil, IV ,
£72T3. “
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Khazir, Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar confirmed Zufar ibn al-H arith  as the
governor of Qarqisya* and *Umair ibn al-Hubab was appointed as
governor of Kafr Tuta and Tur* Abdin. Why should Ibrahim make these
appointments except as a reward for the help that *Umair and the Qaisites had
rendered him in the battle of Khazir? Thus from a ll these arguments it seems
1
impossible to accept Wellhausen's view that there was no treason and, even
if there w as,it came after the battle had been decided for the Iraqis.
Wellhausen is depending here almost exclusively on Tabari and Abu
Mikhnaf's n a rra tive ,i.e . the Iraqi tradition.
_  2 -  TIt is reported by al-Mubarrad that when Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar marched
from Kufa to meet the Syrians, al-M ukhtar walked with him for two "farsakhs".
He gave some of his courtiers white doves ordering them to set them free if  
Ibrahim won a victory, and to send them back to him if  the battle went the 
other way. At the same time he told the Shi*a that God w ill send them
3
angels in the form of white doves to help them against the Syrians. Dozy
accepted this story and regarded it as a way in which al-M ukhtar would get
4
information about the result of the battle. Rajkowski also accepted the story
1. Die Religios-Politischen OppositiorL£parteien im alten Islam, p .84.
2 . Mubarrad, I I I ,  p .267 ff.
3. D °*y , op» c it . ,  p .22 ff.
4 . Early Shi* ism in Iraq, p. 178, Ph.D . Thesis, London, 1955.
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but gave it the different explanation of being one of al-Mukhtar's methods
of impressing his followers. The story seems to be, as Wellhausen^ has
-  2pointed out, a superstition derived from the story of Suraqa ibn Mirdas.
The fact that no confirmation of it has been reported in our sources and that 
it only occurs, without a chain of authority, in al-M ubarrad, who is known 
to have had Kharijite inclinations, is enough to make us suspect it.
When al-M ukhtar accompanied Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar on his departure 
to fight the Syrians, at Dair* Abd al-Rahman, they met some enthusiastic 
Shi* is with an empty chair placed on the back of a grey mule in a very 
solemn procession, escorted by the sadin (guardian), Hawshab at-Bursumi.
3They were circling it and asking God for victory. This scene, however, 
caused a reaction from the moderate Shi* a, such as Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar, 
who disapproved of it . As we shall see later, it was one of the reasons which 
led him to abandon a l-M ukhtar. On the other hand, it added to the zeal 
of the extremists and gave them courage to meet their Syrian adversaries. 
Two narratives te ll us of the origin of this Kursi (chair) and its cult.
1. Die Religios-Politischen Opposition-on.&pqrteien im alten Islam, p .84.
2. See p.
3. Ansab, V ,  p p .247-8; T ab ., II, pp .70 0 -2 ; Kamil, IV/ p .212 j iMuwairi, X IX , 
ld L 3 2 ;  Bidaya, V I I I / p . 278.
The one is Abu Mikhnaf's in Baladhuri and Tabari  ^ which depicts a l-  
Mukhtar as responsible for the presence of the kursi. The second is that
t 2
of Tufail ibn Ja ‘da ibn Hubaira in Tabari which shows al-M ukhtar only * * — •
giving his approval to the idea. Both are repeated by Ibn a l-A th ir and
, - 3  -  _ -  . 4
Nuwairi . Abu Mikhnaf says that al-M ukhtar asked Al Ja*da ibn Hubaira
to give him the chair of * All ibn AbT Talib. They denied that they had such 
a chair, but when he insisted on it, they brought him one and claimed that it 
was the chair of * A li. However, Tufail's narrative differs in that he says one 
day he was in need of money and saw a chair with a neighbouring oil dealer. 
He took it after it had been cleaned. He went to al-M ukhtar and informed 
him that it was the chair on which his father Ja*da ibn Hubaira used to sit 
and that once it had belonged to * A li. A l-M ukhtar ordered the chair to be 
brought and gave Tufail twelve thousand dirhams for it.
The most significant point here is, who were the guardians of the chair?
and who were those encircling it in prayer? The answer may help us to trace
-  T  5the origin of this cult. It is reported by Abu Mikhnaf in Tabari that the first
1* Ansab, V , pp .241-2; Tab., I I ,  p .706.
2 . Tab ., I I ,  pp .702-3 .
3 . Karnil, IV , p .214; Nuwairi, X IX , fol. 46.
4 . Um Ja*da was Um Han** the sister of * A ll ibn Abi Talib.
5 . Tab ., I I ,  p .607.
sadin of the chair was Musa the son of Abu Musa a l-A sh*ari, and then 
Hawshab al-Bursumu Both belonged to Yemenite tribes. Those who were 
surrounding and worshipping the chair were also Yemenites, members of the 
tribes of Shibam, Nahd, Kharif and Shakir.  ^ The fact that in pre-lslamic 
times certain South Arabian clans acted as guardians of sanctuaries, and that
guardianship passed from generation to generation, and conferred high status
2 .(Sh araf) , explains why all the sad ins of the Kursi were South Arabians.
Moreover, among all South Arabian tribes the custom of carrying their tribal
emblems with them when going to war was very common. For they believed
that these emblems would give them victory and thus increase the valour of
the warriors. Therefore, on the day of Dhu Qar we find Banu Bakr ibn Wa* il
expressing their joy by walking round the Gubba of Hanzala ibn Tha* laba before
they held their meeting. Thus the chair here acted exactly like a tribal
emblem in giving victory and increasing the valour of the warriors. It is also
significant that the word uminbar" was borrowed by old Arabic from the
Ethiopic by way of South Arabia, and that the first * Arabs to whom tradition
4attributes the use of the "minbar" were Yemenites. It is not surprising,
1 . Ib id ., I I ,  pp .705-6 .
2 . R.W . Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, p. 14 7 ff., London, 
1894; R. B* Serjeant, Haram and tjaw ta, the Sacred Enclavage in Arabia, 
pp. 4 1 -2 , M TH , 1962. *
3 . Agh. t X X , p* 136.
4 . J. Sauvaget, La Mosgu6 e Omeyyade de M edine, p. 141, Paris 1947;
E. Tyan, Institution du Droit Public Musulman, I, p .4 8 8 ff ., Beirut, 1954; 
Sourdel, Questions de CeremoniaMAbbasTde, p. 130, REI, X X , 1961.
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therefore, that the victory of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar made them worship 
it even more. It is clear, therefore, that the chair was not al-Mukhtar's 
idea and in this case, we may prefer the narrative of Tufail to that of Abu 
Mikh naf.
Nevertheless, the presence of the chair was used by al-M ukhtar 
as a means of getting more support from the extremist Shj*a and encourag­
ing the warriors. Certainly to them it was a holy chair, since they believed 
it to be * AlPs, and would give them victory.
A new menace faced al-M ukhtar shortly after his victory over the 
Syrians* This danger came from Basra, where Mus*ab ibn al-Zubair was 
governor for his brother * Abdallah.  ^ After seizing Kufa and defeating the 
Syrians, al-M ukhtar had become as formidable a foe of Ibn al-Zubair as * Abd 
a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan. His territories embraced a l-K ufa and its Sawad and 
also the whole Jazira. * Abd a l-M a lik  kept Syria and Egypt, while Ibn a l-  
Zubair was confined to the poor country of a l-H ija z  and Basra, and was
threatened by both the presence of al-Mukhtar in Kufa and the Kharijites in
2
Persia. The Kufan refugees in Basra, ten thousand in number, led by 
Shabath ibn Rab* i and Muhammad ibn al-Ash*ath a l-K ind i played an 
important role in inciting Mus*ab against al-Mukhtar and urging him to end 
his activities in Kufa. But Mus * ab would not yield to their request unless
1. Ansab, V ,  p .231; Tab., I I ,  pp .665, 6 8 8 .
2. Dinawari, p .310.
3. Ansab, V , pp .251, 270 (citing Mada* in i); Dinawari, pp .310-11; T a b ., I I ,
p .718 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); K am il, IV , p .220; Nuw airi, X IX , fol. 36.
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al-M uhallab  ibn Abi Sufra, with the troops of Basra, stopped fighting the
Kharijites in a l-A hw az, Far& and Kirman, and joined his forces. This
was because of al-M uhal lab's military competence, and because his troops
were composed of the best fighters of Basra. However, a l-M uhallab  was
unwilling to leave his post as the governor of Fars, or to stop the war against
the Kharijites, and only after M us*ab despatched Muhammad ibn a l-
Ash*oth to him, with the claim that he had come as the messenger of the
women and children of the Ashraf , would al-M uhallab agree to join the
2army of M us*ab. He appointed his son Yazid as his deputy in Fars. The 
presence of a l-M uhallab in this campaign re-enforced the army of Mus*ab  
with men, money and equipment, military experience and leadership.
Mus*ab also was joined by ‘ Ubaidallah ibn *A li ibn Abi Talib for personal
3 -reasons. Before leaving Basra, M usf ab had secretly sent ( Abd al-Rahman
-  . -  4ibn M ikhnaf to Kufa in order to provoke the people against al-M ukhtar.
Hearing of Mus^ab's preparations for war, al-Mukhtar delivered a speech 
in which he promised his followers victory. He followed this by raising an
1* Ansab, V ,  p .252; D inaw ari, p .310; Tab., I I ,  p .719 (citing Abu 
Mikfinaf); K ufi, II, fol. 13a.
2. It is said that al-M uhal lab concluded a temporary truce with the 
Kharijite leader QatrT ibn a l-F u ja ’ a. See Dinawari, p .310.
3. Sa*d, V ,  pp .87 -8 ; Zubairi, pp .43 -4 ; Dinawari, p .311 (the name 
given here is *Umar ibn *A li) .
4 . Ansab, V , p .253; Tab., I I ,  p .719 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .220.
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1
army under the command of Ahmar ibn Shumait . A l-M ukhtar's army
-  2 - -  
met the Basrans in al-M adhar * A !-m aw ali in al-M ukhtar *s army
-  -  -  3
were under the command of Abu *Amra Kaisan, a mawla of 'Uraina.
Before the battle had started *Abdallah ibn Wahab al-Jushami, who was on 
the left wing of Ibn Shumait's army, (and who, it seems, could not bear to 
see the mawali mounted on horses and wanted to get rid of them as a reprisal 
for what they had done against their masters) ddvised his commander-in-chief
to ask the mawali to fight on foot on the excuse of their alleged readiness
4 t
to flee; the latter followed this advice. Al-Mukhtar's army suffered a
crushing defeat in the battle and Ahmar ibn Shumait was k illed . Those 
who fled were pursued by Mus*ab's cavalry, especially by the Kufan 
refugees who killed everyone they caught,to revenge themselves. Only a
1. The number of Ibn Shumait's army is given by Baladhuri (Ansab, V , p .272)
as forty thousand; *while DlnawarT (p .311) makes it sixty thousand; but
Kufi" (II , fo l. 28a) says it was only of three thousand.
2. It is reported by Waqidi in T a b ., ( II ,  p.748) that al-M ukhtar told ibn 
Shumait to meet Mus*ab in a l-M adhffr, because he hadTeard that a 
ThaqflFite w ill gain victory in al-M adhar. But that Thaqifite was a l-  
H a jja j and not a l-M ukhtar. This anticipatory character of this account 
shows that it is of a later fabrication.
3. Ansab, V ,  p .253; Tab., I I ,  p .721 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
4. Tab ., II, p .721 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .221 .
5. Although if is not mentioned in our sources, yet it seems that Abu * Amra 
Kaisan was also killed in this battle, for we do not hear about him after 
this defeat in a l-M ad har.
141.
few reached Kufa and communicated the news of the defeat to al-M ukhtar.
The date of this battle has not been given in our sources: one might assume 
it to be about the middle of 67 /686. ^
The defeat of al-Mukhtar's army in al-M adhar had very serious con­
sequences, both on his own part and on that of his followers. When the 
news of the defeat reached him, he said, "By God the slaves have been 
killed on an unprecedented scale” . He also said on the same occasion,
"Death is inevitable and there should be no better death for me than to die
2fighting like Ibn Shumait This shows how disastrous it was for the morale 
of al-M ukhtar himself. It also shook to the very foundation the trust of 
his most sincere followers, i . e . ,  the Persian mawali to whom he had promised
3victory. They expressed this distrust by saying, "This time he told lies".
M eanwhile, Mus*ab continued to march on Kufa. In order to speed 
up his march, Mus*ab ordered the infantry, the weak and the provisions to 
be carried by boats, while the cavalry advanced by land. In order to hamper 
their march, al-M ukhtar drained the Euphrates and caused its water to go into 
the neighbouring canals. As a result the Basrans1 boats came to a halt. But 
al-M ukhtar was unable to man the dam for long, so that the Basrans soon removed
1. Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Oppositiorv&parteien im alten Islam, 
p. 85.
2. Tab., I I ,  p .724 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .222.
3. Ansab, V , p .254; Tab ., II, p .724 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
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it ,  and could again continue their journey in their boats. ^
After fortifying the mosque and the palace, al-M ukhtar left Kufa
-  -  2and made his camp at Harura> in order to prevent Mus*ab and his army
from entering the city . He had left * Abdallah ibn Shaddad al-Jushami as
his deputy there. Mus*ab's army was arranged into five divisions. On the
right wing was a l-M uhallab , on the left was * Umar ibn ‘ Ubaidallah ibn
Ma*mar al-Tamimi; in command of the cavalry was * Abbad ibn al-Husain,
and of the infantry, Muqatil ibn Misma* al-Bakri; and the Kufan refugees
-  3were under Muhammad ibn al-Ash* ath al-K tnd i. To counteract Mus * ab, a l-  • ■ ■ — #
Mukhtar sent to every tribal "Fifth" of the Basrans, one of his followers
from the same tribe. To Bakr ibn Wa* N, he sent Sa* id ibnM unqidh, to f Abd
al-Q ais he sent * Abd al-Rahman ibn Shuraih aI»Shibami; to Ahl a l-*  A liya he
sent * Abdaliah ibn Ja ‘ da ibn Hubaira al-Quraishi al-M akhzum i; to al-A zd
he sent Musafir ibn Sa* id ibn Nimran a l-N a * it i ;  to Banu Tamim he sent Sulaim
ibn Yazid a l-K ind i and to Muhammad ibn a l-A sM ath , he sent al-Sa* ib ibn 
-4M alik  al-Ashf ari . The two armies soon joined battle, in which Muhammad 
ibn al-Ash*ath and ‘ Ubaidallah ibn * AM were killed . At this point, Muhallab's 
division joined the battle, attacked ai-Mukhtar's army and inflicted defeat on
1. Ansab, V , p .228; Tab., II ,  p .724; Kufi, I I, fo l. 29a.
   •
2. Tab ., I I ,  p .748 (citing al-W aqid i).
3* Ansab, V , p .259; Tab ., II, p .725 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
4 . Ansab, V ,  p .259; Tab., I I ,  p .726.
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it. But al-M ukhtar continued to fight all the night, and only under
pressure from his followers did he agree to return to the palace. ^
Since the battle of Khazir, 10th of Muharram 67/6th of August, 6 8 6 ,
Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar had remained in Musil governing Jazira and its
dependences. Why did he remain there when al-M ukhtar was in such
straits in Kufa, and there was so little  need for his presence in Musil?
Why did not al-Mukhtar ask him to come and join him in the war against
2M us‘ abi? Wellhausen, presumes that there were reasons to prevent a l-
Mukhtar asking the help of Ibn al-Ashtar, or that the latter was not sincere
in his adherence to al-M ukhtar. In fact, the relationship between al-Mukhtar
and Ibrahim had become cool when, on Ibrahim's departure to flight
‘ Ubaidallah ibn Z iyad , al-Mukhtar's followers met him with the chair.
Ibrahim had expressed his disapproval of this by saying,"O God, do not
3punish us because of the deeds of the silly among us." But he did not give 
up his task, perhaps because he was a sincere adherent of the ShH i cause. He 
might also have been motivated by a personal ambition, in that he had been
1. Ansab, V ,  p .259; Tab., II, p .726ff. (citing Abu M ikhnaf). Here again, 
no date for the battle has been given and all we know is that it took place 
67 /686; but if  we consider the narrative of Waqidi in Tab., (II, p .748), 
which says that al-Mukhtar was killed in Ramadan, 67, four months after
the battle of Harura* ,"the date of the battle should be 15th Jumada a l-A w w al, 
6 7 /ls t December, 6 8 6 ; Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Opposition-  
iparteien im alten Islam, p. 56.
2 . Ib id ., p. 8 6 .
3. Ansab, V ,  p .248; Tab., I I ,  p .702 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
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promised by Ibn al-Hanafiyya supposedly, (in the false letter), the governor­
ship of conquered lands. His ambition was satisfied now that he was 
governor of Musil and Jazira; why, therefore, should he be concerned with 
al-Mukhtar's affairs? That the two were on not very good terms is hinted 
at by Tabari; all the heads of the tribal quarters deserted Ibrahim as soon as 
he became governor of Musil, since they believed him to be failing in his 
adherence to the cause of al-M ukhtar. These tribal heads were sent with 
Ahmar ibn Shumait to the battle of al-M adhar.  ^ When Muhammad ibn a l-
*  — ■ .  i .
Ash* ath went as a messenger to al-M uhallah , to ask him to join Mus*ab against
2al-M ukhtar, we are told by Ibn A*tham that he told him, " A l-  Mukhtar now 
stands alone, for Ibn al-Ashtar has deserted him and seized a l-Jazira . " The 
same source says that when al-Mukhtar heard about Mus*ab's preparations for 
war, he believed that Mus*ab had been encouraged to attack, because he
-  3knew that Ibn al-Ashtar would no longer come to the assistance of al-M ukhtar. 
Al-M ukhtar, trying to raise the valour of his followers, made it clear in his
speeches that Ibn al-Ashtar was no longer on his side, and asked them to
4 -
join the army of Ibn Shumait. However, al-M ukhtar was in great need of
Ibrahim's help and military experience, especially after the defeat of his army
1 . Tab ., I I ,  p .720 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
2. Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 27b; Bagh. ,  pp .35 -6 .
3. Kufi, I I, fo l. 28a.
4 . Ibid.
in al-M adhar. He wrote several times to him to ask his help, but Ibrahim 
refused.  ^ When the battle of Hamra* began, al-M ukhtar could only 
express his deep sorrow and regret at his abandonment by Ibrahim. One 
could mention here that after al-Mukhtar's death, Ibrahim made a firm 
alliance with Mus*ab. Mus*ab would never have placed his complete con­
fidence in Ibrahim, had he not been sure of his indifference to al-Mukhtarb  
cause. It is probable that if  Ibrahim had not deserted al-M ukhtar, the out­
come of the battles of Madhar and ^arura* might well have been different.
Gn the next day, (Thursday), Mus*ab and his army continued their 
march on Kufa, which they entered from al-Sabakha and laid seige to 
al-M ukhtar. To prevent provisions reaching the latter and his followers, 
he sent ‘ Abdallah ibna l-H urr a !-Ju *fi to Jabbant al-Sa* id iyin , and
*Abbad ibn al-Husain to Jabbant Kinda; he also ordered al-M uhallab to
•  •  - - .
-  2patrol the road to and from Kufa. These measures prevented al-M ukhtar
from getting even drinking water from the Euphrates, so that he was forced
to mix honey with the water from the palace wells.
In the palace, with al-M ukhtar, were a large number of mawali and
t 3few * Arabs. During the seige which lasted, according to Waqidi , four
.. 4
months, or forty days according to Dinawari, the * Arabs deserted al-Mukhtar
1 . Ib id ., II, fo l. 29a.
2. Ansab, V , pp .260-1; Tab ., I I ,  pp .733-4 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
3. Tab., I I ,  p .749.
4 . Dinawari, p .313.
and took refuge with their tribes, while the mawali remained with him 
until he was k illed . During the seige, however, al-Mukhtar's prestige had
1fallen and people in Kufa dared to throw stones and rubbish on his followers.
The only way they could get supplies was for their wives to bring them, but
soon this visiting of wives was stopped. Realizing that the seige would weaken
their resistance, al-Mukhtar urged his followers to go out with him and fight
until they die or w in, but they refused and decided to surrender unconditionally
toM us*ab. Therefore, al-Mukhtar and only nineteen followers went out to
battle. A l-M ukhtar met his death after having distinguished himself in fighting
courageously. It is reported that he said during this last battle before his
death, to al-Sa*'ib ibn M alik  al-Ashf ari: "I am an Arab. I saw * Abdallah
ibn a l-Zubair seize a l-H ija z , Marwan ibn al-Hakam seize Syria, Najda ibn
* Amir al-H anafi (the Kharajite) seize al-Yamama; so I, inferior to none,
seized this region. The only difference is that I revenged the Prophet's family
2
(Ahl a l-B ait) while the Arabs forgot i t ,"  Al-M ukhtar died on the 14th of
-  3Ramadan 67 /3 rd  of A pril, 687, when he was 67 years old.
1. Tab ., I I ,  p .734 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .224.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .261; Dinawari, p .313; Tab ., I I ,  p .737 (citing Abu 
Mikhnaf); K ufi, I I ,  fo l. 30b; Kamil, lv , p .225; Dhahabi, II, p .378.
3. Tab ., I I ,  p .750. It is mentioned in Baladhuri (Ansab, V ,  p .264) that 
al-Mukhtar's death was in 69/688 in the month of Ramadan. According 
to Fariq (op. c i t . , p. 119, S11, I I I ,  no. 2 , 1966) this date is more likely  
since al-M ukhtar had fought several wars in distant regions where the 
means of communication were slow.
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A ll those who were with al-M ukhtar in the palace, said to have been
six thousand in number, were killed on the order of Mus‘ ab, under pressure
from the Kufan refugees to take revenge for their relatives and kinsmen. ^
This massive slaughter provoked the indignation of pious men like ‘ Abdallah
ibn ‘ Umar, and many of the people of Kufa, which could be noticed in the
death of Mus‘ ab in the battle of Maskin with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan
72 /691 . Mus‘ ab, however, showed no mercy towards al-Mukhtar's followers,
and killed the two sons of Hujr ibn ‘ Adi and also the son of Hudhaifa ibn a l -  
-  3
Yaman. He cut off the hand of al-Mukhtar and pinned it to the side of the
mosque, an act which certainly enraged not only al-Mukhtar's family but all
those followers who remained faithful to him even after his death.
Following the death of al-M ukhtar, Mus‘ ab summoned his two widows,
Um Thabit bint Samura ibn Jundub al-Fazari and ‘ Amra bint a l-N u ‘ man
ibn Bashir al-Ansari, and ordered them to declare that al-M ukhtar was a
liar and an imposter. The former yielded reluctantly, while the latter refused
and asserted that he was a good Muslim. Mus‘ ab imprisoned her and wrote to
1* Ansab, V , pp .262-3 ; Dinawari, p .315; Tab ., I I ,  pp .740-1 ; KufT, II, 
fol. 31a; ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l.270b (citing ‘ Abdallah ibn Abi Rabi‘ a 
al-M akhzum i); Kamil, IV , p .225. It is reported also thatM us‘ ab in ­
tended to k ill the m awaif and set the ‘ Arabs free. The latter were only 
seven hundred according to I bn ‘ Asakir (X V I, fol. 270b) and two thousand 
according to Dinawari (p .315). See also Ansab, V ,  p. 263; Tab ., I I ,  p .749 
(citing Waqidf).
2. Ansab, V ,  p .265 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and ‘ Awana), p .271 (citing ‘ Awana) 
Tab ,, I I ,  p .745 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
3. Ansab, V ,  pp .270-1 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).
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his brother ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zubair in M ecca, saying that she claimed 
that al-Mukhtar was a prophet ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zubair passed sentence
of death on her, but she still refused to recant t ^. The poet ‘ Umar ibn
7 ? -  -  2Abi Rabi‘ a al-Makhzum i has expressed how her death shocked the people
at that time.
After al-Mukhtar's death, ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zubair sent his brother
‘ Urwa to Ibn al-H anafiyya demanding his homage and threatening him with
death should fee refuse. ‘ Urwa gave his brother's message, and then said
to Ibn al-H anafiyya that, "God had killed the imposter al-M ukhtar on whom
you were depending". Ibn al-Hanafiyya replied . .  By God I did not send .
al-M ukhtar as my agent nor was he my supporter; he was more intimate with
3your brother than with m e ." This account shows that al-M ukhtar had 
exploited the name of Ibn al-Hanafiyya for his own ends, and that the latter 
did not approve of his activities.
The interpretation of al-Mukhtar's character given in both the early and 
late sources, as well as by modern historians, is of a "false prophet” , 
making himself into the agent of a l-M ah d i, with connotations of a reflection 
of the relationship between God and the Prophet, forecasting events to show
1. Ansab, V ,  pp .263-4 ; Dinawari, p .315; Tab ., I I ,  pp .743-4  (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); Kam il, IV , p .227. Certainly this act provoked the people
of Kfffa even more against Mus‘ ab, since he had committed a deed which 
the Prophet had forbidden against the wives of the infidels. ‘ Iqd, V I ,  p. 118.
2. Ansab, V , p p .263-4 ; Dinawari, p .315; Tab., I I ,  p .744 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); 
Kamil, IV , p .227. * ”
3. Sa‘ d, V , pp.7 7 -8 ; ‘ Asdkir, X V , fo l. 273a; DhahabT, 111, p .299.
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himself as in touch with the unknown, using rhymed prose to imitate the
Q ur’an, and arousing and directing religious emotions for his own political
ends. His motivations were no higher than political ambition, and he
unscrupulously used all means to these ends. M y own opinion is that he
was a genuine Shi‘ i and became impatient with Ibn al-Hanafiyya's inactivity  
■ *
in pursuing the revenge of al-Husain, especially since he could see the 
political possibilities that the revenge could offer to an ambitious man. He 
achieved power by calling Ibn al-Hanafiyya a l-M ah d i, and this sparked 
off a wave of religious fanaticism which he had to contain by continuing the 
religious pretence: for example, his use of rhymed prose, and his forecasts.
He used this religious fanaticism both for the ends of his political ambition, 
and for the end of the revenge of al-Husain. He seemed to have a genuine 
concern for the social dissabilities of the mawalT, although a part of this 
would spring from the fact that they were the easiest to arouse in support of 
his cause, both because of their religious extremism and their social grievances.
Apart from an ephemeral political success, the revolt of al-Mukhtar 
contributed considerably to the history of the ShHa movement; for it was 
connected with the origin of the Kaisaniyya and the Khashabiyya sects.
A l-Kaisaniyya derives its name from a man called Kaisan, about whom 
our authorities are not agreed. It is said that Kaisan the mawla of <Ali ibn Abi
150.
1 -  Talib was the founder of the sect, from whom al-M ukhtcr took his ideas;
it is claimed that Kaiscn wcs with al-M ukhtar in the taking of the revenge
of al-Husain. Since this Kcisan, however, was killed in the battle of Siffin # •
237 /657 , about thirty years before al-Mukhtar's revolt and the origin of 
the Kaisaniyya, it is impossible to accept this view. It is probable that 
by attributing the Kaisaniyya to the mawla of t A li, or depicting him as a
3disciple of Ibn a l-H anafiyya, the intention was to give the sect a strong 
religious pedigree, since Kaisan would take his knowledge either directly 
from his master, ( A li, or indirectly from his son.
Another view holds that the Kaisan after whom the sect was named, was
al-M ukhtar himself, who was nicknamed Kaisan, either by ( A li or by
4
Muhammad ibn al-H anafiyya. The sources, however, show only that a l-  
Mukhtar was ca lleduKayyis" by ‘ A li and not Kaisan at a ll. The claim that 
the title  was conferred on al-M ukhtar by Ibn al-H anafiyya is extremely un­
like ly , since Ibn al-H anafiyya never trusted him, nor recognized him as working 
for the 11 Ah I a l-B p it" . Therefore, it would seem that al-M ukhtar and Kaisan
1. Nawbakhti, p .21; M aqalcf, p . 18; Ibn Hayyun, Sharh al-Akhbar, fo l.48b; 
M afatrh, p .21; Begin,, p7 /7 j Adyan, p .35; M ifa l, p .280; HiJr, p. 182; 
M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l.39a ; Muqaddima, p .351. “
2. Tab ., I, p .3293 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamil, I I I ,  p .247.
3 - P-280; M r^ a t , V I ,  fol. 39a.
4* M a *a rif, p .267; Nawbakhti, p .20; AMaq, p .218; M aqalat, p. 18;
M uruj, V , _Pj*180 (citing < Dmar ibn Shabba); Bagh., p .27; Nubdha min 
Kitab al-TarTkjn, fol. 245b; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l. 3 9 a.
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were two different people. ^
One final explanation for the name Kaisaniyya is given by Ibn Hazm
_ 2
and Nashwan al-H im yari, who state that the Kaisaniyya were the followers 
of al-M ukhtar and Kaisan Abu * Amra, a mawla of *Uraina from the tribe of 
Bajila. This last explanation helps us to clarify the point that, if al-Mukhtar 
was ever called Kaisan, it was due to the activities of Kaisan Abu * Amra, who 
as the head of al-Mukhtar's personal guard, threatened the non-Shi* i and 
was very influential among his fellow mawali. It could be that when in later 
years Kaisan*s activity against the non-Shi* i were remembered, after the man 
himself had been forgotten, the word “Kaisaniyya" was used to describe all 
the activities of that brief spell of al-Mukhtar's power. This shows how 
Kaisan and al-M ukhtar became linked names, so that Mukhtariyya and 
Kaisaniyya became synonymous.
This study is not concerned with the theological aspect of al-Kaisaniyya  
sect; it is suffice to mention here that the political party which overthrew 
the Umayyids and established the * Abbasids in power (the Hash imiyya) was 
a group of the Kaisaniyya, which split into three groups after the death of Ibn
3al-H anafiyya.
1. Sa*d, V ,  p .77; DTnawarT, pp. 296-7 .
2. Fi§al, IV , p. 94; yu r, p. 182; Freidlaender, The Heterodoxies of the 
Shi* ites in the Presentation of Ibn l^azm, p .34 , JAO S, X X IX , 1908.
3 . V a n V lo te n , op. c it . , p .42; £. 1. (*Abbasfid), (Hashimiyya), (Ghulat).
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The name al-Khashabiyya, " club men", was used for the first time
to designate those sent by al-Mukhtar from among the people of Kufa to
rescue Ibn al-H anafiyya, after being imprisoned by Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. They
were called so because they held wooden clubs in their hands as weapons. ^
2It is said that this was on the instructions of Ibn al-H anafiyya to avoid
the use of swords in the baram. It is also reported by al-Baladhuri and Ibn 
_ 3
a l-A th ir , on doubtful evidence, that they were called Khashabiyya because 
they took the wooden clubs which were piled up by Ibn a l-Zu bair beside the
prison in preparation for burning Ibn al-Hanafiyya and his followers. The fact
4
that Ibn al-H anafiyya was always against violence and the use of force and 
that it was only on their entry into ai-Haram that they held swords, makes us 
favour the first interpretation.
Another account has it that it was Ibrahim's army that was called
. t 5Khashabiyya. According to Ibn Q utaiba, Ibn Rusta and Maqdisi, most of 
Ibrahim's army that fought Ibn Ziyad carried wooden arms (khashab), and for
1 . Akhbar, fols. 45b, 46a, 47a; Ansab, V ,  p .231; Tab ., I I ,  p .694 (citing 
Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .207.
2. Akhbar, fo l. 47a; Ansab, V , p .231; fo l. 262a; T ab ., II, pp .694-5  (citing 
Abu M ikhnaf); Kuft, I I ,  fo l. l ib ;  Kamil, IV , p .^07.
3. Ansab, Y ,  p .231; fo l. 262a; Kamil, IV , p .207.
4. Sa‘ d, V , p .78; Ansab, V , pp .246-7 ; T ab ., I I ,  p p .689-91 (citing Abu 
Mikhnaf); Kuft, I I ,  fol. 12a; Kamil, IV , p p .204-5 .
5. M a *a rif, p. 267; A ‘ lag, p. 218; Bad*, V , p. 133.
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this reason were called Khashabiyya* After al-Mukhtar's death, a l -
Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra, a general of Mus*ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, laid seige to
Nasibin, where Ibrahim al-Ashtar was governor. Abu O arib , Yazid ibn
Abi Sakhr and the Khashabiyya were defending the city . Muhallab addressed
the people saying, "Do not be frightened of these men. They are only slaves
with nothing in their hands but sticks."^ This shows both that Khashabiyya
was being used as a name for Ibrahim's army, and that this was associated
with the fact that they were mawalt.
These Khashabiyya are not the same as those who rescued Ibn al-Hanafiyya
-  2
from Ibn a l-Zu bair. This is made clear by information given in Baladhuri, 
who relates that the four thousand men who came to Ibn al-Hanafiyya's  
rescue, and among whom he distributed the money sent by a l-M ukhtar, did 
not go back to Kufa, but remained with him in the Shi^b of ( A li. Even those 
few among them who, with the permission of Ibn a l-H anafiyya , weht to see 
their families and remained in Kufa until the battle of Jabbanat al-Subai‘ , 
fought in that battle against al-M ukhtar. It is therefore d ifficu lt to imagine 
them in the army of Ibn al-Ashtar fighting the Syrians for the sake of a l-
Mukhtar; nor would the latter have trusted them any more. This informa-
? 3tion of Baladhuri has been confirmed by Ibn Sa( d's narrative which says that
1 . Agh., V ,  p. 155 (citing al-Haytham ibn *A d i).
2. Akhbar, fol. 47a; Ansab, fo l. 262a.
3. Sa( d, V , p .76.
in the year 66 -67 /68 5 -68 6 , Ibn al-Hanafiyya and four thousand of the 
Khashabiyya who were residing in the Shi4b of M ina performed the pilgrim­
age. Thus there were two groups of men known as Khashabiyya: the first, 
the rescuers of Ibn a l-H anafiyya, and the second, Ibrahim's army. In the 
first case, the name was simply used as a descriptive name; it seems that it 
was the second group that developed into a religious sect.
What was the relationship between al-M ukhtar, the Kaisaniyya and the 
Khashabiyya? A l-M a$4udi  ^ tells us that when al-M ukhtar was fighting 
M us*ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, "he had with him many of the Shi4a, called 
Khashabiyya, belonging to the Kaisaniyya." On the authority of al-Zubair
-  t  2ibn Bakkar, al-lsbahani says that, " it was Khi^dif al-Asadi who converted
1 3Kttfhayyir$vhowas known to be a Kaisani ) to the Khashabiyya." A l-M as4udi
in al-Tanbih says that when al-M ukhtar was killed and his followers, about
six thousand, surrendered unconditionally to M u s 4ab, they were all put to
4
death; these followers were known as Khashabiyya. We are told by a l-  
Tabari and al-lsbahani,^ that Yazid ibn 4 Uthman al-Khashabi received his
1. M uruj, V ,  p. 226.
2. Agh. V I I I ,  p .33.
3. Freidlaender, op. c i t . , p. 94, JAOS, X X IX , 1908; E. I. ^, (al-Khashabiyya).
4 . Tanbih, pp .312-13 .
5. T ab ., I I ,  p. 1798; Agh. ,  V I ,  p. 139.
name from the fact that he was descended from one of the Khashabiyya of
al-M ukhtar. These accounts show that a I-Khashabiyya was used as a name
for al -Mukhtar's followers, and that either al-Khashabiyya was another name
for a I-Kaisaniyya^ or else that one of the sects took over the other, perhaps
in a later period, so that the two names were used interchangeably.
As to the reason why Ibrahim's followers carried wooden clubs in their
2
hands and not weapons, modern historians disagree. Wellhausen presumes 
that being mawali, they were poor and thus could not afford to buy weapons. 
The fact that it is not true that all the mawali were poor, nor that all the
Khashabiyya were mawali , makes this presumption inadequate. As has
3been pointed out by Friedlaender, the name must have had religious im plica-
4tions. It is reported by Ibn Hazm that the Rawafid hold that it was forbidden
•  •
to use weapons before the speaking Imam (a l-N atiq ) came forth. After that, 
it would be obligatory to draw swords tflong with him. It may be that the 
Khashabiyya were motivated by similar doctrinal reasons, since both were
extremist Shi4 i sects. This doctrine of using sticks instead of weapons has
5 6been ascribed to both Jewish and Christian origins.
1. E. I. \  (al-Khashabiyya).
2. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositioru&parteien im alten Islam, p .80.
3. op. c i t . ,  p. 94, JAOS, X X IX , 1908.
4 . Fi$al, IV , p. 171.
5. Freidlaender, op. c it . ,  p .94, JAO S, X X IX , 1908.
6 . Rajkowski, op. c i t . ,  pp. 168-9.
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Al-Khqsh qbiyyg as a name was also given to a group of a Zaidi Shi4 a,
known as Shurkhabiyya after a certain Shurkhab a l-Jab ari.  ^ This
2obscure Shurkhab might, as Arendank has suggested, have been the
-  3one who played a part in Tabaristan in the time of al-Hasan ibn Zaid*
It is also reported that a group of al-Jahmiyya was called Khashabiyya; 
they held that God does not speak and that the Q ur’an is created.
4Finally, it is reported that al-Khashabiyya were called so because 
they kept the wood on which Zaid ibn 4 A li was crucified. This, however, 
cannot be true, because the crucifixion of Zaid happened much later, after 
the death of Ibn 4 Umar, on whose authority this story has been reported.
1* M afa tih , p. 21; Adyan, pp. 34 -5 .
(ql"Khashabiyya).
3. Ibn Isfandiyar, (English translation by E. G . Browne), Index.
4 . N ihaya, I I ,  p .33.
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CHAPTER III
‘ ABD AL-M ALIK IBN MARWAn  AND THE * ASABIYYA-     -     »— — --
Tribal feuding existed long before 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's  reign began, a l­
though it reached a new intensity during his caliphate. Nevertheless, by 
the end of his reign, outbreaks of raiding and other manifestations of 
t A§abiyya were very much in the decline, as a result of the policies pursued 
by 4Abd a l-M a lik  towards the tribes.
Feuding broke out in both Syria and al -  Jazira first between the Qais 
and the Kalb, and later between the Qais and the Taghlib. Khurasan was 
also the scene of feuding, starting between Rabi4a and Mudar ( i .e .  Bakr, Tamim 
and Qais)* Later, the Mudarites divided, and feuding began between the 
Tamim and the Qais* Finally , the Tamim began to feud among themselves.
Historians hold different views on the origins of the antagonism between 
the Qais and the Kalb ( i .e .  the Northern and Southern * Arabs). While Dozy^
thinks that the struggle between the Gais and the Kalb "has existed from time
2immemorial", Goldziher considers that it derived from the rivalry between
3the Quraish and the Ansar. Wellhausen stresses the view that the hostility 
between the Gais and the Kalb "did not exist before the capture of Syria 
by the Muslims and the immigration thither of the Qais". It seems erroneous
1 . Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne, I, p . lO & ff . ,  Leiden, 1861.
2. Muslim Studies, I, p. 91, Ed. S. Mb Stern, London, 1967.
3 . The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll,p . 180.
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to connect these feuds with the pre-lslamic ones, for the latter were
between “neighbouring tribes often related to one another1'. ^
The development of the tribal feuds in the Umayyad period seems to
be due to economic and social fact or sand goes back to the time of the
Conquest and the settlement of Arab tribes in the conquered lands. Even
before the conquest of Syria, there were many<Arab tribes living there, most
of them Yemenites. They were Ghassan, Tanukh, Judham, ‘ Am ila, Kalb,
Salih, and Bahra’ . In the north of Syria there were Taghlib, Tanukh, lyad
2
and a l-N im r ibn Qasit # Some of these tribes, such as Ghassan, were
associated with the Byzantines and even fought against the‘Arabs with the 
3Byzantines. This might have temporarily weakened the Yemenite influence 
in Syria, yet their prior presence and their numerical strength meant that 
they soon regained much of their earlier predominance over the other tribes. 
Their years of contact with the Byzantine Empire had raised their economic 
standards of liv ing, and culturally and economically they were superior to 
the new settling‘Arabs. On the other hand, the conquering Yemenite Arabs 
felt that the prior occupation of parts of Syria gave them a special interest in the 
area: when the Caliph ‘ Umar I tried to send re-inforcements to the Muslim
1. B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, p .74, London, 1964.
2. M cfarif, p .212; Ishtiqaq, pp. 225, 313-14, 327; Futub, p .59; Tab.,
I, p .2347; HamdanT, Sifat JazTrat a l - ‘ Arab, p . 1297 A gh■, X V , p. 91; 
Bakri, I, p p .50, 8 6 ; Jamharat, p .423; ‘ Ibar, II, p p .3 6 -7 .
3. Futuh, p. 135; Tab., I, p. 2081 (citing Saif ibn ‘ Umar); E. I. (Ghassan).
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armies who were carrying out the conquest of Iraq, the Yemenites pre-
1ferred to go to Syria as "the land of their forefathers". Thus most of the 
new ‘Arab settlers arriving with the conquests were also Yemenites, thus 
making it likely that the Southern‘Arabs would continue to be dominant in 
Syria even after the conquest. A look at the settlement of tribes in Syria 
clearly shows this dominance: in Palestine were Lakham, ‘ Am ila, Judham 
and Kalb; in Jordan were Ghassan, M adhhij, Quda‘ a, Hamdan, Kalb and 
‘ Ik; Hu ran and Julan contained a mixture of Lakham, Juhaina and 
Dhubian; while Damascus was also inhabited by Guda‘ a, Ghassan and 
Himyar with a small number of Oaisite and Quraishite. Hims was predominantly 
Yemenite in character, where were Kinda, Tay, Himyar, Kalb, Hamdan and 
a minority of ‘ lyad and Gais. Hamat was inhabited by Yementies too, 
especially the Tanukh_and Bahra*. In the northern region we find Salih,
Zubaid, Hamdan, Kinda, and Tay, all Yemenite, with a minority of Gais 
and lyad. The Gais were in a majority in Qinusrin and its outskirts, as well as in the 
JaziraV'as were the Rabi‘ a. The Kalb, on the other hand, were the sole 
occupants of the desert of the Samawa. The Taghlib were on the Khabur 
in the Jazira region.^
1. Tab., I, pp .2187-8; 2217-8 (citing Saif ibn ‘ Umar).
2. Nasr ibn Muzahim, Waq‘ at Siffin, p .232; Futuh, pp. 107-92; Dinawari, 
p. 183; Bui dan/p p .  325, 32V; Tab., U pp. V555^5, 1604-5, 1611, 1740-1, 
2347-8 , 11, 468; HamdanT, §ifat Jazirat a l - ‘ Arab, pp. 129-34; M u ‘ jam, 11, 
p .44 , IV , p. 391; Bughya, fols. 467-501.
160.
The campaigns of the conquest led to a new development in the 
structure of Arabian society: the change from the Bedouin way of life to 
city-dw elling, as different tribes settled in the cities of the conquered 
lands. Contrary to one’s expectation, that this settlement in the cities 
would weaken tribal cohesion, and act as a check on the rivalries and 
jealousies of the different tribes now forced to live together, it did, in fact, 
increase tribal loyalty. Indeed, the Caliph had m ilitary reasons for main­
taining tribal loyalties, as they were used to maintain discipline in the 
lower ranks of the army. The settlement in towns was organised on a tribal 
basis, each tribe having its own quarter.^
In Syria, the m ilitary settlements and districts of the tribes were 
called Jund. The tribes were quartered in these Jund, and could be 
mobilized for seasonal campaigns or for more protracted expeditions. There 
were at first four Junds in Syria, of IHims, Damascus, Jordan and Palestine. 
Later, the Jund of Ginasrin is said to have been detached from this
?  2
organization by the caliph Y azid . "The whole army was a mixture of
men of various tribes, but in the lower ranks, the soldiers remained grouped
3in communities of tribal origin".
1 . Futub , pp. 276-89; Dinawari, p. 147 f f . ; T a b ., I, pj>.
Massignon, Explacation du Plan de Kufa (Irak), pp .345, M M , 111,
1935-40; a l-JanabT, TakhjTt a l-K ufa , pp .76 -80 , Baghdad, 1967.
2* E. I. (Djund).
3. E. I. (Djaysh).
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From the battle of J iffin , one can detect the elements of the Syrian 
army in the early Umayyad period. In that battle the army of M u ‘ awiya 
was composed mainly of Yemenites with a minority of Gaisite but no 
Rabi‘ ites. The Yemenites were Himyar, Guda‘ a (Kalb and Tanukh), Lakham, 
Judham, Hamdam, Khath‘ am, Ghassan, M adhhij, ‘ Ik, Ash‘ ar, Kinda and 
Azd. The Gais minority were mainly Hawazin, Ghatafan, Sulaim and lyad.  ^
On the whole, command of the army was in the hands of the Quraish. The 
religious and political superiority which the Quraish had enjoyed over the 
other tribes in pre-lslamic times continued in Islamic times due to their 
special status as the tribe of the Prophet: they held, in fact, almost all the 
important offices, as commanders of armies and rulers of the ‘Arabs. This 
helped them to maintain a position above the rivalry of the tribes. The 
Umayyad and the Quraish, while not unnaturally choosing to rely on the 
stronger Kalb, nevertheless avoided antagonizing the Qais, with whom they 
were related by blood-ties.
To return to the tribal organizations of the cities, this served to preserve 
the tribes as distinctive units and to prevent much inter-tribal mixing. Cn 
the other hand, the new closeness of the tribes made friction between them 
unavoidable, thus causing unrest and feuding.
1. Nasr ibn Muzahim, op. c i t . ,  pp .233-99; Tab ., I, pp .3282-3310.
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To examine this specifically in the Syrian context, jealousies were 
aroused between the dominant Yemeni element, especially the Kalb, 
with their resentment of the non-Yemenite groups with whom they had to 
share resources, and the Q ais, who envied the Yemeni influence and pros­
perity.
This jealousy showed itself clearly in the relations between the two parties 
and the sovereign, i .e .  first the governor of Syria and then the Umayyad 
caliph. Both parties competed with each other to get the favour of the ruler 
by offering their servi ces to him in return for rewards or appointment to state 
offices, a rich source of both wealth and influence. The sovereign chose to 
rely most on the Kalbites, as they were the stronger, a fact which both 
increased the strength of the Kalbites through government patronage, and 
caused the Qais to swing into bitter opposition to the government. The Qais 
found themselves deprived of office and influence, and thus unable to themselves 
act as a patronage group, which in its turn increased their hostility to the 
Kalbites. It is in the light of this vicious circle that the relations between 
the Umayyad caliphs and the tribes should be seen.
The policy of M u‘ awiya in Syria follows this pattern, for he favoured 
the Kalb in order to both secure his own position at home, and to prepare 
himself to face the Caliph ‘ A li Ibn Abi Talib in war. Both he and his son
163.
1Yazid concluded marriage alliances with the Kalbites, which made the 
Yemenites in general, and the Kalb in particular, the most influential of 
the tribes in Syria during their reign, and during the short reign of
2 -   3
M u*awiya II .  It is also reported in the Kitabat Aghani that at first
M u*aw iya allotted the * Ata* to the Yemenite tribes alone
thus strengthening the Yemenites to the extent that they threatened the Gais
with expulsion from Syria. No other sources confirm this account, but even
if it is an exaggeration, it may well have been based on the state of tribal
tension at the time.
Conflict in the interests of the two tribes, led the Kalbites (Yemenites)
and the Qaisites (Mudarites) to support opposing political groups. In the
period of political trouble that followed the death of the caliph Yazid  I,
the support the Yemenites gave to the Umayyads was due to the favourable
4
economic and political position which they had enjoyed under them. On
1. Ansab, IV , i i ,  p .6 j ;  Tab ., I I ,  p .204; Khulafa*, II, fo l. 70b; E. I. 
(Kais ( A ilan); E. I. , (Kalb). These marriage alliances between the 
Kalb tribe and the Umayyad family date from the time of the caliph 
cUthman ibn ‘ Affan, who married N a ’ ila bint al-Farafisa a Kalbite. 
Ansab, V , p. 99 (citing M ada? inT and Abu M ikhnaf), 10*6; Tab ., I, 
p .3056.
2. Abu Tammam, Naga* ? j  Jarir wal Akhtal, p. I f f . ; Idem, Hamasa, I,
p. 31 9; Khalifa ibrTKhayydt , Tflrtkh, I, p. 21 9; Muhabbar, p. 373; 
Ansab, 177 11/ pp. 60, 65; *V, pp. 127-8, 132 (citing 6 Abbas ibn Hisham 
al-KalbT); Ya'qubT, II, p p .283, 301; Tab ., I I ,  p p .205, 4 7 4 -5 , 837; 
JahshiyarT, pp. 24, 26, 31 /A sak ir, IV , pp. 145, 460; V ,  pp .8 6 , 337; 
jjaba , I I I ,  p .337; Dhahabi, I I ,  p .69; I I I ,  p. 16.
3. Agh. , XV111, pp .69 -70 . Concerning the favour shown by M u ‘ awiya to 
the Yemenites, see also Nasr ibn Muzahim, op. c it . ,  pp .492-3 .
4 . See the notes 1 and 2 on this page.
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the other hand, the Qaisites gave their full support to Ibn alZubair, less 
for their love of his cause, then for their hatred to the Kalbites, and the 
Umayyads who supported them. Mas*udi  ^ reports that the Yemenites, 
headed by the Kalbite Hassan ibn M alik  Ibn Bahdal, stipulated, before 
giving their full support to Marwan ibn al-Hakam , that they should be given 
the same concessions as they enjoyed during the caliphates of Mu* awiya I,
Yazid I and Mu* awiya II. These were that two thousand of them should 
receive two thousand dirhams each annual payment for their support, and if 
the recipiant died, his son or cousin should receive the payment. The 
Kalbites should be given the front place in the court, and should be con­
sulted in every important matter. To ali these terms Marwan gave his consent.
It is also reported by Abu Ja*fr in Tabari, that before al-Husain ibn Numair
gave his support to Marwan, he stipulated that he should give al -Saiga’
2to Kinda as a fie f. Not unnaturally, therefore, the Qaisite gave their full
support in the battle of Marj Rahit (64/683) to Ibn a l-Zubair while the
-  3Yemenites took the side of Marwan. This battle, however, ended with a
4crushing defeat for the Qaisites. This defeat at the hands of the Yemenites
1. M uruj, V , p. 200.
2. T ab ., I I ,  p .487.
3. Abu Tammam, Naga* id Jarir wal AkhJtal, pp. 16-17; Idem, Hamasa, I,
p p .317-19; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .255; Ansab, V ,  pp. 127-28,
132 (citing *Awana), 138, 146 (citing WaqidT), 148; Ya*qubi, II, pp .303-4; 
Tab ., I I ,  p .478; MarzubanT, M u *jam a l-S h *ara* . p .241; Muruj, V ,  p .202; 
kh u la fa*, II, fols. 95a;95b, 96b; Shams, p .42.
4 . It is reported that nine thousand Qaisites were k illed . This might be an 
exaggeration, but it does reflect that heavy losses were suffered.
Abu Tammam, Naqa? id Jarir wal Akhtal, p. 17; MarzubanT, op. c i t . , p. 227.
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was never forgotten by the Qais, and made the conflict between the two 
even deeper. This was one reason for the feuds between them in the 
reign of *Abd ak -M a lik  ibn Marwan,^ for the Qaisites found in the political 
disturbances at the time of his accession an opportunity to revenge themselves.
Tribal conflicts over waterwells and pastureland did not cease with 
Islam and continued even during the Umayyad period. A good example 
of such conflict can be found in the region of a l-Jaz ira . The immigration 
of Qais at the time of the conquest brought them close to the Taghlib who 
were dwelling in Musil and the Euphrates basin. As a result, they began 
to compete with each other for the most important economic resources, 
water wells and pastureland, which was a cause of the feud between them
-  3during the caliphate of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan. Economic and social 
conflicts led to other differences; while the Qais were pro-Zubairids, we find 
the Taghlib supporting the Umayyads. It seems that this was the reason for 
the Taghlib joining the Yemenites in the battle of M arj Rahit against the
1. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id Jarir wal Akh.tal, p p .24, 25, 26; Idem,
Hamasa, I ,  pp .71, 317-18; KhalTfa ibn K hayyat, TarTkh, I, pp .256-57; 
Hayawan, I I I ,  pp .422-23; Ansab, V , pp. 141-2 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); 
Tab. , IT, pp .482-83; AmidT7~PP-74, 129; M uruj, V ,  p .203; A g T ., X V II,  
p .112 (citing Mada* ini); M u ‘ jam, II, pp. 743-44.
2. E. I. ^, (Kais f A ilan; E. I. ^, (Taghlib).
3. See below, p.
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Qaisites,^ They probably hoped that the defeat of the Qaisites in 
this battle would enable them to expel the Qaisites from the region, 
leaving them free to enjoy its economic advantages. However, despite 
their defeat, the Qaisites continued to live as neighbours of the 
Taghlib, thus ensuring the continuation of the tribal conflict.
A third scene of tribal conflict was Khurasan, where it flared up 
after the death of the caliph Yazid I. We shall have occasion to discuss 
this later in detail: it is sufficient to mention here that the Rabi( a were 
jealous of the extent to which the Mudar were exploiting the resources 
of Khurasan. ^ (  \ a s
During the reign of f Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan (65-86), no such 
tribal feuds as were taking place in a l-Jazira  or Khurasan, have been
reported to us in Iraq. It seems that the people of both Kufa and Basra
3  „
were pre-occupied with fighting the Kharijites (Azariqa and Shabib).
Moreover, one must not forget the efforts made by a l-H a jja j to suppress
the * Asabiyya among the tribes. The people of Iraq were also busy in the
conquest of the Eastern provinces. However, tribal rivalry and jealousy
did assert itself in an earlier period. The attempt of al-Muthanna ibn
1. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p .71; Ansab, V , p .328 (citing ‘ Awana); 
Daif, Al-Tatqwur wal-TajdTd fiM^Shi^r al-UmawT, p. 17, Cairo,
1965; E. I. f  , (TaghTibT
2. Futub, p .414; Ansab, fo l. 593a; Tab ., I I ,  p .48bff.
3 . AI-Muss , A I-* Asabiyya al-Q abaliyya wa Atharuha fi'l-S h i*  r q l-
UmawT, p .315, Beirut, 1964,
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Mukharriba a I - ‘ Abdi to seize al-Basra for al-M ukhtar^. and the revolt . • *
  t 2
of Ibn al-Jarud (where the Qaisite sided with a l-H a jja j) , are good
examples of conflicts between the tribes. This w ill be discussed in detail
in a later chapter.
The Qaisites were awaiting their opportunity to avenge
themselves for their defeat in the battle of Marj Rahit: this came in the
%
battle of Khazir, 10th Muharram 67/6th August 6 8 6 , when f Umair ibn
al-Hubab al-SuIam i, who was with the Qaisites on the left wing of the Syrian
army, deserted the battlefield as soon as the battle was joined, thus
bringing about the victory of the Iraqis. Following this treason, *Umair
took refuge with the head of the Qaisites, Zufar ibn al-H arith  a l-K ilab i.
The latter had been keeping a strong hold on Garqisya, against the
-  . 4Umayyads, since the battle of Marj Rahit. From this time onwards 
began the armed conflict between Qais and Kalb, taking the form of raids. 
These wars or raids were called Ayyam (days),each of which usually carried 
the name of the place in which the raid occurred.
Our information about these '‘days'1 comes mainly from al-Baladhuri 
and al-lsbahani in his Aahani. Ibn a l-A th ir mainly repeats the narrative
1. See Chapter I I ,  p. IQ T j^
ibn Khayyat, TarTkh, p .269; Ansab, X I ,  p .282 ff. (citing 
M ada’ ini and Ibn a l-K a lb f); Tab ., I I ,  p p .873-74 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); 
Kami I, IV , p .3 0 8 ff .; * Ibar, IN, p. 94ff.
3. See Chapter I I,  pp. * 5 2. - 4 .
4 . Abu Tammam, N aga’ T j Jarir wal A khtal, p. 26; Khalifa ibn Khayyat,
Tarikh, I, p . 256; Ansab, V ,  pp .3017-3 1 3 -4 ; J a b ., I I ,  pp .480, 483
(citing Abu M ikhnaf); A g^ ,., X V II,  p. 112 (citing Mada* in i); M u( jam,
II ,  p .744; Kamfl, IV , p .254.
of al-Baladhuri. He repeats the narrative of al-M ada* ini in Tabari 
when dealing with the feuds in Khurasan, and thus in both cases he 
adds but little  to our knowledge. A l-Tabari, however, provides an 
important detailed account of the tribal conflicts in Khurasan and the 
Eastern provinces, which together with that of Ibn A*them , provides us 
with a full picture of the events in that area. Our second source of 
information is the poetical works of a l-A khta l, G atam i, Farazdaq and Jarir, 
as well as many other poetical and literary works,  ^ which confirm the 
historical tradition that has reached us from the classical sources. Finally, 
there is another indispensible source of information on these “days11, in 
the books of geneology (Nasab) of Ibn Habib, ibn a l-K a lb i, Ibn Duraid, 
al-Ham dani, Ibn Hazm and al-Sam *ani. Apart from such scattered informati 
as they contain, they are useful in that they show the tribal relationships of 
the individuals involved in these "days1*. However, despite the abundance 
of the material we possess about these "days", it is of a somewhat confused 
nature and rarely follows a chronological sequence. Y e t, by comparing 
the different narratives and by following the faint clues they contain, one 
is able to build up a chronology for these events.
We have four narratives which describe the beginning of the feud
1 . Abu *Ubaida, Naga* id Jarir wal Farazdaq; Abu Tammam, Nag a* id
JarTr w al-A khta l; AI-QurashT, JamhararAsh* ar a l-*A rab ; Ibn Sal lam,
Tabagat al-Shu* a ra *; Jahiz, AT-Hayawdn; RasMl; Al-Bayan wal
TabyTn; Amidt, A l-M u *ta lif  w a l-M u k h ta lif.. . ;  Marzubflnf, M u*jam a
Shu* arci*; Tawfrtdt, A l-lm ta* wal -M u 3 anasqT"A I-* AskarT, Kitab a l -
Sfna* atain.*
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T 1between the Qais and Kalb; two are in Baladhuri and two in the
-  -  2 ~K itab al-A ghani. The first account of Baladhuri narrates that when
the battle of Marj Rahit was over, Zufar ibn a l-H arith  a l-K ilab i fled
to Qarqisya*. He was then joined by ‘ Uniair ibn al-Hubab al-Sulam i.
They both began to make raids on the Kalbites and other Yemenites to
revenge the death of those Qaisites killed in Marj Rahit. Some of the
Taghlib were with them in these raids, which led the Kalbites to retaliate
by raiding those Tagh lib who were with Zufar. The second narrative of
Baladhuri has come to us on the authority of Dawud ibn * Abd al-Ham id.
He says that after the battle of Khazir, *Umair ibn al-Hubab al-Sulami,
scorning tc join al-M ukhtar, went to Garqisya* to join Zufar ibn a l-
Harith al -  K ilab i, where the two began to raid the Kalbites and other
Yemenites. Owing to the many problems which *Abd a l-M a lik  faced at
the time, he was unable to deal with Zufar immediately. Meanwhile, *Umair
ibn al-Hubab, not wishing to stay longer with Zufar in G a^ lE y a *, asked *Abd
a l-M a lik  for Aman . Despite the malice which *Abd a l-M a lik  bore against
‘ Umair for his treason in the battle of Khazir, he did not refuse to grant
this request, and *Umair joined ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . However, false rumours
soon caused ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to imprison* * Umair, who however eventually
managed to escape and went to a l-Jaz ira . * Umair took his residence on
1. Ansab, V ,  pp .313-14.
2. Agh., X V II,  p. 11 I f f . ;  X X , p .!2 0 ff.
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the banks of the Bulaikh river,where he was joined by his branch of the
Qaisites. He then began to make raids on the Kalb and other Yemenites in
the region, and also made enemies of his Taghlibite neighbours by
tyrannizing them. This was before ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  marched to fight first
Zufar, and then Mus * ab ibn a l-Zubair, Both of these narratives show 9 «
that the feud between Qais and Kalb was started by the Qaisites. They
also agree that Zufar ibn al-H arith  and ‘ Umair ibn al-Hubab together
•  ■ ■ ■ «
began to raid the Kalb and other Yemenites from Qarqisya’ . However, 
the first narrative, which comes to us without any chain of authority, 
makes no mention of the role of ‘ Umair in the battle of Khazir, and 
portrays him as joining Zufar after the battle of Marj Rahit. Thus it 
does not follow as closely the sequence of events as the second account, 
although it does explain how some of the Taghlib took part in the 
Qaisite raids on the Kalbites. The second narrative is repeated by Ibn 
al -AthTr. ^
-  T 2According to the first narrative of the Kitab al-A ghani, however, 
the feud began when Zufar ibn al-H arith  a l-K ilab i made a sudden attack 
on the settlements of the Kalbites in Musaiyakh , killing twenty of their 
men. When news of this reached Humaid ibn Huraith ibn Bahdal a l-K a lb i,
1. Kam il, IV , p .254.
2. A g h ,, X X , pp. 120-1.
171.
he retaliated by killing sixty men from Banu Numair, who were living 
in Tadmur. This slaughter of Banu Numair led Zufar to search out the 
Kalbites, and k ill more than five hundred of them in the “day" known 
as the “day of a l - lk l i l11. Zufar returned safely to Qarqisya^ where 
Humaid could not reach him. The second narrative of the Kitab a l-  
Aghani, ^on the authority of Mada 9 in i , says that, following the defeat 
of the Oaisites in the battle of Marj Rahit, Zufar fled to Qarqisya’ , 
where he was joined by *Umair ibn al-Hubab after the death of Ibn 
Ziyad in the battle of Khazir. Then ‘ Umair began his raids on Kalb, 
Q uda*a and other Yemenites. These raids caused the Kalb, led byt '
Humaid ibn Huraith ibn Bahdal, to retaliate, killing a large number of
the tribe of Banu Numair in Tadmur.
Thus we see that the Kitab al-Aghani's first narrative portrays Zufar,
and not *Umair, as the one who began the feud. This, however, is not
confirmed in any other accounts. On the other hand, the narrative of
Mada* ini in the Kitab al-Aghan? confirms that of Dawud ibn *Abd a l-
Hamid in Baladhuri, in that both say it was *Umair who started the feud 
2
against the Kalb. They also agree that *Umair only joined Zufar in 
Qarqisya’ after the battle of Khazir. Therefore, it is possible to give
i
1. Agh. , X V II ,  p. I l l  ff. (citing Mada* in i).
2. Forming his opinion from Kitab a I-Agh an i's narratives, Wellhausen 
decides that it was Zufar ibn al-Harith who started the feuds, and 
not ‘ Umair ibn al-Hubab. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .202.
a rough date for the beginning of this feud, from these two accounts.
The feud, it seems, did not start before the year 67 /68 6 , for this was
the year of the battle of Khazir, the time when ‘ Umair joined Zufar.
Moreover, considering that narrative of Baladhuri which states that ‘ Umair's
raids on the Kalbites were before ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  had fought either Zufar
or Mus* ab, it is also possible to oonclude that these raids between Kalb 
*
and Qais were confined to a period between 67/686 and 70 /699 , for 
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  fought Zufar and Mus‘ ab in the years 70 -72  (699-701). 
Perhaps this is why Ibn al-Athir^ gives the year 70 /699 as the date of the 
feud. After the slaughter of the Banu Numair in Tadmur by Humaid ibn
2
Huraith ibn Bahdal, Zufar ibn a l-H arith  killed five hundred Kalbites. 
However, Humaid attempted to retaliate by following * Umair when he 
went to raid the Banu Janab of the Kalb tribe, but being unable to 
reach him, he instead attacked a group of Qaisite followers of ‘ Umair, and
put them a li to death, except for one who managed to flee and carry the
3 r  -news of this massacre to * Umair. * Umair returned to Qarqisya*. The
feuds between Qais and Kalb continued and the names of several "days'1
1 . Kamil, IV , p .254.
2. A g h ., XX, p. 121.
3. Ansab, V , p .309 (citing Ibn af-K alb i); Aah . .  X V II, p. 112ff.
(citing Mada* ini).
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-  1are reported to us, such as that of a l-G huw air, ai-Faras and Duhman.
Owing to these constant raids, the Kalbites left the area affected by the
2Qasite raids, and emigrated to al-G haur in Palestine. Thus we see 
that Qais realized their end of achieving unchallenged supremacy in the 
area.
Following the accession of Marwan ibn al-Hakam to the Caliphate 
64 /684 , he sent an army under ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad to conquer Kufa.
On his way, Ibn Ziyad tried to liquidate Zufar ibn al-H arith  , who, with 
the Qaisites, had a strong hold on Qarqisya’ . After an abortive seige 
of a year, Ibn Ziyad had to give up this project, and marched on to Kufa, 
where he was defeated and killed in the battle of Khazir, 67 /68 .
Being engaged in consolidating his power in Syria, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan 
left Zufar and the Qais in Qarqisya’ unmolested for a w hile. However, as 
soon as he felt secure enough at home, he returned his attention towards 
Iraq. There was little  fioint in attacking M us‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, the 
governor of Iraq for his brother ‘ Abdallah, while Zufar still held 
Qarqisya’ in support of Ibn a l-Zubair. Therefore, before advancing 
against M us‘ ab, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  wrote to Aban Ibn Abi ‘ Uqba Ibn Abi 
M u ‘ a i t ,  his governor of Hims, ordering him to fight Zufar in in Q arq isya \^
1. A g h . ,  X X , pp. 121-23.
2. Absab, V ,  p .308; Agh., X X , p. 123.
3. See Chapter I I,  p. „
4 . Ansab, V , p.307 (citing ql-Haythqm); Kamil, IV , p .275; ‘ Ibar, II I ,  p .81.
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Zufar's forces were defeated in this campaign and one of his sons k illed ,
yet he still remained in control of Qarqisya*.
Having put down the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq in Damascus,
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  once again marched against Iraq to fight Mus^ab ibn a l -
Zubair, Before doing so, he made another attempt to end the insurrection
of Zufar and the Qaisites in C a ^ E y a ’ . This task occupied the whole
summer of 71 -7 2 /6 9 1 .  ^ ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  first laid seige to the city of
Q arqisya’ and began to bombard its fortifications by catapults for forty days.
Following the advice of the Kalbites, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ordered that only the
Yemenites in his army should take part in the battle which followed the seige.
This decision, however, worked in the favour of Zufar and his followers
2
who were able to cause ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  Yemenites to retreat. ‘ Abd a l -
M alik's army at this time was composed predominantly of Yemenites,
especially Kalb, Quda‘ a and to a lesser extent, Kinda. There were
minorities of Qaisites and Quraishites -  the latter including the caliph and
3
some‘Umayyad princes.
Having failed to attain his goal by force, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  tried by 
peaceful means, endeavouring to reconcile Zufar. He wrote to him asking 
for his obedience, pointing out that the majority of Muslims recognized him
1. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 191.
2. Ansab, V , pp .301 -4 ; KufT, I I ,  fol. 50a; Kamil, IV , p p .275-6;
‘ Ibar, I I I ,  pp .81 -2 .
3. Ansab, V , pp .301-5 , 3 0 7 /(citing al-Haythgm); Kufi , II, fo l.50a; 
Kamil, IV , p .276; ‘Jbgr, I I I ,  p .81 -2 , ”
as caliph, and inviting him to do the same. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  promised
him a reward for his acceptance of this offer, and threatened him, should
he refuse it.^  The messengers of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  were the theologian
-  - 2  Raja' ibn Haiwa al-K indi and a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi. However,
Zufar refused this offer; but his son al-Hudhail was not unwilling to
accept it . This convinced ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  of the possibility of reaching
a peaceful settlement and led him to order his brother Muhammad ibn
#
Marwan to grant Zufar and his son al-H udhail, Aman (safe conduct)for
3themselves and their followers and promise them favour. A l-Hudhail 
again responded to this offer and managed to persuade his father to accept 
it . Zufar agreed on the condition that he would have the choice either of 
remaining loyal to Ibn al-Zubafh, or of joining ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .^  While 
these negotiations were going on, the Kalbites in ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  army 
opposed this agreement between the caliph and their Oaisite adversaries, 
and they advised the caliph to refuse Zufar's terms and instead to continue 
the battle. They pointed out that most of the fortifications of the city of
1. Ansab, V , p .305.
2. The choice of a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf and Raja' ibn Haywa as messengers
to Zufar ibn al-H arith  seems to have been a diplomatic one. While 
the first was Qaisite like Zufar's followers, Raja* was from the 
Kinda tribe, to whom Zufar was related, as known to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . 
Ansab, V , p .303; Kam il, IV , p .278. One should also note the 
important religious status of Raja’ .
3 . Ansab, V , p .305.
4. Ansab, V , p .305; Kamil, IV , p .277; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .82.
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T ” 1Qarqisya* were already destroyed. At first, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  gave way to 
this demand of his Kalbite supporters, but eventually he was forced to 
make peace on Zufar's terms, seeing that the war was not to be so easily 
won. This voluntary submission of the Qaisites may have been due to the 
fact that the future of Ibn a l-Zubair was not yet secure, or may have been 
in response to the generosity of ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  terms.
The agreement between the caliph and Zufar was made on the follow­
ing terms: the Caliph granted Amah to Zufar, his son al-H udhail, and all 
of their followers. Zufar would bear no responsibility for his insurrection, 
either for the people killed , or for the money spent in the fighting. Zufar 
agreed not to make war against ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , but because of his previous 
homage to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, he would not fight with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  against
him. Finally, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  was to give Zufar a sum of money to
2distribute among his followers. This agreement was sealed by a marriage 
contract between al-Rabab, the daughter of Zufar ibn a l-H arith , and Maslama, 
the son of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . To show his loyalty to the caliph, Zufar ordered 
his son al-Hudhail to join ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  army against Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Zubair,
1. Ansab, V , pp .303-4 (citing Mada* inT); p .305; Kamil, IV , p .277;
‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .82.
2. Ansab, V , p. 305; X I, pp. 24 -5  (citing ‘ Awana); Kufi, I I ,  fol. 50b;
Kami I , IV , p. 277; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p. 82.
3. Jahiz, Rasa* i l ,  (ed. Sandubi), p. 182 (citing M ada? ini); Ansab, V ,
Kamil, IV , p .278; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .82.
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because, unlike his father, he had no commitment towards Ibn a l-Zubair . ^
M eanwhile, the feud between the Taghlib and the Qais started in
the Jazira, which led to a temporary lull in the raids between the Qais
and the Kalb there. However, the G ais/K alb feud broke out in a different
area. The raids of Humaid ibn Huraith ibn Bahdal, the sayyid of the
Banu Kalb, on the Qaisites in the Jazira had stirred up the leaders among
2the Qaisites in Iraq, especially of the Banu Fazara. Their complaints were
carried to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan by ‘ Abdallah ibn Mas‘ ada a l-Fazari,
who refused to dine with the caliph as a protest against the massacre of the
Banu Sulaim and the Banu ‘ Amir in the raids of Humaid ibn Huraith ibn 
3Bahdgl. When Humaid heard of ‘ Abdallah's complaints, he decided to • •
raid the Banu Fazara, to whom Ibn Mas‘ ada belonged. This decision
of Humaid was welcomed by the ‘ Umayyad princes whose mothers were
Kalbites. These princes were infuriated by the pride their half-brothers
4
with Qaisite mothers took in the Qaisite raids on the Kalbites. Humaid,*
therefore, did not find it difficult to get a letter of assignment (‘ Ahd) in
the name of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  commissioning him to collect the Sadaqa from 
5the Banu Fazara. The latter had not yet been involved in the feuds,
1. Ansab, V , p .350 (citing ‘ Awana); Kamil, IV , p .278; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p .82.
2. Fazara ibn Dhubian ibn Baghid ibn Ghaith ibn Ghatafan ibn Sa‘ d ibn
Qais ‘ Ailan ibn Mudar ibn Nfzar ibn M a ‘adibn ‘ Adnan. See Nasab,fols. 
173a-174a; Jomharat, p .2 4 5 ;E . 1.2, (Fazara).
3 . Ansab, V , p .309 (citing Ibn al—K alb i); A a h ., X V II,  p .311 (citing Vlada’ in
4 . Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p. 260.
5. Ibid. , I, p .260; Ansab, V , pp. 309-310 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); A a h ., X V II,
p. 114 (citing M ada’ in i); ‘ Asakir, V I ,p .  118; M u ‘ jam, I, p .739;
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possibly because their settlements, (Wadi'l Rumma in Najd and southern
Syria), were far from the Jazira. After getting a false ‘ Ahd to collect the
Sadaqa from the Banu Fazara, Humaid ibn Huraith, accompanied by two
•  ■- ■ —1
hundred^ cavalry men from his own people, the Kalb, marched on Banu”
Fazara. He took them by surprise and killed a large number of them in a 
-  2place called a l - ‘ Ah.
This raid incited the Banu Fazara to retaliate. Their chiefs, 
including Asma* ibn Kh arija al-Fazari and Khalid ibn Dathar ibn Q uraiz, 
met ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan at a l-N ukhaila  after he had defeated 
Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Zu bair. They raised a strong protest to him about Humaid's 
action, and demanded Qawad(that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  should slay Humaid for their
3revenge). ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , however, found it enough to give the Banu 
Fazara money to recompense for the blood of Humaid .had shed. He expressed
f*
his opinion by saying, “You were in Fitna (dissension), the equivalent of
= according to Abu Tammam (op. c i t . , I, p .260), it was Khalid ibn Yazid
ibn M u ‘ awiya who prepared the^Ahd for Ftamaid. There is also 
reference to this in Baladhuri's Ansab, IV , i i ,  p .6 8 . Other sources confirm 
that Humaid had a false ‘ Ahd, which he acquired as a result of the rivalry 
between the Umayyad princes, according to their family relation with 
either the Qais or the Kalb, which leads us to believe that it was Khalid 
ibn Y azid , whose mother and grand-mother were Kalbites, who was the 
most likely to have prepared the false ‘ Ahd for Humaid.
1* Agh. , X V II,  p. 119 (citing Mada* in i).
2. Abu Tammam, jjamasa, I ,  p. 261; Ansab , V , p. 309 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i);
Agh. , X V II ,  p. 113 (citing M ada’ in?); BakrT, I, p .279; ‘ Asakir, V I ,  p. 118;
M u ‘ jam, I, p .739.
3. Qawad and Qisas are synonymous, both meaning retaliation. According to 
Muslim law, Qawad and Qisas are applied in cases of k illing , called =
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Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic times), and there was no Qawad in Ja iliyya". At
first, they refused to accept only money, but came to agree, with the
2intention of using it to buy military equipment for retaliation. Clt is
possible that f Abd a l-M a lik  refused to take severe action against Humaid
and the Kalbites, because he feared to provoke against himself this strong
and influential tribe and other Yemenites in Syria, especially since
4Abdallah ibn al-Zubair was still holding strongly in the H ijqz*. He may
*
well also have hoped that the money payment would provide a peaceful 
end to the strife between the two parties at a time when both were equally 
gu ilty of the feud*
3 -
It is reported that at the time of Humaid's raid, 4 Abd a l - 4 A ziz
4ibn Marwan, whose mother was a Kalbite, was boasting to his brother
5 .Bishr ibn Marwan, a son of a Qaisite mother, in the court of 4Abd a l-M a lik .
-  Qisas f i'l-N a fs  (blood vengeance), and of wounding, called Qisas
flma dun a l-N afs . E, I. (Kisas).
1 . Ansab, V , p .310 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).
2* Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p .262; Ansab, V , p .310 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i);
Agh. / XV11, p. 114” (citing Mada* int); 4Asak?V, V I ,  p. 118.
3 . Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p .262; B akri, I, p. 279; 4 Asakir, V I ,  p .118.
4. Abu Tammam, hjamasa, I, p .262; Ibn Qais al-Ruqayyat, Diwan, p. 153;
Khalffa ibn Khayyat, Tabaqat, p .60;Hayaw an, V I I ,  p. 154; Ansab, V , pp. 
143, 164; Nasab,fo l. 12b; M a 4 ad, fo l. 74b; 4 Asakir, X , foi. 194b.
5. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, i ,  p .262; Ansab, V , p. 164; Nasab, fol. 12b;
Bakri, I, p .279; Jamharat, p .264; 4Asakir, I I I ,  fo l. 177a.
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This provoked Bishr, to give money to the Banu Fazara to help their 
retaliation. This story shows clearly how the ‘ A.sabiyya asserted itself 
even among the princes of the ruling dynasty. It was by exploiting this
that Humaid ibn Huraith obtained the false ‘ Ahd commissioning him to
*  *  - ——
collect the Jiadaqa of the Banu Fazara.  ^ There seems no reason to reject
2  " this story, asWellhausen does, simply because ‘ Abd a l- *A z iz  and Bishr,
the caliph's brothers, were the governors of Egypt and Kufa respectively.
This event may well have occurred during a visit to the court, as we know
such visits did take place.^
4Feeling that they were treated unjustly, and encouraged by Bishr 
ibn Marwan, the Banu Fazara used the money they received to buy military 
equipment. They then retaliated against the Kalbites (the Banu ‘ Ulaim and 
Banu ‘ Abd Wudd) in a place called Banat G ain , killing a large number of them. 
When he heard of this, ( Abd a l-M a lik  became very angry and ordered 
ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi, his governor of a l-H ija Z /^  to punish
1 . See p .l78o f this
Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its FaH p .207.
3. Khalifa ibn K hayyat, TarikJi, I, p .268; K indi, p .51, where he states 
that in the year 70 , £ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz  ibn Marwan visited his brother
‘ Abd a l-M a lik ; Dhahabi, 111, p. 117.
4 . Ansab, V , p. 310.
5. AbC? Tammam, Hamasa, I, p .263; Ansab, V , p .311 (citing a l-K a lb i);
Agh . , X V II ,  p .115 (citing M ada*in i); BakrT, I, pp .279-80; IV , p .160; 
‘ Asakir, IV , p. 118; M u cjam, I, p .739; I I I ,  p .596.
6 . According to Mada* ini (Agh., X V , II, p. 115), this day of Banat Gain
happened during the governorship of a l-H a jja j in Iraq. This, however, =
181.
the Banu Fazara severely. However, Halhaia ibn Qais and Sa‘ 7d ibn* *
‘ Uyayna, the two Fazarites chiefly responsible for this feud, averted
the disaster from their tribe by giving themselves up voluntarily to a l -
H ajjap. He sent them to the caliph.  ^ In the court at Damascus, the
presence of the two offenders caused a difference of opinion among the
Umayyad princes. W hile those of Kalbite women demanded their execution,
the sons of Qaisite mothers demanded that they should pay a money recom- 
2
pense. Eventually, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  gave the two offenders to the Kalbites, 
who killed them in vengeance for their people.
This did not in any way mean that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  took sides against 
the Qaisites. It shows only that he tried to be above the parties, and to 
punish the Banu Fazara for violating his measures to end the feud.
The dates of the days of a ! -4Ah and Banat Q ain are not given pre­
cisely in our sources. However, it is possible to conjecturefhem from the events
-  -  3 _of the period. According to M ada*in i, Humaid's raid on the Banu ‘ Amir and
Banu Sulaim (the day of a l - ‘ Ah) took place before Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Zubair had
t 4been killed by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . This has been confirmed by Ibn a l-K a lb i.
-  could not be possible, since Bishr ibn Marwan was present at the court 
when Sa‘ id and Halhaia gave themselves up.AI-IJajjaj did not 
receive the governorship of Iraq until the year #5 , when he replaced 
Bishr after the latter's death.
1 . Abu Tammam, op. c i t . , I, p. 263; Ansab,V, p .311 (citing Ibn a l-
KalbTJ; Aah. , X V II,  p. 115 (citing Mada* ini); BakrT, I, pp .279-60;
‘ Asakir, V I ,  p. 116.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .311 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); A ah ., X V I I ,  p. 116 (citing
Mada* ini); Bakri, I, p .280; ‘ Asakir, V I ,  p. 118.
3* Ag|h., X V II,  p. 114 (citing Mada* in i).
4 . Ansab, V ,  p .310.
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Moreover the two sources state clearly that it was after the death of Mus‘ ab
that the Banu Fazara complained to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  about Humaid's raid of the
day of a i - ‘ Ah. This makes it clear that the day of a l - ‘ Ah could not have
occurred after the year 72 /69 1 , the year of Mus'ab's death. As for the day
of Banat G a in , our sources^ say that a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf was the governor
of a l-H ija z  when ‘ Abd a l-M a fik  ordered him to punish the Banu Fazara.
Judging from the fact that a l-H a jja j was appointed the governor of a l-H ija z
in the year 73 /692 and was only transferred to the governorship of Iraq in
the year 7 5 /6 9 4 , the day of Banat G ain  must have taken place some time
between 73 /692 and 7 5 /6 9 4 . Therefore, it would seem that Dozy was wrong
in putting the day of Banat Gain in M u ‘ awiya's time.
As one would expect, the Kalbites who suffered at Banat Gain were not
satisfied by the killing of the two chiefs of the Banu Fazara. They began to
prepare for a fuller retaliation. When news of this reached the ears of ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik , he threatened them, saying that "he would kill as many of them as
3they killed from the Gaisites". Thus, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  once again showed 
himself above the parties. This threat seems to have been effective in that we 
do not hear of any other "days" during ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  reign, and the day of
1. Ansab, V ,  p .311 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Bakri, I, pp. 279-80; ‘ A sak ir,V I,
p. 118.
2. Dozy, Spanish Islam, p .69, London, 1913.
3. Ansab, V ,  p .311 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Agh. f X V II,  p. 115 (citing Mada*
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Banat Gain was the last of the famous “days" between Qais and Kalb.
Despite the fact that they were both N iza rite , the relations between
TaghMb and Qais were far from cordial. The feuds between them were
almost constant. The exception was when a small group of the Taghlib
joined ‘ Umair ibn al-Hubab in his raids on the Kalbites.^ But one may
assume that on this occasion they were forced to act so, for fear of ‘ Umair
and his Qaisites, in command of the Jazira at that time.
The campaigns of the conquest which brought the Qaisites into the
Jazira region made them close neighbours of the Banu Taghlib who were already
living there. But the Qaisites' maltreatment of their neighbours caused
2strained relations between the two. The situation deteriorated when ‘ Umair
-  -  3ibn al-Hubab with the Banu Sulaim settled on the Khabur river.
•
The tense situation exploded when a man from Banu al-Harish (from
• ■
the Banu ‘ Amir) slaughtered a goat belonging to a Taghlibite woman called
Urn Dawbal. As a result, her son Dawbal made a raid on the Banu al-Harish.
The Qaisites* answer to this raid was to kill three men from the Taghlib and to
4
take a number of their camels. In an attempt to put an end to these encroach­
ments some of the Banu Taghlib went to Zufar ibn a l-H a tith  a l-K ila b i, the
1. Ansab, V , pp. 308, 313; A g h ., X V II,  p. 112 (citing M ada’ inT); Kamil, IV , p.
p725?.
2. Ansab, V , p. 314.
3. Ansab, V , p .314; A g h ., X X , p. 126.
4 . A l-A k h ta l, DTwan , pp. 35 -7 ; Abu Tammam, Naga* id Jarir wal Akbtal, p .6 6 ;
Ansab, V , p p .3 1 4 ff.; Agh . ,  X X , p p .l2 6 ff.
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sayyid of the Qais at the time, asking him to return to them their camels,
to pay compensation for the three men killed by the Qaisites, and to ask
4 Umair ibn al-Hubab to leave the region of the Khabur, for as long as
he stayed there, the feud would continue.  ^ While Zufar agreed to the first
two demands, he refused the third one. He tried in vain to convince them
to give up the idea of expelling 4 Umair from the Khabur region. Meanwhile,
the Taghlib attacked some Qaisite villages near Qarqisya*, but were
defeated, lyas ibn al-K harraz, a Taghlibite sharif, sought a peaceful
solution by going to Zufar ibn al-H arith  in Qarqisya* to negotiate; however,
he was killed by a fanatic Q aisite. Zufar paid the ransom for this murder
and reconciled his people.
3Wellhausen sees in Zufar's attempts to reconcile the Taghlibites
a move to prevent them going over to the Umayyad side. But the Banu
Taghlib were already described in our sources^ as pro-Marwanid (Marwaniyya),
and are even said to have fought with Marwan against the Qaisites in the battle 
5of Marj Rah i t . It is probable that Zufar was trying either to get Taghlib's 
help against his bitter enemies, the Kalbites, or at least ensure their 
neturality in the conflict with Kalb.
It would seem, however, that 4 Umair did not like this peaceful
1. Agh., X X , p. 127.
2. Ib id ., X X , p. 127.
3. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .204.
4 . Ansab, V , p .314, p .328 (citing ‘ Awana).
5. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p .71.
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settlement, and that he hoped to expel the Taghlib from the Jazira, as 
he had the Kalbites before.^ This was no doubt as a reaction to the 
Taghlib demand for Zufar to force ‘ Umair to leave the Khabur region.
'Umair went to Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir and told him that he had already
forced Quda‘ a to settle in Syria and there only remained the Christian Taghlib
r  2in the Jazira. He asked Mus‘ ab to give him authority over them. Probably
he convinced Mus‘ ab that "being Christians, they were under suspicion of
sympathy with the Syrians". ‘ Umair managed to get permission to collect
dues from them, but Mus*ab only granted this commission subject to the
consent of Zufar ibn al-H arith  . The latter, being convinced that ‘ Umair
wcuW not treat the Banu Taghlib fa irly , but would seize this opportunity to
give free reign to his hostility, sent others to the Banu Taghlib ordering them
to treat the latter kindly. When the Banu Taghlib refused to pay their dues to
these men, Zufar sent them again to inform the Banu Taghlib that they
were acting on the orders of Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Zubair; they would have to pay
the dues or he would fight them. The Taghlibites answered this by killing some
4of Zufar's men. This action infuriated Zufar, and he sent their bitter enemy 
‘ Umair ibn al-Hubab with the Qaisites against them. The Taghlib under
1. See p. 175
2. Agh., X X , p. 127.
3. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .204.
4 . Agh. , X X , pp. 127-8.
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Shu*aib ibn M ulai|, met ‘ Umair at a place called MaksTn (also called 
Maks and Khabur). In this battle the Banu Taghlib suffered a defeat and
their leader Shu*aib was killed with a large number of his followers.^ This
battle was the first large scale confrontation between Qais and Taghlib.
Zufar was considerably upset to see the two sons of N izar fighting
2each other, while their common enemy, the Kalbites, were left unmolested.
On the other hand, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  found that this conflict played into his 
hand, on two accounts: firstly, because it weakened both sides, thus, he 
hoped, rendering them more amenable to his control in the future; secondly, 
because it prevented the Qaisites from helping his enemy M us‘ ab ibn al-Zubair.
'iL
The Taghlib did not let their massacre in the day of Masin go without
revenge. They received re-inforcements from Rabija in a l-Jaz ira  and Iraq,
-  3especially from a l-N i’mr ibn Qasit and Banu Shaiban. They chose as their
-  ? 4leader the Taghlibite, Ziyad or Yazid ibn Huber. Hearing that they were 
gathered for battle, ‘ Umair ibn al-Hubab appealed to the Asad and Tamim for
5
help, but neither responded. He, therefore, decided to meet them with 
his own people, the Banu Sulaim in this battle, which was called "Yawm a l-
1. Abu Tammam, Nago*icj Jarir wal A k h ta l, pp. 230-1; Ansab, V , pp .316-7  
Agh. , X X , pp. 127-8; Kamil, IV , p .255.
2. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id JarTr wal Akhtal, p. 27; Ansab, V , p .320; Agh* / 
X X , p. 127. ‘
3* Ansab, V , p .318; Agh. , X I ,  p .61 ff. (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).
4 . Nasab, fo l. 229b; he called him Hanzala ibn Qais ibn Huber.i * »
5. Ansab, V , p .318; A g h ., X I ,  p .62 (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).
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Tharthar a l-A w w al" , the Qaisites suffered a severe defeat in which many
of them were k illed , while thirty women from the Banu Sulaim had their
stomachs opened as a reprisal for the day of Maksin. ^
The defeat of the Qaisites in the day of al-Tharthar al-Awwal was
so grave that Zufar ibn a l-H arith , before this time hesitant to involve himself
in the feud, came from Qarqisya* to help ‘ Umair in his retaliation against
the Taghlib. These two, with Banu ‘ Amir and Sulaim, met the Taghlib
under Ibn Huber again on the Tharthar, which gave its name to the battle,
"the day of a I—Tharthar al-Thani". When battle was joined, the Banu ‘ Amir
fled but the Banu Sulaim remained firm and were able to in flict a defeat 
2
on the Taghlib.
However, neither the victory of the Qais nor the defeat of the Taghlib
in these two "days" put an end to this feud* We hear of "days" called, al-Fudain,
_ 3
al-Sukair, a I-M u ‘ arik, Lubba, al-Shar‘ abiyya, Balad, and al-Bulaikh. On
a ll of these "days", the Qais were victorious, apart from the indecisive "day 
of Lubba", and the “day of al-Shar‘ abiyya" , which was a victory for the 
Taghlib.
To break this run of successful Qaisite raids against them, the Taghlib
1. A l-A k h ta l, Piwan, pp. 132-4; Abu Tammam, N aqa’ id Jarir wal Akhtal,
pp .34, 107; Ansab, V ,  pp .318-19; Agh. , X I ,  pp .61 -2  (citing AbtT** Ubaida).
2. Ansab, V ,  p .320; Kamil, IV , p .256.
3. Jarir, Piwan, p. 54; Abu Tammam, N aqa‘ id Jarir wal A kh ta l, pp .80and113  
Ansab, V , pp .321-23; Kamil, IV , p p .256-58.
drew up forces from both the desert and the towns. As in the "day of
a I-Tharthar a l-Than i", the Qaisites were under both ‘ Umair ibn al-Hubab
and Zufar ibn a l-H arith . The Taghlib, headed by Ibn Huber,met them
in al-Hashshak and the bitter fighting lasted for three days. On the third
day, Zufar ibn al-Harith^ with the Banu ‘ Amir fled to Qarqisya>. To justify
his defeat, he later claimed that he had heard news that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  had
marched against him in Qarqisya*. Whether this pretext was true or not,
‘ Umair met the T agh I i b alone; his followers were defeated, and ‘ Umair
was killed in battle.  ^ The Banu Taghlib joyfully sent his head to Damascus
2as a sign of their loyaltyto‘ Abd a l-M a lik , but Zufar ibn al°Hari_tlh was moved to
3
sorrow' and expressed this in sad verses. As for the date of the battle, 
according to Khalifa ibn Khayyat and Ibn a l-A th ir ,^  it was the year 70 /689 .
This date sounds authentic as ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan only in that year felt 
himself free enough from cares at home to deal with Zufar ibn al-HariHi_ and 
the Qaisites in Garqisya’ .
The death of ‘ Umair ibn al-Hubab did not go unrevenged. His brother
1. A l-A k h ta l, D iw an, pp. 33, 106, 151, 220; A l-Q a tam i, Piwan, p .8 9 f f .;
NaqcTTd, 1 ,373 , where it is called the "Pay of Sinjar"; Abu Tammam, 
Naqa* id Jarir w a l-A k h ta l, pp*33, 34, 117-18, 160; Ansab, V , p .323; 
MarzubanT, M u‘ jam al-Shu‘ ra1, p .245; Kamil, IV, p .2 5 8 ff .; Bakri, p .338 
(here it is called the Day of al-Tharthar).
2. Ansab,V ,  pp .325, 327; Kamil, IV , pp .259-60.
3. AnsSb, V , p. 325.
4 . Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .262 (citing al-Layth); Kamil, IV , 
p p .258-60.
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Tamim ibn al-Hubab came to Zufar ibn al-H arith  asking him to take
vengeance. Zufar, however, at first was unwilling to undertake this
task, but under the persuasion of his son a l-H udhail, be bound himself
to do it, Zufar then left his brother Aws ibn a l-H arith  as his deputy in
Qarqisya*, probably to watch the movements of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  against him.
Before Zufar himself advanced against Taghlib, he sent Yazid ibn Hamran
against the Banu Fadukis, killing their men and proscribing their properties.
Zufar also sent Muslim ibn Rabi‘ a a l - ‘ U qaili, who surprised a gathering of
Taghlib, and killed a number of them. Muslim then marched against the
main body of the Taghlib, who were gathered in a place called al-*Aq7q
in M usll. The Taghlib fled before him, attempting to cross the Tigris.
When they reached a l-K u h a il, they were followed by Zufar with the Qaisites.
The Taghlib suffered a severe defeat; even more of them were drowned in
the Tigris in fligh t, than were killed in the battle. Those who survived
went to Lubba, but were followed by a l-H udhail ibn Zufar, who killed alt
]
those except the few who managed to cross the river.
In the year 73 /69 2 , when ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zu bair was killed and
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan was recognized as the sole caliph , there was a
temporary lull in the feud between Qais and Taghlib. This was mainly
1. Jarir, Dlwan, pp .244, 362-63; N a q ? id ,  I ,  p .507; Abu Zaid a l -  
QurashT, Jamharat Ash‘ ar a l - ‘ Arab, p. 169; Abu Tammam, Naqa‘ \<j 
Jarfr wal A kh ta l, p p .90 -91 , 226-27; Ansab, V ,  p p .3 2 6 -2 7 ;A g h . , X I ,  
p p .5 8 -9  (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); Kamil, IV , p p .260-61.
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due to the policy of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  in keeping in check all parties.
However, under this apparent peace, the hostility between them was 
smouldering and needed only an opportunity to flare up again. Such 
an occasion arose when the Taghlib poet, a I-A kh ta l, boasted of the
prowess of his clansmen to al-Jahhaf Jbn Hukaim al-Sulami, in the court
1 -  of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Infuriated by this boast, al-Jahhaf ibn Hukaim con­
trived to get a letter of assignment (‘ Ahd) for himself, by which he was 
appointed to collect tax from Bakr and Taghlib in the region of a l-Jaz ira . 
Accompanied by a considerable Qaisite cavalry, al-Jahhaf set out for a l -  
Jazira. On his way, he told his followers that his intention was to spill 
the blood of the Banu Taghlib, and that his ‘ Ahd was false. He then
said, "You have the choice between Hell if you follow me, and disgrace 
2if  you do not. 11 They chose to follow him. He surprised the Taghlib at
a place called al-Bishr, or al-Rahub, or Mukhashin, and made a fearful
massacre among them. A son of al-Akhtal is said to have been k illed , and
al-Akhtai himself was seized as prisoner, but was set free because they
3thought he was a slave. On being released, he returned to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
1. Akhj-al, Piwan, p. 268; Nag a' id, I, pp.4 0 1 -2 , 507-8; Abu Tammam, 
Naqa* id Jartr wal Akht a l, p. 2 2 8 ff .; Jumafcn, p .41 I f f . ; Shu‘ ara9, 
p p .303-4 ; Anjab, V , p .228 f f . ; Mubarrad, II, p. 98 (citing al-Zubair  
ibn Bakkar); Jlmidi, p .76; §ina‘ atain, p .87; Kamil, IV , p .261 f f . ; 
Bughya, fols. 46 -7 .
2. Abu Tammam, Naqa’ id Jarir wal Akhtal, p .229; Agh . , X I,  p. 59 
(citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); Bughya, fo l. 48 .
3. A l-A kh ta l, D iw an, pp. 10-11; Jarir, Diwan, pp. 25, 49 , 50, 87 , 8 8 , 
199, 200, 366, 367, 381, 382; Naga‘ id, I, pp.401; 5 0 7 ff .; Abu_ 
Tammam, Naga* id JarTr wal A khtal, pp. 173, 186, 2 2 8 ff .; Jumahi, 
p .412; Shu‘ arg; , p .303; Ansab, V , p .328; Agh. , X I ,  p .59 (citing =
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with the news of this massacre, and asked for his help to punish al-Jahhaf.
Fearing the caliph's punishment, al-Jahhaf fled to the territory of the
Byzantines and remained there until the Qaisites managed to persuade
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to grant him Amam. ^
Realizing that if he let this occasion pass without any decisive
action, the feud between the two parties would never cease, ‘ Abd a l-
M a lik  tried as much as possible to satisfy both sides. On the one hand,
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  forced al-Jahhaf to pay money as compensation to the
Taghlib for the blood shed in the "day of a l—Bishr**, On the other, ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik  made his own son a l-W a lid , whose mother was a Qaisite (from
Banu ‘ Abs), pay a money recompense to both sides, for a ll the bloodshed
2
between them before the "day of al -Bishr". The choice of a l-W alid  for 
this task was because the Taghlib were the ones who had suffered most 
in the feud, and moreover, by this device, both sides would feel that 
they were treated equally, with neither of them having the upper hand as 
a result of these feuds. However, al-Jahhaf was unable to pay the money 
set as compensation, for it was well beyond his financial means. In order 
to honour his promise to the caliph and to save his life , he went to Iraq 
where a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-Thaqaff was governor. A l-Jahhaf appealed to
= ‘ Umar ibn Shgbba); Amidi, p .76; Ishtiqqq, II, p. 187; M u ‘ jam, I,
p .362/ Kamil, IV , p .2 6 1 ff .; Bughya, fo l. 46ff.
1. Abu Tammam, Naga* i j  Jarir wal A k h ta l, p .229; Ansab, V , p .330; Agh., 
X I,  p .60 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); $ina‘ atain , p .87; Kamil, IV , p .263; 
Bughya, fo l. 49 (citing Ibn aT-SakTt).
2. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id JarTr wal Akhj~al, p. 229; Ansab, V , p .330;
Bughya, fo l. 49 (citing Ibn al-Sakft).
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him for help, as the most influential man among the Qais at the time.
After some hesitation, for he did not wish to be accused of spending
the money of the Muslims in the interests of his own people, a l-H a jja j
agreed to help, and gave al-Jahhaf half of his own annual salary.  ^ It
is clear that in aiding al-Jahhaf financially, a l-H a jja j was following
the same policy as the caliph himself, in seeking a peaceful end to the
tribal feud between Qais and Taghlib.
In the end, al-Jahhaf ibn Hukaim and his companions undertook 
•  •  *
to make a pilgrimage to Mecca in repentence and there to ask God for 
forgiveness. Thus the feud between Qais and Taghlib came to an end 
during the reign of *Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan, as a result of the latter^  
policy towards the tribes.
The ‘Arab tribes which settled in Khurasan after its conquest carried 
with them their rivalries and jealousy. Rivalry for power was clear from 
the very beginning among the leaders who participated in the conquest of 
the country, a good example of which was the rivalry between Q ais Ibn a l -
T 2
Haitham al-Sulami and his kinsman ‘ Abdallah Ibn Khazim al-Sulam i.
1. Abu Tammam, Naqa? id Jarir wal AkhJal, p. 229-30; Ansab, V , pp. 329-30  
A g h ., X I , pp. 60- (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); Kami I , IV , p. 263; Bughya / 
ftlT . 49 -50  (citing ibn al-SakTt).
2. Ansab, fo l. 593a; Futuh, p p v 4 0 8 « 9 ; T a b . ,  I I , p p . 6 5 -6 (citing Mada*inT)? 
77kiafir, V I I I ,  p p .T T S ;  E. 1.2, (|bn Khazim).
193.
The political troubles in Syria and Iraq in the period following the death
of the caliph Yazid I had their repercussions in Khurasan and other Eastern
provinces. The disturbances started first in Sistan, when the death of Yazid
was followed by a revolt in Kabul. As a result, the governor Yazid i.bn
Ziyad was killed and his brother Abu * Ubaida was taken prisoner. Their
brother, Salm ibn Z iyad , then the governor of Khurasan, sent Talha ibn
‘ Abdallah al-K huza‘ i as the new governor of Sistan. The latter managed
to release Abu ‘ Ubaida by paying a ransom of five thousand dirhams. ^
The new governor of Sistan, Talha, was soon to die, and he appointed
as his successor a Bakrite from Banu Yashkur. This appointment infuriated the
Mudarites, who drove the Bakrite from his office, thus causing hostility
_  2
(5\sabiyya) to flare up between Rabi‘ a and Mudar. This state of affairs
-  3encouraged the Zunbil to exploit the situation. A l-Q u b a ‘ , Ibn al-Zubair*s 
governor of Basra, therefore sent ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A ziz  ibn ^Abdallah ibn 1 Amir as 
governor to Sistan. He fought the Zunbil and killed him, but was forced by 
the Tamimite ‘ Abdallah ibn Nashir to leave the country. When,however,
Ibn Nashir entered the city of Z iran j, he himself was driven out and killed  
by another Tamimite, W aki‘ Ibn Abi al-Aswad, and thus ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A ziz  was
4able to return once more to the c ity .
Futuh,pp.3 8 7 -8 ;Tab, ,11, pp.488-9  (citing M ada’ inT); Kamil, IV , p .84.
2. Futafr , p .398; K am il, IV , p .84.
3. Zunbil is a regnal title  and not a personal name, the exact form of which is
somewhat uncertain. Bosworth, Sistan Under the Arabs, from the Islamic
Conquests to the Rise of the Safforfds, pp .34 -6 , Rome, 1968.
4 . Futuh, p .398.
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In Khurasan, the governor, Salm ibn Z iyad, at first tried to keep
secret the news of the caliph‘s death and those of his brothers in Sistan and
Basra. When he could no longer keep this secret, he asked the Arabs in
Khurasan to pay him homage, until the unity of the Muslims should be restored
by the election of a new caliph. They agreed, but soon betrayed their
 1
homage, and Salm then found himself forced to leave Khurasan. Before 
leaving, he appointed al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra as his deputy governor. But 
the Bakrites found it humiliating to submit to the insignificant Azdite.
I P ^ T h e r e f o r e , Sulaiman ibn Marthad al-Bakri, 
meeting Salm ibn Ziyad in Sarkhas, forced him to appoint him as governor 
of Mervarud, Faryab, Jaliqan and Jurjan. Salm was also forced to appoint 
another Bakrite, Aws ibn Tha‘ laba, as governor of Herat, Meanwhile,
‘ Abdallah ibn Khazim al-Suiam i, who since an early date had also tried to 
get the governorship of Khurasan, met Salm at Nishapur. Ibn Khazim asked 
Salm whom he had appointed as his deputy. When the latter told him, Ibn Khazim, 
surprised, answered, “Could you not find a Mudarite, rather than divide Khurasan 
between Bakr ibn Wa* il and Muzun ‘ Uman* (Azd ) ^ %
pje a | s0 managed t0  get from Salm a patent
1. Ansab, fo l. 593b; Futufr , p .413; Tab. I I ,  pp .488-9  (citing Mada?inT).
■    -*-*■— —  *
2. T ab ., I I ,  p .489 (citing M ada’ in i). ProfessorS. a l - ‘ A li considers* these 
appointments as being w illingly given by Salm ibn Ziyad to satisfy the 
tribes in Khurasan. Istitan a l - ‘ Arab fi Khurasan, pp .4 8 -9 , MKAB, II I ,
1958. WKTle there is no evidence to support this view , it seems more 
likely that Salm only made these appointments to save his life with
no intention of keeping the balance between the tribes.
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as governor of Khurasan, and a subsidy of one hundred thousand dirhams.
Then Ibn Khazim returned to Merv P  This complicated situation made 
imminent an outbreak of conflict between Rabi‘ a and Mudar. These reports 
of Salm*s appointments, however, may well be fabrications of a later date, 
“Tribal traditions trying to legitimatize the subsequent actions of their 
heroes*1. ^
Finding himself unable to face both Rabi‘ a and Mudar, al-M uhallab Ibn . 
Abi Sufra departed from M erv, leaving a Tamimite as his deputy, thus
adding to the confusion. The weakness shown by al-M uhallab was due
-  -  3
to the fact that the Azdites were few in number in Khurasan at this time.
AfM uhallab^ deputy tried to prevent Ibn Khazim from entering M erv, but
4
was defeated and died of his wounds in the struggle.
However, the rivalry between Bakr and Tamim turned out to favour 
Ibn Khazim. Although he was not Tamimite, as a Mudarite he gained the 
support of Banu Tamim. The Rabi‘ ites, however, were not prepared to leave
1. Ansab, fo l. 593b; Futufi, p .414; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .323; Tab ., II, 
p .489 (citing M ada*in i); Ghurar, fol. 4.
2. Sha‘ ban, op. c it . ,  pp .67 -8 .
3. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .417.
4 . Tab ., II, pp .490-1 (citing M ada*in i).
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s
the Mudarites to exploit Khurasan unopposed, ^
and soon afterwards, fighting started between Ibn Khazim,
supported by Mudar (Qais and Tamim) and Sulaiman ibn Marthad with the
Rabi‘ ites (Bakr and other Rabi‘ ite branches) in Mervarud. Sulaiman was
killed and his followers defeated. Then Ibn Khazim went to a l-Talikan and
inflicted another defeat on Bakr, killing ‘ Amr ibn Marthad, a brother of
Sulaiman, who held the city . The defeated Barkites fled to Herat, where
they joined Aws ibn Tha‘ laba in the hopes that they could expel Ibn
-  -  2Khazim and the Mudar from Khurasan. The Banu Suhaib among them were 
most enthusiastic to this idea, and thus Aws was forced to act against his 
w ill.
As in Syria, these tribal rivalries had political implications, in as much
as the Mudarites were opposing the direct authority of the Umayyads,
prefering the rather loose authority of Ibn al-Zubair; the RabiMtes, on the
other hand, opposed the Zubairids, largely because of their fear and jealousy 
3of the Mudarites.
This conflict between Rabi‘ a and Mudar did not arise without leading 
some of the Mudarites to seek a peaceful solution; Ibn Khazim was forced to
1. Futuli, p .414.
2. Futub, p .414; Ja b ., I I ,  pp .480-91 (citing M ada’ in i).
3. Sha*ban, op. c i t . ,  p. 83.
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negotiatie with the RabHites. These negotiations fa iled , since the 
RabHites were not prepared to accept anything less than the expulsion 
of Mudar from Khurasan.  ^ Accordingly, Ibn Khazim left his son Musa 
in M erv, and marched against them in Herat. The RabHites fortified  
themselves by digging a ditch. The fighting between them and Ibn Khazim 
continued for about a year. In order to incite the RabH ites, Ibn Khazim 
said to them, “You have shut yourselves up in your ditch: are you prepared 
to accept that ditch as your share of Khurasan?" Enraged by this, they left 
their strong position, and suffered very heavy losses in lives. Aws ibn 
Thac laba, who was wounded in this battle, fled to Sistan to take refuge with
? o . 2the Zunbil but died before arriving. These two successive crushing defeats 
left the Bakrites powerless, and Ibn Khazim and the Mudar dominant in 
Khurasan. This also had its echo in Ba$ra, for, according to al-M ada* in i,  
when the news of it reached Basra, al-Ahnaf ibn Qais and other Tamimite 
chiefs went to M a lik  ibn M ism a*, the chief of the RabH a there, to apologize. 
This move, however, was spoilt by the verbal aggression of one of al-Ahnaf's 
colleagues at this meeting* M a lik  burnt down the houses of the Tamimites in
1. Tab ., I I ,  pp .494-5  (citing M ada*in i). Here the narrative of M ada*ini 
ends, but it is completed by that of Abu1!-Hasan al-Khurdsani.
2. Futuh, pp .414 -5 ; Tab ., M, pp .491-6 . This fighting between RabHa 
and Mudar occupied the period 64-65.
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Basra as a reprisal for the slaughter of the Bakr in Herat. ^
The peace in Khurasan was only of a short duration. Hostility
soon flared up among the Mudarites themselves, i . e . , Qais against Tamim.
Cur sources are unanimously silent about the reason for this hostility,
„ 2
apart from a chance narrative in Jabari , repeated by both ibn a l-A th ir
and Nuw airi. The narrative says that after Ibn Khazim had used the Tamim
to defeat the RabH ites and become the sole master of the whole of
Khurasan, he neglected them. This negligence could not be other than
a reluctance to give them office, or at least, not giving them as much
-  -  3
as they expected as their share of the revenue of Khurasan.
Ibn Khazim appointed his son Muhammad governor of Herat, and left 
him for assistants, two Tamimites, Shammas ibn Dathar a ! - tfUtaridi and 
Bukair ibn Washah, who was head of the Sh urta. It seems that beyond this, 
Ibn Khazim was not prepared to give any concessions to the Banu Tamim, 
who were not satisfied with these appointments. It was probably for this 
reason that when Banu Tamim went to Herat, Ibn Khazim wrote to Shammas 
ibn Dathar and Bukair Ibn Washah ordering them to prevent Banu Tamim from 
entering the city . Shammas refused to obey this order, and joined his people,
1. Ansab, fo l. 496b (citing Mada* ini); Tabf , II, pp .451-2 .
■  »
2. Tab ., I I ,  p .593; K am il, IV , p. 171; Nuw airi, X IX , fo l. 52.
3 . A I - ( Ali suggests that Ibn Khazim relied on the Ahl a l-*  A liya  and 
not on the Tamimites, and therefore the latter opposed him. Ai —4 A l i , 
Istitan a l A r a b  fi Khurasan, p .51, MKAB, I I I ,  Baghdad 1958.
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while Bukair complied with the order. This difference was due to the personal 
hostility between Bukair and Shammas. Bukair promised Shammas thirty 
thousand dirhams for himself, and a thousand for each of the Banu Tamim if 
they withdrew. They refused, and entered the city , killing Muhammad ibn
T 1( Abdallah ibn Khazim in revenge for two Tamimites he had killed by lashing.
The Banu Tamim then went to M erv, where they were joined by other Tamimites,
and chose al-Harish ibn ( Abdallah a l-Q u ra i‘ i as their leader in the struggle 
•
against Ibn Khazim. The war between the latter and the Banu Tamim is said
2  „
to have lasted for two years. The Tamimites found themselves unable to 
overcome Ibn Khazim. They therefore adopted the plan of dividing their 
forces, with one group leaving Merv to entice Ibn Khazim to follow them,
3and thus enabling those who remained in Merv to seize the city . Following 
this policy, Bahir ibn Warqa* went to Nishapur, Shammas to Sistan, * Uthman
ibn al-M uhtafar and Zuhair ibn Dhu’ aib a l - ‘ Adawi to Fartana, and al -
- 4Harish Ibn H ila l a l-Q u ra i* i to Mervarud. But this division made it possible 
for Ibn Khazim to defeat them, by attacking one group at a time. He began
1 . Futuh, p .415; Tab ., I I ,  pp.496 , 593-4 (citing Mada; in i); Ghurar,
fo l. 4; Kam il, IV , p. 171; Nuwairi X IX , fols. 52 -4 .
2. Tab., I I ,  p .595 (citing Mada* in i); Kamil , IV , p. 172. This, however, 
might* have included the war against Bakr also. Wellhausen, The Arab 
Kingdom and its Fall, pp .419-20.
3. Futuh , p .415.
4 . T ab ., I I ,  p .596, (citing Mada* ini); Kamil, IV , p. 172; Nuwairi,
X IX , fols. 53 -4 .
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t  . -  -  1with al-Harish and forced him to leave Khurasan. He then turned to
Zuhair and his followers, who surrendered unconditionally. Ibn Khazim
2
killed them all in revenge of his son Muhammad. Finally, he set out to
fight Bahir ibn Warqa? and his followers in Nishapur.
Before leaving Merv to fight Bahir, Ibn Khazim made Bukair his
deputy there, and ordered his son Musa to cross the C xus and to seek refuge
3 ”in a fortress, or with a king there. This was because Ibn Khazim feared 
that the Tamimites might k ill Musa as they had killed his brother Muhammad, 
before.
When Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Zubair was killed , 72 /691 , Ibn Khazim was still 
fighting Bahir Ibn W arqa*, At this time, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  wrote to Ibn Khazim 
asking his "b a i'a *1 and promising him in return the governorship of 
Khurasan for a term of seven years. Ibn Khazim, who had secured the 
country by his own sword, would not accept this offer. He considered it
as little  more than an insult, and made the messenger eat the letter of ‘ Abd
4 5  „
a l-M a lik . Welihausen thinks that the reason for Ibn Khazim's refusal to
1 . Tab ., I I ,  p .596; Kamil, IV , p .172; NuwairT, X IX , fols. 52 -4 .
2. Tab., I I ,  pp .696-8; Kamil, IV , p .210; N uw airi, X IX , fols. 54 -7 .
3. Futuh, p .415; T ab ., 11, pp. 1145-6; Kamil, IV , p .402.
4 . Khalifa ibn Khayya't, Tarlkh, I, p .296; Futuh, p .415; Ansab, fol. 593b;
Y a ‘ qub7, I I ,  p p .323-4; Bui dan, p. 81; Tab7, T l ,  p p .831-2 (citing 
Mada* inT), 834-5; Ghurar, fol. 4; Bad*, V I ,  p .27; Kamil, IV , p .282
Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .325; ( Ibar, I I I ,  p .83.
5. Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .420.
201*
recognize ( Abd a l-M a lik , was that he wanted to rule independently. However, 
it is clearly stated in the sources,^ that the refusal was bacause of his "BaHa*1 
to Ibn al -Zubair.
Failing to obtain Ibn Khazim's homage, *Abd a l-M a lik  offered the 
governorship of Khurasan to Bukair ibn Washah, Ibn Khazim's representative.
He accepted the offer and called the people to the "BaMa" of 6 Abd a l-M a lik , 
with which they w illing ly complied. This popular willingness to renounce
-  2Ibn Khazim sprang from the cruelty and i l l -w il l  he had shown to Banu Tamim.
Ibn Khazim found himself unable to face both Bukair ibn Washah and Bahir
ibn Warqa* and therefore he decided to join his son Musa in al-Tirm idh.
However, he did not succeed in reaching him, for he was overtaken by
Bahir and k illed , after putting up a stiff resistance, by W aki‘ i ibn a l -
3
Dawraqiyya, in 72 /691 .
The death of Ibn Khazim, however, did not put an end to the feud 
in Khurasan. A new feud now broke out between the Tamimites themselves. 
Bukair ibn Washah stole the head of Ibn Khazim from the k ille r, and sent
■ ■■■ II •
it to ( Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan in Damascus. He not only told the caliph 
that he had killed Ibn Khazim himself, but he also put Bahir, the one really
1. Yaq‘ ubi, II, p .324; Tab., II, pp. 1145-6; K am il, IV , p .402.
2. Ansab, fo l. 593; Futuh, p .415-6; Y a ‘ qubi, II ,  p .324; Buldan, p .81;
Tab ., II, pp .832-3 (citing M ada? inT); ‘ Asakir, IX , fol. 81b; Kamil,
IV , p .282; Nuw airi, X IX , fol. 70; Dhahabi, I I I ,  pp. 111-2;
Bidaya, V I I I , p . 325; ( Ibar, I I I , p .83; Tahdhib , V , p. 195.
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responsible for his death, in prison.  ^ This action not only started the rivalry
between Bahir and Bukair which continued until the letter's death, but * 9
also had another serious consequence. It severely strained the relations
between Banu M uqa4is ibn 4Amr and al-Butun, and the Banu 4Awf ibn Ka4b
-  2  
and the Abna’ . The first supported Bahir, while the latter supported Bukair.
The old feud which Khurasan had witnessed since the death of Yazid I, and this
new tension between the two Tamimite branches created a state of affairs at
the time so serious that the people of Khurasan were brought to reconsider
their position. They realized that such a state of instability would encourage
their enemies to attack them. This led them to believe that stability and
peace would return to Khurasan, only if they could find a neutral governor,
not belonging to any one of the rival groups in Khurasan. Accordingly, they
wrote to 4 Abd a l-M a lik  asking him to send a Guraishite governor, who would
stand above the envy and rivalry of the tribes. 4 Abd a l-M a lik  then sent them
Umayya ibn 4 Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid, in the year 74 /69 3 , who was both
3an Umayyad and a Quraishite. 4 Abd a l-M a lik  instructed him not to take 
sides in the feud, but to engage the people of Khurasan in the jihad against 
the Turks; and to take trouble to collect and develop the revenue of the country.
1. Farazdaq, Diwan , I, p. 90; Ja b ., I I ,  pp. 832-834; Kamil, IV , p. 282.
2. Tab ., I I ,  p .680; Jamharat, p p .207-8; M i / a t ,  V I ,  fo l. 8 b.
»  I mm 1 — ■ ■■>■ i n -   
3. Khalifa ibn Khayya.t, TarTkh, I, p .297; Mughtalin, p. 176; Futuh,
p .416; Bui dan, p .81; Tab ., I I ,  pp .860-i (citing Mada* in i); Ghurar, 
fol. 5; M ir* at , V I ,  fo l. 8 b; DhahabT, III, p. 117; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 91 -2 .
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Bahir met Umayya on his arrival in Nishapur and tried tb incite him
against Bukair, without success. Umayya offered the leadership of the
Shurta to Bukair. The latter, being ex-governor of Khurasan, felt it
beneath him to accept this office. His rival Bahir, however, was prepared
to accept the post, probably in the belief that it would help him to execute
his plan of vengeance against Bukair.^ However, Umayya did not remove
any of the officials appointed by Bukair. It would appear that he was
following instructions from 4Abd a l-M a lik , to avoid favouring either Bukair
or Bahir, but to try to reconcile them both. This was the reason for his
appointment in the first place. Moreover, with both Bukair and Bahir in
such a strong position, Umayya would have to attempt to win them both to
his side if he expected tohave any authority in the caliph's name.
Bukair, however, was infuriated by both the appointment of Umayya
as governor of Khurasan and by the hostile attitude of Bahir towards him, and
he seized his opportunity to  act when Umayya set out on one of his campaigns.
Being left in Merv as Umayya's deputy, Bukair seized the city. Hearing of
2
this, Umayya hurried back and beseiged Bukair for four months. When he 
found that he was unable to defeat him, for Bukair had secured the money
1. M ughtalin, p. 176; Tab ., I I ,  p p .860-2 (citing Mada* ini); Kufi, II,
fols. 58a-58b; Ghurar, fo l. 6 ; M i r , a t, V I ,  fols. 8b-9a; Dhahabi,
I I I ,  p. 117; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  p p .91-2 .
1 . KufT, I, 58b.
and the men of Merv for himself, Umayya entered into peace negotiations 
wi th h im. These were welcomed by Bukair, probably because he was not 
sure of the continuing support of the people of M erv. Bukair and Umayya 
agreed that Umayya should pay Bukair's debts, give him a large sum of money 
for himself, and that he should give Bukair a period of forty days to go 
wherever he wished in Khurasan.^ Bukair chose to remain in M erv. This 
settlement was made in the year 77 /696 .
4 Abd a l-M a lik , however, became impatient with Umayya's failure to 
carry out his instructions on appointment, and relieved him of office. The 
responsibility for the area was given to the capable a l-H a jja j, who appointed
al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra.
6
The rivalry between Bukair and Bahir continued, the latter continually 
warning Umayya against Bukair, until he was eventually convinced that Bukair 
was conspiring against him. Despite Bukair's denials, Umayya seized him 
and had him killed by his bitter enemy, Bahir, in the year 77 /69 6 . Bahir 
was convinced that the “ Banu Sa4d would never be united while they both 
lived " . 2
1 . M uahtalin .p . 176; Futuh, p .416; Y a 4qubi, I I ,  p .324; T a b ., I I ,  pp. 1122-8 
(citing Mada* in i); Kufi, I, fols. 58b-59a; Ghjurar, fols. 6 -7 ; M ir* at, V I ,  
fo l. 26b; Bidaya, IX , p .21; 4 Ibar, III, pp. 101-2.
2. Mughtalin, p. 177; Ansab, fo l. 315a; Futufo, p .417; Y a 4qubi, II, p .324; 
Tab., I I ,  pp. 1028-31 (citing M ada*int); KufT, I, fo l. 59a; Qh.urar, fo l. 7; 
jqmharat, p .207; 4Asakir, IX , fo l. 82a; Kamil, IV , p .361 ;~7v\irTdt, V I ,  
fo l. 26b; Bidaya, IX , p .21; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  p. 102.
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Bukair's death, however, did not end the hostility in the Banu Sa4d,
to whom both Bahir and Bukair belonged. Four years after the death of Bukair,
in 81 /700 , Bahir was publically assassinated by one of the Banu 4 Awf, ibn
§ a 4^a4a ibn Harb, who shouted, "Ya li tharat Bukair11 as he killed him;
*
this took place in the court of al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra, who was at this
-  -  1time the governor of Khurasan. The assassin was put to death and his people 
satisfied by the payment of blood money. Thus the feud among the Banu Sa4 d 
came to an end.
During the governorship of al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra (79 /698-
82/701) and that of his son Yazid after him (82/701 -8 5 /7 0 4 ), we see the Azd
 2
as one of the strong powers in Khurasan, taking their part in al! important
3
events. The alliance between al-A zd and Bakr (Rabi4a) in Basra was also
*
formed in Khurasan. The date of this alliance is not ditectly given by the
sources. Judging from the fact that a l-A zd  were not strong in Khurasan before
the governorship of a l-M uhallab , it is unlikely that the Azd/Bakr alliance was
formed before 79 /698 , It was perhaps formed by al-M uhallab's efforts for there
is no mention in our sources of this alliance before his time. It is reported in the 
-  T  4Kitqb al-Aahani that during the governorship of a l-M uhallab , some dispute
1* Mughtalin, p. 179; Ansab, fol. 503b; Tab., I I ,  pp. 1047-51 (citing
M ad5? inf)”; Jamharat, p .207; 4 Asakir, IX, fo l. 82a; Kamil, IV , pp .367-9
Bidaya, IX , pp. 34 -5 ; 4 ibar, I I I ,  p. 103.
2. Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fa ll, p .427.
3 , Ansab, IV , pp. 105-6 (citing M ada? ini and Abu 4 Ubaida); NaqaM d,
II, p .729; Tab ., I I ,  p»446 (citing Abu 4Ubaida). ’
4* A g h ., X I I I ,  p .58.
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arose between al-A zd and 4 Abd a l-Q ais . This was expressed by the 
satiric verses of the pcetsKa4b al-Ashqari and Ziyad a l-A 4 jam. A l-M uhallab  
intervened and paid blood money to both sides and thus the dispute was 
ended. It is also reported by the same source^ that al-Yemen and Rabi4a 
were in H ilf during the time of al-M uhallab and his son Y azid . There is
also re ference to this H ilf in the verses of the poet Nahar ibn TawsHa al -
”  t  2Tamimi bewailing al-M uhallab. In a later period, as the revolt of Qutaiba Ibn
Muslim al —Bahi 1 i (95/714) and that of Yazid ibn al-M uhallab (101/719),^  this 
u* 4H ilf is also mentioned. However, al-Nusst seems to have misunderstood
5the report of Abu 4 Ubaida, and decided that this Hi If existed in the time of 
‘ Abdallah ibn Khazim. But Waki* ibn Hassan al-G hudani, to whom Abu 
‘ Ubaida referred, is not the same W aki4 as killed Ibn Khazim. Ibn Khazim 
was killed by W aki4 ibn 4 Umair a l»Q urai4 i, called Ibn al-Dawraqiyya.
It was expected that 4 Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan would give himself 
up to the Kalbites and the Yemenites in general, for it was through them that
1. jb id . , X I I I ,  pp. 59-60.
2. Tab., II, p. 1084 (citing Mada* ini).
3. Naqa* id , I , p .358; Agh . ,  X I I I ,  p. 55; A l - 4 Uyun w al-H ada’ iq,_ _  :
4. Al-Nusjs , op. c i t . , I, p .293.
5. Naqa’ id, I, p. 365.
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his father, and the Umayyads generally, had secured the caliphate. However 
this was not the case. 4 Abd a l-M a lik  had learnt in the turbulent period 
before his accession how dangerous tribal feuds could be and he, therefore, 
tried not to patronize one side against the other. This was a difficult task 
since the politics of the time depended on understandings with the tribes. 
Moreover, tribal passion and jealousy (4Asabiyya) were strong even among 
the members of the ruling house, which made the task of the caliph more 
difficu lt. However, 4 Abd a l-M a lik  showed himself a clever statesman and 
above parties. Being from the Guraish, the caliph was able to take up a 
middle position. ^
Having failed to subdue the Qais by force, he reconciled them to him,
and when they gave up their opposition to him, he treated them equally with
the Kalbites. Zufar ibn al-Hdrith and his sons al-Hudhail and Qawthar,
4 Abdailah ibn Mas4ada al-Fazari and other Gaisites were among the most
influential men in the court of 4 Abd a l-M a lik . Even when al-Hudhail ibn Zufar
deserted the caliph's army after the reconciliation to join Mas4ab ibn a l-Zubair,
24Abd a l-M a lik  showed him tolerance.
In order to get the confidence of the Gais and win them more firmly to 
his side, 4 Abd a l-M a lik  himself married a Qaisite woman, Wallada of the Banu
1. Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .211.
Ansab, V , p .350 (citing 4Awana); Jghshiyari, p .30; Im ta*,H I, 
pjD. 170-1; Jamharat, p. 245; 4Asakir, V , p .376; V I ,  fo l. 212a;
Kamil, IV , p .278; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  p .82,
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1
4Abs, who became the mother of his sons al-W alid  and Sulaimdn. He 
also sealed the treaty between Zufar ibn al-Harith and himself by the
marriage of his son Mas lama to al-Rabab, the daughter of Zufar ibn a l -
2 . 3
Harith . The Kalbltes showed their displeasure at this; however, 4 Abd
a l-M a lik , in spite of associating himself with the Qais, did not neglect
the Kalb, but on the contrary treated both Qais and Kalb equally. To the
end of his reign, Yemenites, like Ibn Bahdal, Rawh, ibn Zinba4, a l - 4Ayyash
•  *  — —
ibn Khaythama, Abu Hafs a l-Shakiri, Ibn al-Zubriqan ibn Azlam, M a 4yuf 
a l-H u ja ri, and Ibn Abi 4Aushn (the latter five from Hamdan) were among his 
intimate courtiers.^
This policy of treating tribes equally also showed itself on other 
occasions: after the day of al-Bishr, 4 Abd a l-M a lik  through his son al-W alid
paid money recompense to both sides for the blood-shed before the day of
5 „
al-Bishr. 4 Abd a l-M a lik  also put to death two Fazarite chiefs, for their
responsibility in the feud of Banat G ain. 4 Abd a l-M a lik  imprisoned Arta*a
t  6ibn Suhya a l-M u rri, for incitement in his poem against the Kalb. Gn the
1. Fgrazda^, Diwan, I, p .80; Ansab, X I ,  p. 172 (citing Abu 4Ubaida); 
Bughyq, fo l. 174.
2. Rasa* i I, (Ed, Sandubi), p. 182, (citing Mada* in i); Ansab, V , p. 307; 
Kamil, IV , p .277; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  p .82.
3. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id Jarir Wal Akhtal r pp. 19-20; Idem, Hamasa, I,
pp. 656-657, 658-9; AmidT, pp. 35 -6 .
4 . Ansab, X I,  pp. 173-4 (citing al-Haytham), 253 (citing Mada* ini);
Ham dam, IklTI, X , pp. 148-9.
5. See above, p.
6 . BakrT, IV , pp. 1159-60.
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other hand, he imprisoned a number of Yemenite nobles (Wujuh), because
of the murder of a Qaisite.  ^ He also threatened 4 Abd Yasu4 ibn Harb,
the sayyid of Banu Taghlib, as an attempt to put an end to the feud between 
2Qais and Taghlib.
In choosing his officials, 4Abd a l-M a lik , following the normal 
practise of the time, favoured his relatives. However, he was not the 
prisoner of his family. Probably he trusted them more than others, because 
of the nature of the problems he faced at the time of his accession; and as 
Quraishites, they were able to attain a level of aloofness from tribal frictions, 
more difficult for other 4Arabs to obtain. Nevertheless, 4 Abd a l-M a lik  kept 
an eye on them and was ready to remove any who showed incompetence; he 
would replace them by a more capable person, no matter whether he was an 
Umayyad or not. When Khalid ibn 4 Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid showed 
incapability in facing the Kharijite threat and in collecting the Kharaj, 
he was soon removed from his post as a governor of Basra. 4 Abd a l-M a lik  
also removed al»Harith Ibn Khalid al-Makhzum i, the governor of Mecca,
4because he did not perform his duty as a leader of the congregation. As
1 . A g M , X IX , p. 109.
2. Nasab, fols. 227b-228a.
3. Ansab, X I,  pp .266-7 (citing Abu Mikhnaf and 4Awana), fo l. 25b (citing
M ada’ ini); 4 Iqd, IV , pp. 23-4; T a b ., I I ,  p .825 (citing Aba Mikhnaf).
4 . Agh., III, p p .102-3 (citing Mu$4ab a l-Z u b a iri, a l-Zubair ibn Bakkar
and 4 Umar ibn Shabba), 113 (citing Mus4 ab a l-Zubair!).
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we have seen, Umayya ibn 4Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid was appointed
to the government of Khurasan in order to keep the balance between the
conflicting parties. When Umayya failed to end the feuds and engage the
people of Khurasan in the Jihad against the Turks, he was removed from his
_  |
post and the government was transferred to al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra.
On the other hand, the death of Bishr ibn Marwan (74/693) left vacant
the important post of governor of Iraq. Apart from having strong anti-Umayyad
feelings (especially in Kufa), Iraq was constantly menaced by the Kharijites.
To this must be added the turbulant and insubordinate nature of the 4 Arab
tribes there. The governorship of Iraq was therefore the most responsible post
in the whole Islamic Empire. On the other hand, the severity with which
a l-H a jja j restored the peace in a l-H ija z , and the harsh treatment and
discrimination he showed to the people there, made 4 Abd a l-M a lik  transfer him 
o
to Iraq.
1. Ansab, X I,  pp. 194=5; (citing Mada* in i) ,  310=11 (citing al-H aytham ); 
Futgfr , p .399; Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1028-29; KufT, I I ,  fols. 59a-59b, 72 a - 
72b, lOOa-lOOb; Ghurar, fols. 6 -7 ; 4 Iqd, IV , p p .23-4; A g h ., X I I ,  p. 56; 
Marzubani, op. c i t . , pp .227-8 , 230, 265; Kamil, IV , pp .299-300; 
Dhahabi, II I ,  pp. 125-6; M iles, Two Unpublished Dirhams of 4Abdallah 
fBn Umayya, p. 156, A N S M , X IV , 1968.
2. Mahasin, pp .63 -4 ; A l-Z uba ir ibn Bakkar, Akhbar al-Muwafaqiyyat fil 
Siyar, fo l. 46 (citing 4Awana); Imama, II, p .25; Y a 4qubf, I I ,  pp .326-7; 
Tab., II, pp .863-73; Kufi, I I, fo l. 69a; 4 Iqd, I I ,  pp .78181; Muruj, V ,  
pp .290-302; Bad*, V l,p ,2 7 ;  TanukhI, al-Mustajad min Fi4 lot a l-A jw ad, 
pp.44 -6 ; J q Its , fols. 8 b, 9a, 9b felting M us4ab a l-Z u h rt); Ghurar, fol. 17  
Kamil, IV , p p .303-5; M ir*a t, V I ,  fols. 8 a, 14b, 15a; Bidaya, IX , p .7;
4 Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 93 -4 . However, contrary to the written sources which give 
the date of Bishr's death as 74, there is a coin bearing the name of Bishr s
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A l-H a jja j has been accused of showing4Asabiyya to both the Qaisites, 
and more especially to his own people, the Thaqifites. It is true that he 
removed many of the previous officials, appointed by Bishr, and replaced 
them with Thaqifites. In Sistan, he appointed 4Ubaidallah ibn Abi Baka;^
in Basra, al-Hakam ibn Ayyub and 4Urwa ibn al-Mughira as his deputy in
2 3
Basra and Kufa; in the Yemen, he appointed his brother Muhammad, and
4
in Fars, another Thaqifite, Muhammad ibn al-Qasim . Nevertheless, there
are also examples of his appointment of Yemenites to high office: 4 Abd al “Rahman
ibn Muhammad ibn a!-Ash4ath al-K indi was his choice as governor of Sistan and
-  T  5as leader of the celebrated army, Jafeh al-Tawawis; appointed head of the
6 —Shurta was Abu l - 4Amarta (Kinda); and he appointed al-R abi4 ibn Qais (Kinda)
= struck in Basra in the year 75. This numismatic evidence would seem 
to indicate that Bishr was immediately succeeded by a l-H a jja j, thus 
eliminating Khalid ibn 4Abdallah ibn Asid from the list oF"governors of 
Basra and Kufa. See W alker, Some New Arab Sassanian Coins, p. 107,
N C , X I ,  1952; M iles, A Byzantine Bronze Weight in the Name of Bishr 
ibn Marwan, p p .117-8 , Arabica, IX , 1962.
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .386; Ansab, X I,  pp .310-11 (citing
al-Haytham); T a b ., I I ,  p p .1033-4 (citing^Abo M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 
1 0 0 a; Ghurar, fo l. 52; Kamil, IV , p .362; Mir*at,"\7"l, fo l.29a;
W afayat, I I ,  p .215.
2. Khalifa,ibn Khayyat, TaFtkh, I, p .385; Ansab, V , p .179; Tab., II,
pp .872, 979~fciting Abu M ikhnaf), 4Asakir, IV , pp .389-9*0; Bidaya, IX , p.
3. Futuh / p .73 (citing Mada* ini); Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 83a.
4. Tab., I I ,  p. 1200; Dhahabl, I I I ,  p .233.
5. Farazdaq, Diwan, I, p .328; Imama, I I ,  pp .29-30; Ansab, X I,  p .319;
Ya*qubi, I I ,  p. 331; Tab., I I ,  pp. 1044 (citing al-Sha4 bT), 1046; Kufi,
II, fo l. 101a; M uruj, V , p .301 f f - ; TanbTh , p. 314; Ghurar, fo l.5 3 f f .;
Bad*, V I,  p .53; K am il, IV , pp .365-6; M ir*a t, V I,  fo l.31b; Bidaya,
IX , pp .31 -5 ; Shgdharat, I, p .87.
6 . M a 4a4  fo l. 27a; Jamharat, p .401.
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as governor of Pars, Abd al-Rahman ibn Abt Sabra (Nakha4) as governor 
- 2of Isbahan, a l-Zubair ibn Khuzaima (Khath4 am) as a later governor of
•  3 -  -  -  4
Isbahan, and 4 Imara ibn Tamim (Lakham) as governor of Sistan. Thus it
seems that rather than exercising a tribal system of patronage, a l-H a jja j
was advancing men on the basis of his trust in them and his belief in their
efficiency: it was more a personal system of patronage.
5 .Welihausen is one who believes a l-H o jja j to have favoured the 
Qais. He says that a l-H a jja j removed al-Mufaddal ibn al-M uhallab from 
Khurasan because he killed Musa ibn 4 Abdallah ibn Khazim. The latter was 
a Qaisite who held out for twelve years after the death of his father, in 
Tirmidh. However, historical tradition is not in favour of this conclusion.
A l-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra was appointed the governor of Khurasan by a l-
— 6 —H ajja j. Before his death, a l-M uhallab nominated his son Yazid as his
-  7successor. This nomination was approved by a l-H a jja j. If a l-H a jja j had
1 . M a 4a d ,fo l. 27a.
2. M a 4a d ,fo l. 46b; Jamharat, p .385.
3. M a 4ad ,fo l. 53b.
^u^ qn/ P« 61; Jamharat, p. 398.
The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .429.
6 . Ansab, X I ,  p .311 (citing al-Haytham); Futuh, p .317; Y a 4qubi, II, p .330
BuTddn, pp .60 ,81; Tab ., I I ,  pp7T033, 1039, 1047, 1063; KJfl, I I ,
fo l. 90b; Ghurar, fo l*33; Kamil, IV , p .362; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l. 29a;
4 (bar, I I I ,  p .103.
7 . Futub , p .417; Dinawarr, p .289; Y a 4qubi, II, p .330; Buldan, 
p .8 2 ;T a b ., I I ,  p p .1083 (citing Mad a* int), 1085; Ghurar, fo l.74;
M ir*a t’ , V I ,  fo l.40b .
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had any sort of partisanship to his people, he would have chosen a
Qaisite governor for this important post; or at least he would not confirm
the nomination of al~Muhal lab’s son Yazid as his successor. But al«l^ajjaj
only removed Yazid from Khurasan after he had been governor there for three
years. This removal of Yazid from Khurasan was not caused by a l-H ajja j's
partisanship to the Qais against the Azd, to whom Yazid belonged;
relations between the two had become strained when Y azid , because of his
< Asabiyya to his people, sent only the Mudarite participants in* the revolt
*
of Ibn al-Ash^ath as prisoners to a l-H a jja j, setting free all the Yemenites.^
Moreover,proud and disobedient to his master as he was, Yazid was unpopular
2 . 3  in Khurasan, even among his own people, the Azd. It is also reported that
1. Ansab, fols. 19a~l9b; Y a 'q ub i, I I ,  p .330; T ab ., I I ,  pp. 1119-22 (citing 
Abu ( Ubaida); Kcrfi, I I ,  fo l. 112b; M ir *a t, V I ,  fo l.51b .
2. T a b ., I I ,  p p .1142-43 (citing M ada*in i), 1143-44 (citing Ib n a l-  Kalbi
and Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, II ,  fols. 127b, 128a; Ghurar, fo l.75; Agh . ,  
X llt ,p .6 1 ;  K^mil, IV , p.4Q2. "  “
3 * Jalis, fols. 56a~56b; Ghurar, fo l.78. It is also possible that owing
to the insurrection of Sa(Td and Sulaiman, the sons of s Abbad, with 
the Azd in * Uman, a l-H a jja j feared Yazid and he was very cautious 
in removing him from KhurSsan. See ‘ Asakir, V I ,  pp. 167-68;
Azkawi, Kashf al-Ghumma a l-J a m M i Akhbar al-Umma, fol.326a«326b. 
Part of the latter work has been translated into English by E .C . Ross, 
Calcutta, 1874. The same part has been edited by Hedwig K lein, 
Hamburg, 1938. The Kashf al-Ghumma was also copied, for the most 
part lite ra lly , by another local Historian called Salil ibn Raziq in his 
work “History of the imams and Seyyids of *Uman“ , translated and 
edited by G . Badger, printed for the Hakluyt Society, M .DCCCLXXL); 
English translation, p. 10; Kelin, p. 12.
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a l-H a jja j removed Yazid because he was embezzeling the treasury of the
1country. F inally, the hostile tradition, which tries to show a l-H a jja j
as superstitous, and connects this with the dismissal of Yazid has so much of
the flavour of a legend that it is not worth serious consideration.
In order not to arouse Yazid's suspicions that he was to be dismissed,
?  2a l-H a jja j married Yazid's sister. Another device a l-H a jja j employed in
this connection was when he asked Yazid to come to Wasit to discuss an
*
important matter with him, and to leave his weaker brother al-Mufaddal as
3 This deputy governor. After some hesitation, Yazid submitted to the order
of aU H ajja j and left Khurasan to his brother. The latter reamined for a few
months until Outaiba ibn Muslim al-Bahili came to replace him as governor.
Thus we see that the temporary appointment of al-M ufaddal was but a device
used by a l-H a jja j against Y azid . It was because a l-H a jja j considered Yazid's
position in Khurasan to be not in the interests of the state, that he dismissed
him, not because of the £A§abiyya. A l-H a jja j must also by this time have
realised that his appointment of al-M uhallab and his Azdite supporters had had
the effect of driving the Mudar party into such sharp opposition, that it even
1. Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1143-4 (citing Mada* ini); Ghurar. fols. 75 -6 ; A a h .. IX,
pp .55 -6 ; Kamil, IV , pp.400-1 ; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo!52a; i Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 119-20*
2. Ya*qubT, 11,p .330; K j f f j l ,  fols. 128a»128b.
3. Y a 'q u b i, II, p .330; T ab ,, I I ,  p. 1141; Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 128b;
Ghurar, fols. 76-77; Kamil, IV , p .401; M ir *a t , V I ,  fo l.52a;
Bidaya, IX , p .56; 6 Ibar, I I I ,  p. 120.
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led the Qais to align with the Tamim. He, therefore, chose another
governor who could be relied on to carry out his policies and yet would
be acceptable to the Mudar -  that is, Gutaiba ibn Muslim. ^
A l-H a jja j is also said to have enouraged the £Asabiyya among
the tribes by inciting the poets against each other, as for example, in the
satirical battle between Jarir and al-Farazdaq. The fact that a l-N a q a ’ Ic!
3were composed more for entertainment than for political hostility, does not
convince us in favour of al-Nuss's thesis, especially since we know that
•  •
-  4
Jarir and al-Farazdaq enjoyed an intimate friendship.
Finally, it was a l-H a jja j who imprisoned his brother-in-i-Jaw, M a lik
-  -  t  5Ibn Asma7 ibn Kharija a l-Fazari, for embezzlement. M a lik  asked his
father, the Sayyid of Fazara, to use his influence to release him, only to
be met with a refusal because his father dared not petition a l-H a jja j on such
a matter. This shows $hat it was well known that a l-H a jja j would not respond
to appeals of kinship.
1. Sha£ban, op. c it . ,  p. 99.
2 . A l-N u ss , op. c i t . ,  p .262.
3. P a if, op. c i t . , pp. 179-80.
4 . Jarir, Pi wan, pp .72, 323, 439; Jumahi, p. 1 0 0 , ‘Iqd, II I ,  p. 145;
Aghf X’lX , pp. 24 -9 .
5. Agh., X V I, p .41; Jalis, fols. 8 8 a -8 8 b.
6 . A g h ., X V I, p .41.
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Al "Hajjaj's system of patronage may well have added to his 
unpopularity; it would seem more likely that he upset the Qais for 
failing to exercise his powers of patronage on a solely tribal basis, than 
that he erred in favouring his own people beyond what was usual at the 
time. In many ways it seems he was a man one step in advance of his time.
Another characteristic of the policy of * Abd a l-M a lik  in choosing 
his governors and officials, was that he mainly employed members of the 
Northern tribes as governors, while his court officials mostly belonged to 
the Southern tribes. Out of fifty  six officials whom he employed as 
governors during his regime, only five were from the Northern tribes;^
1. Hadhif, p p .3 ,7 1 ; Sa‘ d, V , pp.41, 112-13; Zubairi, pp .82, 190-1,
313, 328-9 ; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tabaqct, p .601; Idem, Tarikh, I, 
p p .340, 341, 381-394; AzraqT, I I ,  p. 136; Muhabbar, pp .23 -5 , 378; 
M ughtalin. pp. 176-7; Munammaq, p p .501-2; Bay an. I, p. 165;
Mahasin, pp .63 -4 ; M a f arif, pp. 155, 156; * Uyun, p. 207; Imama, I I ,  
p. 25 (citing AbH M a ‘ shar), 48 -9 ; Futuh , p. 229 (citing WaqidT, 332, 
339-400, 415-7 ; Ansab, V , pp .79T750, 160, 162-3, 166, 171 (citing 
Mada* in i), 178, 186 (citing Mada* in i), 346-7 (citing al-Haytham);
351 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 354, 373 (citing WaqidT), 374; X I,  pp. 17-18 
(citing al-Hqythqm)^"30-2  (citing M adaM ni), 68 -9 , 189 (citing 
M ada’ in i), 266-7 (citing Abu Mikhnaf and ( Awana), 269-70 (citing 
M adaM ni ), 310-11 (citing al-Haytharn); Ya^gubi, I I ,  pp .324-5; 326-7 , 
331, 335; Buldan, p p .60 -1 , 80-1; Idem, Mushakalat a l-N as ii 
Zamanihim, p. 18; Bahshal, Tarikh W asit, p .40 (citing i Awana); Nasab, 
fols. 3a-3b , 13a, 13b,“ l5b , 17a-17b, 29a-29b, 173a, 185a; Q u ja tT T  
pp. 124, 135, 130; T a b ., I I ,  p .816-7 (citing M adaM ni), 818 (citing 
M adaM ni), 852, 853-4 , 855, 859-63 (citing M adaM ni), 873 , 928 
(citing 6 Umar ibn Shabba), 940 (citing W aqidi), 1022 ff. (citing Madah'ni), 
1031-32, 1033;*5 (citing Abu Mikhnaf and M adaM ni), 1039, 1046-7, 1063, 
1085, 1127 (citing WaqidT), 1171; Kufi, I I ,  fols. 5Sa-59b, 68b-69a, 72a - 
72b;flqd, I I ,  pp .78-81; IV , 304; M urJ j, V , pp. 266, 290-2; Kindi, I, 
pp.4 8 -9 , 55, 58; Bad', V I ,  p p .25-7; Agh. ,  111, pp. 1 00  (citing Mus‘ ab 
a l-Z u b a irl), 10 2 -3 7T 0 7 -8 , 110 (c it in ^ a d a M n l) ,  113; X I I I ,  p. 56;* =
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while fifteen out of twenty court officials were from the Southern tribes,  ^
This might have been another way of keeping the balance between the two 
sides.
= TonukhT, op. c i t . , pp .44 -6 ; Marzubani, op. c it . ,  p p .227-8 , 230,
260; Jails, folsT 8b-9a; Ghurar, fols. 5 -7 , 17; Jamharat, pp. 138-9,
178, 234; Bakri, I, p. 55; Sam'ani, fo l. 64a; ‘ Asahir, 11,p. 131; I I I ,  
fols. 177a-177b, I79a-179b; 180a; III, pp. 128-30; IV , pp .52 ,82;
V I I ,  pp .4 0 -1 ;Mu< jam, I, p .326; I I,  p .669; I I I ,  p p .928-30; Kamil,
IV , p p .270, 274, 294, 295, 296, 298, 300 , 303 , 308 , 338 ,”3 6 l7  
362, 364, 367, 374, 382, 411; Us£, I, pp. 117, 258; I I I ,  p. 135;
M ir* a t , V I ,  fols. 2a, 3b, 8 a , 8 b, 9a-10a, 14a-15a, 17br 24a, 29a, 40b; 
Ibn al-Abbar, a l-H u lla t a l-S iyara*, pp. 189, 465-66; Zubda, I, pp.4 4 -5 ; 
Wafayat, I, pp .599, 630; NuwairT, X IX , fo l. 70; Mukhtasar, I, p .208, 
DhahabT, I II ,  pp. 115, 117, 126, 213, 233-4 , 241, 310;“ B id ^ a , V I I I ,  
pp. 316 -7 , 326, 347; IX , pp .2 , 3 , 7 , 9, 15, 2 1 , 22, 32, 52, 61;
4 Ibar, I I I ,  pp .81, 91 -2 , 93, 103-4, 292-5; Arab, pp.41, 79 , 160,
177, 186, 285, 360, 372-4 , 382, 393 , 396; Khitat., II, p .71;
Tahdhib , I, pp. 371-2; 111, p. 102; V ,p p . 5 -7 ; ^ d d h a ra t, I, pp.79-80; 
Karbala, M uf jam Qaba* il a l - ‘ Arab, I, pp .27, 42 , 60, 125, 148; II, 
pp. 622; I IT, pp. 929, 989-90 , 996ft. ,  1 0 2 f f . ,  1070ff., 1192, 1213;
A I - ‘ A ll,  Muwazafu Btlad al-Sham fil *Asr al-Um aw i, p .72, al-Abbatb, 
X IX , 1966;Caskel, Gamharat an-Nasb das Genealogische Werk des 
Hisham b. Muhammad a i-K a lb t, I, pp. 1 , 8 , 1 0 , 1 1 , 14, 2 1 , 23, 29,
35, 96, 118, 137, 144, 147 , 236, 352, Leiden, 1966.
1. $a*d , V , p. 131; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh I /p p .3 9 0 , 394-6 ;
Idem, Tabaqat, p .792; MuhabBar, p .373; Ansab, X I ,  pp. 155, 192-3; 
Maia_cJ fo]s. 31b, 32b, 61 b ;“T ab ., I I ,  p .Z S T p T q d , IV , p. 169;
Jahshiyari, pp. 2 8 ,3 0 -3 ; Masbahir, p. 112; KhuIflnT, p. 109; La/aMf, p .61; 
Jamharat, pp. 224, 393, 395, 405; Khulafa? II ,  fols. 139a-139b, 140b;
Usd, IV , pp. 191 -2 ; M ir*at, V I ,  fo l.33a; NuwairT, X IX , fo l.70 ;.Arab/ 
pp.42, 58, 83, 192, 222, 224, 230, 231, 355, 406; l$aba, I, pp. 1072;
HI, 532; TahdhTb, V ,  p .85; V I I I ,  pp .364-7; Kabbala* op* c i t . ,  I, pp .30 -1 , 
49, 174, 286, 305, 344, 365 -6 , 388; I I ,  pp.527 7 706; III ,  pp.844, 1260; 
AI-^AIT, Mawazafu,Bilfld al-Sham fil ( Asr a l-U m aw i,pp .53-61 , al-Abbath 
X IX , 1966; Caskel ,op. c ? t.,T , pp. 199,' 208, 243, 245, 248. '
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The success of ( Abd a l-M alik 's  policy towards the tribes can be 
measured by the fact that the last few years of his reign were free from 
armed inter-tribal struggle. He was successful in harnessing tribal feeling 
to the interests of the government, at the same time suppressing its violent 
manifestations. His successors, however, were less careful in treading this 
narrow road between the beneficial and disruptive effects of the tribal 
system, and in later years, the rivalries and antipathies of ‘ Asabiyya again 
erupted in violent feuds.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE C IVIL WAR, 67 - 7 3  A .H .
Throughout the twenty-one years of his reign, * Abd a l-M a lik  faced
a series of revolts and dissensions, perhaps the most serious of which was
the revolt of ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zu bair, who had proclaimed himself caliph
on the death of Yazid I in 64 /683 . At the height of his power, he controlled
a l-H ija z  and Iraq, as well as receiving at least nominal recognition from
many other provinces of the Empire.^ Certainly, not until Ibn al-Zubair's
death in the year 73 /692 , was f Abd a l-M a lik  acknowledged as Caliph
throughout the Empire.
4 Abd a l-M a lik , however, was unable to challenge Ibn al-Zubair's
sway in Iraq and the East before he had secured his position in Syria itself,
the centre of his -authority. There, N atil ibn Qais al-Judhami was
2
occupying Palestine in support of ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zu bair. * Abd a l-M a lik  
succeeded in liquidating N atil in the battle of Ajnadin. Both Khalifa ibn
1. As in the case of ‘ Abdallah ibn Khazim al-Sulami in Khurasan and 
Zufar ibn al-Harith  a l-K ilab i in Sarqisya*. Ansab, V , pp .305, 350
(citing ‘ Aw an a), fo l. 593b; Futuh, pp.414-5 ; Ya'qubT, II, pp .304, 
324; Buldan, p. 81; Bad?, V I, p. 27; Khulafd*, 11, fo l. 1 12a; Kamil,
IV , pp .277, 278, 282; Ibar, I I I ,  p .82; Tahdhib, V ,  p. 195; l§aba,
II, pp .735-6 ; M iles, Some New Light on the History of Kirman, p .89, 
W O I, 1959.
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikjh, I, p .332 (citing al -  Lay th); Ansab,
V , p. 158 (citing M ada’TnT); Y a ‘ qubT, II, p .321; M uru j, V , p p .224-5.
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Khayyat and Mas'udi  ^ state that this battle took place in the same year
as the battle of Khazir, in which 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad was k illed . The
date of the battle of Khazir is given by other sources as 10th Muharram,
2
67/6th August, 6 8 6 ; while Khalifa dates it as 66 /685 , without specifying 
the month. These two dates are not necessarily contradictory, for if the 
battles of Ajnadin and Khazir took place at the end of the year 6 6 , in the 
month of D hul-hajja, the difference between Khalifa's and Mas'udi's dates 
is as little  as ten days, which is not significant.
Another threat to 'Abd a l-M alik 's  position in Syria at this time 
came from the Byzantine Emperor, who, encouraged by the political con-
" . . .  . 3fusion of the time, sitrred up the Jarajima (Mardaites) against the 'Arabs.
■? 4 . . -According to Baladhuri, a Byzantine cavalry came into the Amanus district 
(Lukam) and penetrated as far as Lebanon. This force was joined by a large 
number of Jarajima, Anbat (Nabateans)and runaway slaves. The caliph 
found himself compelled to make a treaty with them, guaranteeing them a 
weekly payment of one thousand Dinars. Then, following the precedent of
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh , i ,  p .33 2 ;M u ru j, V ,  p .224.
2. M a 'a r if , p. 152; Dhahabi, I I ,  p .375; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .283.
3. Futuh , pp. 160-1, 188; Ansab, V , p .299; Y a 'q u b i, II, p .321; 
Tab., II, p .796 ;M u ru j, V , p. 224; M u 'jam , I I ,  pp. 35-6; Kamil, 
!V, pp .250-1; Bughya, fbls. 255 (quoting Baladhuri), 258; Duwal,
I, p .37; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .313; Shadharat, I, p .77.
4 . Futuh, pp. 160-1.
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M u'aw iyya , he offered peace terms to the emperor.
The contents of the treaty between them are preserved only by 
the Christian sources. According to this treaty, the caliph agreed to 
pay 365,000 gold pieces, 365 slaves and 365 thoroughbred horses; he had 
also to surrender half of the tribute from Cyprus, Armenia and Iberia. In 
return, the emperor Justinian If agreed to withdraw the Mardaites, and he 
recalled 12,000 of them to be settled in Byzantine territory.  ^ It is interest­
ing to note here that the Christian sources reproach the emperor for denuding 
the frontiers in this way.
Following the account af Baladhuri, after signing the treaty, 'Abd  
a l-M a lik  sent one of his trusted men, Suhaim ibn a l-M u h a jir, to the 
Byzantine officer commanding the Jarajima. Suhaim succeeded in 
winning his confidence by pretending to take his part against the caliph. 
Then Suhaim used his troops, which he had hidden, to make a surprise 
attack, killing the officer and his Greek followers. As for the Jarajima, 
they were guaranteed Aman; some went away and settled in the villages 
of Hims and Damascus, while the majority of them went back to the Amanus; 
the Anbat returned to their villages and the slaves to their masters, while
1. Theophanes, Chronographia, 6176, M igne, 1857; Constantine 
Perphyrogentus, De Administrando fmperio, pp. 93 -5 , ed. G y. 
Moravcsik and translated by R.J. H. Jenkins, Budapest, 1949; 
Michael the Syrian, Chronique, II, pp. 469-70; Ibn a l - '  Ibri 
(Bar Hebraeus), Chronographia, I, p. 103; E. I. (Djarqdjima).
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others entered the caliph's service, ^
Here again, cs in most of the events of this period, no definite 
date is given for the Mardaites' raids or the treaty. Baladhuri, Theophanes, 
Constantine Perphygrogentus, Michael the Syrian, Ibn a l- 'A d im , Ibn a l-
? T 2 .' Ibri and Dhahabi date them after the death of Marwan ibn al-Hakam and
the accession of 'Abd a l-M a lik  to the caliphate, in the time of political
«  -  «  »  3
turmoil. Both Ya'qubi and Mas'udi refer to the same date when they
place these events along with the rebellion of N atil ibn Qais in 66 /685.
Another account without any chain of authority in Tabari, repeated by
T t  -  4Ibn a l-A th ir , Ibn Kathir and ibn a U ' Imad, gives the year as 70 /689.
Finally, another report found in Ibn a l-A th ir puts this Byzantine threat in
the year 69 /688 , to coincide with the revolt of 'Amr ibn Sa'id  al-Ashdaq 
5in Damascus. O f all these different dates, it would seem that the period 
65 -6 6 /6 8 4 -5  is the most like ly , in that troubled period before 'Abd a l-  
M alik  secured his succession; the narratives which give other dates are 
either less detailed and without a chain of authority (Xabari's) or without 
confirmation in the early sources (Ibn al-A thir's).
1. Futuh , pp. 160-1.
Fi’frub/ pp. 160-1, 188; Chronographia, 6176; De Administrando Imperio, 
p .93; Chronique, II, 469; Bughya, fols", 255-6 (quoting Baladhuri); 
Chronographia, I, p. 103; Duwal, I, p .37.
3. Y a 'q u b i, II, p. 321;M uru j, V , p .225.
4. Tab., II, p .796; K am il, IV , p .251; Didaya, V I I ,  p .313; Shadharat, I,
p .77.
5. Kamil, IV , pp .250 - 1 .
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It was these troubles which 'Abd a l-M a lik  faced at home that
prevented him from interfering in the war between M us'ab  ibn a l-Zubair
and al-M ukhtar ibn Abi 'U baid al-Thaqafi in 67 /686 . Moreover, 'Abd a l-
M alik  may well have thought it wiser to let his enemies fight each other and
so weaken themselves. Welihausen^ has argued that the reason for 'Abd
a l-M a lik ’s neutrality in this conflict was due to the famine that struck Syria
in 68 /687; this, however, is incorrect, since the famine occurred a year
2after the war between Mus 'ab  and al-M ukhtar. ' On the other hand,
M us 'ab  himself was too busy fighting other enemies, such as the Shi'a in
Kufa and the Khawarif in Basra, to take the offensive against 'Abd a l-
M a lik . Therefore, any conflict between the two was delayed.
As soon as he was free from troubles at hom^,'Abd al-jVtalik launched
an attack on M us'ab, advancing until he reached But nan Habib in the district • * •
of Q inasrin, where he made his camp. M us'ab  consequently left Kufa and 
made his camp in Bajumaira near Takrit. These choices of camp headquarters 
were not without significance. Apart from the fact that both were boundary 
stations on the road from Syria to Iraq, there were other, more important
1. Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 187.
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .335 (citing al-Layth); Tab., II, 
p .765; KamiTT"IV , p .236; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .294, (quoting Tabari).
reasons for their choice:- But nan Habib and the neighbouring Qinasrin
were inhabited by the Banu 'Abs ibn Baghid, with whom 'Abd a l-M a lik
1had a marriage alliance. On the other hand, Mus'ab may well have
chosen Bajumaira on the Euphrates because of its proximity to the
Qarqisya* area, where Zufar ibn al-Harith a l-K ilab i adhered to him
2and opposed 'Abd a l-M a lik .
The first march of 'Abd a l-M a lik  against Mus'ab was in the summer 
3of 69 -70 /689 . However, 'Abd a l-M a lik  had to leave Butnan and return 
to Damascus, to deal with the revolt of one of his kinsmen, ' Amr ibn Sa'id  
ibn a l- 'A s , nicknamed al-Ashdaq. 'Amr's revolt was to establish his 
claim to the caliphate, which had been acknowledged at the treaty of
1- Nasab, fo l. 35a; Jamharat, pp*239-40; Buahya, fol. 471 (quoting
Muhammad ibn Ahmad a l-A zd i, al-Nassaba).
* 9
2. See Chapter I I I ,  pp. / i  7
3. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .336 (citing al-Layth); Tab., I I ,  
pp. 783 (citing WaqidT), 784 (citing ' Awana); Kamil, IV , p .250; 
Nuw airi, X IX , fols. 89-90; Dhahabi, I I ,  pp .383-4 ;( Bidaya, V I I I ,  
p .307. As for the account in Jab ., (II, p .765), repeated by Ibn a l-  
AthTr, (Kamil, IV , p .236), which says that 'Abd a l-M a lik  and his 
army camped in Butndm Habib in 68 /687, it seems, as Welihausen 
justly observed, that "it contradicts the preceding account, that at 
that year 'Abd a l-M a lik  did not take the fie ld , because of the 
famine". The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 188.
al-Jab iya; Marwan had then broken his fa ith , by appointing his two
sons as his successors. Our information on ‘ Amr's revolt comes from the
narrative of Waqidi in Ibn Sa( d, repeated by Ibn ‘ Asakir and Dhahabi,^
the narrative of Abu Mikhnaf in Baladhuri, repeated by Tabari and Ibn a l -  
- 2 .
Athir, and that of ‘ Awana in Tabari, repeated by Ibn a l-A th jr, a l-N u w a iri,
*? -  3Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun. There are also other accounts which are mainly
compilations of these three main narratives. The narratives not only
disagree on the date of the revolt, but also emphasise different aspects of
it. W hile 6 Awana is interested in the way that ‘ Amr was k illed , Abu
Mikhnaf endeavours to explain why ‘ Amr so easily succeeded in taking
Damascus. Waqidi passes over the agreement between * ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  and
* Amr before the letter's submission, it is therefore only by putting all the
accounts together that one can form a satisfactory picture of this revolt.
According to Ibn Sa‘ d , Mus*ab a l-Zu bairi, Baladhuri, Tabari,
Ghurar al Siyar, Ibn ‘ Abd Rabbih, Ibn ‘ Asakir, Ibn a l-A th ir  Nuwairi and
Dhahabi, ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id was with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  when he marched from
Damascus against M us‘ ab ibn a l-Zubair in Iraq. On the way there, ‘ Amr
reminded ( Abd a l-M a lik  of Marwan's promise that he should succeed him, and
1 . Sa‘ d, V ,  pp. 168-9; 6 Asakir, X II I ,  fo l. 230b; Dhahabi, I I I ,  p p .58-9 .
2. Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 138-40; Tab ., I I ,  p .782; Kamil, IV, p .250.
I l iu m !  nH i | «  ■■ ■■< I iitaM
3. Tab ., I I ,  p. 2 8 3 ff .; Kamil, IV , p .2 4 5 ff.;  Nuw airi, X IX , fo l. 89ff; 
Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .307ffTTnbar, I I I ,  p .72ff.
asked <Abd a l-M a lik  to name him as successor on his own death, in honour 
of his father's promise. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  paid no heed to ‘Amr's claim. As 
a result, ‘ Amr, accompanied by some of his followers, deserted ‘ Abd al
M alik's camp at night and went to Damascus.^ Another account, given
-  -  -  — -  - 2  
by Y a ‘ qubi, Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir, Nuwairi, Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun,
says that the desertion of ‘ Amr from ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  army occurred when
the latter was going to fight Zufar ibn al-Harith a l-K ilab i in Garqisya*,
not in his campaign against Mus‘ ab. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  besieged ‘ Amr in
3Damascus for sixteen days, during which time negotiations and correspondence
1. Sa‘ d, V , pp. 168-9 (citing W aqidi); Zubairi, pp. 178-9; Ansab, IV , it , 
pp. 138-40 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); T a b ., I I ,  p .784; Ghurar, fols. 7 -8 ;
‘ Iqd, IV , pp.407 -9  (citing Abu M a ‘ shar); ‘ Asakir, X I I I ,  fo l. 230b 
(quoting lbnSa‘ d); Kamil, IV , p .250; N uw airi, X IX , fo l. 95; Dhahabi, 
III, pp .57 -9  (quoting Ibn Sa‘ d).
2. Y a ‘ qubi, 11, pp .321-3; T a b ., II, p.783 (citing ‘ Awana); Kamil, IV , 
pp .245-6 ; Nuw airi, X IX , fols. 89-92; Bidaya, V I I I ,  pp .307-8; ‘ Ibar, 
I I I ,  pp .7 2 -5 . As for the account which says that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  left 
‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id in Damascus as his deputy, when he went to fight 
M us‘ ab ibn a l-Zubair, this seems unlikely since ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  knew 
very well how ambitious his rival was. Their rivalry went back to 
their early years. Imcma, I I ,  p .20 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar); Tab., II, 
p.783 (citing W aqidt); M uruj, V , pp. 233-5; Marzubant, op. c i t . ,
p .231; Kamil, IV, p. 250; E. 1 . (‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ Td al—AshdagJI
3. Sa‘ d, V ,  pp. 168-9 (citing Waqidi) ‘ Asakir, X I I I ,  fo l.230b (quoting 
Ibn Sa‘ d); Dhahabi, i l l ,  pp .57-9  (quoting Ibn Sa‘ d). According 
to Abu M a ‘ sTiar (Imama, II,  p .20), the siege lasted for more than 
one month.
227.
took place between them, which brought about the submission of * Amr, and
( Abd a l-M a lik  re-entered the city. Unfortunately, our sources do not
preserve for us a complete version of the terms of the agreement between
e Amr and f Abd a l-M a lik . However, the following terms can be gathered
from the fragments that do occur in the sources:- £ Amr would succeed ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik  to the caiiphate; ‘ Amr would be put in charge of the treasury
and the Diwans, and would appoint one official for each one appointed by
2‘ Abd a l-M a lik ; and the caliph would consult i Amr in all decisions . Such
a division of responsibility at the head of power was hardly politically feasible,
and ( Abd a l-M a lik  decided to remove the threat of ‘ Amr once and for all -
according to tradition, ‘ Amr was invited to the palace and killed by f Abd
3al-M alik 's  own hands.
M ughtalin, p .205; Bayart, I I I ,  pp .229-30; Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 138-40 
(citing Abu Mikhnaf); Y a^ubT , I I ,  pp .321-3; Ghurar, fols. 7 -8 ; 
Muruj, V , p .234; fAsakir, X II I ,  fo l.230b (quoting Khalifa); Kamil,
IV , p .246; Nuw airi, X IX , fo l. 89ff; Dhahabi, I I I ,p p .57-9; Bidaya, 
V I I I ,  pp .307-8; 311-12; ‘ Ibar, 111,pp .73 -4 ; Shadharat, I, p .77.
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 263; iViughtalin, p. 205; Imama, II, 
pp. 13-20; Ansab, IV , i i ,  p. 138ff. (citing Abu Mikhnaf); DTnawar'f, 
p .294; Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  p .322; Tab., I I ,  pp.793 (citing ‘ Awana), 875 
(citing ‘ Awana); Ghurar, fols. 7 -8 ; ‘ Iqd, I, pp. 92 (citing M ada’ im)
IV , p .408 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar); M uruj, V , pp. 234-5 ; e Asakir, X I I I ,  
fo l .230 (quoting Khalifa); Kamil, IV , pp .245-6; Dhahabi, III, pp .58-9; 
Bidaya, V I I I ,  p p .357-8 , 3 l2 7 1 hadharat, I, p.77.—
3. ^9‘ cl/ V , p. 169 (citing Waqidi); Zubairi, p. 179; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, 
Tarikh, I, p .263; Mughtalin, p .205, Kitab a l-T a j, p .6 6 ; Dinawarf,pp. 
294-5; Y a ‘ qub7, I I ,  pp .322-3; Tab., I I ,  pp .891-2 (citing ‘ Awana); 
Ghurar, fol. 8 -9 ; Mqd, IV , pp .408-9  (citing AbtJ M a ‘ shar); iViuruj, V ,  
p p .237-9; ( Asakir, X III,fo ls . 227a, 230b (quoting Khalifa), 230b 
(quoting Ibn Sa‘ d); Kamil, IV , pp .248-9; Sharh , IX , p. 119; Nuvyxiiri, 
X IX , fols 92-4; Dhahabt, I I I ,  pp .57 -9  (quoting Ibn S a ‘d and Khalifa);
The murder of ‘ Amr left a stigma on ‘ Abd a l-M a lik (s name, used
by the hostile tradition to condemn him, with no consideration of any of
his achievements. One can argue, however, that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  had some
justification for killing ‘ Amr. In this troubled time of political confusion,
there was no room for ambitious men of the ruling family to put forward
claims that undermined the unity of the Umayyad family and the security of
the Empire: ‘ Amr's murder was "pour encourager les autres". Moreover,
had ‘ Amr lived to succeed in his bid for power, he would surely have had to
k ill ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  cast ‘ Amr's head to the crowd, together with a large
sum of money: the people fell on the money, paying no attention to the 
2severed head. In this way, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  succeeded in diverting the 
attention of the people from the killing of ‘ Amr. At the same time, he
ordered an announcement to be made. It is reported in the al-Imama wai
.. -  3Siyasa that when the head and the money were thrown to the crowd, one of
1 . Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh^, I, p .263; Dinawari, p .294; Tab., II,
p .795 (citingtAwana); Ghurar, fo l. 9; Kamil, IV , p .250; Nahaya,
II, p .46; NuwairT, X IX , fo l .94; Dhahabi, I I I ,  p .59; Bidaya, V I I I ,  
p .310; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .75 . —
2. Imama, I I ,  pp .21 - 2  (citing A b u M a‘ shar); Ansab, IV , i i ,  p. 139 (citing
Abu Mikhnaf); DinawarT, p .295; Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  pi 323; Tab., I I ,  p .791 
(citing ‘ Awana); Ghurar, fo l .9; ‘ Iqd, IV , p .409 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar); 
M uruj, V ,  p .339; Ibn HamdCfn, Tadhkira, I, fo l. 6 6 b; Kamil, IV , p p .248- 
9; N uw airi, X IX , fol. 93; Bidaya, V ll l ,p .3 0 9 ;  ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  pp .74 -5 .
mm
3. Imama, II ,  pp .21-2  (citing Abu M a ‘ shar).
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‘ Abd a l-M a lik ‘s men made the public announcement, that "Your man was
killed by the caliph according to the Qadar of A llah , which no one can
prevent, 11 and urged the people to keep quiet,promising them material
rewards, to which they agreed. Two important points emerge from this
announcement: the first is that the caliph, i .e .  the State, held to the
doctrine of Qadar (predestination) and used it in the political sphere as
a means of silencing opposition to the regime. This point has been made
1
clearly by Ibn Qutaiba, when he described how government officials pointed 
to the doctrine, in justification for their acts of tyranny. The second 
important point is that there were a considerable number of people, at least 
in Damascus, who believed in this Qadar doctrine. Both of these points 
are borne out by the evidence of a letter sent by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  to al-Hasan 
ibn A b i11 Hasan al-Basri concerning this doctrine.^
Once again we face problems of chronology, for more than one date
r  3
is given for ‘ Amr's revolt. Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir and other late sources give
the year 69 /688 . On the other hand, Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Y a ‘ qubi, Mas‘ udi,
M a ‘ arif, p .195. According to al-Dhahabi (Tarikh, III ,  p .1 2 8 )‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik  hung M a ‘badal-Juhani, because he refused to believe in the 
doctrine of "Qadar”.
2. Risalat Mukatabat ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan Wal Hasan ibn AbiM-Hasan 
al-BasrT, fols. 1-13; Ritter, Studien Zur Geschichte der Islamischen 
Frommigkeit, pp .66 -82 , D l, X X I, 1933; Obermann, Political Theory
in Early Islam, pp. 132-62, JOAS, 55, 1935; Schwarz, The letter of al - 
Hasan al-BasrT, pp. 15-30, Oriens, X X , 1967; Murtada, pp. 19-20;
Jarir, Diwan, pp .380, 474.
3. T ab ., I I ,  pp .783 (citing WaqidT), 783 (citing ‘ Awana); ‘ Asakir, X II I ,  
fol, 231a (citing IbnSallam); Kam il, IV , p .245; N uw airi, X IX , fo l .89; 
Dhahabi, I I I ,  p .59 (quoting al-Layth); Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .307; TahdhTb, V I I I ,  
p .38 (citing al-Layth).
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Ibn ‘ Asakir, Ibn aMAdim, Dhahabi, Ibn Hajar and Ibn a l-*  lmad/ ^
2mention the year 70 /689 , Moreover, a third group of sources place the 
desertion of * Amr from ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  army in the year 69, and his 
death in. 70, This account seems to be the most convincing, for according 
to the Muslim calendar, "the turn of the year then fell in the summer", and the
military activities, which ceased in winter, would therefore be spread over
3 -  T ?two Muslim years. Waqidi in Tabari, and * Awana state that * Amr left
the camp of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  and returned to Damascus in 69 /688; while Mas‘ udi
4specifically states that * Amr was killed in the year 70, The argument in
favour of these events covering a period of two years is strengthened by the
consideration that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  had reached as far as Butnan Habib in the• •
5summer of 69 -7 0 /68 9  on his march against Mus ‘ ab, before he was forced to 
return to Damascus to deal with ‘ Amr's revolt; these journeys would certainly 
take a considerable time.
The revolt of ‘ Amr and his death occupied the whole summer and ‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik  spent the rest of the year 70 /689  in the capital re-establishing his 
authority.^ The next year, 7 0 -7 1 /6 9 0 , the campaign against M us‘ ab was
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .263; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p. 323; Murup, V ,
p .233; ‘ Asakir, X IIt ,  fo l.230b (quoting Khalifa); Bughya, foK 256 (quoting 
BaiadhurT); Dhahabi, I I I ,  p .58 (quoting K hairfa); TafidhTb, I I I ,  p .38; 
Shadharat, I,  p .77.
2. Tab ., I I ,  p .796 (citing WaqidT); Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .310 (citing Waqidi);
TahdhTb, i l l ,  p .38.
3. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p, 187.
4. Tab ., I I ,  p .783; M uruj, V , p .233.
5. See Z  2* ■
6 . Sa‘ d, V , p. 169 (citing W aqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .262
(citing al-Layth); M uruj, V , p .240.
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resumed and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  with his army once again marched as far as 
Butnan Habib. M us‘ ab was waiting for him in Bajumaira where he had 
made his camp. Winter came on before the two reached each other and no 
battle took place, since they both turned back home.
However, taking advantage of M u§‘ ab's absence from Basra, ‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik  tried to instigate a tribal revolt there in his favour. Our information 
about this event comes mainly from Abu ‘ Ubaida, Mada* ini and Abu Mikhnaf 
found in Baladhuri and Tabari, There are only minor differences in these 
accounts, and on the whole they re-inforce each other. There are another 
two accounts, one of Wahab ibn Jarir in Baladhuri, and one of Sha‘ bi in 
al-Futub of Ibn A ‘ tham; these are brief and without details, although they 
broadly agree with the three accounts before mentioned. Both Ibn a l-A th ir  
and N uw airi, however, had restricted themselves to the account of MadaMni 
alone.
According to Abu ‘ Ubaida, Abu Mikhnaf, Wahab i*bn Jarir and al -
-  2 -  
Sha‘ bi, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  began by writing to his supporters (sh i ‘ a) in Basra,
1. Naqa* id , I I ,  p. 1091; Ansab, V , p .336 (citing ‘ Awana); Tab., I I ,  
p .797; Kufi, II, fo l.48a (citing a l-5 ha‘ bT); Agh . ,  X V II,  p. 162 
(citing M ada’ inT); ‘Asakir, X V I, foT7266b (quoting Khalifa); M u ‘ jam,
I, p .454; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .315. ~
2. Naqa’ icj, I I, pp. 1090-91; Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 155 (citing Abu Mikhnaf), 
157 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir); Kuff, I I ,  fo l.48a (citing a!-Sha‘ bt).
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promising them lavish rewards if they would support his cause against
M us‘ ab. Finding an encouraging response to this offer, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
sent Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid to seize Basra for him.
-  1Mada* ini and M us‘ ab a l-Z u b a iri, however, do not mention this cor-
respondence, and they say that Khalid himself suggested to the caliph
that he should send him to Basra to seize the town for him, and that ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik  agreed to this. Khalid went to Basra secretly with his mawafi
and retainers, and took refuge with one of the Ashraf of Bahila tribe,
probably because of its well-known Umayyad sympathy. However, this
man found himself unable to protect Khalid against the forces of the
governor and advised him to seek the help of M alik  ibn M i sma‘ , the head 
2 -of the Bakr tribe. M a lik  was one of those mentioned in other sources, to
whom ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  had written, and he took Khalid into his Jiwar (protection).
Soon Ziyad i.bn ‘ Amr a l - ‘ A tk i, the chief of the Azd, came to their aid,
T 3mainly due to the H ? If between Rabi‘ a and a I-A zd . Members of the tribes
of Thaqif, Tamim, ‘ Abd a l-G ais  and Sadus are also said to have joined
— 4the side of Khalid. On the other hand, we find the majority of the Zubairid
Naqa3 id , I I ,  p .749; Zubairi, p. 189; Ansab, IV , i i ,  p. 159; J a b ., II, 
p .798; Kamil, IV , p .252; Nuwairi, X IX , fo l .68.
2. Ansab, IV , i i ,  00.156 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 159 (citing Mada* ini);
Tab ., II ,  p .798 (citing Mada* ini); Kamil, IV , p .252; NuwairT, X IX , 
fol. 68. It is also reported that Khalid directly went to M a lik  ibn Miisma ‘ 
and no mention of that Bah i i i te Sharffhas been given. Nag a* i<j, II,
p. 1061; ZubairT, p. 189; Ansab,"IV , i i ,  p. 158.
3. Naqa’ id., II, p .729; Ansab, IV , ii,p p . 105-6 (citing M ada? ini and Abu 
‘ Ubaida); Tab ., I I ,  p .446 (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).
4 . Farazdaq, PTwan, II, p. 57; ZubairT, p. 189; Naga* id / H/ PP* 749-50, 
1091-2; Ansab, IV , i i ,  p p .156 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 157-8 (citing 2
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front was drawn from the Mudarites, headed by ‘ Umar ibn ‘ Ubaidallah 
ibn M a ‘ mar al~Makhzumi, M us‘ .ab's governor of Basra. However, it is 
clear that the‘Asabiyya played only a small role in this rising, since 
members from the same tribe fought each other on different sides. Abu 
‘ Ubaida and Wahab ibn Jarir^ state this clearly. The main reason for the
support received by the Umayyad front would appear to be the monetary
2rewards that they offered their adherents.
The two parties met in a battle in a place called al-Jufra in the
district of a l-M irbad , which gave its name to the supporters of Khalid,
3"Jufriyya". The fighting between them, according to one accoutit, lasted 
for forty days, according to another,^ only twenty-four days. Hearing of the 
battle, M us‘ absent Zuhr ibn Qais a l-Ju ‘ f i ,  with a thousand horsemen, to
5help Ibn M a ‘ mar. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , on the other hand sent ‘ Ubaidallah
ibn Ziyad i.bn Zabian, whose brother had been killed by M us‘ ab, with a 
• *
Wahab ibn Jarir), 160 (citing Mada* ini); Ja b ., I I ,  p .799 (citing 
Mada* inT); BakriJ II, p .387; Kamil, IV , p .252; Nuw airi, X IX , fo ls.68 -9 .
1. Naga* icl/ 11, pp. 1091-2; Ansab,. IV , i i ,  p. 158.
2. Ansab, V , pp .332 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir), 344-5; X I, p. 14 (citing
MadcT inT); fols. 499b-500a (citing M ad?  inT); a l - ‘ AIT, AI-Tanzimat
a l-ljt im a ‘ iyya wal Iqti^adiyya fil Basra fil Qarn al-Aw w al a l-H ijr t , p. 108, 
Baghdad, 191953. “ “
3. Naqa* id, H, p. 1092.
Naga* id, II, p .750 (citing Mada* ini); Ansab, IV , i i ,  p. 116 (citing 
Mads ?inT); Tab ., I I ,  p. 800 (citing M ada‘ inT); Kam il, IV ,p.252;
Nuw airi, X IX , fo l .69.
l^qcl^ d ,  I I ,  p. 1092; who adds another thousand men sent by Mus’ ab to 
the help of Ibn M a ‘ mar;Ansab, IV, ii, p. 161 (citing Mada* inT); T ab ., II, 
p. 800 (citing Mada* inT); Kuff, II, fo l.48b (here it is presented that one 
thousand men were sent by boat);Kamil, IV , p .252; Nuwairi, X IX , fo ls.68-9 .
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Syrian army to help Khalid, but he arrived too iate.^ Thus the balance
of the battle turned to Mus‘ ab's favour. However, soon the two sides
entered into negotiations which resulted in the Aman for Khalid and those
who supported him; it was agreed that Khalid should leave Basra, which he
did and returned to Damascus, to join ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Fearing Mus‘ ab?s
punishment, M alik  ibn M ism a‘ left Basra for al-Yamama after losing one
2
of his eyes in the battle. Mus ‘ab tried in vain to reach Basra before Khalid 
and his followers left it . Nevertheless, he inflicted a severe punishment
3on those who remained in the city.
According to M ad a ’ ini and al-Mubarrad, the rising of al-Jufrawas in
-  . -  5
the year 70 /689 . This date is also given by Abu Mikhnaf in Baladhuri, when
he says that it was at the same time as ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id's revolt in Damascus,
-  6i .e .  69 -70 /689 . Wahab ibn Jarir may well be agreeing with them in giving
the year 69, for he might, like Abu Mikhnaf, have meant the summer of
-  -769 -70 /689 . However, aI-Sam ‘ ani is certainly wrong when he gives the year
1. Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 156(citing Abu M ikhnaf), 161 (citing Mada* ini);
Tqb , , 11, p. 800 (citing Mad a* inT); Kami I , IV , p. 252; Nuwairi, X IX, fol. 69.
2. Farazdaq, Diwan, II, p. 57; Naqa’ id, I I ,  pp.750(citing Mada* in i), 1092; 
ZubairT, p. 189; Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 156-7 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 157 
(citing Wahab ibn JarTr), 161 (citing Mada* inT); Mubarrad, I, p. 131;
Tab., I I ,  pp. 800-1 (citing MadaMnT); Bakri, 11, p .387; Samzan7,
fol. 132a; Kami I, IV , p .253; NuwairT, X IX , fo ls .69-70.
3. Ansab, IV , H, pp. 162-3; T a b ., I I ,  pp .801-3 (citing M ada^ni); Kuft, 
ll, fols. 48b, 49a, 49b; Kamil, IV , p .253; NuwairT, X IX , fo ls.69-70.
4 . NaqSMd, II, p. 749 (citing Mada* ini); Mubarrad, I, p . l3 1 ;T a b .,  I I ,  p .798
(citing Mada* in i); Kamil, IV, p. 252; Nuw airi, X IX , fo l .68.
5. Ansab, IV , i i ,  p .157 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
6. Ib id ., IV , i i ,  p. 157.
7. Ansab, fo l. 132a.
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73 /692 , for Mu$‘ ab himself was killed in the year 72 /691 .
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  spent most of the summer 71-72/691 in subduing the
insurrection of Zufar ibn al-Harith a l-K ilab i and the Qaisites who were
■? -  -  . 1 holding out in Qarqisya* since the battle of Marj Rahit. When he had
pacified this area, he marched on Nasibin (Nisibis), where about two
thousand of the Khashabiyya, a remnant of al-Mukhtar's followers, were
still unsubmissive. On being offered the Aman , they surrendered and
2were enrolled in the army of the caliph.
Now came the time for the third and last decisive encounter 
with M us‘ ab: ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  set out with a large army from Damascus and
made his camp in Maskin. When Mus‘ ab heard of this advance against him,
H u  ^ 3
he left Kufa to fight ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , stationing himself at Bajumaira.
The battle between them took place in Dair a l-Ja th liq , (monastry of
Catholics), between Maskin and Bajumaira.
The time preceeding the battle was not wasted by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ;
he wrote to the tribal chiefs among Mus‘ ab's followers, promising fhfety
1. See Chapter 111, p.
2. Muruj, V , p.241; Agh., V , p. 155; V I I I ,  p .33; X I,  p .47.
3. Sa‘ d , V , p. 169;(citing Waqidi); M a^arif, p. 156; Ansab, V ,  pp .335
(citing ‘ Awana), 332 (citing Wahab ibn JarTr); DinawarT, p .316; Tab.,
II, pp .804-5 (citing WaqidT), 804 (citing Mada* inT); KufT, II, fo l.50b ,
where troops from Egypt are said to have been with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ; ‘ Iqd,
IV , p .410; V , p .242, here also there is mention of Egyptian
troops; TanbTh/ pi 313; Bad*, V I ,  p. 23; A g h ., X V II,  pp. 161-2 (citing 
Mada* irtf)7 ‘ Asakir, X V I, fol. 217a; Kam il, IV , pp. 263-4; Dhahabt,
I I I ,p . 108; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .3 1 4 ; ‘ lbar, I I I ,  p .76.
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them governorships and money rewards if they would betray Mus‘ ab. ^
Many of the discontented among them had already written to ‘ Abd a l-
-  2M alik  offering him their support in return for the governorship of Isbahan.
Moreover, by killing six thousand men from among the followers of a l-
Mukhtar, Mus‘ ab had made enemies, not only of their relatives, but also 
-  . o 3of most of the Kufans, who disapproved of this act of savagery. The 
Basrans also, especially those who had taken part in the rising of a l-Jufra , 
never forgot the humiliating punishment Mus‘ ab had inflicted on those who had
■? 4supported Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn Asid. Therefore, Mus‘ ab had alienated ■1 •
both peoples by his cruel behaviour. To these factors, one might add the
insubordinate nature of the tribesmen in Iraq, and their tradition of frequently
shifting their allegiance, which also worked against Mus‘ ab. Mus‘ ab seems* .
to have been aware of his isolation and tried to get the loyalty of the Basrans
1. Imama, II ,  p .23; Ansab, V , pp .337 (citing ‘ Awana), 340 (citing a l-  
Haytham), 344 (citing Mada* inT); X I, p p . l ,  6ff, (citing al-Haytham), 
11-13, 13-14 (citing Mada’ m i), 27; DTnawari, pp .317-18; Y a ‘ qub7,
I I ,  pp .317-18; T ab ., I I ,  pp .804 (citing Mada’ in i), 804 (citing 
WaqidT); ‘ Iqd, IV , p .410; V..~. V , p. 243; Agh. , X V II,  p. 162 (citing 
M ada’ inT)/K am iI, IV , p .265; Dhahabi, I I I ,  p. 108; Bidaya, V I I I ,  
p .3 1 4 ; ‘ lbar, 111, p .77 ; Shqdharat, I, p .79.
2. Ansab, IV , i i ,  p p .157-8; V , pp .332,-333 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir), 
335,351; Agh . ,  X V II ,  p. 161 (citing M ada’ inT)>.X, p. 9 4 ; ‘ Asakir,
X V I, fo l .271 a; K am il, IV , p .264; Mukhtagar, I, p. 207; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .76.
3. Ansab, V ,  pp .262-3; Dinawari, p .315; Tab ., I I ,  pp .740-1 , 749-50
(citing MadaM ni); KufT, I I ,  fo l.31a; ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l.27a (citing
‘ Abdallah ibn abF Rabi‘ a al-Makhzum i); K am il, IV , p .225; E. 1. ,
(Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Zubair).
»
4. See p. 23*+
25
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by giving them the ‘ Ata* twice a year, but without avail.  ^ In vain also
2
were the warnings of ai-Ahnaf ibn Qais, the Tamimite chief, and Qats
*
ibn al-Haytham al-Sulam i, not to let the hungry Syrians get into their rich
Iraqi land. When Mus( ab asked the Basrans to fight with him against ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik  and the Syrians, they showed great reluctance and insisted that the
Kharijite threat in Basra should be dealt with first. Thus M us‘ ab was forced to
dispense with a part of his army, in sending al-M uhallab with the best troops
-  . 3of Basra against the Kharijite. Mus‘ ab showed himself a short sighted
leader by not listening to the warning of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar against the
traitor-chiefs, nor did he follow Ibrahim *s request not to send him any as
reinforcements. Ibrahim had given to Mus* ab,unopened, a letter he had
received from ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , and told him that ail the other leaders had
4
probably received similar letters, but had kept them to themselves. He was
1. Ansab, V ,  p p .271 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir), 280; Azmina, I I ,  p . 134;
* Asakir, X V I, fol. 271a.
2. Ansab, V ,  pp .332 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir), 344-5; fols. 499b-500a
(citing Mada* ini); X I, pp. 14-15 (citing Mada* in i); T ab ., II, p .806 
(citing ‘ Umar Ibn Shabba).
3. Ansab, V ,  pp.332;335-6 (citing * Awana); Muruj, V , p .241; ‘ Asakir
X Y lT fo l. 271a.
4. Hayawan , V , p .594; Imama, II ,  p .23; Ansab, V , pp .337 (citing
* Aw ana), 340-1 (citing al-Haytham); X I,  pp .6 (citing ‘ Awana), 11-12; 
Dinaw art,pp.317-18; T ab ., I I ,  p. 805 (citing WaqidT); ‘ iqd, IV , p .411 
Muruj, V , p .243; A g h ., X V II,  p. 162 (citing M ada? inT); Kamil, IV ,
p .265; Dhahabi, I I I ,  p. 108; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .315; * Ibar, I I I ,  
p. 77.
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the only chief to remain faithful to Mus‘ ab until his death at the
9  9
beginning of the battle. The names of the treacherous leaders are
preserved to us by a I-Baladhuri, Tabari/ andM ascudi. It appears
from their names that they were all Kufans. On the other hand, we find
the Rabi‘ ites of Basra delighted that Mus‘ ab and his son ‘ Tsa were killed
2and that they boasted that they were responsible for his death.
After the death of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar in the beginning of the
battle, ‘ Attab ibn W arqa*, who was on the cavalry of the Kufans in
Mus‘ ab's army, gave way, while the other Kufan leaders, such as
Qatan ibn ‘ Abdallah al-Harijrhj, with Madhhij, Hajjar ibn Abjar and
Muhammad ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ id al-Ham dant, refused to obey
3M u s ^ b 1 s orders, and left him almost alone in the battle fie ld .
Owing to the close friendship between Mus ‘ ab and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  
in their early life , the latter offered to spare Mus‘ ab's life and was prepared 
to give him the governorship of Iraq, or any other country, in return for his
1. A ‘ sha Hamdan, Diwan, p .313; Ansab, V , p p .338 -9  (citing ‘ Awana), 
440-1 (citing al-Haytham ), 344 (citing Mada* in i); X I,  pp. 1 -2 , 6 -9  
(citing al-Hayfham ), 13-15 (citing Mada* in i), 21 -3 ; Tab., I I ,  pp .804, 
806-7 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); Muruj, V , p .245; Kamil, IV , p .266.
2. A ‘ sha Hamdan, Diwan, p p .314-15; Bakkar, p .314 (citing Mlus‘ a b a l-  
Zubairi); Ansab, X I,p . 282.
3- Ansab, V ,  pp .331 (citing ‘ Awana), 340-1 (citing al-Haytham); X I,
pp .6 -7  (citing al-Haytham); T ab ., I I ,  p p .806-7 (citing ‘ Umar ibn 
Shabba), ‘ Iqd, IV , pfTlO ; M uruj, V , p .245; A g h ., X V II, p. 163 
Inciting MadSj* inT); Kamil, IV , p .266; DhahabT7"i1I, p. 109 (quoting 
Tabari); Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .315; ‘ Ibar r III, p .78.
239.
allegiance,  ^ but in vain. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  then tried to save the life of
Mus‘ ab’s son, but without success, and ‘ 7sa was killed before the eyes
of his father. Then Mus‘ ab, already bleeding from many arrow shots, was
killed by Za* ida ibn Qudama a l-Th aqafi, who, when dealing the fatal
blow, shouted, MYa Ii Tharat al-M ukhtar". ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad ibn
2Zabian cut the head from the body and went with it to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . 
Thus the death of al -Mukhar had not been allowed to go unrevenged; the 
death of Mus‘ ab shows that al-Mukhtar's followers did not submit after 
their leader's death but continued to work underground, to reappear when 
they found a favourable opportunity.
The date of the battle of Dair al-Jathliq between Mus‘ ab ibn a l-  
Zubair and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan was the month of Jumada I or I I ,
1. tjadhhif, p .47; Ansab, V , pp .339 (citing ‘ Awana), 340; X I, pp .2-3  
(citing ‘ Awana), 7 (citing al-Haytham); T ab ., I I ,  pp .808-9 (citing 
MadS* h i); Am ali, p. 122 (citing Mada* inT); Muruj, V , p .247;
Agh . ,  X V II,  p. 163 (citing Mada* inT); Kamil, IV , p .267; Dhahabi, 
llT, p. 109; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .315 (citing M ada’ in i); ‘ Ibar, TIT, p .78.
2, Sa‘ d, V , p. 169 (citing W aqidi); Imama, II ,  p .23; Ansab, V ,  
pp. 334 (citingWahab ibn Jarir), 340; X I, pp. 5 (citing*Awana),
7 (citing al-Haytham); DTnawarT, p. 3 1 9 ;Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  p .317;
Tab., I I ,  p. 809*7citing M ada‘ inT); ‘ Iqd, IV , p. 411; M uruj, V , 
pp .248-9; Agh. , V I I ,  p .117 (citing Miada* inT); Jamharat, p .296; 
‘ Asakir, X V i /  fo l. 171 (citing al-Sha‘ bi); M u ‘ jam, IV , p .530;
Kamil, IV , p .268; Sharh., HI, p .296; Dhahabi, I I I ,  p. 110; 
Bidgya,V  I I I ,  p .316 (citing Mada? inT); ‘ TEar, I I I ,  pp .78 -9 ; 
Shadharat, I, p .79,
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1 -  -  -  2
72 /691, Waqidi In Tabari, however, alone among the early authorities,
gives the year 71 /690 , The fact that this date is repeated by other late 
3sources is not evidence that it is correct, for it is likely that they have
used Waqidi's account as their source. Moreover, there is another account
-  . T -  4by Waqidi himself, in Ibn Sa‘ d ’s Tabaqat and repeated by Ibn ( Asakir,
which gives the year 72 /691. Furthermore, the date 72/691 is confirmed
by the fact that the victory of ‘Abd a l-M a lik  was followed by the sending
of a l-H a jja j against Ibn a l-Zubair, which our authorities unanimously agree
was in the year 72 /691.
1. Sa‘ d, V , p. 136 (citing Waqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I,
pp .264,265; Idem, Tabaqat, p .603; M a *a rif, p. 156, Ansab, V ,  
pp. 286 (citing M ada’ inT); 342; X I,  pp.8 , 26 (citing Ibnal-KalbT  
and Abu Mikhnaf); DinawarT, p .319; Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  p .317;
Tab ., II, pp .318 (citing Mada* inT), 1466 (citing 6 Umar ibn Shabba 
and Mada* inT); M uruj, V , p .243 f f . ; TanbTb, p .313; Agh . ,  X V II ,  
p. 161ff, (citing Mada* inT); Athar, p. 318; ‘ Asakir, X V I, fol 177a 
(quoting Khalifa), 264a, 273 ^quoting Ibn Sa‘ d and W aqidi); Mu* jam,
IV , p .5297"Dhahabi, I I I ,  pp. 108-10, 210; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p.316  
citing Mada^Tnf); Shadharat, I, p .79.
2. Tab ., II, p.S04ff. (citing W aqidi).
3. Mash ah i r , p .67; Kamil, IV, p .2 6 3 ff .; Fakhri, p. 112; Nuwairi,
X IX , fo l.70; Mukhta^ar, I, pp .314-6; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .79.
4 . Sa*d, V ,  p. 136 (citing W aqidi); ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l .273 (citing
WaqidT),
241.
Following the victory over Mus*ab ibn a I -Zubair at Dair a l-
Jathliq, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  entered Kufa, where he received the homage of
the people, and appointed his officials. He also sent al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf
al-Thaqafi at the head of two thousand Syrians against ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Zubair 
1in Mecca. The choice of a l-H a jja j to lead this campaign was because of his
strong leadership, as evidenced in the efficiency with which he restored
discipline among the mutinous troops of the caliph, when he was in the
2rearguard in the campaign against Mus ‘ ab. Even before that, he had shown
unlimited loyalty to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  in the negotiations with Zufar ibn al -
Haritji a l-K ila b i. A l-H a jja j refused to pray with Zufar, because he was a
3rebel against the caliph.
However, a l-H a jja j's  army was not the first Syrian army that ‘ Abd 
a l-M a lik  had sent against ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zubair. Going back to the time
1. Sa‘ d, V , p. 169 (citing Waqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat Tarikh, I ,
p p .340-1 ; M a ‘ arif, p. 156; Imama, I I ,  pp .23-4  (the numXer of the 
army here is given as 1500); Ansj b , V , pp .346 (citing al-Haytham), 
352, 357 (citing WaqidT) and ‘ Awana); X I,  pp. 17-18 (citing 
al-Haytham ), 39-40 (citing WaqidT and ‘ Awana); DTnawarT, p .319; 
Y a‘ qubT, II, p .318 (the number here is 20 ,000); T a b ., II ,  pp. 839-40  
(citing WaqidT); Kufi, I I ,  fols. 52a-52b; ‘ Iqd., IV , p .414 (citing 
Abu M a ‘ shar); Mturuj , V ,  p .259; Bad; ; VT, pp. 24 -5 ; * Asakir, I I I ,  
fo l. 177a; Kamil, IV , p .284;U sd, 111, pp. 163-4; M ir? at, V I ,  fo ls.3a-b  
(citing Ibn-HabTb); Buahya, fo l.3 9 ;fIbri, p. 193; Mukhtasar, I, p .207;
I, p .207; DhahabT, Ml, p. 113 (citing WaqidT); Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .325;
‘ Ib a r, I I I ,  p .85. With this army of a l-H a jja j, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  is said 
to have sent M a lik  ibn ShurahTl al-Khulant with three thousand men 
from Egypt by a sea route. KindT, I ,  p .51; Kufi, I I ,  fo l.53a .
(A l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf).
3* Ansab, V ,  p .305; Tadhkira, I, fo l.78a .
of his succession, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  had sent an army of six thousand men 
under ‘ Urwa ibn Unaif to a l-H ija z , with the orders not to enter Medina, 
but to make his camp in a l - ‘ Arda ( This was perhaps to
protect Syria from any retaliatory attack from Ibn a l-Zu bair. When Ibn 
aM Zubair’s governor of M edina, al-H arith  ibn Hatib al-Jum ahi, learnt of
•  —M M  « •  *
the advance of this army, he fled, leaving his office vacant. ‘ Abd a l-
Mtalik's army remained there undisturbed for a month and then went back
home, on the caliph's orders. ^
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  sent another army to a l-H ija z , consisting of four
thousand men under ‘ Abd al—Wahid ibn al-Hakam ibn aUAs . Again, Ibn• . *
al-Zubair's governor of Fadak and Khaibar, Sulaiman ibn Khalid a l-Zuraq i,
fled. He was pursued and killed by a detachment of horsemen under A b u 'l-
Qamqam, sent by ‘ Abd al-W ahid ibn al-Hakam. However, Ibn al-Zubair's• *
new governor of Medina, Jabir ibn al-Aswad a l-Z u h ri, retaliated by sending
640 men under Abu Bakr ibn Abi Gais against AbuM-Oamqam. They found
the latter with his followers in Khaibar, where he was defeated, and thirty
2of his men taken prisoner, later to be killed.
Meanwhile, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  dispatched Tariq ibn ‘ Amr with a Syrian
1. Ansab, V ,  p .355 (citing W aqidi); X I, p .34 (citing W aqidi); Kamil, IV
p .283; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .84.
2. Ansab, V ,  p .356 (citing W aqidi); X I, pp .35 -6  (citing W aqidi); Kamil
IV , pp .283-4; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .84.
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army, ordering him to station himself between *Ayla and W ad i'l-G u ra ,
with instructions to check the activities of ibn al-Zubair's governors,
to protect the land lying between his camp and Syria, and finally , to
]
cope with any situation that might develop. When he reached the arranged
place, Tariq sent some of his horsemen against Abu Bakr in revenge for
Abu'l-Qamqam, They killed Abu Bakr and his followers. Ibn al-Zubair,
however, had already written to a l-Q u b a *, his governor of Basra,
instructing him to send two thousand men to defend Medina against the
Syrians. These reinforcements did not arrive until after the death of Abu
Bakr and his followers. They were therefore ordered to go to fight Tariq's
«
army. The two armies met near Medina in a place called Shabakat al-Dam  
( where the Basrans were annihilated. Hearing of this,
Ibn al-Zubair wrote to his governor of M edina, ordering a recruitment of two 
thousand men from the city and its environs to defend their city; he promised 
to send money for their pay. However, the money for this recruitment was 
never sent, and it was therefore abolished and called "Fard a l-R ih ".^
Jariq and his army returned to W adi'l-G ura  and remained there until they 
received orders from ‘ Abd a i-M a lik ,to  join the army of a l-H a jja j.
1. Ansab, V , p. 356 (citing Waqidi); X I ,  p. 36 (citing Waqidi); ‘ Asakir, 
VII,. p .40 (citing Khalifa); Kamil, IV , p .284; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  pp .84 -5 .
2. Ansab, V ,  pp .356-7 (citing W aqidi); X I, pp .36-8  (citing W aqidi); 
‘ Asakir, V I I ,  pp.40-1 (citing Khalifa and Ibn Sa‘ d); K am il, IV , 
p .2 8 4 ; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .85.
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A l-H a jja j, obeying ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  orders, made his camp at a l-
T a 'i f ,  from where he made frequent skirmishes against the troops of Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir, in which a l-H a jja j was almost always victorious. However,
when the negotiations with Ibn al-Zubair fa iled, and realizing that these
skirmishes would not lead to a decisive victory, a l-H a jja j wrote to ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik  asking for re-inforcements and for permission to attack Mecca by
force.  ^ ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  granted both requests. The significance of ‘ Abd a l-
M alik's original reluctance to allow a l-H a jja j to enter Medina and M ecca, has
2been discussed in detail in Chapter I. At the same time, it was argued that
. .-  3al-H ajja j showed considerable scrupulousness in his attack on a l-K a ‘ ba.
The historical tradition which is hostile to the Umayyads in general and
a l-H a jja j in particular, have ignored the fact that it was only the new part
of a I-K a ‘ ba that was attacked, and emphasized only that a l-H a jja j and his
master, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , violated the sanctity of the holy shrine. However,
when, during the storming of a !-K a ‘ ba, a sudden thunderstorm raged and
was interpreted by religious men among his followers as a sign of Divine
disapproval, a l-H a jja j succeeded in convincing all that it was but a natural
1. Ansab, V ,  pp.358 (citing ‘ Awana), 359 (citing W aqidi); X I ,  pp .40 -1 , 
(citing ‘ Awana), 42 (citing Waqidi); DlnawarT, p .319; Tab., I I ,  p .830 
(citing WaqidT); K u fi, I I ,  fo l.53a; Kamil, IV , pp .284-5; M ir*at, V I,  
fo l.3b  (citing Ibn Habib); DhahabT, 111, p. 113 (citing Wagidf); Bidaya,
V I I I ,  p .325; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .85.
2. See ^ p- ^
3, Ib id ., pp. 5 2 ^  7
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phenomenon, and even that it could be a portent of victory. During
?2the siege, which started according to Waqidi on the first of Dhul Q u ‘ da,
72 /25 th  March 792, and lasted for over six months, Ibn al-Zubair was hard
pressed by a l-H a jja j, who made a complete blockade of M ecca, preventing
-  . 3all food and supplies from reaching a l-H ija z  from outside. As a result of this, 
pri ces in Mecca became inflated, which was aggravated by the avarice of Ibn
4al-Zu bair. Since a l-H a jja j and his Syrian army were constantly supplied
1. Ansab, V ,  pp. 362 (citing ‘ Awana and Mada’ in i), 363 (citing 
W aqidi); X I ,  pp.47 -8  (citing ‘ Awana), 48 (citing M ada’ inT), 4 8 -9  
(citing WaqidT); Y a ‘ qubf, 11, p .3 1 8 ;T a b ., I I ,  pp .844-5 (citing 
WaqidT); ‘ Asakir, IV ,p .50; Kam il, IV , p .285; M iV a t, V I,  fo l.5a ;
DhahabT, 111, p .114 (citing WaqidT); ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .86.
2. Sa‘ d, V , p. 169; Ansab, V , pp .367-8; 386; X I ,  p .57; T a b ., II,
pp .844, 851; Kam il, IV ,p .290; Ibn al-JawzT, Sifat al-Safw a, I, p .325;
Sharfo, X X , p. 122; Mukhtasqr , I, p. 207; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .329; Dhahab, p .26.
3. Nasab, fo l. 190b; Jamharat, p .233; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p .329 (citing WaqidT).
4 . Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, pp. 319-20; M a ‘ arif, p .99; Imama, II,
p p .20 ,23 ; Ansab, V , pp. 194-5 (citing Mada> inT), 281 (citing ‘ Awana), 
360-1 (citing WaqidT), 361-3 (citing WaqidT and Ibn al-KalbT), 373;
X I,  pp.44 -6  (citing WaqidT), 46 -7  (citing WaqidT and Ibn al-KalbT),
49 (citing Ibn al-KalbT); DTnawarT, p .314; Y a ‘ qubT, II, p .319;
M a ‘ad, fols. 46b, 76b; ‘ Iqd, I I ,  pp. 96-7 (citing al-Zubair ibn 
BaklaiJr), 98; IV , pp. 17 6 ^ TM urJj, V , pp. 174-5; Bad’ , V I ,  
pp. 25, 26; Agh^., I, p. 9 (citing"‘ Umar ibn Shabba); IV , p. 138 
(citing al-Zubair ibn Bakkar); X , pp. 165-6; JalTs, fo l. 160a (citing 
Mad a’ inT); Lata’ i f , p. 140; N ihaya, I, pp .78 , 295-6; III, p. 265;
Tadhkira, I, fols. 130a, 139b; Kamil, IV , p p .286, 414; M ir ’ at, V I ,  
fo l.4b ; Sharh, X X , p p .103, 145 (citing M ada’ inT); Fakhrt, p .110; 
Mukhtasar, I, p .204; Bidaya, V I I I ,  p. 137; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .68; Khizana,
III,  pp .237-8; IV , pp .45 -6 ; A l-Fadil fi'l-FunO n, fo l. 103b-104a 
(citing aI-Sha‘ b7).
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with all provisions by the caliph, they enjoyed far better conditions than
the troops of Ibn a l-Zubair, so that many began to desert Ibn a l-Zubair,
especially when a l-H a jja j issued a free pardon for all who joined him. It
is said that ten thousand of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir‘s followers, including two of
-  1his sons, defected to a l-H a jja j.
Ibn al-Zubair went into the battle-fie ld  with greatly depleted forces; 
among his loyal supporters was his youngest son. On the 17th Jumada, J
7 3 /1 8th September 692, Ibn al-Zubair was slain after showing considerable
2 „  „  
bravery. Other reports give the date as the month of Jumada II, while
al-Bustt alone gives the year 7 2 /6 9 1 .^
At the death of Ibn a l-Zubair and the submission of a l-H ija z , the
unity of the Muslims was restored and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  was recognized as the
sole caliph. It is for this reason that the year 73/692 was called ,(the year
1 • Ansab, V ,  pp. 194, 364, 376-7; X I,  pp.45, 51; Tab., I I ,  p ,845;
KafT, II, fo l.53b; Muruj, V ,  p .262; ‘ Asakir, V I I ,  p .415; Kamil,
IV , pp.286°7; Shar'bT X X , p p .144 (citing Mas‘ ud7), 118 (quoting 
Tabari); Dhahabi, III, pp. 114-15 (citing WaqidT); Bidaya, V I I I ,  pp .330, 
341. ~
2. Sa‘ d, V , p p .169-70 (citing WaqidT); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh.-, I,
p .343; Idem, Tabaqat, p .31; Mughtalin, p .25; M a ‘ arif, p. 156; Imama, 
II, p. 25; Ansab, V ,  p. 368 (citing Waqidi); O u d a t, I, p. 142; Tab ., II, 
pp. 844 (citing WaqidT), 849 (citing Waqidi); JanbTh, pp. 313-14;
‘ Asakir, V I I ,  pp .341-2; Inafa, I, p. 130; Dhahab, p .25; Is aba, I I ,  
p .759; Tahdhib, V , p .312; Suyuti, p. 142; Shadharat, I, p .80.
Ansab, X I ,  p. 25 (citing W aqidi); Dinawari, p .321; T a b ., II, p .851 
(citing W aqidi); Mturuj, V , p .209; KindT, I, p .51; Kamil, IV , pp .289-90 
Usd, IN, p. 164;3Harfr, X X , p. 104; Mukhtagar, I, p. 207; Dhahabi, Ml, 
p .75; ‘ Ibar, 111, p .89; Suyuti, p. 142s
4. Mashahir, p .30. However, Ibn A ‘ tham gives it as lOth^Jumada 1, 73,
while another account in Mas‘ udi" gives the 14th Jumada 1, 73. Kufi,
II, fo l. 55a; M uruj, V ,  p .266.
What was the nature of the support which Ibn al-Zubair had received
for his movement? To some, he was a champion who would restore the political
. " 2  supremacy of a l-H ija z , lost since the murder of ‘ Uthman. To others, ibn
a l-Zubair was the focus of opposition to the Umayyads after the murder of al -
3
Husain ibn *AH ibn Abi Talib, which left no active ‘ A lid claimant. Ibn 
•  •
al-Zubair was aware of the possibilities in this source of support, as shown in
-  4his encouragement to al-Husain to leave a i-H ija z  for Kufa; he did not lay
claim to the caliphate before the death of al-Husain. This tragic death, he
«
tried to exploit for his own ends, by exposing the harsh treatment that the
5Umayyads had dealt to the family of the Prophet. S im ilarly, Ibn al-Zubair 
laid great stress on the religious aspect of his caliphate. He tried to imitate 
‘ Umar I, in carrying the Durra as the emblem of his caliphate, and claimed
1. * Iqd, V , p. 35; Agh. , X I ,  p. 143 (citing Ibn a l-*  Arabi).
2. H e ll, Arabic C iv ilization , p .52, London, 1926; Wellhausen, The
Arab Kingdom and its Fall, pp. 199-200.
3. See Chapter I I,  p. J j
4. Mabasin, pp. 152-3 (citing al-Sha<bi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh.
I, p p .223-4; Akhbar, fols. 47b-48a (citing al-Sha^Et); Tab., I I ,
pp. 232-3 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I, fols. 192a-193b, 207a- 
207b, 234a; Sharfr, X X , *p7134; Bidaya, V I I I ,  pp. 189 (citing AbO 
M ikhnaf), 190.
5. Akhbar, fo l. 47b; Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 16-17, fo l.262a; Kufi, I I ,  fo l. 
11a.
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that he had been appointed by ‘ Uthman as his successor in the defence of 
-  1the Dar, although there were many other Quraishites and companions of
the Prophet better qualified for this task. He also made capital out of the
Holy city by using it as the headquarters of his movement; he called
2
himself "A l-*A idh  11 (the one who takes refuge in the Ka*ba). He was 
helped in portraying himself in a religious way by the fact of his relation-
3ship with the Prophet on both his father's and his mother’s side, and by the 
belief of the people of H ijaz that the sons of the old companions of the
4Prophet were the most eligible for the caliphate.
There were also economic reasons for the support received by Ibn 
a l-Zu bair. The fiscal reforms introduced by M u*awiya I made the provinces
1. A l-J ah iz , al-Uthmaniyya, p .223; Ansab, V , 74 , 189-90 (citing 
Madd* inT); * Iqd, IV , p .418; ‘ Asakir, V I I ,  p. 402; M ir* a t, V I ,  fol. 4b; 
Sharh, I I,  p. 166; Bidaya, V I I /  167.
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh , I, p .224; Tab ., I I ,  p .222; Muruj, V ,
p .165; K am il, IV , p .13.
3. ZubairT, pp .237-9; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tabaqat, I ,  p .31; J a b iz , 
al-IJthmaniyya, p. 224; Nasab, fols. 24 a-24 b ; Mash ah i r , p. 30; Lata* I f , 
p. 12; Akhbar Isbahan , I, pp.46 -7 ; * Asakir, V I I ,  p p .396-7; Usd,
II I ,  pp. 161-2; M ir>at , V I ,  fo ls.4a-4b; Dhahafi , I I I ,  p. 167f f . ;  jsaba,
II, p .7 5 ff .; TahdhTbT V , p. 213; Suyuti, pp. 141 -2 ; E. I. , (‘ Abdallah ibn 
a l-Zu bair).
4 . Duri,Muggddiimq fi Tarikh Sadr al-Islam , p. 64, Beirut, 1961.
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contribute to the expenses of the State. They also laid down the
principle that pensions were in return for military service, particularly
for the government. This had deprived a considerable number in H ijaz
of their pay as heirs of the first recipients of pensions,  ^ leading many
of them to look bitterly on the Umayyads. Moreover, the Umayyads,
through their ownership of large estates in MedTna, controlled the
market in wheat there, which brought upon them the hostility of the
people caused by their economic grievances at the high price of essential
. 2food stuffs in M edina, as compared to Syria and the rest of the Empire.
A ll these discontents in Medina found a means of expression in the 
opposition movement of Ibn a l-Zubair.
ibn a l-Zubair himself had been ambitious for the caliphate from 
quite an early date. He was pushed forward towards this aim by the sudden 
death of Yazid and the very short reign of his son M u ‘ awiya II. But in 
other ways Ibn al-Zubair showed himself less able as a politician than his 
riva l, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . A cause such as his needed active propaganda 
work and a generous distribution of money to rally the people round him and 
to propagate his claims through the tongues of the poets; however, he was a 
man very reluctant to part with his money, even when it would pay back
^  Ful'ub / P*45S; Larmnens, Le Califat de Y a z id ler, pp .804-13;
Beirut, 1921; E. I. , (al-Harra).
2. Imama, I, p. 169 (citing ‘ Abdallah ibn Ja‘ far); Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  pp .267-
8. These estates are said to have yielded at the time of M u‘ awiya I,
150,000 Wusq of dates and 50,000 Wusq of wheat annually. A ! - ‘ A li,
Muslim Estates in H ija z  in the First Century of H ijra , p. 251, JESHC,
II, 1969.
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large dividends in terms of support, while *Abd a l-M a lik  opened his hands 
to embrace everyone who came to him, showing generosity and forgiveness.
Another reason for the failure of Ibn a l-Zubair was that be 
shut himself up in Mecca. Countering the religious support that this brought 
him, were the shortcomings of the area as a headquarters; economically, it 
was a poor district, relying on other provinces for its support, and the 
population of a l-H ija z  were not politically active, prefering a life 
of pleasure (or in other cases piety) to that of fighting causes. Ibn al-Zubair 
neglected to make full use cf the support he received in other, more favourable 
areas. For example, he left Mus*ab In Iraq to his own resources, which
were quickly exhausted by the fighting against the Kharijites and the
•?  1 2 Shi*a. Welfhausen considers that Ibn al-Zubair lost a golden opportunity
when he refused the offer of a I-Husain ibn iMumair that he would secure
« •
the bai*a for Ibn a l-Zubair in Syria, if he would go there. However, what 
reason had Ibn a l-Zubair to trust this offer of a past enemy who had often 
fought against him? Even had he trusted Ibn Numair, his chances of a good 
reception in Syria were not high, as it was the centre of the Umayyads and 
their supporters. He committed a graver political fault when he failed to 
ally the opposition in Iraq to himself, so that the energy of his supporters was
1. See p. J  S ^ f  '
2. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .200.
exhausted by fighting the Kharijites and the Shi* a there, never leaving 
him free to face the Umayyads. The support of the Shi* a was lost by his 
strong an ti-*A lid  feelings, which dated from his early life; this also
|
aroused opposition to him in his own ranks, among his close supporters. 
The failure of Ibn al-Zubair's movement owes a great deal to its leader's 
meanness, and his lack of political ab ility to make the best use of his 
chances.
1- Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .204 (citing Abu *Ubaida);
Akhbdr, fols. 47a -  49b (citing Abu Mikhnaf and al«Sha*b7),
51b-52a (citing Abcj M ikhnaf); Jahiz, M in Fusul al-JdiTig, fo l. 4b-5a; 
Imdma, I I ,  pp .47, 55 -6 , 61, 64, 67, 68; Ansab, IV , n , p,28 (citing 
al-Haytham ); V , p .372 (citing al-ZuhrT); X I,  pp .65-6  (citing al-Zuhri) 
fols. 173a-174b, 178a (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 180a; Kuff, I, fols. 30a, 31 
31b, 32b, 36b; JalTs, fols. 36a-36b; * Iqd, IV , pp*313-14; V ,
pp. 184 (citing *Umar ibn Shabba), 184-5 (citing * Umar ibn Shabba),
187-88; Agh., X I I I ,  p .168; X V I, p .131 (citing Madd’ inT); Khulafa*,
I I, fols. 201a~2Qlb; Ijily a , 1, p .91; *Asakir, V I I ,  pp .201 -2 ; Sharb /
I, p p .22 -3 , 233-4; II, pp. 169-70 (citing al-Zubair ibn BakkarJTvTl, 
pp.38, 230-1; X IX , p p .91-2 (quoting I.sbahanT); X X , p p .128-30, 134, 
138 (quoting Mas*udT).
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CHAPTER V 
OTHER OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS
The Revolt of ‘ Abdallah ibn ai-Jarud
In the year 73 /694 , a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi was trans-
1ferred from the governorship of al—H ijaz to a l-lraq , The famous
inauguration speech in which he proclaimed his policies,showed the
2
Iraqis from the very start that the time of leniency was over. A l-  
Hajjaj 's first and most urgent task in Iraq was the restoration of discipline 
among the troops of Basra and Kufa, who, on the death of Bishr ibn Mar wan, 
the previous governor, had deserted the camp of a l-M uhailab ibn Abi Sufra 
in Ramhurmuz and were wandering in the towns. A I-M uhallab was garrisoned 
at Ramhuruz to fight the Kharijites who were threatening Basra, AI-Hajjcij 
made an announcement that all deserters should return to camp within three
3days, or else they would be killed and their property laid open to plunder;
1. See Chapter I I I ,  p. Z-1 &  ‘
2. Jumahi, p ,1 4 6 ;B a y a n , II, pp. 164-5; A l-Zubair ibn Bakkar, Akhbar
ai-M uw afagiyyat f i'l-S iy a r , fo l .4 7 f f . ; Imama, II, pp. 25-6  (citing
At>u M a ‘ shar); Ansab, X I,  pp .266 -7  (citing Abu Mikhnaf and cAwana), 
269-70 (citing MadcP ini); 270-3 , 274 (citing M a d ^  inf); Y a ‘ qubT, II ,  
pp .326-7 ; Mubarrad, I, pp .380-1; I I I ,  p .366; Tab ., I I ,  pp .863-6 , 
869-70, 870-2 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); * Iqd, IV , p. 12 4 ;\ A_ ,
V , pp .292-302; J a ils , fol*18a (citing ai-STJa^Bl); ‘ Asakir, IV , pp .52-3  
Tadhkira, I, fo l.69a; Kamil, IV , pp .303-8; Sharb, IV , pp. 181-4; X I,  
p .45 , NuwairT, V I I ,  p .244; Bidaya, IX , pp .7 -8 ; * Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 93-4.
3. Bayan, I I ,  p. 165; A l-Zubair ibn Bakkar, Akhbar al-Muwafaqiyyat
fi'l-S iy a r, fo l.50 ; AnscTb, X I,  pp .270 (citing M ada7inf), 274 (citing =
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and he kept his word. The soldiers streamed back to their camp and a l-
Hajjaj h imself supervised the distribution of their pay and accompanied
them as far as Rustuqobad.  ^ It was at this time, Sha‘ ban 75 A . H . , that a l-
Hajjaj was faced with a very dangerous revolt led by ‘ Abdallah ibn al~
Jarud, the Sayyid of ‘ Abd a l-G ais .
Thanks to Baladhuri we know much about this revolt. Unfortunately,
the account of Abu Mikhnaf in Tabari is'flo more than a brief notice, which
adds nothing to the account of Baladhuri. Late sources, such as Ibn a l-
Athir, Ibn al-Jaw zi and Ibn Khaldun, as usual do but repeat the early
sources, in this case the narrative of Baladhuri.
The revolt led by Ibn al-Jarud started as a dispute over pay. During
the governorship of M us‘ ab ibn al-Zubair in Basra, the Basrans not only
received their pay (‘ At a5) twice a year, but also were awarded an increase
2in pay of one hundred dirhams each. In one of his speeches to the Basrans,
-  Abu Mikhnaf), p p .275-6; Mubarrad, I, pp .363-6 , 382; Tab., II,
pp .865-6 , 868-71 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); Kufi, I I ,  fols. 67a - 
68a; Ghurar, fols. 12-15; Muruj, V ,p . 297; Tadhkira, I, fo l.69a;
Kamil, IV , pp .297-8; Sharh, IV , pp. 180-2; Bidaya, IX , p p .3 ,8 ;
‘ ibar, I I I ,  p p .90 -4 , 320ff.
1. Ansab, X I,  p .277; Mubarrad, I, p .383; I I I ,  pp .366-7; Tab,, II, p .866
^citing 'Umar Ibn Shabba); Muruj, V , pp .298-302; KamiI, IV , pp .305-6;
Sharh, IV , p . l 8 2 ; ‘ lbar, I I I ,  p .94.
2. Ansab, V ,  pp .271 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir), 280; X I ,  p .280; Ja b ,, II,
p .874 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Azmina , I I ,  p .134 (citing 1bn a M A ra b t);  
‘ Asakir, V I I ,  fo l.271a; M u‘ jam , II, p .834; Kamil, IV ,p .309; M ir*o t,
V I ,  fo l. 15b; Dhahabi, li 1 / p.TT9 (citing T a barf); ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p*95.
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a!-H a jja j declared that this increase of pay was illegal and that he would
permit it no longer. He gave as reason the fact that it had been granted
1them by Mus‘ ab, who was an enemy of the caliph. Probably the real
reason was the need to economise in order to meet the cost of the war against
the Kharijites, although he also found it an occasion, to demonstrate his loyalty
to the caliph against all enemies.
In protest against this declaration, ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Jarud said that
the increase had been approved by the caliph ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  himself during
the governorship of his brother Blshr in Iraq. But a l-H a jja j, seeing this reply
as a challenge to his authority, threatened Ibn al-Jarud with death if he
dared to speak again in such a matter. The latter made it clear that he was
expressing not only his own personal view, but that of all the people
concerned. Realizing the truth of this, al-Hajjaj tactfully restrained
from mentioning the matter of pay for a while, in order to give himself
time to establish himself firmly in the town. However, he did not intend to
give up the matter altogether, and only a few months later, he mentioned the
reduction again, to be met with the same reply from Ibn al-Jarud, supported
2by the Ashraf of the city.
1. Ansab, X I ,  p. 280; T a b ., 11, p. 874 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); M u ‘ jam, II, 
p .834; Kamil, IV , p .309 - M ir*a t, V I,  fo l, 15b; DhahabT, III, p. 119 
(quoting Tabari); ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p. 95.
2. Ansab, X I ,  pp. 280-1; T a b ., I I ,  p. 874 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); M u‘ jam,
I I ,  p .834; Kamil, IV , pp ,309-310; M ir* at, V I ,  fol. 15b; DhahabT, III ,
119 (quoting Tabari); * Ibar, I I I ,  p .95,
•  1   '  “
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Thus, learning that a l-H a jja j had no intention of dropping his
plan to reduce their pay, all the tribal chiefs and the most influential
men (Wujuh) of Basra made Ibn al-Jarud their leader. They paid homage
to him, pledging to support him in driving a l-H a jja j out of the country;
they would then write to * Abd a l-M a lik  asking him to appoint a new
governor. If he refused, they would denounce him, although they did
not expect him to refuse their request, since the Kharijites still formed a
' 1constant threat to the authority of the Umayyads in Iraq. Most
enthusiastic among the Wujuh of Basra were the two Tamimites, al-Hudhail
_  _  — — — 2 
ibn ‘ Imran al-Burjumi and f Abdallah ibn Hakim ai-M ujashi* i .
From this bai‘ a and plan of action, many of the characteristics of 
the revolt began to emerge: the in itia l grievance over the threat to their 
pay acted as a focus for the Iraqi resentment of all the repressive measures 
initiated by a l-H a jja j since his appointment. This protest against the over­
activeness of a l-H a jja j bore elements of Iraqi dislike of Syrian domination. 
One can also see traces of current social tensions in this revolt, for 
example, the ‘ A.sabiyya: the Rabi‘ a and their allies a l-A zd  did not like 
to submit to the Mudarites represented by a l-H a jja j, while the Tamimites
1. Ansab, X I ,  p .281; Kam il, IV , p. 309; M ir* at, V I ,  fo l. 15b; ‘ Ibar, 
TiTTp”. 95. '
2. Arab, p .378; Kahhala, M u ‘ jam G aba*il a M A ra b , I, p .71; I I I ,  
p. 1038; Caskel, op, c i t . ,  I I ,  p. 111.
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showed reluctance in submitting to the Qaisite sway.^
Hearing of the plans of Ibn al-Jarud and his followers, a l-H a jja j
* *—
took precautionary measures. He separated the Akhmas of Basra from the
Arbaf of Kufa by putting a heavy guard on the roads between them. He
, -  2also put a guard around the treasury (Bayt a l-M a l).
After secret preparaiions, the rebels came into the open (Rabi* 11,76). 
A ll the tribes, our authority says, rallied under the flag of Ibn al-Jarud, 
while a l-H a jja j was supported only by his intimate friends (Khassatihi) and 
his family. By cutting the bridge between the two camps, Ibn al-Jarud was 
able to seize a l-H ajja j's  store of weapons which were stored on the other 
side of the river. However, a l-H a jja j did not surrender, and sent A 9 yun, 
one of his mawali, to Ibn al-Jarud ordering him to come before him, or else 
he would k ill him with his family and all his supporters. But both the
3messenger and his master were humiliated, A ‘ yun being turned away.
Then Ibn al-Jarud and his followers marched against a l-H a jjc j,
*  amm
entered his M Fustat u and plundered his property. Successful in this, 
they decided to put off dealing with a l-H a jja j until the next morning
1. A I"Z ih e ri, NaqaMcj Jarir wal-Farazdaq, p. 178.
2. Ansab, X I,  p .281; Kamil, IV , p .310.
3. Ansab, X I,  pp. 282-3; Futuh , p .281 (citing Mada* inT); Kam il,
IV , p. 310; M ir* at, V I ,  fo l. 15b; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 95 -6 .
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for their intention was not to k ill him, but to expel him from the country.
For this reason, the Yemenites carried off his first w ife , a daughter of
a l-N u ‘ man ibn Bashir al-Ansari, while the Mudarites took with them Um 
■   » •
Salama, his second w ife.
Being left alone, a l-H a jja j became so desperate that he began
to think of fleeing the country to save his life . But to his side began to
drift the more hesitant of the rebels, those who had probably been forced
to join in the rebellion in the first place. Al-Ghadban ibn a l-Q u b a ‘ thari
warned Ibn al-Jarud not to leave a l-H a jja j until morning, pointing out
•
how many had already gone over to his side, and how more might be 
1'expected to do so; this warning was ignored. Thus the rebels lost an
opportunity, which was to cost them their lives.
The jealousy of the clans made it possible for a l-H a jja j to play them
off one against the other. It is said that while ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Jarud, a l-
HudiVaiI ibn ‘ Imran al-Burjumi and ‘ Abdallah ibn Hakim al-M ujashi‘ i were
discussing their affairs in a council, ‘ Abbad ibn al-Husain a l-H abti came
• • . ■
to join them, but they refused to admit him. As a result of this slight, ‘ Abbad 
and one hundred men went over to the side of a l-H a jja j. This so raised the 
latter's morale that he is said to have declared: j,Now I do not care If nobody 
else comes to my side. H ‘ Abbad *s action precipitated other divisions in the
1. Ansab, X I ,  p p .283-4; K am il, IV , p p .310 -11; M ir ja t , V I ,  fo 1.15b; 
‘ Ibar, H i, pp. 96-7.
side of the rebels: it was followed by the desertion of Gutaiba ibn Muslim
al-Bahili and about thirty men from the tribe of A ‘ sur, to join a l-H a jja j
• •
This was a reflection of ‘ Asabiyya, for being a Qaislte like a l-H a jja j,
9 •  mm
Gutaiba could not tolerate the latter being left alone with both his life
and property exposed to danger. The same motive seems to have led both
Sabra ibn ‘ AM a l-K ilab i and 5a ‘ id ibn Aslam ibn Zar‘ a a l-K ilab i lo g o
over to the side of a l-H a jja j. In addition, some of the Azd and Bakr changed
to his side. Thus did a l-H a jja j succeed in playing the tribes against each
1other for his own interest.
Feeling himself again strong enough to fight, a l-H a jja j joined the 
rebels in battle. During the fighting, Ibn al-Jarud fe ll dead from a chance 
arrow. His followers were so discouraged that they could not carry on the 
battle and soon gave way, a fact which gave the victory to a l-H a jja j. The 
latter issued a general pardon (Aman), but which excluded the two chief 
instigators, al-Hudhail ibn ‘ Imran al-Burjumi and ‘ Abdallah ibn Hakim 
al-M ujash i‘ i : both were killed . Their bodies,with that of Ibn al-Jarud, 
were crucified, while their heads were sent to the camp of al-M uhallab In 
Ramhurmuz to discourage the Kharijites, who had banked on this revolt to
1. Ansab, X I ,  pp. 287-8; K am il, IV , pp .311 -12; M ir* at, V I ,  fols. 
15b-16b; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p. 97.
provide them with an opportunity to invade Basra*
Settling the affairs in Rustuqabad, a i-H a jja j returned to Basra
•  w -  9
and wrote to the cafiph informing him of the revolt and the steps he had
taken to suppress it, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  approved of his actions, and praised
his loyalty to him* Thus a l-H a jja j put down the first Iraqi revolt against
• —
himself and the Umayyad rule, and temporarily restored peace and discipline 
in the country.
The Revolts of the Zanj
Having put down the revolt of ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Jarud, a l-H a jja j
• ***
found himself confronted with another menace: the insurrection of the Zanj in
3Ba§ra. They took advantage of the unrest and disorder of the time to ravage 
and devastate the Euphrates area.
Unfortunately, apart from the brief account in Baladhuri, no other 
early source says a word of this revolt. Among the late sources, only Ibn 
a l-A th ir and Ibn Khaldun mention it , only to repeat the narrative of Baladhuri, 
thus adding nothing to our knowledge. What complicates the issue further is
1. Khali fa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh . I, p. 347; Mulpabbar, p .462; M a ‘ arif,
pp. 147-6; Ansab, X I,  pp. 288-9; M a ‘qd fo l. 18b; Nasab, fo l.235b; 
Tab., I I ,  pp .873-4 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Jolts, fo l.44b; Jamharat, 
p. 279; ‘ Asakir, I I I ,  fo l. 180a; Mu ‘ jam , II, p. 834; Kamil, (V, p. 312; 
M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l. 16a; DhahabT, III, p. 119 (quoting TabarT); Bidaya, 
T X 7 ? 1 0 ; ‘ ibar, I I I ,  £797.
2. Ansab, X I,  pp. 293-4.
3. The Zanj were gangs of forced-labourers, mainly drawn from imported
negro slaves from the East coast of Africa (hence their name), but - =
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that Baladhuri does not state clearly the reason for this revolt, nor how
it was organised. He mentions Ahl a !-K a la ’ and others whom he calls
"Bidan‘ "(white people), as joining the revolt but gives no reason why 
*
they should do so. Thus, regretfully, one can only present a very incomplete
account of the revolt.
Thei r first insurrection was during the governorship of Mus‘ ab
ibn al-Zubair in Basra. They mutinied and plundered the crops, but
Mus ‘ ab was too busy to take effective action against them. After Mus ‘ ab's
death, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  appointed Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn Asfd as governor
of Basra. The people complained to the new governor, urging him to put
an end to the devastating activities of the slaves. Khalid raised an army
against them, but before he could reach them, the Zanj dispersed. However,
some of them were seized and sent to the governor, who killed them and
crucified their bodies.  ^ It has been stated that this event was less a rebellion
than a mutiny of gangs consisting of a small number of slaves living the life  
2
of robbers.
Despite the severe punishment inflicted on them by Khalid, the
slaves revolted again during the governorship of a l-H a jja j, utilizing the
confusion that resulted from Ibn al-Jarud's rebellion. However, this time
= including also peasants of the surrounding country. They were
employed, under very poor working conditions, on the land In an  ^
attempt to make the nitrous lands of Shatt a l - ‘ Arab cultivable. E. I. 
(Zandj). According to Jahiz, their tribes were Qunbula, Lanjawiyya, 
Naml and Kilab. Bayan, Til, p .36; Pellat, Le M ilieu  Basrien et la 
Formation de G ah iz , p p .4 l-2 , Paris, 1953.
1. Ansab, X I,  pp .303-4 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ Abd a l-M u*m in);K am il, IV ,  ^
p .314; ‘ Ibar, 111, p .98.
2. Noldeke, Sketches from Eastern History, p. 152, English translation by 
J.S . Black, London, 1892.
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their movement reached a new phase. It was no longer a mutiny of robbers,
but an organised revolt. In addition to the Zanj (black slaves), other
elements rallied themselves under the banner of the leader of the revolt.
«- 1According to Baladhuri, Ahl a l-K a la ’ and other white poeple joined them.
2 -
By Ahl a l-K a la ’ he meant the Z u tt, whom Mada* ini describes as those
• *
3 -  -
who were in the Tufuf area following the Kala’ , Some Persian mawali
possibly joined the revolt. The leader of the revolt, a man called Riyah,
-  4was given the title  of Shir Z an ji, a Persian name which means "the lion of 
the Zanj". Unfortunately we know nothing of the social or political aims of 
the Zan j, beyond the safe assumption that they sought to improve their con­
ditions, and doubless sought freedom; our ignorance of the details of the 
revolt is the more frustrating since we do know that for a short period its 
success was not inconsiderable.
Riyah Shir Zanji made his authority fe lt all over the Euphrates 
region and Ubulld> a fact which led Kirraz ibn M a lik  al-Sulam i, the governor 
of a l-H ajja j in the region, to flee. Riyah went so far as to call himself the
1. Ansab, X i,  p .305.
2. People of Indian origin, mainly from the Sind area, who were wandering
around the Persian G ulf. Futub, pp .373 (citing M ada’ in i), 375 (citing 
‘ Awana), 377; A l-A li ,  al-Tangimat q i-ljtim a* iyya wal Iqti\sadiyya fil Ba§ra 
fjI Oarn- al -Awwal a l-H ijrF,p. 7T; ibn MangOr, LisSn a l - ‘ Arab, V I I ,  p. 308; 
A l-Zubaid f, Taj a l - ‘ Arus, V , p. 146.
3. Futuh, p. 373.
4 , Ansab, X I,  pp .304, 305.
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"Commander of the Faithful" (AmTr a l-M u ?rnmin),  ^ an indication of
his power, or perhaps of his ambitions.
Having suppressed the revolt of Ibn al-Jarud, a l-H a jja j sent an
army against Shir Zanji and his supporters, under the command of Hafs
ibn Ziyad ibn ‘ Amr a i - ‘Atki , whose father Ziyad was the police officer of
. 2a l-H a jja j. But this army was routed, and its leader Hafs k illed . Thus 
•  — •  •
was Shir Zanji able to defy the government's forces.
The news of this defeat incensed a l-H a jja j and he threatened the
Basrans with a very severe punishment if they would not put an end to the
insurrection of their slaves and sweepers (Kassahin). Therefore, men from
every khums of Basra were recruited to re-inforce the regular M uqatila.
Both were under the command of the defeated governor of Ubulla, Kirraz
ibn M a lik  al-Sulam i. After a severe struggle, the Zanj were forced to
retreat to the desert of Dawraq. There a decisive battle took place in
which the Zanj and their leader were massacred after putting up a brave
-  3
fight, as indicated by the verses preserved in Baladhuri. This revolt of the 
Zanj which a l-H a jja j succeeded in repressing, seems to have left no mark 
on the Islamic society of the time. However, it is almost certain that it laid 
the seed for the later revolt of the slaves in Basra in 255/868, which lasted
1. Ansab, XIJ? p .305 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ Abd a !-M u ’ min)»
2. Ansab, X I,  pp .304-5 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ Abd a l-M u Jmin); Kamil, IV , 
p. 315; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p. 98.
3 . Ansab, X I ,  pp .305-7 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ abd q l-M u ?roin); Kamil, IV , 
p .3 1 5 ; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .98.
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for fourteen years and gave a severe shock to the whole fabric of the 
‘ Abbasid empire.
The insurrection of the Azd in ‘ Uman
A l-H a jja j had to suppress another insurrection in ‘ Uman on the 
G ulf coast of Arabia, led by the two Adzite brothers, Sa‘ id and Sulaiman 
the sons of ‘ Abbad ibn al-Julanda ibn al-Mustaqir. The ‘ Umanis felt 
their independent position in the Muslim empire to be threatened by the 
energetic policies of a l-H a jja j, directed towards making the caliph's 
authority effective throughout the Empire. The civil war between ‘ Abd a l-  
M a lik  and ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Zubair, together with the remoteness of ‘ Uman 
from the central government, encouraged them to seize this opportunity of
re-asserting the independence they had maintained since the time of the
1 "
Prophet. Only by successive m ilitary campaigns was a l-H a jja j able to
restore order there.
The imperial historical tradition does not usually concern itself
with minor events in the outlying provinces, and this revolt is dealt
with only summarily by the Arabic sources. O f the early sources, only
1. M iles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian G u lf, p .34, 
London, 1966.
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Khalifa ibn Khayyat,^ mentions it , briefly. The account of Ibn
2
‘ Asakir, of the later sources, is not only brief and confused, but is
also unreliable, since he tells it more as a fable than as history. However,
we are fu lly informed of the event by the eighteenth-century chronicler,
‘ Umani Sirhan ibn Sa‘ id a l-A zkaw i, in his annals entitled Kashf al-Ghumma,
probably based on oral tradition.
No date has been given for the earliest , unsuccessful, campaigns
that a l-H a jja j sent against Sa‘ id and Sulaiman . However, one can conclude
-  4
from the account of Ibn ‘ Asakir that it was before the revolt of ‘ Abd al-Rahman»
ibn al-Ash‘ ath. ‘ Uman was not only an outlying province but also a 
mountainous region difficult of access; its western borders were the desert 
(the empty quarter) which could be used as an escape route in times of 
emergency. This inaccessibility doubtless accounts for the failure of a l-  
Hajjaj ‘s in itia l campaigns. Not before the rebellion of Ibn a l -
1. Tarikh, I, p. 319.
2. ‘ Asakir, IV , pp. 167-B.
3. MS. in the B,M . No. Or.B076. A part of this work has been
translated into English by E. C. Ross, Calcutta, 1874. The same 
part has been edited by Hedwig Keiin, Hamburg, 1938. The 
Kashf al-Ghumma was also copied, for the most part litera lly , by
another local historian called SalTI ibn Roziq in his work "History of
the ImGtns and Seyyids of ‘ Uman1*, translated and edited by G . Badger, 
printed for the Hakluyt Society, M O CCLXXI.
4 . ‘ Asakir, V I ,  p. 168.
Ash‘gth had been crushed did a l-H a jja j have a free hand to deal with * Uman 
Then he despatched a large army under the command of al-Qasim  ibn Sha‘ wa 
al-M uzant, by sea to ‘ Uman; but the Azdite cavalry, led by Sa‘ id and Sulaiman, 
routed this army and killed its leader al-Qasirn. ^
When this alarming news reached a l-H a jja j, he was incensed and 
eager for revenge. He kept the Azdite chiefs in Basra under close observation 
to prevent them aiding the rebels, and raised an army of 40 ,000  from the 
Nizarites alone. The command of this army was given to M u ja ‘ a ibn 
Sha‘ wa a l-M u zan i, a brother of al-Q asim , killed in the last campaign. Half 
of this army took the land route, while the other half was sent by sea.
Sulaiman and his Azdite cavalry were able to defeat the land division, who 
reached ‘ Uman earlier. M eanwhile, M u ja ‘ a and the sea army marched on 
Sa ‘ id after being informed that he had been left with a small body while his 
brother, with the rest of their supporters, was fighting the army that had come 
by land. Realizing that with such a small number of men he could not w ith­
stand the large army of M u ja ‘ a , Sa‘ id retreated by night and took refuge in
2the mountains; but he was pursued and besieged.
1. A zkaw i, fo l.326b; English translation, p. 10; K lein ,op* c it . ,  pp. 11-12; 
Saiil ibn Raziq, op. c it . ,  pp. 1-2; M iles, op. c it . , p .50.
2. Azkaw i, fo l. 327a; English translation, pp. 10-11; K lein, op. c it . ,  
pp. 12-14; SalTI ibn Raziq, op. c i t . , p p .2 -4 ; M iles, op. c i t . , p .52.
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When he heard of this, SuicnmGn came back to meet M u ja ‘ a in
battle, to release his brother. Csfore this, he had set fire to fifty of
M u ja ‘ a's ships, while the rest of the fleet managed to escape to sea.
Finding himself unable to cope with Sulaiman, M u ja‘ a managed to escape
with his followers to a piece called Jalfar, from where he wrote to a l-H a jja j
asking for re~inforcements. The latter sent him five thousand Syrians under
‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sulaiman. Perhaps owing to a decrease in their local 
■
support, Sa‘ id and Sulaiman perceived that they could resist no longer, 
especially when they heard of these new re-inforcements. They fled with their 
families and property to the land of the Zanj (East African Coast),^ where 
they remained to their deaths.
Following their flight, M u ja ‘ a and ‘ Abd al-Rahman entered ‘ Uman 
where they punished the inhabitants for their support of the rebels. Then a l -  
Hajjaj appointed al-Khayar ibn Sabra al-MujashH i, governor of ‘ Uman, who 
remained there until the death of a l-H a jja j, to face no more trouble from the 
Azd.
The Revolt of ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ash‘ ath
Far more dangerous than any of the other revolts was the revolt of ‘ Abd 
al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ash‘ ath , which shook the very foundations of 
the Umayyad rule.
] .  Azkawi, fois. 327a-327b; English translation, p .11; K lein, op. c it . ,
p -1-4; SaliI ibn Raziq, op. c it* , p p .4 -5 ; E. I , ( A z d ) ;  M iles, op. c i t . ,  
p. 53*
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In the year 78 /697 , after the recovery of Iraq from the Kharijite
«  -  ] 
threat, Khurasan and Sistan were added to the governorship of a l-H a jja j.
He appointed to govern Khurasan, al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra, while to
Sistan he sent ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Abi Bakra al-Thaqafi, At that time, the
first task of a governor of an outlying province was the "G hazu11, to subject
the bordering lands. The undertaking of the "Ghazu11 both provided extra
revenue for the central government, and was an opportunity to train and
discipline the troops. For these reasons, ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Abi Bakra
undertook a campaign in 79/698 against the King of Kabul and Zabul, the
„ 2 -  
Zunbil who had been refusing to pay tribute to a l-H a jja j. With the troops
*
of Basra under his command, and Shuraih ibn Hani* a l-H arith i at the head of 
the Kufan troops, Ibn Abi Bakra advanced against the Zunbil. The latter 
enticed him far into the country, drawing him into the difficult passes of 
Kabulstan and then cut him off in the rear. It was only by paying the Zunbil 
500,000 or 700,000 dirhams, by leaving some of his followers, including 
three of his sons, as hostages, and by promising not to invade his territory as
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh , I, p .297; Ansab, X I ,  p .311 (citing 
afcHaytham); Bui dan, p. 81; T ab ., I I ,  p. 1033_ (citing Abu Mikhnaf); 
‘ Asakir, I I I ,  p. 129; Kamil, IV , p .362; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo .29a; Bidoya,
IX , p .2 1 ;M b a r, I I I ,  p .103.
2
2. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p p .231 -2 ; E. I. , (Ibn 
al-Ash‘ ath); Bosworth/S istdn under the Arabs from the Islamic Conquests 
to the Rise of the § a ffa ^ s , pp. 34 -6 , Rome, 1968^ Mas‘ crcST, incorrectly, 
however, makes him one of the Indian Kings. M uru j, V , p .302.
long as he was governor, that Ibn Abi Bakra was able to retreat, ShGraifr
did not approve of this settlement, finding it humiliating to offer such
terms to the enemy. He wanned Ibn Abi Bakra that any sum he paid to the
Zunbil would be deducted by a l-H a jja j from the ‘ A ta* of the troops. A
group of the army under Shuraih then took the field against the Zunbil only
1to suffer heavy losses in lives and Shuraih himself was k illed . ‘ Ubaidallah,
however, had made peace with the Zunbil after explaining the resistance of
Shuraih as disobedience to his orders. The news of the heavy losses and
humiliating defeat infuriated a l-H a jja j, who wrote to the caliph asking
2his permission to take vengeance on the Zunbil for the Muslims,
Receiving the permission of the caliph for his plan, a l-H a jja j
•
raised an army from Basra and Kufa,so numerous and magnificently equipped
-  -  3that it was called the “Peacock army1*, (Jaysh al-Tawawis). The command
of this army was given by a l-H a jja j to ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn
.  ~  » •
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tdrikh./ 1/ p. 275; Futuh, p. 399; Ansab, pp .311-7  
(citing MadaHnT); Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1036-38 (citing Abu MiCKnaf); Kami l ,
IV , pp .363-4; M ir * a t , V I ,  fols, 31a-31b (citing MadcftnTJ; DhahabT,
III, p. 126 (quoting KhalTfa); concerning these heavy losses see also the 
Diwan of A ‘ sha. Hamdan,pp.317-8 .
2. Ansab, X I ,  p .318 (citing Abu Mikhnaf and ‘ Awana); T ab ., I I ,  pp. 1038
(citing Abu M ikhnaf), 1042-3 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , pp.364,
365. “  ~
3. Ansab, X I,  p p .319-20 (citing Abu Mikhnaf and ‘ Awana); Tab., I I ,
p. 1046; TanbTh , p. 314; Kamil, IV , p .367; M ir* at, V I,  fo f.31b.
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aI-Ash‘ ath a l-K in d i, a descendent of the pre-lslamic Kings of Kinda.
Conflicting reports ere to be found in the sources as to where ‘ Abd
al-Rahman sbn al-Ash‘ ath was at the time of his appointment. According 
*  —  _ •
T T  T  -  1to Baladhuri, Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir, Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun, he was sent
_ 2
to Kirman to suppress a mutiny of Himyan ibn ‘ Adi al-Sadusi. Another 
account in Tabari and Ghurar al-Siyar^ suggests that he was in Kufa and 
accompanied the “Peacock army" from there. A third account says that he
-  . 4 . 5was fighting the Kharijites. Finally, there is the account of Ibn A ‘ tham
which says that Ibn al-Ash‘ ath was at the head of the “Peacock army11 when
it left Kufa, and on the march to Sistan, he put down the mutiny of Himyan
*
ib n ‘Adi al-Sadusi in Kirman: this last account seems the most convincing way 
of reconciling the other accounts.^
1. Ansab, X I,  pp. 320-1 (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida); T a b ., I I ,  p. 1046; Kami I , 
IV , pp .366-7; Bidaya, IX , p .32; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p. 105.
2. Himyan ibn ‘ Adi al-Sadusi was originally sent there to help the governor 
of Sistan and of Sind, if necessary.
3. Tab., I I ,  p. 1044; Ghurar, fol. 53.
4. Ansab, X I,  pp .320 (citing Abu Mikhnaf and ‘ Awana), 318.
5. Kufi, I I, fo l. 101a.
6. M me L, Veccia Vaglieri prefers the first account simply ^because
it is a detailed one. This is perhaps because she had no access
to ibn A ‘ tham'o work (ai-Futub)» E. I . (Ibn al-Ash‘ ath).
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Cur mam source is Tabari, who follows almost exclusively the
narrative of Abu M ikhn af, taken from his two books, Kitab Pair ql-Jamajim
and KhaH <Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Ash‘ ath and Kitab Hadith ya Himyara wa
M a q ta l’ ibn al-A sM ath.^ Abu Mikhnaf was a Kufite who died in 157 A. H. ,
and thus was very nearly a contemporary of the revolt. The next of our
sources is Baladhuri, who mainly reports the narrative of Mada* in i, which is
as detailed as that of Abu Mikhnaf, but which suffers from some gaps. However,
Ibn A*tham follows a quite different account which lacks both chronology and
consistency, but which agrees almost entirely with the narrative of Ghurar
al-S iyar in its main outline. Dinawari, however, as shown by M me L. Veccia  
2
Vagfieri, portrays the revolt as being the result of a religious dispute started 
by propaganda from Ibn al-Ash*ath, declaring al-H ajja j to be impious; 
this so stirred the religious men that they started the revolt, Apart from Ibn 
Kathir, the late sources add no new information; they re-edit the narratives 
of the early sources. As for Ibn Kathir, he is the only one among our authorities 
to report the narrative of Waqidi which gives fresh information here and 
there. Despite the fact that Waqidi's account confuses the battles of Dair
3al-Jamajim and Maskin with each other, yet is worthy of consideration,
1. Ibn a l-N ad im , Fihrist, p ,93 .
2. op. cit.
2
h / (Dayr al-Djam adjim ).
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There are two varying chronologies of the revolt. One gives the 
year 81 as the beginning of the revolt, the year 82 for the battles of 
Ba§ra, Kufa end Mas kin, and the year 83 for the battles of Sistan and
H I U
Khurasan. The other puts the dates a year later, i .e .  82, 83, 84, 
respectively. Both chronologies are uncertain of the year of Ibn al-Ash* ath's 
death, except that it was either in 84 or 85. Wellhausen^ studied this
2question thoroughly and decided, I think justly, in favour of the first one.
3
In order not to repeat the same argument, as M me Veccia Vaglieri has done,
I shall follow the same chronology as followed by Wellhausen.
In the year 80 /699 , * Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash*o,th and his army 
arrived in Sistan, where he made a speech inviting the muqatila there to join
4his army, which they did. An army from Tabaristan under his brothers a l -  
Qasim and al-Sabbah is also said to have joined him. Hearing of this powerful 
army sent against him, the Zunbil wrote to Ibn a I-Ashf ath apologising for the 
fate of the army of Ibn Abi Bakra, and offering him a plan for a peaceful
1. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, pp .241-2 .
2. The coins struck in Fars in the year 81 A. H. support the chronology
which regards the beginning of the revolt as 81 A, H, W alker, A 
Catalogue of the Arab-Sassanian Coins, pp. IX i i - IX iV ,  117;
BoswomT  ^ op. c i t . ,  p .61. However, another piece of numismatic 
evidence favours the second chronology. M iles, Some New Light on 
the History of Kirman, pp. 96 -8 , W O I, 1959.
3. E . l .^ ,  (Ibn al~Ash*ath).
4* Ansab, X I ,  pp .321 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 322-3 (citing M ada*in i);
Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1044-5 (citing Abu M7I<hnaf); Kamil, IV , p. 366; M ir*at, 
V l,  fo l.31b; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 105.
settlement. Ibn al-A^h* ath paid no heed to this and marched against the 
-  1Zunbil. Hoping thct he could trap him in the same way as he had Ibn 
Abi Bakra, the Zunbil began to entice Ibn al-Asfrath far into the country 
by withdrawing in front of him. But Ibn 01-Ash‘ ath was aware of this 
strategy and was too cautious to be so trapped. He established garrisons 
in every city or fortress he occupied, and assured his lines of communications 
by linking these places by an organised postal service. After mastering a 
considerable part of the country and securing valuable spoils, ibn al-Ashf ath 
returned to Bust, postponing the military operations until the next spring
(81/700). He thought it wiser to let the soldiers get accustomed to the
2 . . . . . .mountainous area and its severe winter. He wrote to a l-H a jja j informing
him of his success and of the strategy he was employing. But a l-H a jja j, 
quick and impatient as he was, wrote to him a series of humiliating and 
arrogant letters ordering him to advance without delay far into the enemy's 
territory and to fight him to the death; if he refused, he would give the 
command to Ibn al-Ash‘ cth's brother, and reduce him to the rank of a simple
1. Ansab, X I ,  pp. 321-2 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 322-3 (citing Mada* ini); 
Tab., N, p . 1045 (citing Abu MikhnaTJ; KufT, II, fo l. 101 b; Kamil, 
iV , p .366; M ir*a t, V i ,  foL31b; Bidaya, IX , p .32; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 105.
2. Ansab, X I?  p .223 (citing M ada*in i); Y a ( qubi, I I ,  p .331; Tab.,M l, 
pp. 1045-6 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kam il, IV , pp. 373-1; M ir7 at, V I ,
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1
soldier to serve beneath him.
Deeply offended by a l-H ajja j's  aggressive letters, which depicted
him as an inefficient coward, Ibn a!-Ash( ath decided to avenge himself.
He ordered a meeting of the chiefs among his followers, during which he
told them of the orders of a i-H a jja j and revealed his intention to defy him.
He pointed out that his own strategy had been approved by all the
experienced men among them, and said that he was more concerned for their
welfare than a I -H a jja j. Finally, he told them, 111 am only one of you: if
you want to march, I shall march; if you refuse, I shall refuse. “ They all
2shouted, "We w ill not obey the enemy of God, a l-H a jja j. n Another
7 . 3version is given by Baladhuri, Ibn A f tham and the author of Ghurar al-S iyar,
who say that Ibn al-Ash‘ ath, before holding the meeting, fabricated a letter
in which he represented a l-H a jja j as ordering him to depose some chiefs of their
posts and k ill ;*others, in an attempt to aggravate their hatred and discontent.
In fact, little  aggravation was needed: the harsh policies of a l-H a jja j at
home, and the prolonged wars in distant lands were enough to lead the
1* Ansab, X I ,  pp .323-4 (citing M ada*in i); Y a tfqubi, I I ,  p .331; Tab.,
I I,  pp. 1052-3 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Tanbih, p .314; Bad*, V I ,
p. 35; Kamil, IV , p .317; M irH ilt, V I ,  fols. 32a, 37a-37b; Dhahabi,
III, p. 128; Bidaya, IX , p .35; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 106; Ferier, V ie d 'a l-  
Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, p. 162, Paris, 1904.
2. Ansab, X I,  pp .324-5 (citing M ada*in i); Tab., II, p p .1053-4 (citing 
Aba M ikhnaf); Kuff, II, fols. 101 b-102a; G hurar, fo l. 53; Kami I , IV, 
p .371; /STir*at, V I ,  fo l.37b; DhahabT, I I I ,  p. 128; Bidaya, IX , p .35;
* Ibar, 111, p. 106.
3. Ansab, X I ,  p .325 (citing Mada’ ini); KufT, I I ,  fo l. 101b; Ghurar, fo l .53.
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Iraqis to give such a reply to Ibn al-Ash4ath. He need do no more than 
remind them of their grievances to get their support. Abu al-Tufail 
4 Amir Ibn W athila al-K inani was the first to announce the deposition,
(Khal4) of a l-H a jja j; and 4 Abd a l-M u ’ min ibn Shbath ibn Rab4 i a l -  
Tamtmi invited the troops to march on Iraq to expel the hated governor.
They swore an oath of allegiance to Ibn al-Ash4ath.  ^ It is highly sig­
nificant that both Abu al-Tufail and 4 Abd a l-M u ?min were not only Kufans,
2but also former sincere adherents of al-M ukhtar. Thus the first men to declare 
publicly the revolt were from Kufa with Shi4ite inclinations.
In order to be free to carry out this scheme, Ibn al-Ash4ath 
made peace with the Zunbil on the following terms: if Ibn al-Ash4ath 
was victorious, he would grant the Zunbil an exemption from paying the 
tribute as long as he was in power; if he were defeated, the Zunbil would
3 Tgive him refuge. It was advantageous for the Zunbil to accept this offer, 
for even in the case of Ibn al-Ash4ath's defeat, this war with a l-H a jja j 
would not only leave the Zunbil unmolested for a w hile, but would also 
weaken a l-H a jja j and the government of a l-lraq . Before marching on Iraq,
Ibn al-Ash4 athr also appointed governors for the important towns of Sistan,
AnsSb, X I, pp .325-6 (citing M ada4 inT); T a b ,, II,p p . 1054-5 (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); K am il, IV, pp .371 -2 ;M ir 'a t ,  V I ,  fo l.37b;PhahabT,ill, 
pp. 128-9; Bidaya, IX , pp. 35 -6  (citing Abu M ikhnaf); 4 Ibar, 111, p .106. 
Professor Bosworth attributes the speech given by 4 Abd a l-M u 7min ibn 
Shabath ibn Rab^ T al-TamTml to Ibn al-Ash4atT}. Perhaps the similarity of 
the two names has caused this confusion. See Sistan under the Arabs 
From the Islamic Conquest to the Rise of the JaffarTds, p .59.
2. Ansab, fol.261.a; Tab ., II, pp.654, 694 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
3, Ansab, X I,  p .327; Futuh, p .400; Y a 4qubi, I I ,  p .332; T a b ., I I ,  p. 1055 ~
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such as Bust and Zaranj. (81/700).
On the march to Iraq, the poet A 4 sha Hamdan was with Ibn ai~
Ash4 ath, reciting verses celebrating the occasion.  ^ These verses are 
important in that they reveal a religious conviction behind the revolt, for 
a l-H a jja j is depicted as of bad faith. Moreover, the verses show clearly 
that both the M a 4adites and the Yemenites (Hamdan, Madhhij and Oabtan)
a llied  themselves against a l-H a jja j and his tribe, Thaqif. This is supported
**• — 2 „ — me
by evidence in al-Farazdaq's Diwan and Baladhuri. M  Veccia Vagliert
in writing, “ Ibn al-Ash4 ath had put himself at the head of the l<ahtanis and
3Hamdanis against the M a 4adis and the Thaqafis1' has misunderstood these
verses of a l-A 4sha. In fact, the revolt of Ibn al-Ash4ath was one of the
rare occasions where we find the Northern and Southern 4 Arabs standing
together against a common foe. It was the first time that the Mudarites found
it not unacceptable to follow a Yemenite leader, and in which their 4Asabiyya
to their country, Iraq, was stronger than their tribal loyalties.
When Ibn al-Ash4ath and his rebel army reached Fars, they realised
that the deposition of a l-H a jja j could not be separated from a revolt against
*Abd a l-M a lik . Consequently, the rebels renounced the latter and paid
(citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .372; M ir *a t , V I ,  fol .37b;
Bidaya , IX , p. 36; 4 Ib a r / II I ,  p. 107.
1. A 4 sha Hamdan, D iwan, p .342; Tab., I I ,  p. 1056; Agh . ,  V , p. 159 
(citing Miubarrad); M ir* at , V I,fo l.3 7 b ; M ukhtasar, I ,  p .208.
2. Farazdaq, DTwan, I, pp. 239-41; Ansab, X I ,  p. 334.
3 . E. I. (Ibn al-Ash4ath). However, Baladhuri reports, on doubtful evidence, 
that a l-H a jja j kfTTed some Yemenite Syrians who joined Ibn a I -Ash4 ath 
under the impetus of4Asabiyya. Ansab, fo l.27b .
homage to Ibn al-Ash4 ath, thus leading the revolt into a new phase. They 
paid homage to ibn al-Ash4ath in accordance with the “ Book of God, the 
Sunna of the Prophet, the deposition of the Imams, of error (A* immat ai 
D<$ialc&), and the Jihad against a l-M u h illin " .  ^ This Bai4a w ill be 
discussed later.
Ibn al-Ash4ath is said to have written to al-M uhallab ibn AbT Sufra
inviting him to join the revolt, but he refused and warned Ibn al-Ash4 ath
2
not to spill the blood of the Muslims. It is also said that al-M uhallab wrote 
to a l-H a jja j advising him not to fight the Iraqis before they reached their 
home, for as soon as they could be with their wives and children again, they 
would lose interest in revolt. A l-H a jja j, however, did not follow this 
advice.^
When the news of the homage paid to Ibn al-Ash4ath reached a l-
H ajjS j, he went to Basra and sent an urgent letter to the caliph asking for
4
Syrian forces; the caliph, equally alarmed by the news, sent him one
1. Ansab, X I ,  p .334; T a b ., II, pp. 1057-8 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Tanbih ,
p .314; M uruj, V , pp .302-3; Kami I, IV , p .373; M ir ’ a t, V I ,  fol .37b;
Bid ay a , IX , p. 36; 4 Ibar, I II ,  p. 107.
2. Ansab, XI, p .329 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir), 335-6 ; Tab ., II, pp. 1058-9;
Kafr, II, fo l. 102a; Mir^at, V I ,  fo l.38a; Bidaya, IX, p .36.
3. Ansab, X I ,  p .336; Jab ., I I ,  p. 1059; KSmil, IV , p .373; M ir ’ at, V I,
fol. 38a; Bidaya, IX ,p .36; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  p. 107.
4 . On this occasion 4 Abd a l-M a lik  is said to have sought the advice of
Khalid ibn Yazid ibn M u4awiya, who told him that he should not worry 
since the threat had come from Sistan and not from Khurasan. Ansab, X I,  
p. 337; T ab ., I I ,  p. 1059; Kamil, IV , p. 373; M ir ’ atT V i ,  fo l.38a; 
Bidaya, IX , p. 36, Professor Bosworth refers to tfiis~account and regards -
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detachment' after the other continually.
it would appear that Ibn al-Ash4ath spent a considerable time in
Fars, for he minted his own dirhams.  ^ The first encounter between his army and
a l-H a jja j took place on the 10th Dhul H ajja , 81/25th January, 701,^  near
Tustar. A l-H a jja j's  forces were defeated, and consequently a l-H a jja j
withdrew to Basra; but finding no support there, he left and established
himself in a l-Z aw iya . During this time, they were hard-pressed by the lack
of provisions, which led a l-H a jja j to confiscate the food supplies of the 
3
merchants. M eanwhile, Ibn al-Ash4 ath entered Basra unchecked, and was
= it as evidence of a "relative decline, at this time, in terms of military
resources and man power, of Sistan as compared with Khurasan."
Sistan Under the Arabs From the Islamic C onquest to the Rise of the 
JaffarTds, p. 61. However, Ibn A 4tham reports this event and says that 
4 Abd al -M a lik  sought Khalid's advice, because the latter was well 
informed of the "days of the people" and the "books of dissention"
( V.C: Ibn A 4 tham also says that
4 Abd a l-M a lik  asked Khalid whether it was the time when "the Black 
Banners ) would appear as a sign of the cessation of
"Cur M u lk". Khalid told him not to worry unless the danger came from the 
"Bottom of M erv". Kufl, II ,  fo l. 104b. Very similar to this is the account 
of the author of Ghurar a l-S iyar, fo l .55. The anticipatory character of 
this account leads us to question its authenticity.
1. W alker, op. c it . , pp. IXii i- lX iV ;  Bosworth, op. c it . , p .61.
2 . Sa4d, V I I , i i ,  p. 177 (citing al-Haytham); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh ,
I, pp .362-3 (citing Mada’ inT); Ansab, X I, p .341 (citing al-Ffaytham ); 
Y a 4qub!, II, p .332; T ab ., I I ,  pp. 1060-1 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kuff, I I , 
fols. 105a; 105b; Ghurar^, fo Is .55-6; TanbTh, pp .314-5; Bad’ , V I ,  p .36; 
Kamil, IV , p .374; M ir ’ a t , V I ,  fo l.38a; DhahabT, I I I ,  pp .226-7; Bidaya, 
IX , pp. 36 -7 ; 4 Ibar, Mi, p. 107. _
Ansab, X I,  pp. 340-1; Kufl, II, fo l. 106a.
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met with a very enthusiastic reception, especially by the Gurra’ 
and elderly men. He dug a trench and set up fortifications. After about 
a month of skirmishes, a battle was joined on 28th Muharram, 82/early  
March 701, in which many G urra’ were killed. Thanks to the perseverence
of a l-H a jja j and the skill of his Syrian leader, Sufyan, Ibn aUAbrad a l-
■r 2Kalbi, he eventually was victorious.
Following this defect in a l-Zaw iya , Ibn al-Ash4ath left Basra and
went to Kufa. With him were his Kufan soldiers, as well as some cavalry
from Basra. In Basra, he left 4Abd al-Rahman Ibn 4Abbas al-Hashimi a l-  
♦  *  •
Gurashi, who continued the struggle only for a short w hile, because the 
majority of the Basrans accepted the Aman of a l-H a jja j and opened the
1. Literally, the readers of the Qur’ an. Their first appearance is
said to have been at the time of Abu Musa al-Ashf ari. They received 
high payments, regardless of their tribe or their participation in the 
early conquests. They also gained the financial support of some wealthy 
men. Thus they held a high status, both religiously and materially.
Their number increased steadily and many Ashraf as well as mawulT 
joined them. They played a distinctive role in the battle of Siffin; 
and ten thousand mawali from among them are said to have joined the 
Kharijites. H jjya, V , p .61; A l - 4 AIT, A l-Tanzim at a l-ljtim a 4 iyya wal 
iqfi^sadiyya fil Basra fil Qarn q l-A w w afaT -H ijrt, pp .44 -6 .
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Ta rikh ., I pp. 364 (citing M ada’ Ini and Abu1!
Yaqdan), 368-70 (citing Abu 4 Ubaida); M a 4arif, p. 156; Ansab, X I,  
pp .341-8; Tab ., II, pp. 1063-66 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kuft, II ,  fols. 
106a-106b; Ghurar, fo ls .56-8; Tanbih, pp .314-5; M u4 jam, II, p .911; 
Kamil, IV , pp .374-5; M ir ’ at, V I,  fols. 38a-40a; S a fa d r /a l-W aft b i1!-
W afayat, X V I, foIs.228b-229a; Bidaya, IX , pp0 37-9; Waqidi* here 
confuses this battle with that of Dair al-Jamajim; 4 Ibar, I I I ,  p. 107.
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way for him through the city. As a result, *Abd al-Rahman with a
1small group of followers left Basra and joined their leader in Kufa.
Ibn al-Ash* ath probably chose Kufa for his next centre because it
was his home c ity , where he could count on the support of his tribe and
friends.
However, on his arrival there, he found himself obliged to drive
out Matar ibn N ajiya  al-Tamimi, who had taken hold of the Qasr (the
government centre) there, after turning out the Syrian garrison left by a l-
H a j j a j *  M atar was an officer of a l-H a jja f in a l-M a d a ’ in, who took
advantage of the troubled situation to seize Kufa. With the help of Hamdan,
2kinsmen of Ibn al-Ash*ath, the latter was able to force Matar to submit.
The Kufans received Ibn al-Ash* ath very warmly, and his army was
re-inforced by many elements who were discontented with the Umayyads.
M eanwhile, a l-H a jja j left Basra to his cousin Ayyub ibn Abi'l-Hakam  ibn . — . .
*Aqil a l-Thaqafi, and made his way through the desert to Kufa. Being 
harrassed on route by *Abd al-Rahman ibn * Abbas al-Hashimi with a
1. Hadhif. p. 23; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .365; Ansab,X I ,
pp .248-9 , 355 le i  ting al-Haytham*); Y a*q u b f, II, p .332; Nasab, 
fol. l l a ; T a b . , II, p. 1066 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I I ,  fo l. 106b; 
Ghurar, fo ls .57-8; TanbTh, p. 315; BakrT, I I ,  p. 373; Kam il, IV ,
p. 375; M ir* a t , V I ,  fo l.40a ; A l-Safadt, op. c it . ,  X V I, fo l. 299a; Bidaya, 
IX , p .4 0 ;* lb a r ,  I I I ,  p. 108.
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarrkh , I, p .365 (citing Mada* ini); Ansab, X I ,
pp .353-5 , 355 (citing al-Haytham ), 356-7 (citing Abu Mikhnaf);
Nasab, fo l. 17a; T a b ,, I I ,  pp. 1069-71 (citing Abu MikhnaTJ; K uff, II, 
fo l. 106b; Jamharat, p. 215; Kamil, IV , p .376; M ir *a t , V I ,  fo l.40a; 
Bidaya, IX , p .40 (citing Waqidt); * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 108.
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detachment of cavalry, a l-H a jja j was forced to pitch his camp in
Dair Qarra; nevertheless, this position facilitated easy communication
with Syria, from where he received constant re-inforcements. Ibn a l -
Ash *ath left Kufa with his enormous army  ^ and made his camp in Dair
al-Jamajim (Rabi* I, 82 /A p ril, 701). Both sides dug trenches and for
2months engaged in indecisive encounters. The more prolonged the war
between a l-H a jja j and Ibn al-Ash* ath, the more the caliph, * Abd a l-M a lik ,
became alarmed. However, on the advice of some Guraishite and Syrian
dignitaries, he decided to negotiate with the rebels in an attempt to find a
peaceful settlement. He therefore sent another Syrian army under the
command of his brother Muhammad and his son * Abdallah, charging them to
propose terms to the Iraqis if they would submit. If they refused, the
army and its two leaders were to join a l-H a jja j, and be under his command.
These were the terms to be offered to the Iraqis: a l-H a jja j was to be removed
from Iraq, their pay (*Atc7) was to be raised to be euqal to that of the Syrians,
and Ibn al-Ash*ath was offered the governorship of any town in Iraq he wished
for life . A l-H a jja j tried to dissuade the caliph from offering such terms but
1 • His army is said to have numbered 200,000 m en,half of them on the
regular pay roll , while the other half were mawafi. Tab ., II, p. 1072 
(citing Abu M ikhnaf); K am il, IV , p .377; M ir *a t , V I ,  fo l.40a ,
2. Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kh.araJ p. 57; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh , 1, 
p .356; Ansab, fol. 15b; YcfqubT, l l /T l /  p .332;"Tab., II, pp. 1071-3 
(citing Abu M ik h n a f); Kufi, II, fo l. 107a; Ghurar, fo l .58; Tanblh, 
p,315; BakrT, II, p .573; Mu* jam, II, p .685; Kam il, IV , p .377; M ir* at, 
V I,  fo l.40a ; Bidaya, IX , p740 (citing WagicffJT* lbar, III ,p . 108.
3. Ansab, fol. 16a; T a b ., I I ,  p .1083 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, ll,fo ls . 
107a-107b; Ghurar, fo l .58, here, as in Kufi, no mention of a pay rise 
is given; K am il, IV , p .377; M ir* at, V I ,  f o l . 40a; Bidaya, IX ,p .41 
(citing WQqtdT); * Ibar, 111, p. 108.
281.
in vain.
In spite of Ibn a I-Ash* ath's attempts to persuade the rebels to accept 
these terms, the Iraqis, hot-headed by temperament, refused and
(t wonce more denounced the bai*a of *Abd a l-M a lik . They were banking on 
the fact that a l-H a jja j and his Syrian troops were suffering from a lack of 
provisions, but their calculations were mistaken. The Syrians, despite their 
difficulties, stood firm and as a result, the Iraqis lost their chance to rid 
themselves of a l-H a jja j and to gain a pay increase.
Consequently, the fighting was resumed and it lasted for one 
hundred days. The most enthusiastic of Ibn al^Ash* ath "s followers were 
the Gurra* in the fighting against a l-H a jja j; they placed themselves as a 
separate squadron under Jabala ibn Zahr ibn Gais a l-J u * f i,  and showed 
a remarkable bravery. But their enthusiasm was lost after the death of their 
leader and they soon dispersed. On Jumada II, 82 /Ju ly  701, the decisive 
battle of Dair al-Jamajim was joined. At first, the Iraqis gained the 
upper hand but when al-Abrad ibn Qarra al-Tamimi,on the right wing of 
Ibn al-Ash*ath*s army, was unable to withstand the attack of the Syrian 
Sufyan, ibn al-Abrad a l-K a lb i, and therefore gave way, the Iraqis inter­
preted this as treason, and were so discouraged that they fled. In vain Ibn a l-  
Ash* oth tried to rally them again* Their flight was facilitated by the Aman 
issued by a l-H a jja j. Ibn al-Ash* ath himself was forced to flee with some of 
his supporters. He first entered Kufa, where he took leave of his fam ily, and
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then went in the direction of Basra. Meanwhile, a l-H a jja j entered
Kufa, where he executed a large number of the captured rebels.^
However, the defeat of Ibn al-Ash‘ ath was not yet completed.
Some of his followers with Muhammad ibn Sa‘ d ibn Abi Waqqas took
« •
possession of al-M ada* in. But they soon left their position on hearing 
that a l-H a jja j was advancing against them, and joined their leader in
• i—^
2
Maskin. At the same time, ‘ Ubaidallah ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura
*
.  3
al-Ourashi succeeded in seizing Basra for Ibn al-Ash‘ ath. But the
latter could not stay long enough in the city and returned to Maskin on the
Dujail. A l-H a jja j spent a month in Kufa, after which he went in pursuit
of Ibn al-Ash‘ ath and his followers. They met in Maskin where a long
and severe struggle took place. Finally, in Sha‘ ban 82/September 701,
Ibn al-Ash‘ ath was defeated decisively and his followers fled across the
1. Sa‘ d, V I I ,  i i ,  p. 177 (citing al-Haytham); Khalifa ibn Khayyat,
TarTkh, I tf, p. 368; Ansab, fols. 17a-18b (citing Abu a I—Mukhariq 
al-Rasibij; Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1086-95 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufl, II, 
fols. 107b-T08b; Ghurar, fo ls .59-60; Tanbih, p .315;M uru j, V ,  
p .304; Bad^ , V I ,  p .36; BakrT, II, pp .573,574; 593;Mu* jam, I I ,  
p p .652, 685; Kamil, IV , pp .378-9 , 383-6; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo ls .40a- 
40b, 42b~43b (citing al-Haytham), 43b; Dhahabf, I I I ,  p p .227-8 ,
229; Bidaya, IX , pp.41 -2  (citing WaqicfiTT'47-8; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 109-10 
Shadharat, I, I, p .92. It is said that the Qaisites fought very 
courateously in the battle against Ibn al-Ash‘ ath, J a rir , DTwan,
p. 264; Naga* id, I, p .410.
2. Ansab, fo l. 18a; Jab ., I I ,  p. 1098-9 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,
fo l. 109b; Ghurar, fo l .60; Kamil, IV , p .3 8 6 ; ‘ Ibar, II I ,  p .110.
3. Nasab, fo l. 18b; Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1098-9 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Jamharat, 
p .67; Kamil, IV , p .386; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p. 110.
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Dujail river, where many of them were drowned. ^
Ibn al-Ash* ath and those who survived the battle of Maskin 
retreated towards SistcTn. But a detachment of Syrians under * Umara 
ibn Tamim al-Lakham i, accompanied by a l-H a jja j‘s son, was sent to 
pursue them. They reached Ibn al-Ash* ath at Sus, where the rebels were 
defeated and fled to Sabu”r. Here Ibn a I-Ash* ath was joined by the Kurds 
and with their help was able to defeat the Syrians when they met in battle. 
However, Ibn al-Ash*ath continued his march until he reached Kirman, 
and then went on to Sistan, But his governor of Zaranj, a Tamimite called 
‘ Abdallah ibn * Amir al-B a*ar, refused to let him enter the city; while his 
governor of Bust, * lyad ibn Himyan al-Sadusi, took him prisoner, hoping 
thus to get the favour of a l-H a jja j. However, the Zunbil forced the 
governor of Bust to free Ibn al-Ash* ath and took the latter with him to
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .368; Ansab, fo l. 18a; Ya*qubi,
II, pp. 332-3; T a b ., I I ,  pp. 1099-1101 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi,
II, fols. 109b-110a; Ghurar, fo l .61; both the author oFThis work 
and Kufi give the name al-Maftij? instead of Maskin; Tanbih , p. 315; 
Kamil, IV , p p .386-7; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l.43 (citing Ibn al-KalbT); * Ibar,
I I I ,  pp. 110-11. The account found in T a b ., II, pp. 1123-5, which 
makes the defeat of Ibn al-Ash*ath a result of the guidance given
a shepherd to the troops of a l-H a jja j, seems unconvincing; for it is 
neither reported with a chain of authority nor has if any support in 
other early sources. It is probably, therefore, an anti-Syrian tra­
dition trying to find justification for the defeat of the Iraqis.
2. Ansab, fo l. 18a; M a*ad , fols. 111 a -1 11 b; Ghurar, fo ls .62-3; Kamil, 
IV , p .387; M ir* at, V I ,  fo!43b (citing Ibn al-KalbT), * Ibar, I I I ,
p. 111.
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“ 1Kabul, and showed him great honour. This treatment Ibn al-Ash*ath  
received from the ZunbM was due to the agreement between the two some 
time earlier.^
Meanwhile, however, *Ubaidallah ibn *Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura 
al-Qurash I and *Abd al-Rahman ibn * Abbas al-Hashimi, with followers 
numbering 60,000 Iraqi fugitives, gathered in Sistan. They invited Ibn 
al-Ash*ath to resume the struggle and he accepted. First they marched 
against Zaranj, where they took the city and punished the unfaithful governor, 
*Abdallah ibn *Amir al-B a*ar. At this time, * Umara ibn Tamim and the 
Syrian army were approaching, and being afraid of the Syrians, Ibn a l -  
Ash* ath*s followers forced their leader to enter Khurasan, where Yazid  
ibn al-M uhallab was governor. They chose Khurasan thinking that as it was a 
large country, they would either not be attacked at a ll ,  or else would be 
able to find some place of refuge there where they could maintain themselves 
until the deaths of a l-H a jja j and * Abd a l-M a lik . They also hoped to get the 
support of the people of Khurasan. In vain did Ibn a I-Ash* ath try to convince 
them that entering Khurasan would only lead them into the necessity of 
fighting both Yazid ibn al-M uhallab and the Syrians, However, at this
1. Ansab, fols. 18a-18b; T ab ., I I ,  p p .1101-2 (citing Abu Mikhnaf);
Kffft, I I ,  fols. 11 lb -112a; Ghurar. fo l .63; Kamil, IV , p .388; M ir*a t,
V I ,  fo l.43b  (citing Ibn al-KalbT); Bidaya, IX , p .48 (citing WaqidTj;
* Ibar, 111,pp* 111—112.
2. See p. £ /
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point, f Ubaida!lah ibn *Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura, with two
thousand men, deserted and began to urge the others to do likewise.
No reason has been given for this move, but presumably Ibn Sapiura
realised that Ibn al-Ash*ath had lost control over his followers and so
was no longer fit to lead. This had the result of deciding Ibn al-Ash* ath
to rely on the Iraqis no more, because of their disunity and fickleness, and
be made his way back to the Zunbil with a remnant of supporters. The rest
paid homage to *Abd al-Rahman ibn a l-*  Abbas al-Hashimi and entered Herat,
killing al-Ruqad a l-A zd i, an official of Yazid ibn a l-M uhallab . Therefore,
Yazid was forced to retaliate and sent an army under his brother al -
Mufaddal, which inflicted a crushing defeat on them. M any, including the
leader, fe ll prisoners.^ Ibn a l-M uhallab , because of his *Asabiyya to the
2
Yemenites, released these, and sent the rest of the prisoners to a l-H a jja j, 
who executed a large number of them.
Meanwhile, some five hundred of Ibn al-Ash*ath's followers, under 
Mawdud ibn Bishr a l-N a d a ri, were still holding out in Zaranj, although they
1. Khalifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikh, I, pp .367-8; Ansab, fols. 18b-l 9b;
Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1104-10(citing Abu M ikhnaf), however, the narrative 
of Mada* inT (Tab ., I I ,  p. 11 lO ff.) is somewhat different from that 
of Abu M ik h n a f.; Kufl", II, 112a; Ghurar,fo ls. 63 -6 ; K am il, IV , 
pp .388-90; M ir* at, V I,  fo l.44a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Bidaya, IX , 
pp .4 8 -9  (citing WaqidT); * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 112; Tarikh - i  Sistan, p p .116-7.
2. Ansab, fols, 19a-19b; Ya*qubi, I I ,  p. 330; Tab ., I I ,  pp. 1120-2 
(citing Abu *Ubaida); Kufi', I I ,  fo l. 112b; M ir 'a t ,  V I ,  fo l.51b .
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eventually submitted when * Umara ibn Tamim granted them Amam
(approved by a l-H a jja j), so becoming master of the whole of Sistan. ^
*  * • * *
Now only *Abd al-Rahman ibn a I-Ash* ath himself remained a 
possible danger to a l-H a jja j. A l-H a jja j, therefore, wrote repeatedly 
to the Zunbil, in turn threatening him and offering him inducements, to 
persuade him to hand over Ibn al-Ash*ath. At last a l-H a jja j succeeded, by
-r 2exempting the Zunbil from the payment of tribute for seven or ten years.
This agreement was reached in the year 85 /700. Our sources give different
versions of the death of Ibn a I-Ash* ath. He is said to have been killed by
” 3  Athe Zunbil himself, or to have died in his bed,of consumption, and his
severed head sent to a l-H a jja j. Finally, there is the generally accepted
account which says that he was put in chains and delivered to * Umara ibn
Tamim, who was to take him to a l-H a jja j. However, on the way to Iraq, he
1. Ansab, fo l.19b  (citing Mada* ini); Tab., II, p p .1132-3 (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); K am il, IV , p. 399; M ir* at, VS, fo l. 52b; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 116.
2. Ansab, fols.20a-20b (citing al-Haytham and Mada* ini); Ya*qubi, II, 
pp.3334; J a b ., II, pp. 1133-3 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I I ,  fols. 112b- 
113a; Ghurar, fo ls.66-70; Tanbih, pp .315-6; Bad*, V I ,  pp .36-7; Kamil 
IV , pp .399-400; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l.53a; Mukhtasar, I , p . 208; Bidaya,
IX , p. 53; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 116.
3. Ansab, fo l.20a; J a b ., I I ,  pp. 1133-4 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); K am il,
IV , p. 399; Bidaya, IX , p .53; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 116; ShqcfFTarat, i ,  p. 94.
4. Ansab, fol.2Ga; Tab., I I ,  p. 1134 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I I ,  fo l. 
113a; K am il, IV,* pp .399-400; Bidaya, IX , p .53; * Ibar, III, p .116.
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threw himself from a rooftop at Rukhkhaj;^ and then his head was severed 
and sent to a l-H a jja j.
The revolt of Ibn al-Ash*ath has received much attention from
2 3 4modern scholars. Von Kremer , followed by A . M uller and by Van Vloten,
links the revolt of Ibn al-Ash* ath with that of al-M ukhtar, and regards it as
another attempt by the mawali of Basra and Kufa to obtain economic, social
and political rights, as much due to them as to the *Arab aristocracy, by the
5 -teachings of Islam. Wellhausen. recognises that the fall of al—Mukhtar did
not put an end to the revolt of the mawali; and that the new measures^ imposed
on the mawali by a l-H a jja j had made things even more difficult for them.
* *
1. Ansab, fo l. 20a (citing al-Haytham), 20a-20b (citing Madal ini); Ya*qubi,
II, p .334; Ghurar, fols. 69-70; Tanbih, pp .315-16; Bad*, VI?, pp .36-7; 
Kamil, IV , p .400; Tadhkira, I, fo l. 163b; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l.53a;
Mukhtasar, I, p .208; Duwal, I, p .24; Bidaya, IX , p .53; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 116.
2. Culturgeschichtilche Streifzuge, p .23ff. (quoted by M me I. Veccia
VagNeri in E. I. (Ibn al-Ash* ath); Idem, Culturgeschichte des Orient, I 
(English translation), pp .201-3 , Calcutta, 1920.
3. Der Islam im Morgen-und Abenland, I, pp .390-2 (quoted by M me L . 
Veccia V ag lieri, in E. I. (Ibn al-Ash* ath).
4. La Domination Arab, Le Chi*tisme et les Croyances Messianiges sous la
KTtalifoFdes Qmayades, pp. 17, 26. ~ ~
5. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 245ff; also Lammens, E. I. ^, (a l-
Hadjdjadj ibn Yusuf).
6. See p. '
28b.
However, he rejects the view that the revolt of Ibn al-Ash*ath was a
mere continuation of that of al-M ukhtar. The participation of a large number
of mawali in the later revolt was, in his opinion due to the custom of the
time, that they should fight side-by-side with their patrons. They might,
he adds, have had their own interests in the revolt, but considers that
these were only secondary. Wellhausen also denies that the revolt of Ibn
al-Ash*ath had any religious motives; and concludes that it was "rather
a renewed and desperately powerful attempt of the Iraqis to shake off the
Syrian yoke. “ Professor Bosworth agrees with Wellhausen when he says
that the revolt of the "Peacock army" was “basically a reaction of the old
* Arab aristocracy against the authoritarian rule of the plebian a l-H a jja j,
•
and of the Iraqi * Arabs against Syrian domination. Finally, M me L.
2Veccia V ag iieri, while considering Wellhausen's argument, refuses to accept 
the view that the revolt had no religious motivation. She emphasizes the 
religious aspect of the revolt in the light of the “vehement participation of 
the Karra* in it. “
Crucial to the proper understanding of this revolt is to take account 
of the grievances and causes of all the different elements who took part in it: 
in the case of the leader, the main cause was the personal insult inflicted by 
a l-H a jja j, but his supporters had each their own reason for joining him. One 
could define the basic tensions lying beneath the revolt as four: the Iraqi hatred
1. op. c it . , p .60.
2. E. 1.^, (Ibn al-Ash* ath); also E. I. (al-Hadjadj ibn Yusuf).
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of a l-H a jja j *s attempts to make Syrian rule effective, the inequalities in 
pay and privelege between Syrians and Iraqis, the Shi*a opposition to the 
Umayyads, and the social inequalities between *Arab and mawali. The 
mawali were supported in their struggle for equal rights by the O urra*, many 
of whom were mawali. But to deal first with the leader of the revolt; the
Arabic sources stress strongly the alleged mutual personal hatred between Ibn a l-
- 1  2 
Ash*ath and a l-H a jja j. But M me Vaglieri is right to point out that the relation­
ship between the two had always been friendly, the reason for a l-H a jja j giving 
to Ibn al-Ash* ath the command of the “peacock army". Moreover, Ibn a l-  
Ash*ath had been a faithful subordinate to a l-H a jja j, obeying him until the 
year 81 /700 , when the latter insulted him. Nevertheless, from this time, 
personal factors were important in providing the immediate cause of the revolt. 
Once a suitable leader presented himself, the people of Basra and Kufa were 
quick to support him in his defiance of a l-H  a jja j; but for reasons of their 
own, not because of the original personal insult. One main reason for their
1. Imama, II,  pp. 29-30; Ansab, X I ,  pp .319-20; (citing Abu Mikhnaf and
*Awana), 319 (citing al-Sha* b f); Dinawari, p .322; Tab ., II, p p .1043-4 
(citing Abu Mikhnaf); KufF, I I ,  fols. 98b, 99a-99b, 101a; Ghurar, fo!53; 
Kamil, IV , p .366; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l.31b; Dhahabi, I I I ,  p. 128; Bidaya,
IX , pp .31 -2 ; * Ibar, I I ,  p. 105.
2. I . E . 2 ,  (Ibn al-Ash*ath).
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readiness to support Ibn al-Ash*ath was because a l-H a jja j had sent them
to fight for a long period (Tajmir) in inhospitable lands far away from their
homes and families; while on the other hand, Syrian troops were not
employed in remote regions, neither did they serve any but short periods.
Whether they did their military service in the cities of Syria or in Iraq, the
Syrians received higher pensions than the Iraqis, despite the latter's harsher
conditions. That this inequality of pay and treatment was an Iraqi grievance
1
can be seen by the terms offered to the rebels by the caliph.
Another clear motive behind the in itial support given to Ibn a l-  
Ash* ath can be seen in the Shi* a inclinations of the two most active
supporters: Abu al-Tu fa il *Amir ibn W athila al-K inani and *Abd a l-M u ’ min
•  ' rAi -
-  -  2ibn Shabath ibn Rab* i al-Tam im i. Both were past followers of al-M ukhtar, 
and also both Kufans from the Northern tribes. This supports what the 
poet A*sha Hamdan has said, that the Asabiyya was not a motive attracting 
adherents to the revolt of Ibn al-Ash* ath. It would appear that one of the key 
in itial sources of the militancy of the revolt derived from the Shi*a of Kufa, 
awaiting any opportunity to challenge Umayyad rule.
Underlying the baMapaid to Ibn a I-Ash* ath in Sistan was the Iraqi 
hatred of al-H ajja j and his harsh policies aimed to make the caliph's rule in
1. See p. 0  ■
2. S eep . U J  note ( £ )
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Iraq effective. This bdi*a: "to give him support and fight with him until
1God expels a l-H a jja j, the enemy of God, from Iraq", is almost identical
"  -  . 2  to that paid to Ibn al-Jarud a few years earlier. In the two revolts, the
first target was a l-H a jja j, the main intention, to expel him, rather than
any direct renunciation of * Abd a l-M a lik . However, by the time of the
bai*a in Fars a new development has taken place; homage was paid to Ibn a l-
Ash* ath "on the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet, to depose the
Imams of Error (A* immat a l-D & la la ) and to fight against a l-M u h ilfm ",
3 -i .e .  the Umayyads. From a revolt against a l-H a jja j and his oppressive
policies, the rebels had moved to a revolt against the caliph and the Umayyad
vrule in general. This development was inherent in the earlier ba i*a , since a l-  
Hajjaj had no pretensions to be more than *Abd a l-M alik 's  o ffice r, and the 
caliph had always supported his governor's policies.
On Ibn al-Ash*ath 's arrival in Basra and Kufa, he was joined by a 
new element, very large numbers of Qurra’ . The reasons for their adherence 
to the revolt are many: as other Iraqis, they disliked a l-H a jja j’ s attempts 
to strengthen Syrian domination, and their material interests, they fe lt, 
were not sufficiently cared for by a l-H a jja j. But other distinctive grievances
1. Ansab, X I,  q . 326 (citing M ada’ in i); J a b ., II, p. 1055 jc iting Abu
M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .372; M ir*a t, V I ,  fo l.37b; Bidaya, IX , p .36.
2. See p. 2  5 5  '
3 . Ansab, X I ,  p .334; Tab ., I I ,  p p .1057-8 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);
Tanbth , p .314; M uru j, V , p p .302-3; Kamil, IV , p.373T M ir ? at, V I ,  
fo l. 37b; Bidaya, IX , p .36; * Ibar, I I I ,  p. 107.
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they had as Gurra?, religious men: they considered a l-H a jja j to be a
ruthless and impious man, with religion low on his list of priorities. They
were also strong sympathisers of the m aw ali, who had received particularly
harsh treatment from a l-H a jja j. In an effort to restore the finances of Iraq,
depleted as a result of the conversion of a great number of the native population
to Islam, a l-H a jja j had ordered new converts to pay the J izya, and had,
moreover,ordered them to return to their villages.^ The Gurra* supported the
mawali as champions of equal rights for all Muslims, in accordance with the
teachings of the Prophet. The Gurra* were very effective in rallying the
population to join the revolt through their propaganda: they proclaimed the
need to fight a l-H a jja j and his followers by calling them "M uhiUm ",
. —* *
innovators, who disregarded truth and practised oppression. They also depicted 
them as neglectful of the prayers, and accused them of persecuting the weak.
The slogan of the Gurra* is said to have been, "Ya li Tharat a i-S a lat". They
1. Ansab, X I,  p p .336-7 (citing *Umar ibn Shabba); Mubarrad, I I ,  pp.
96-7 (he puts this order of a l-H a jja j after and not before the revolt 
of Ibn al-Ash* ath); T a b ., II, pp. 1122-3; * Iqd, I I I ,  p .416 (citing a l-  
Jahiz); Kamil, IV ,  p .374; * ibar,I I I ,p . 107; Von Kramer, Culturgeschichte 
des Orient (English translation), pp. 201-2; Van Vloten , op. c it . , 
p .26; Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p .280; A I-*A IT , 
Al-Tanyimat aj-ljtim g* iyya wal Iqtisadiyya Fil Basra Fil G am  o l-  
Awwal a l-H ijrT  pp. 8 4 -5 , 282; Shartf, A l-J ira * Bain'i-* Arab wal 
M aw alf, pp. 25 -6 .
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urged the people to fight the Syrians, whose impiety endangered both the
religion and the material prosperity of the Iraqis (Dinukum wa Dunyakum).^
They not only preached these doctrines, but were prepared to die for them
on the battlefield.
Another somewhat surprising, element among the supporters of Ibn a l -
2Ash4 ath were the M u rji’ a , who had received special favour from the Umayyads, 
since their doctrine favoured passive support of the ruler, whatever his
evils. The Z u tt, Asawira and the Sayabij a also joined the revolt with their
T . -  3masters, Banu Tamim, to be severely punished as a result by a l-H a jja j.
1. Sa4d, V I I , i i ,p .  137; Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh_, I, p p .371-2;
Ansab, fols. 16a, 16b, 17a, 609a~(citing M ada7 int); 612a; T ab ., II,
pp. 1086-8 (citing Abu M ikhnaf; Koft, II, fols, 107b, 108a, 108b, 109a;
A g h ., V , p. 1 5 3 ;H ily a , IV , p .379; ‘ Asakij; IV , fo l. 124b; Dhahab", I I I ,  
p .229; Bidaya, IX* p .40 (citing WaqidT).
2. Hur, p .204. It is also said that some Ibadi Kharijites of Basra fought a l-
with Ibn al-Ash 4 ath . E. I, , (A l-lbadiyya).
3. Futuh , pp .373-4 ; A l - 4 A li, Al-Tanzimat a l- ljt im a 4 iyya wal Iqtisadiyya 
fil Basra fil Qarn al-Aw w al a l -H i jr t , p .204. Refering to the punishment 
inflicted by 'a l-H ajja j on the rebels who fe ll into his hands, M me L.
Vaglieri says that a l-H a jja j "spared all the Kurayshis, all the Syrians, 
and all those belonging to the clans of the 'two tribes' (named in S iffin " .
To support her argument she refers to a passage in T’abari ( II ,  1097), which 
tells the story that, when a l-H a jja j asked a man from the tribe of
Khath 4 am to admit that he was an unbeliever since he had not 
supported a l-H a jja j against Ibn al-Ash4 ath, the man refused to do so, and 
therefore was sentenced to death. He found sympathy among the Quraishites, 
the Syrians, and the parties of both Ibn al-Ash4 ath's and a l-H a jja j *s , . 
followers, who mourned the death of such a pious man. ( ^
, jh us ft can be seen that this passage
in now ay supports M me L. Veccia Vaglieri's thesis, and that, therefore, 
she must have misunderstood the passage.
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The strength of the Yemenite influences in the revolt is reflected
by Ibn al-Ash* ath's use of the title  of Q ah tan i, the one awaited by the
]
Yemenites to restore them to power. He was also called by the poetess,
-  2Bint Sahm, al-Mansur * Abd al-Rahman; it is also said that he called ' • * *
„ T 3
himself Nasir a l-M u ’ minin.
Therefore, since the revolt was coloured by the particular greivances
and ideas of every contributing group, it is a mistake to attempt to describe
the nature of the revolt as though it were homogeneous. Perhaps the only
general characteristic among all Ibn al-Ash *ath's followers was a hatred for
a l-H a jja j and his policy of subjecting Iraq's interests to those of Syria.
One could, indeed, make a general comment on all the revolts dealt with
in this chapter (with the exception of the Zanj), that all were provoked by the
1. Tanbfh , p. 314; Bad*, V I ,  p. 35; Van V loten, op. c i t . ,  p. 61; Lammens, 
Etudes sur le Siecle des Qmayyades, p .400; Wellhausen, The Arab 
Kingdom and its Fall, p. 245; Farazdaq, quoted by Wellhausen, _
op. c it . ,  p .234, n . l ;  Lewis, The Regnal Titles of the First *Abbasid 
Caliphs, p. 17, ZHPy, 1968; Curie I, Monnaies, Arabo-Sasanides, 
p. 67, r  ; pN , VTTfT1966.
2. Ansab, X I,  p p .333-4; Van V loten, op. c i t . , p .61; Lewis, The 
Regnal Titles of the First *Abbasid Caliphs, p. 17, ZHPV, 1968.
3. Tanbih, p .314; BadJ, II, p. 184; V I ,  p .35 (he is called here Nasir 
Amir a l-M uVnininT/Van V loten, op. c i t . ,  p .61, n .4 .
harshness or tactlessness of a I-H anoi , so that one might wonder why * Abd 
a l-M a lik  did not save himself a fair amount of trouble by removing a l-H a jja j 
and appointing in his place a more reasonable man. This, however, would 
be to miss the point that only a man such as a l-H a jja j could have made 
the caliph's rule in Iraq effective. The benefit of a l-H a jja j's  ruthlessness 
in crushing Iraqi opposition was felt in the years 85 -95 /704-713  in which 
Iraq was peaceful and free from troubles.
CHAPTER V I 
THE KHARIJITE RISINGS
The worst period of Kharijite risings during the Umayyad caliphate 
occurred in the reign of * Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan, who was threatened by 
them from several fronts. In Yamaha were the Najdat or a l-N a jd iy ya ,  ^
whose field of activity embraced, in addition to Yamama, Hadramut, parts
of Yemen, Bahrain, Ta* if and *Uman. Basra was directly and constantly
2 -  
threatened by the dangerous Azariqa, who controlled al-A hw az, Pars,
-  -  3Isfahan and Kirman. In Muusil and the Jazira region were the Sufriyya.
- . . .  . 4Finally, there was another Kharijite group in Basra, namely al-lbadiyya,■™— . *
who played a distinctive role in the history of the period, although they did 
not take arms against the caliph.
1. Followers of Najda ibn * Amir a l-H anafi, E. I. , (Kharidjites); W ell­
hausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositions^parteien im alten Islam,
p. 29; W att, Islam and the Integration of Society, p. 100, London, 1966.
2. A Kharijite sect which took its name from its leader N afi* ibn al -
Azraq. He held the doctrine that all his adversaries should be put
to death with their wives and children. E. I. (Azariqa); W att, Islam 
and the Integration of Society, pp. 99-100; Idem, Islamic Political Thought, 
p p .5 5 -6 , Islamic Surveys, 6 , Edinburgh, 1968.
3. Followers of Salty ibn Mussarih, who was succeeded by Shabib ibn
Yazid ibn Nu*aim al-Shaibant. E, I. , (ShabTb ibn YazTd ibn Nu*aim
al-Shaibani); W att, Kharijite Thought in the Umayyad Period, p .222, 
D I,"X X X B I, 1961. —
4 . An important branch of the Kharijites, which derived its name from that 
of its founder * Abdallah ibn"TBdy a l-M urrt al-Tam im i, E« I. , (A l-  
lbadiyya).
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The Kharijites, because they held to the doctrines of equality 
and the elective caliphate, considered the Umayyads to be usurpers. The
political confusion in the period 64 -73 /68 3-692 , together with the harsh 
policies of a l-H a jja j in Iraq, were certainly among the reasons 
encouraging the Kharijites to defy the central government.
It is not the intention of this study to deal with the origin of the 
Kharijites, nor their doctrines or theological differences: its only concern 
is the political aspect of the Kharijite risings during * Abd a l-M alik 's  reign, and 
how these risings were suppressed.
In the year 65 /684 , the Kharijites of Yamama, who were from Bakr
and,more especially, from Banu Hanifa, chose Abu Talut, Salim, as their
leader. This choice was, however, conditional, for they stipulated that
should they find a better person, both Abu Talut and the Kharijites would
pay homage to the new man,  ^ Abu Talut with his followers then seized a l-
Hadarim, which had originally belonged to Banu Hanifa, but had been 
* • .
confiscated by M u*aw tya, who had sent there four thousand slaves, probably 
to cultivate the land for him. When Abu Talut seized the region, he 
distributed the slaves among his followers. Meanwhile, one of the Kharijites, 
Najda ibn * Amir a l-H an afi, intercepted a caravan coming from Basra to Ibn 
a i-Zubair in Mecca, and brought the spoils to Abu Talut in al-Hadarim , 
where they were distributed. Najda also advised the Kharijites to continue
1. Ansab, X I, p. 126; K am il, IV , p. 165; Nuw airi, X IX , fo l.46; * Ibar, 
TiT7pT3i3.
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to use the slaves to cultivate the land for them. Those actions brought
him such distinction that Abu Talut was deposed and Najda elected as
leader in his place and from now on the movement was called after him.
Najda was by this time (66/685) only thirty years old.  ^ He had already
2exercised considerable influence in Yamama , and it is probable that it was 
only his youth which had before delayed his election as Kharijite caliph.
On assuming the leadership, Najda went to al-Bahrain where he raided 
the Banu Ka‘ b ibn Rabi‘ a, and in the battle of D h u 'l-M a jaz , inflicted a 
severe defeat on them. In the year 67/686 Najda marched once again on a l -  
Bahrain to subdue the tribes of * Abd a l-O ais  who were at this time hostile to 
the Kharijites. With the help of a l-A zd , Najda was able to k ill a large 
number of ‘ Abd a l-Q ais  and also captured a large number as prisoners in a l-  
Q a tif, where he stayed for a w h ile .^
The growing strength of Najda in ‘ Arabia threatened directly the 
authority of Ibn a l-Zubair. Consequently, Hamza ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-
1. Ansab, X I ,  pp. 127-8; M u‘ jam , I I ,  p .4 5 0 ff .; Kamil, IV , p. 166; Nuw airi,
)OX7~fol.45.
2. Tab ., I I ,  pp .401-2 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); M agalat, I ,  pp. 89-90; Bagh.,
p. 66; Brunnow, Pie Charidschiten unter den ersten Umaiden, Leiden, 1884, 
(English translation), p. 14.
3. Ansab, X I,  pp. 127-8; Kamil, IV , p. 166; N uw airi, X IX , fo l.47; ‘ Ib ar, 
Tn7pT3i3.
4. AnsQb, X I ,  pp. 130-1; M g q a la t, I, p. 90; Kam il, IV , p. 166; Nuwairi 
X IX , fo l.47; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .314.
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Zubair, who was the governor of Basra for his father, tried to check
Najda's influence there. He sent ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Umair a l-Laith i with an
army of fourteen thousand against him, but this army was surprised and
put to flight (67/686).  ^ Following this victory, Najda sent ‘ Atiyya ibn a l-
Aswad al-H anafi to ‘ Uman where ‘ Abbad ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Julanda 
#
T -  2and his two sons, Sa‘ id and Sulaiman, were in control. ‘ Atiyya succeeded
in capturing ‘ Uman and stayed there for a few months, and then left the
country in the hands of Abu'l-Qasim , his deputy. However, Abu'I-Gasim
was killed and SaMd and Sulaiman, supported by the ‘ Umanis, once again
3
seized the country. Meanwhile, ‘ Atiyya ibn al-Aswad fe ll out with Najda,
-  4
perhaps because of personal jealousy, and went back to ‘ Uman. Unable
to seize the country, he went to Kirman, where he achieved enough success
5
to enable him to issue his own coins (al-Darahim a l - ‘ A tw iyya). However,
1* Ansab, X I,  p. 133; Y a ‘ qubT, II, p .325; Tab ., I I ,  p .752; Kamil, IV , 
p p .166-7; Nuw airi, X IX , fols.47 -8 ; ‘ Ibar, l l! ,p .3 1 4 . Gn the 
chronology of this event, see Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen 
Oppositions>parteien im alten Islam, p .30, n .2 .
2. See Chapter V ,  p. ^  3 ^ ,
3. An$ab, X I ,  p. 134; Kamil, IV , p. 167; Nuw airi, X IX , fo l.48; Mbar, 
111, p .314.
4 . According to Baladhuri the reasons for the disagreement between the 
two were Najda's inequality in distributing the ‘ Ata* and his corres­
pondence with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Ansab, X I,  p. 142.
5. Ansab, X I ,  p. 142; Kamil, IV , p. 167; Nuw airi, X IX , fo l.48; M iles, 
Some New Light on the History of Kirman, p. 90, W C I, 1959.
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this success was not long lasting, for he was followed by al-M uhallab's  
cavalry. He fled to Sistan and then to Sind, where he was killed in 
Q indabil. ^
By this time (68/687), Najda had subdued the northern parts of al*“
Bahrain and levied the Sadaqa from the Banu Tamim in Kadima. He also entered 
San*a* where he received the homage of the people and collected the Sadaqa
m
from them. To Hadramut, Najda sent Abu Fudaik to levy the Sadaqa on • •  _
its people. ^
As a result of these successful campaigns, the influence of Najda in
3Arabia became even greater than that of Ibn a l-Zu bair, At this time, * Abd 
a l-M a lik , with many problems to face at home, was unable to send an army 
against Najda, Instead he wrote to him, confirming him as a governor of 
Yamama and freeing him from all responsibility for the blood he had shed and
. 4the money he had seized, on the condition that he would pay him homage. 
N ajda, however, bluntly refused. * Abd a l-M a lik  had tw o objects in mind
1. Ansab, X I,  p. 135; Bagh., p .67; K am il, IV , p. 167; Nuw airi, X IX ,  
fo l.4 8 ; * Ibar, 111, p .3T4, However, Professor Montgomery W att, 
following the account of Ash*ari, makes this /agreement as between
*Atiyya ibn al-Aswad and^5bu Fudaik. M a q a la t, I, p. 92; Kharijite 
Thought in the Umayyad Period, p .219, D l ,  X X X V I, 1961.
2. Ansab, X I, pp. 136-7 (citing M ada*in i); Kamil, IV , pp. 167-8; Nuwairi, 
X IX , fo l.4 8 ; * Ibar, III, p .314.
3. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p .200.
4 . Ansab, X I,  p .314; M aqalat, I, p. 92; M i la l ,p. 215; K am il, IV , p. 169;
* Ibar, I I I ,  p .315.
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in this correspondence with N ajda. Firstly, he hoped to win
Najda over to his side or else to keep him quiet for a w hile; should
this fa il, he might succeed in causing disagreement between Najda
and his followers. As we shall see, * Abd a l-M a lik  achieved this last
object, causing Najda to be deposed and eventually k illed . ^
However, in the pilgrimage of this year (68/687), Najda and about
680 of his followers went to Mecca where they performed their religious
2pilgrimage independent of both Ibn a l-Zubair and * Abd a l-M a lik . This 
shows the weakness of Ibn al-Zubair,since he did not dare refuse them 
permission; it also shows that Najda was equal in power to both the 
caliph and his rival Ibn a l-Zubair . Finishing his pilgrimage, Najda
intended to proceed * to M edina, but he abandoned this plan because of
— 3 -religious scruples, and went to Ta> if  instead. On approaching Ta* i f,
4 Amir ibn *Urwa ibn Mas*ud al-ThaqafT met Najda and paid him homage
on behalf of himself and the people of Ta* if ,  thus making it unnecessary
for Najda to enter the city. He then went to Tabala, from where he proceeded
to al-Bahrain. Before leaving al-Bahrain, however, he appointed officials.
* .  ___
1. See p.
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat^ Tarikh, I, p .333; Ansab, X I ,  p. 137; Jab ., I I ,  
pp.782-3 (citing Wagidt); K am iI, IV , pp. 158, 244-5; NuwairT, X IX , 
fols. 48 , 67; Bidaya, V I I I ,p p .294-5; * Ibar , I I I ,  p .314.
3 . It is said that all the Medinese, oh hearing that Najda was coming 
towards them/ prepared themselves to fight him; even the most pious 
and politically inactive, ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Umar ibn al-Khatt ab. Ansab, 
X I,  p. 137; Kamil, IV , p. 188; NuwairT, X IX , fo l. 48.
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Al-Haruq al-H anafi was made governor of Ta’ if, Tabala and al-Surat; and • • *
Sa*d a l-Talayi* was sent to collect the Sadaqa from Banu H ila l In Najran.
* *
From al-Bahrain, Najda sent orders stopping the M ira (food provisions) for
Mecca and Medina. This was another way of defying the authority of
Ibn al-Zubair in his own capital. It was only by repeated requests from
pious men such as ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Abbas, appealing to Najda's religious
feelings, that the M ira was restored.^
Underlying Najda's apparent success were currents already working
to undermine him: no sooner had he reached the peak of his power, than
he was rapidly to decline. For discontent soon arose among his followers,
which first led to his deposition and eventually to his murder in 72 /691.
This discontent arose from the perennial problem of Kharijism; the conflict
between the believers in a strict adherence to the literal interpretation of
the Q ur’ an and the Sunna of the Prophet, and those who believed in the
_  2
"evolutionary adaptation based on reason and the spirit of Islam". Najda  
was overthrown by the first group. The sources give as the reasons for their 
discontent, Najda's correspondence with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  ibn Marwan and his 
giving to him a grand daughter of * Uthman ibn ‘ Affan, seized in one of the
3raids; Najda's refusal to k ill those who followed him only because of
1. Ansab, IV , pp. 139-40; K am il, IV , pp. 168-9; NuwairT, X IX , fo l.49 ; 
‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .315 .
2. Salem, Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij, p .22 (the 
John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 
Series LXXIV , N o .2, 1956).
Mughtaltn , p. 179; Ansab, X I ,  pp. 137-8; 143; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p. 325; 
M agalot, I ,  p .92; MIlgT) p.215;Kam il, lV ,pp . 1 6 8 -9 / Ibar, 111, p .315.
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Taqiyya (prudent fear); his unjust distribution of the Fai’ among the troops;^
his unwillingness to punish one of his distinguished followers because he had 
2
drunk wine; and fina lly , his payment to both M a lik  ibn Misma* and 
‘ Ubaidailah ibn Ziyad ibn Zabian of ten thousand dirhams each when they
3fled from M us‘ ab ibn al—Zubair to take refuge with him in Yamama.
After the deposition of Najda,his followers chose one of the mawali
called Thabit al-Tammar, as his successor. They were soon to realize
that they would rather follow an ‘ Arab than a mawla, proving that their tribal
feelings were stronger than their Kharijite doctrine. However, they charged
Thabit to choose a new caliph for them, and he chose Abu Fudaik, ‘ Abdallah
4ibn Thawr from the Banu Qais ibn Tha‘ laba.
M eanwhile, N ajda, fearing Abu Fudaik, hid himself in one of the 
villages of Hajar. When this hiding place was discovered, he took refuge 
with his cousins, Banu Tamim. Najda thought by this time to flee and join
1. Ansab, X I ,  p. 142; M a q a la t, I, p. 91; Kamil. IV , p. 169; Nuw airi,
X IX , fo l.49 ; ‘ Ibar, ilT7~p.315.
2. Ansab, X I,  p. 143; M aqalat, I, p. 91; Kamil, IV , p. 169;* Ibar, I I I , p . 315.
3. M ughtalin , p. 179; Ansab , X I ,  p. 143; Y a ‘ qub?, I I ,  p .325; M a q a la t,
I, pp. 91 -2 . — -
4 . Mughtalin, p. 179; Ansab, X I ,  p. 143; Y a ‘ qub7, II, p p .325-6; M aqalat,
I, p. 92; K am il, IV , p. 169; NuwairT, X IX , fo l.4 9 ; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .315. 
However,according to Baghdad? and Ibn Abi'l-Hacffd, it was N ajda, 
after his deposition, who^Rose Abu Fudaik and not Thabit al-Tammar. 
Bagh. ,  p .69; Sharh, IV , p. 134.
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1 . 2 ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  in Damascus, but he was surprised and killed (72/691).
His death did not go unrevenged. One of his followers, called Muslim ibn
Jabir a l-H an afi, plunged a knife into Abu Fudaid. However, the latter was
3only wounded, while the assailant was assassinated. Because of this Abu
Fudaik left Yamama, where Banu Hanifa were dominant, and went to a l-
*
Bahrain, where he made his head-quarters.
4
Despite his pre-occupai tons, Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, the governor of
t
Basra for his brother, tried to put an end to the activities of the Kharijites 
of Yamama. It seems that he was encouraged by the last dissenscon among 
them which had resulted in the murder of Najda and the leadership of Abu 
Fudaik. He therefore sent a Basran army under Muhammad ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman
ibn al-Iskaf (72/691) against them; this campaign, however, was a complete
5 6 —failure. According to Baladhuri, another army under Ziyad ibn al-Q urashi,
1. This reflects the early correspondence between the two. See p. 3 0 o ,
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .338 (the year given here is 70);
Ansab, X I, pp. 144-5; T ab ., I I ,  p .829; M aqalat, I, p. 92; Bagh., p .69;
M ila l , p .215; Kamil, IV , pp. 169-70; Shari} IV f p. 134; NuwairT, X IX , 
fols. 4 9 -5 0 ;j jb ^ T T T l, p. 315.
3. Ansab, X I,  p .147; Idem, fo l.40a (citing M ada’ in i); Kamil, IV , p*170; 
N uw airi, X IX , fo l.50 .
4 . He was by this time threatened by both the Azariqa and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
5. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikli, I, p .339 (the year 71 is given here); Ansab,
foT.40a (citing M ada’ int).
6. Ansab, fo l. 40a.
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with troops from Basra and Bahrain, marched against Abu Fudaik. But* .
Ziyad was killed with a large number of his army. Thus ended in failure
all the attempts of the Zubairids to crush the Kharijites of Yamama. Mus‘ ab
had no more time to deal with Abu Fudaik and his followers, for he was
killed in that year, 72 /691 , in a battle with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .^
The new governor of Basra, Khalid ibn 6 Abdallah ibn Asid, dispatched
an army under his brother Umayya against Abu Fudaik, 73 /692 , But Umayya
2and his twelve thousand men were ambushed and put to flight. It was such 
a humiliating defeat that Umayya had to hide himself from the people, while 
his brother Khalid wrote to the caliph in an attempt to justify the defeat by 
blaming the Basrans for not holding firm in the ba ttle -fie ld . Khalid also 
informed the caliph of the seriousness of the situation, for Basra was threatened 
by both Abu Fudaik and the Azariqa. It is worth noting here that at this time 
another brother of Khalid, *Abd a l - ( A z iz , was defeated by the Azariqa. 
Despite their theological differences, both the Azariqa and the Najdat 
seem to have been co-ordinating, to force the government's troops to fight 
on two fronts. ^
1. See Chapter IV , p. 2 3 3  ,
2 . Farazdaq, Diwan, p .221; *Uyun,p.2QS; Ansab, fols.39a-39b (citing 
Wahab ibn Jartrj) 40a-40b (citing Mada* ini'); Y a ‘ qubi, 11, p. 325; Tab ., 
I I ,  pp .829,861; i Igd, I, p. 168; Mu* jam, IV ,p .4 9 3 ;Kamil, IV , p .281; 
M iV a t ,  V I ,  fo l.3a ; Dhahabi, I I I ,  p. I l l ;  Bidaya, V I I I ,  p.348(quoting 
Jqbaft); f Ibar, I I I ,  p .322; Khizana, IV , p .40 (quoting NuwairT).
3. Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositions^parteien im alien  
Islam, p .38; QaiamawT, Adab al-Khawarij fit *A$r al-Um awt, p .36; 
Cairo, 1945.
Owing to this alarming situation, the caliph decided to send another
campaign against Abu Fudaik, to which command he chose ‘ Umar ibn ‘ Abdallah
ibn M a ‘ mar. The latter only accepted this appointment on the assurance from
the caliph that neither his brother Bishr ibn Marwan, the governor of Kufa,
nor Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah, the governor of Basra, would interfere in the
campaign. For he was sure that such interference would take place since
his appointment came directly from the caliph. Moreover, in Khalid’ s
case, he would be delighted to see this campaign end with failure to save his
brother's reputation. ^
‘ Umar left Damascus with Syrian troops for Kufa, where he recruited
about eight thousand men. He placed them under Muhammad ibn Musa ibn
*
Jalha and ordered them to proceed to Basra. ‘ Umar spent few days in
Kufa and then joined his army. In Basra he recruited another ten thousand
men under his cousin Musa ibn ‘ Ubaidallah ibn M a ‘ mar. With this numerous
2
army, ‘ Umar marched on Abu Fudaik in al-Bahrain.
As with almost all other K harijite  leaders, Abu Fudaik was joined by
3a number of Bedouins (A‘ rab), who did not profess Kharijism. It is this
1. Ansab, fols. 4Gb-41a (citing M ada’ ini).
2. Uadhif, p .78; Ansab, fo l.39b  (citing al-Haytham and Wahab ibn Jarir), 
41a-41b (citing M ada’ im ); Tab., I I ,  p .852; K am il, IV ,p .294; M ir ’ a t, 
V I ,  fo l.3b ; PhahabT, IN , pp. 115-16; ‘ Ibar, 111, p. 322; Kh i zana, IV ,p .40 
(quoting NuwairT).
3. Ansab, fo l.41b .
participation of the Bedouins, together with religious fanaticism, which 
gave the Kharijite movement its distinguishing characteristics of deep 
tribal and religious fervour.
‘ Umar ibn ‘ Ubaidallah ibn M a‘ mar with his army, said to have 
numbered twenty one thousand men, met Abu Fudaik and his followers in a l -  
Mushshaqqar in al-Bahrain. In the battle, which lasted for five days, the 
advantage was first with Abu Fudaik's army. However, thanks to the courage
and skill of ‘ Umar, the situation was reversed, and Abu Fudaik was k illed ,
1 -  _
his head being sent to the caliph. His followers were pursued and the mawali
among them were k illed , while the ‘ Arabs were set free. Thus the Najdat 
were crushed in Arabia, never to rise again.
When ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  recovered control of Iraq after the death of M us‘ ab
ibn al-Zubair in the battle of Maskin, 72 /691 , he found it necessary to take
immediate measures against the Azariqa. By this time the Azariqa held
Khuzistan, Fars and Kirman, forming a direct menace to Basra and the
surrounding territories. Although a l-M uhallab , whom Mus‘ ab had sent against
them, achieved no decisive victory over them, he did succeed in driving
them away from Basra. Under ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , a l-M uhallab was confirmed in
1. t ja d h if.p .78; Ansab, fols.39a (citing al-Haytham and Wahab ibn Jarir), 
41b-43a (citing Mada* ini); Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,  p .326; Tab ., II ,  pp .852-3; 
Bagh., p .70; M ila l , p .216; Kamil, IV ,p p .294-5; M ir ’ at, V I ,  fo l.3b ; 
DhahabT, I II ,  pp. 115-16; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .322; Khizona, IVTpp.40-1 
(quoting NuwairT).
his post, to fight the Azariqa. But, nevertheless, the situation did not
improve. For ‘ Abd a l-M alik 's  new governor of Basra, Khalid ibn
‘ Abdallah ibn Asid, out of personal jealousy, decided to fight the Azariqa
himself, disregarding the caliph's orders. He also paid no heed to the advice
of his intimates nor of the people of Basra discouraging him. With his army,
Khalid, accompanied by al-M uhallab , met the Azariqa in a l-A h w az.
Meanwhile, following the caiiph's order, Bishr ibn Marwan, the governor
of Kufa, re-inforced the army fighting the Azariqa by Kufan troops under
( Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn ai-Ash*ath. Thanks to the caution and
advice of al-M uhallab , Khalid managed to drive the Azariqa, after forty
-  1days of fighting, back to Kirman.
After this scant success, Khalid returned to Basra leaving his brother
‘ Abd a l - ‘ A ziz  in charge of the war with the Azariqa, while al-M uhallab was
-  2 . ^  Tappointed governor of al-Ahw az. After five months in Kirman, Q atri and
his followers came back to Fars. As a result, ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz  with thirty
thousand Basrans met them in a battle in Darabjird. Owing to his lack of
experience and military foresight, ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz  was overwhelmingly defeated
1. Ansab, fols.31a-32b(citing M ada’ ini); Mubarrad, I I I ,  p p .347-53; T ab ., 
I I, p p .82 4 -7 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fols. 60b-61b; Ghurar, 
fols. 10-11; K am il, IV ,p p .285-1; M ir ’ a t ,V I ,fo l .3 a ;  Sharh, IV ,pp . 171 — 
3 ; ‘Jbgr, lll,"pT32l. ”
2. According to Abu Mikh naf, after his success, Khalid dispatched Dawud 
ibn Qahdhbam with some cavalry men to follow the Azariqa. Being 
informed of this, the caliph ordered Bishr ibn Marwan to send a Kufan 
army to re-inforce Dawud's cavalry. Bishr therefore sent ‘ Attab ibn 
Warqa’ al-Riyahi with four thousand Kulans. Both Dawud and ‘ Attab 
followed the retreating Azariqa but without success. Tab ., I I ,p p .827-28  
Kamil, IV ,p .281; M ir ’ a t ,V I ,fo l.3 a .
1 .and his army scattered. This failure to cope with the Kharijite threat
cost Khalid his governorship: he was soon removed from his post and Basra
2was added to the government of Bishr ibn Marwan in Kufa.
We have two narratives dealing with these events. One is a l-
M ada’ ini's in Baladhuri repeated by al-Mubarrad, and with which both Ibn
A ‘ tham and Ibn A bi'l-H ad id  are in complete agreement. The second
narrative is that of Abu M ikhnaf in Tabari, a detailed narrative, repeated
by Ibn a l-Jaw zi and Ibn Khaldun. The narrative of the author of Ghurar
al-S iyar is very similar to that of Ibn A ‘ tham . However, the former is
less detailed. There is one main difference between the two narratives of
M ada’ ini and Abu M ikhnaf. Contrary to a l-M ad a ’ in i, Abu Mikhnaf dates
the campaign of Khalid after that of ‘ Abd a l-A z iz . However, judging from
the fact that a l-M ad a ’ ini is a more reliable authority on the affairs of Basra
and the eastern provinces than Abu Mikhnaf, whose main interest was Kufa '
and its affairs, one is inclined to prefer the narrative of a l-M ad a’ ini on this
point. Moreovdr, M ada’ ini's account has a confirmation in the narrative of 
-  3Wahab ibn Jarir, who agrees with him on this.
1. Ibn Qais al-Ruqayyat, Diwan, p. 190; Ansab, fols.32b-33b (citing Abu
Mikhnaf); Mubarrad, I I I ,p p .353-5; Tab ., I I ,p p .822-6 (citing Abu 
Mikhnaf ); KufT, ll,fo ls .62a-63b; G hurar, fo l. II; M u ‘ jam, 11,p.66; 
Kam il, IV ,00 .27 9 -8 0 ; M ir ’ a t ,V I , fo l .21; Sharb, IV ,p p l7 3 -6 ;
‘ Ibar, I I I , p .320.
2. See Chapter I I I ,  p. 2=0^
3. Ansab, IV , i i ,  pp. 158-9.
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The caliph, despite the removal of Khalid, re-appointed a l-
Muhallab as responsible for fighting the Azariqa, and gave him a free
hand in recruiting troops from Basra. Also on the caliph's orders, Bishr
ibn Marwan, the governor of Iraq, sent a Kufan army under ‘ Abd a l-
Rahman ibn Mikhnaf to join al-M uhallab.  ^ However, being appointed
directly by the caliph, a l-M uhallab was independent of Bishr. Realising this,
Bishr sought to depose him and turned to Ibn M ikhnaf, ordering him to disobey
al-M uhallab . But, being an Azdite like al-M uhallab himself, and wiser than
the young inexperienced Bishr, Ibn Mikhnaf considered the interest of his
2
own people and country rather than the personal interest of the governor.
He, therefore, did not listen to Bishr*s orders, although he pretended to 
accept them. A l-M uhallab , with the troops of Basra and Kufa, was able to 
push the Azariqa back, and captured Ram-Hurmuz where he stayed for ten 
days.
Mieanwhile, Bishr ibn Marwan died in Basra. The news of his death gave 
the turbulent troops of Basra and Kufa an excuse for leaving their camp:
3they made their way to their homes, loitering in the cities. Being left
1. Ansab, fo l. 34a; Mubarrad, III, pp .362-3; T ab ., I I ,  p .855 (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); KufT, II, fo ls .65a-67a; Ghurar, fo l. 12; Kamil, IV ,p .2 9 7 ;
M iP ljt ,  V I,fo l.8b ;S harb , IV?p. 178; Dhahabi, H I,pp. 116-7 (quoting 
TabarTj; Bidaya, IX ,p .3; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,p .322.
2. Imamq, I I ,p .76 -7 ; Ansab,fols.34a;34b; Mubarrad, I I I ,p p .362-3; Tab.,
11, p. 826 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K am il, IV , p. 297; M ir ’ a t , V I ,  fo i.bb;
Sharh, IV ,p . 180; Bidaya, IX ,p .3; ‘ Ib a r , I I I ,p p .90 -1 , 323.
3. Ansab, fol. 34b; Mubarrad, I I I ,  pp. 364-6; J a b ., 11, pp. 857-9  (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); KufT, 11, fo l. 67b; Ghurar, fols. 12-13; K am il, IV ,p p .297-8;
M ir *5 t , V  I,fo l.8 b ; Sharh, IV ,pp . 180-1 ;Bidaya, IX ,p .3 ; ‘ Ibar, 111,pp- 91 ,323-4 .
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with only small number of his Azdite people, al-M uhallab was forced
to the defensive. Thanks to the disagreement which arose among the
1Azariqa, a l-M uhallab was left unattacked. The situation,however,
remained crucial, and needed an energetic and prudent man to restore
order among the indisciplined troops of Iraq, and to back al-M uhallab
effectively in his campaign against the Azariqa. As we have seen earlier,
‘ Abd a l-M a lik  found such a man in a l-H a jja j, to whom he assigned the
2
governorship of Iraq i / 5 /6 9 4 ).
The presence of a l-H a jja j, as governor in Iraq, was indeed a turning
point in the struggle against the Kharijites in general and the Azariqa in
particular. He not only forced the insubordinate people of Iraq to go back to
their camp in Ram-Hurmuz, but also continued to back al-M uhallab until the
3Azariqa were completely crushed. In order to strengthen al-M uhallab to 
face the enemy effectively, al-Hajjaj assigned to him the Kharaj of all the 
lands which he would conquer between Fars and Basra, until the war was 
over.
With this energetic backing, al-M uhallab was now able to take the 
offensive, pushing back the Azariqa to Sabur. Then he made his camp in 
Arjan and seized Sardan, a mountainous region which otherwise the Azariqa
1. Kufi, 11, fo l. 68a; Ghurar, fols. 14-15.
2. See Chapter I I I ,  pp. 21 o
3. See Chapter V , p.Z^jJL
might have used to fortify themselves. From Arjan al-M uhallab moved to
Kazrun where he secured his camp from night attacks by digging a ditch
round it. By this time the Kufan army under Ibn M ikhnaf had also arrived,
but had a separate camp to al-M uhallab's. Ibn M ikhnaf, who had no
experience of the method of warfare of the Azariqa, ignored the advice
of al-M uhallab and refused to dig a trench around his camp. The Azariqa
made a surprise night attack on ai-Muhallab's camp, which completely
failed because of the ditch. They then turned to Ibn Mikhnaf's feamp which,
unprotected as it was by a ditch, allowed them to in flict a severe defeat
an the Kufans in which many lives were lost, including that of their leader
Ibn M ikhnaf (75/695). ^
In the next year, 76 /696 , a l-H a jja j sent ‘ Attab ibn Warqa’ al-RiyahT,. — *
the governor of Isbahan, to replace Ibn Mikhnaf as the leader of the Kufan 
army. However, ‘ Attab did not stay long as commander, being recalled to 
Iraq after only eight months (77/697). He was transferred because he was 
needed in the war against another Kharijite group, Shabib and his followers;
1. Suraqa ibn Mirdas, DTwan , pp.4 3 -4 ; Ansab, fols.34b-35a; M ubarrad ,III,
pp .370-3; Tab., II, p p .875 (citing Abu M ikh n af), 879-80; Kamil , IV ,
pp .315-16; M ir ’ at, V I ,  fo l. 16b; Sharh , iVTpp* 185-7; D hahab r,lll,
pp. 119-20; Bidaya, IX , p. 10; ‘ Ibar, ill,p p . 99, 323-4 . However, the
Kufans' account, which implies that al-M uhallab was responsible for
this defeat, should not be taken seriously. It is obviously an an ti-
Muhallab tradition; and also Kufan attempt to justify their defeat.
Tab ., 11, p. 876.
•
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also the relationship between him and ai-M uhallab had begun to deteriorate,
threatening a tribal conflict between the Tamim supporting * Attab, and the
Azd and Bakr supporting al-M uhallab. It was in the light of this rift that
a| -M uhallab became keen on strengthening the Hi If between al-A zd and
Bakr, of which he had not at first been in favour.^ After * Attab's departure,
al-M uhallab appointed his own son Habib to be head of the Kufan army. They
■
together continued to fight the Azariqa in Sabur, and expelled them from
Fars completely. The Azariqa then went to Kirman, where they fortified
t  2 themselves in Jiruft.
Impatient as always, a l-H a jja j continued to send reproachful messages
and deputations to al-M uhallab. He accused him of deliberately prolonging
the war in order to appropriate for himself the Kharaj of the lands under his
3control. A l-H a jja j urged him to waste no time in exterminating the enemy.
*
Because of his distrust of a l-M uhallab, a l-H a jja j took away from him the control
1. Ansab, fol .35b; Mubarrad, l l l ,p p .379-81; T a b ., 11,pp.872-8 (citing 
Abd1 M ikhnaf); Kamil, iV ,p .3 16 ; M ir*a t ,V I,fo M 7 a  (citing Ibn a l-K alb i) 
Sharh. l^ ,p p . 194-6; Bidaya, IX ,p . 10; * Ibar, 111,pp. 99,324.
2. Ansab, fo l.36a; Mubarrad, l l l ,p .382; T ab ., I I ,p . 1003 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); 
Kamil, IV ,p p .317,353; M ir*a t, V I,fo l.2 6 a ; Sharh , IV ,p . 196;* Ibar, I I I ,p . 99.
3* * Uyun.p .4 9 ; Ansabr fols.34b-35a; 35b (citing Mada* in i); Mubarrad, 111,
p p .36 8 ,3 70 ,3 7 3 -4 , 3 7 7 -8 ,3 7 9 ,3 8 5 -6 ; Tab ., I I ,p . 1003 (citing AbJ 
M ikhnaf); KufT, I I ,  fo ls ,72a;72b,73a-75b,77a-80a; Ghurar, fo ls .19-21, 
22-24; <lqd, I,p . 145; Aghy, X I I I ,  p .60 ;.K a m il, IV ,p p .36 3 -9 ; M .V a t,
V I ,  fols. 26a-26b; Sharh , IV , pp. 187 ,1 89 -92 ,1 93 -4 , 195, 199-200,
219-20 (quoting UbahCtnT); NuwairT, V I I , p . 246-8 .
of Fars, as soon as the district was recovered once and for a ll from the 
Azariqa. It was only on the caliph's orders, that he left the revenue of 
special "Kuwar11 for al-M uhallab to maintain his army.  ^ On the other hand, 
al-M uhallab showed tolerance towards the impatient governor, and tried 
to explain to him that his strategy was not to risk a battle which would 
expose his army to danger, preferring to wait until an opportunity arose 
to deal the fatal blow to the enemy. Nevertheless, he did not leave them 
completely unmolested, but carried on continuous skirmishes and minor 
battles.
Meanwhile, disputes "over matters of state and interpretation of law"
2arose among the Azariqa. These disputes were fomented by a l-M uhallab, 
who found in them a good opportunity to weaken his enemy. Eventually, these 
disputes resulted in the desertion of eight thousand m awali, under one 
of them, ‘ Abd Rabbih al-Saghir, from Qatri ibn a l-F u ja ’ a , with whom were
1. Ansab, fo l. 36b; Mubarrad, I I I ,  p. 389; T ab ., 11,pp. 1003-4 (citing Abu 
Mikhnaf); K am il, IV ,p .354; M ir* at, V I ,  fo l. 26a; Sharb, IV , p .201;
< Ibar, I I I ,p .342.
2. Ansab, fols.36a, 36b (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), 37a; Y a ‘ qubi, I I ,p .329; 
JvQbarrad, I I I ,  pp .3 8 2 -3 ;Tab., II,p p . 1006-7; KulT, ll,fo ls .83b -88a; 
Ghurar, fols. 27-30; Maqa I St, i,p p ,8 7 -9 ; Bad', V I ,p .32; Bagh., pp. 65-6; 
Kamil, IV ,p p ,3 5 4 -5 ;M ir , S t , V I , f o l . 2 6 b ; ^ h ,  IV ,pp . 197 -9 ,20 2-3 , 
204-5; e Ibar, I I I , p . 343; I. ‘ Abbas, Shi‘ r a l-E kaw arij, p .35, Beirut,
1963. However, this large number of mawsh in the ranks of the 
Azariqa might have been due to the fac tjh a t their movement flourished 
in the Persian provinces of al-A hw az, Fars, fsbahan and Kirman. For, 
with its doctrine of equality, the Kharijite movement was the most 
attractive movement to them. Thomson, Kharijitism and K harijites,p.37b, 
MPV,/ Princeton, 1933.
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the majority of the ‘ Arabs. Also ‘ Am ru'i-Qana with a small number of
‘ Arabs joined ‘ Abd Rabbih al-Saghir.^ Consequently, a l-H a jja j, since
the war was costly both in men and equipment and in loss of revenue from
Kharaj-controlled provinces, urged al-M uhallab to seize this opportunity
and attack them. However, al-M uhallab did otherwise, for he thought
that this attack on them might serve to reunite them. Nevertheless, ‘ Abd
Rabbih al-Saghir and his mawali followers drove Q atri and his ‘ Arab
supporters out of the city of Jiruft and they made their camp outside the
city. But they soon realised that .it was wiser not to put themselves
between two stools, i .e .  ‘ Abd Rabbih and al-M uhallab , and they therefore
-  2left Jiruft and made for Tabaristan.
The departure of Qatri to Tabaristan made it easier for al-M uhallab• .
to deal with the remainder of the Azariqa under ‘ Abd Rabbih al-Saghir.
The latter was soon killed in a battle and his followers dispersed, while some 
of them were granted Aman by al-M uhallab. The latter returned to Basra 
where he and his sons and his prominent soldiers were received very warmly
1. Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Cppositiondfrparteien im alten 
Islam, p .40 .
2. Ansab /o ls. 137b-13Sa; Y a ‘ qubi, 11, p. 329; Mubarrad, I I I ,  p. 394; T ab ., 
I I ,p . 1007 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, 11,fol. 85b; Ghurar, fo l. 28;
Bagh . ,p .6 6 ; M u ‘ jam ,ll,p .6 2 ;  Kamil, IV ,p .355; M ir *a t , V I,fo l,2 6 b ;  
Sharb , IV , p. 206; Waf ay a t, I, p. 601; Bidaya, IX , p. 30 (citing Abu 
M a ‘ shar and WaqidT); ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  p .343.
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by both a l-H a jja j and the people (7&/692). Thus the war between a l -
Muhallab and the Azariqa, which lasted for three years of al-Hajjaj*s
governorship, ended in success.
W hile a l-M uhallab was still fighting ‘ Abd Rabbih al-Saghir and
his followers, he wrote to a l-H a jja j about the situation and asked him to send
•
an army against Q atri ibn a l-Fu ja*a  and ‘ Ubaida ibn H ila l in Tabaristan.
* •
A l-H a jja j accordingly sent Sufyan ibn al-Abrad a l-K alb i with a Syrian 
army against them. To Sufyan's aid came a Kufan army under ‘ Abd al-Rahman 
ibn al-Ash‘ ath from Tabaristan, as well as Ja‘ far ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn 
Mikhnaf with an army from Rayy. By these combined efforts, Q atri was—mmm f
-  2killed and his head sent to a l-H a jja j*
Nevertheless, the Azariqa were not completely exterminated. For ‘ Ubaida 
ibn H ila l and his followers fortified themselves in a castle in Oumis. But 
Sufyan ibn al-A brad, who was now in charge of the war against the Azariqa, 
tackled him as soon as he finished with Q atri. He beseiged them for three 
months. During this they suffered badly from lack of provisions. Sufyan also 
issued Aman for those who would lay down their arms and come over to his side.
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyo^, Tarlkh, I, p .356; Ansab, fols.37a,37b(citing a l-  
Haytham); DTnawarT, pp. 286-9; Y a ‘ qubT, II, p .329; Mubarrad, I I I ,p p .394, 
396^?09; Tab., II,p p . 1007 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 1033 (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); K afi, I I, fols,84a-88b; 89a, 90a-90b; Ghurar, fo ls .28-30 , 
3 1 -3 ; * Iqd, 11,pp. 81 -2  (citing Mada* irn); M uruj, V ,p p . 350-1; Bad*
V I , p . 32; Bagh., p .66; Kamil, IV ,p p .355-7; M ir * a t , V I , f o l .26^1 
Sharh . IV ,pp . 206-16, 22Q-3; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,p p .343-4 .
2. KhalTfa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh, I, p. 356; Bayan, 111,p. 134; M a *a rif,p . 181; 
Ansab, fo l-38a-38b; DTnawarT, p.2b9; Y a ‘ qubT, I I ,p p .329-30; *, s.*
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While some accepted this offer, others, including ‘ Ubaida himself, decided
1to fight and were very easily defeated (78/692), Thus this dangerous 
Kharijfte sect was exterminated. Sufyan, however, remained in Tabaristan
until he was recalled to Iraq prior to the battle of Dair al-Jamajim between
-  -  2 ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash‘ ath and a l-H a jja j.
During the time of the war against the Azariqa, another serious 
Kharijite rebellion occurred in the Jazira region, forming a potential threat 
to Kufa and its surroundings. This rebellion was led by the Sufrite Salih 
ibn Musarrih al-Tam im i. However, the movement took its name from that of 
ShabTb ibn Yazld ai-Shaibani, one of the most distinguished followers of 
Salih and was able to defy the government's forces for over a year.
We have two accounts of this event. The first and most detailed one is 
that of Abu Mikhnaf in Baladhuri and Tabari. The second is that of ‘ Awana 
ibn al-Hakam , reported by Baladhuri, Ibn A ‘ tham and the author of Ghurar 
al-S iyar. While it is interesting to have both the Iraqi and the Syrian accounts,
-  T a b ., 11, pp. 1018-20 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,  fols. 90b-91a;
Ghurar, fols.46 -7 ; Bad*, V I ,  p. 33; Bagh. ,  p .66; Kamil, IV, p. 357-8; 
M ir*S t, V I,fo l.2 6 b ; Wafayat, l ,p .6 0 1 ; Bidaya, IX ,p .30 (citing 
Abu M a ‘ shar and WaqidT); ‘ ibar, I I I ,p .  344; Shadharat, I ,p p .86-7  
(quoting lEn Qutaiba).
1. Ansab, fols.38b-39a; T a b ., II,p p . 1020-1 (citing AbTJ M ikhnaf); Kufi, I I ,
fols. 91 a-92a; Ghurar. fols.4 7 -8 ; Bagh., p .66; M u‘ jam 7T ll,p .62 ; Kamil , 
pp. 358-9 ; M ir7 a t , V I ,  fo l. 26b; ‘ Ibar, 111, pp. 344-5; G abrie li, La Poesia 
Harigita nel Secolo degli Cmayyadi, p .358, RSO , 1943; I . ‘ Abbas, 
op. c i t . , pp .52 -3 .
2. See Chapter V , p. 2 1 $
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unfortunately ‘ Awana's account is not only brief, but also inconsistent
and lacks chronology. Moreover, it presents a somewhat incomplete
picture, since it omits the beginning of the movemebt by Salih ibn
Musarrih. However, the details provided by Abu Mikhnaf*s account
fit in with and supplement the other historians, such as Khalifa ibn Khayyat
and Ibn Qutaiba. Furthermore, Abu Mikhnaf reports his account on the
authority of eye-witnesses on bdh sides; men like al-M uhallam i, Farwa
ibn Laqit, ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Jundub and the Syrian Abu Zaid al-Saksaki. 
. •
For all these reasons, we should place more reliance on the narrative of 
Abu M ikhnaf.
The movement began when Salih ibn Musarrih, the Kharijite leader
in Dara, and about 120 followers rebelled against Muhammad ibn Marwan,
_  ]
the governor of /Vkcusil and Jazira in Safar, 6 7 /M a y ,6 9 5 . They seized
some of the Dawab(animals)belonging to the governor, in Dara. This was
an essential first step, since none of them was mounted. For thirteen days
they remained in the area arousing the fear of the people of Dara, Nasibin
and Sinjar. At first the governor underestimated the importance of this
Kharijite band and tried to send ‘ Adi ibn ‘ Adi ibn ‘ Umaira with only five
1. However, Salih ibn Musarrih was not the first Kharijite to revolt 
in the Jazira region. His revolt was preceeded""Ey that of Fadala 
ibn Sayyar al-TaimT al-Shaibani, who with his eighteen followers 
was massacred by the ‘ Anza tribesmen. The caliph rewarded the 
latter by letting them settle in the Bamqya* and assigning ‘ A ta* 
to them. Tab ., II, p .893 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamil, IV ,p .321; 
‘ Ibar, I I I , p .326.
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hundred men against them. It was only when ‘ Adi called the attention of
the governor to the fact that they contained the bravest cavalry of the
Rabi‘ ites, that he agreed to increase this expedition to one thousand
men. However, ‘ A di, who was a pious man and therefore hesitant to fight
them, was surprised and put to flight by Salih and his followers in a place. *
called Suq Dhughan. ^
Following this defeat, Muhammad ibn Marwan reconsidered the situa-
tion and sent two armies against the Sufriyya, each of which contained 1500
men under Khalid ibn Jaz* al-SuIami and al-Harith ibn Ja ‘ una a l-M urri.
When hostilities were resumed, the Kharijites found themselves unable to
cope with this overwhelming force, and retreated by night to al-Daskara.
This brought them into conflict with a l-H a jja j, for al-Daskara was considered
as a Kufan territory. Consequently, a l-H a jja j dispatched three thousand men
under al-H arith  ibn ‘ Umaira al-Hamdani against them. A l-H arith  and his army
followed them until they met in a battle in al-M udabbaj, in the Mausil region,
where the Kharijites were beaten and their leader Salih was killed on 13th
2Jumada 1, 76/3rd September, 695. The seventy men of Salih's followers who 
survived the battle of al-M udabbaj, retreated into a stronghold there. But Shabib
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh, I ,p .351; Ansab, fo l.44a  (citing Abu Mltkhnaf); 
T ab ., 11, pp. 886-9  (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamil, IV ,p p .318-9; M ir* a t,V I ,  
fo ls .21 a-21b; Sharh, IV ,p p .225-9; DhahabT, I I I ,p . 121; Bidaya, IX ,p p .10- 
12 (quoting Tabart); ‘ Ibar, i l l ,p p .324^5.
2. KhalTfa ibn Khayyat, Tgrikh, I ,p .351 (here Jumada II is mentioned); Ans£b, 
fols.44a-44fcT{citing Aba Mikhnaf); Tab., I I ,p p .889-92 (citing Abu Mikhnaf) 
Bagh., p .89; M ila l, p. 224; M u ‘ jam, IV ,p .448; Kamil, IV ,p p .319-20; s
ibn Yazid al-Shaibani, who now assumed the leadership, succeeded in
saving them; for in a night attack he inflicted a defeat on his enemy, and
1the Sufriyya escaped far from Kufa* This was the beginning of a series of
military victories over the troops of a l-H a jja j, which met but rarely with
•
reverses until Shabib* s death.
In Mausil, Shabib was joined by Salama ibn Sayyar, and together 
they raided the tribes of * Anza and Banu Shaiban, Shabib's own tribe.
Meanwhile, a l-H a jja j ordered Sufyan ibn A b i'l - ‘ A liya ai-K hath‘ ami, 
originally sent to Tabaristan, to return to fight Shabib. A l-H a jja j also 
ordered Sawra ibn Abjar to take over the army of al-Harith ibn ‘ Umaira, and 
join Sufyan in his campaign against Shabib. However, Sufyan and his army 
met Shabib in Khanaqin before Sawra was able to arrive, where Sufyan was 
defeated. Then, following the orders of a l-H a jja j, Sawra ibn Abjar with his army
55 M ir*a t, V I ,  fols.21b-22b; Sharh, IV ,p p .230-1 (citing Farwa ibn LaqTt);
Dhahabi, 111,p. 122 (here also Jumada II is given); Bidaya, IX ,pp . 12-13 
(quoting Tabari); ‘ Ibar, I I I ,p .325. According to BafadhurT, ShahrastanT 
and Yaqut, it was Bishr ibn Marwan who sent the army of al-Harith ibn 
‘ Umaira against S a l * b n  Musarrih and his followers. However, judging 
from the fact that Salih was killed in the year 76, and that the death of 
Bishr ibn Marwan was in theyyear 75, it is certain that it was a l-H a jja j 
and not Bishr who sent that army. Ansab, fo l.44a; M ila l , p .224; M u ‘ jam, 
IV ,p .448.
1. It is said that Salih ibn Musarrih, before his death, ordered his followers
to pay homage to Shabib. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh, I , p . 351;
M a ‘ a rif, p. 180; Bagh., p .89; M ila l, p .224; Dhajabt, 1II,p * 112.
However, another account says that Shabib himself, after Salih's death, 
asked the latter's followers to pay him homage and they agreed to do so. 
Ansab, fo l. 45b (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Tab ., 11, p. 891 (citing Abu Mikhnaf) 
Kgmil, IV ,p .320; Sharb, IV , p .231; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,p p .325-6 .
pursued Shabib. They met in battle in al-Nahraw an, where Sawra was
defeated and followed until he reached al-M ada* in* Thanks to local
resistance, Shabib was turned away from a l-M ad a*in , and the troops of Sawra
1went back to Kufa.
After these successive defeats, a l-H a jja j raised an army of four 
thousand men under ‘ Uthman ibn Sa‘ id a l-K in d i, nicknamed a l-J a z l. Con­
trary to his predecessors, the latter showed great caution towards Shabib, being 
always on the alert and digging trenches to avoid night attacks. For two 
months no decisive battle issued between the two. The impatient a l-H a jja j 
could wait no longer,and he replaced a l-Jaz l by Sa‘ id ibn a l-M u ja lid  a l~  
Hamdani. A l-H a jja j ordered the latter to reverse his predecessor's strategy 
and to fight Shabib as soon as he saw him. Following these orders,
Sa‘ id led his army in pursuit of Shabib and his followers, until they met in 
Baraz al-Ruz. A fierce struggle took place which ended in a disaster for a l-
H a jja j*s  army; Sa‘ id was killed and his army fled. However, a l-Jaz l tried to
2
rally them, but he was severely wounded and soon died in a l-M a d a *in .
1* Khalifa ibn Khayyat , Tarikh, I, p .351; Ansab, fols.45b-46a (citing 
Ibn al -K a lb T jT ja b ., 11, pp. 893-901 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); K am il, IV , 
p p .321 -4 ; M ir* a t, V I , fo l .  22a; Sharb, IV ,p p .232-6; Dhahabt, I I I ,p .  122;
‘ Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 326-7; E. I.  ^ (ShabTb ibn Yazid ibn N u‘ aim al-ShaibanT).
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat-, Tarikh, I, p .351; Ansab, fo l.46a  (citing ibn
a I -K  al bi); M  a 'ad, fols. 28b, 69a; Tab ., 11, pp. 202-11 (citing Abu Mikhnaf) 
911-15; Kamil, IV ,p p .32 4 -7 ; M ir ’ a t, V I,  fols.22a-22b; Sharb , IV, 
pp.2 2 7 -4 4 ;~Dh ahabT, I I I ,p . 122; ‘ Ib a r , I I I ,p p .327-8 .
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As a result of this victory, Shabib marched towards Kufa routing an 
army which a l-H a jja j sent against him commanded by Suwaid ibn ‘ Abd a l -  
Rahman a l-S a ‘ di. However, Shabib did not enter Kufa but instead went to 
Adharbayjan. It seems that Shabib decided to give his followers a rest and 
also planned to surprise his enemy. Throughout all his wars with the govern­
ment he showed himself a master of guerrilla warfare. His small forces helped him 
to move swiftly, enabling him to surprise his enemies. Moreover, because he 
was on good terms with the Christian population in the area of his m ilitaryopera- 
tions, they helped him to find shelter for his small forces, and also provided him 
with full information about his enemy's movement.  ^ However, a l-H a jja j was 
relieved to know that Shabib was far from Kufa, and he went to Basra. While he 
was there, he heard that Shabib was on his way to Kufa, which news sent him back 
to Kufa. He reached there the afternoon of Shabib's arrival in the evening of 
the same day. That night, Shabib and his two hundred followers entered Kufa 
and defied a l-H a jja j by thundering with an iron bar on the gate of the Qasr 
(palace) of a l-H a jja j, leaving a deep trace on it. They also went to the mosque
of Kufa, killing all those who they found praying there. But in the morning
2 _
they dispersed. A l-H a jja j then sent Zahr ibn Qais a l-Ju ‘ fi with eighteen hundred
1. E. I.  ^ , (Shabib ibn Yazid ibn Nu‘ aim al-Shaibani).
2. It is said that Shabi b entered Kufa with his wife G hazala , who per­
formed her prayers in the mosque of Kufa in fulfilment of a vow she 
had made some time earlier. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I ,p .352;
M a ‘ a rif, p. 181; Ansab, fols.46E (citing Ibn a l-K a lb t),48 a  (citing a l-  
Haytham); KufT, ll7fol«93a; Ghurar, fo l .29; M uru j, V ,p p 320 -1 , 441;
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cavalry men to pursue Shabib and fight him. At the same time, a l-H a jja j
sent Bishr ibn Ghalib al-Asadi with two thousand men; Za* id a ibn
Gudama al-Thaqafi with two thousand men; Abu'l-Dharis, a mawla
of Tamim, with one thousand men; A ‘ yun, a mawla of Bishr ibn Marwan
with one thousand men; and Muhammad ibn Musa ibn Talha with two
•  •  •
thousand men. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  appointed the latter to the governorship of 
Sistan and made him dependent on a l-H a jja j. A l-H a jja j had persuaded him 
that he should not go to Sistan before fighting Shabib, to get the merit of 
defeating or killing him. A l-H a jja j also made Za* ida ibn Qudama the 
commander-in-chief of these five armies, which were gathered at Rudbar, 
about twenty four parasangs from Kufa. M eanwhile, Shabib had met Zahr 
ibn Qais, seriously wounded him and routed his army. Then Shabib marched 
against the huge army under Za* ida ibn Qudama, killing the latter and defeating 
his army.  ^ Despite the urging of his followers, he did not attack Kufa although 
it lay open to him by this time, and thus did not take advantage of his victory. 
Instead he went to Khanjar, where he constituted a direct threat to al-M ada* in, 
the door to Kufa.
“ Agh. , X V I,p . 155; Bagh., p p .90-1 (here his mother's name ismentioned
instead); M ir* at, V I ,  fo l.23a; W afayat, I, p .314; Bidaya, IX ,p . l4 ;  
Shadharat, I, pp. 83 -4 ; I . ( Abbas, op. c i t , , pp. 6 3 -4 . However, the 
narrative of Abu Mikhnaf in Tabari, repeated by Ibn a l-A ‘ thq; Ibn 
Abi'l-HadTd and Ibn Khaldun, is completely silent on Ghazala's vow 
and prayers. Tab., II,pp . 917-1 9; Kamil. IV , pp .328-9; Sharh., IV , 
pp .245-7; ‘ Ibar. I l l ,p p .329-30.
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tartkh, I, p .352; M a ‘ arif, pp. 180-1; ‘ Uyun,
p. 152 (citing”Abu11-Yaqdan); Ansab, fols.46b (citing Ibn a l-K a lb t),
50a (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida); Y a ‘ qubl, 11, p. 328; T a b ., II ,  pp. 915-29 (citing
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Again a l-H a jja j raised an army under ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad
* •
ibn al-Ash‘ ath and ordered him to fight Shabib. Cn the advice of a l-J a z l,
Ibn al-Ash‘ ath was always on his guard and entrenched himself at night.
Shabib, failing to surprise this army, tried to draw Ibn al-Ash‘ ath into
rough and difficult passes and roads to tire him out, so that he could then
launch his attack. But Ibn al-Ash‘ ath refused to be drawn, although his
caution infuriated a l-H a jja j, who replaced Ibn al-Ash‘ ath by ‘ Uthman
ibn Gatan a l-H arith i . The new leader was as hasty as his predecessor had been
cautious and very soon engaged in a battle with Shabib on the banks of the river
D uja il, Dhu'l-Hajja, 76 /M arch , 696. But here again a l-H a jja j‘s army was
defeated and its leader ‘ Uthman ibn Qatan k illed , while Ibn al-Ash‘ ath
1managed to return to Kufa with the routed army.
After these brilliant military victories, Shabib went to the mountains
of Bahrugan where he spent the three months of the summer of 77 /696 . Here
. . - 2
he was joined by many who were dissatisfied with a l-H a jja j. However, these
three months of unofficial truce gave a l-H a jja j time to mobilize all those Kufans
• —
able to fight and in receipt of the ‘ A ta * , and also some Basran troops. The
-  Abu Mikhnaf); Jamharat, p. 183; Bagh. ,pp. 90-1; K am il, IV ,p p .327-33;
M ir*a t, V I,  fo ls.23a-23b, Sharh , IV ,pp244-54 (citing Farwa ibn LaqTt); 
W afayat, I ,p .314; Dhahabt, I l l /p . 122;Bidaya, IX ,p . 14; ‘ I b a r ,  I I I ,p p .328-32; 
Shadharat. I, pp. 83 -4 .
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I , p . 352; Ansab,fols*46b-47a (citing Ibn a l -  
KalbT);Tab., 1 l,pp. 930-9 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); KufT, 11, fo l. 92b; Ghurar, 
fo ls.4 8 -9 ; Bagh,. pip. 90; K am il, IV ,p p .333-6; M ir*a t,V I ,  fols.23b-24a; 
Sharb, IV ,p p . 256-60; DhahabT, l l ,p . 122; Bidaya, IX ,p . 14; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,  pp. 33 2 -4 .
2. Tab ., 11, p. 914; (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kami 1, IV ,p . 338; M ir* at, V I ,  fo l. 24b; 
Sharb, IV ,p p .260-1 .
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number of this army is said to have reached fifty thousand men. Meanwhile,
Shabib marched on al-M ada* in , where Mut arrif ibn al-M ughira was governor.
The latter was a fanatical Muslim, sympathetic to the Kharijite cause although
he was not one of them. When ShabTb approached al-M ada* in , he kept him for
2four days in discussions, but without any result. Realising that a l-H a jja j 
would punish him, M utarrif evacuated a l-M ada*in  and went to the mountains. 
Thus Shabib seized the c ity , a fact which gave him a better strategy for his 
attack on Kufa. M eanwhile, a l-H a jja j recalled ‘ Attab ibn Warqa* al-R iyahi, 
who was fighting the Azdriqa with al-M uhallab, and gave him the command of
-  3the overwhelming army he had raised against Shabib. ‘ Attab made his camp in
Suq Hakama not far from Baghdad. Shabib, however, with only six hundred
- 4
followers, was able to defeat ( A ttab’s army, and killed ( Attab. A l-H a jja j,  
however, had already appealed to the caliph for help after the Kufans had failed
1. Bidaya, IX ,p .17.
2. See p. 3 5 5  .
3. See p. 5
4 . Khalifa  ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, l,p .3 4 5 ; A nsab, fo l.47a  (citing Ibn a l -
Kalbi); Tab ., I I ,p p .942-54 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); KufT, ll,fo l.9 2 b ;
Kamil, IV , pp .338-43; M ir*at, V I,  fols.24E^25b; Sharfr, IV ,p p .261-8; 
DhahabT, 111, pp. 122-4 (citing Abu Mikhnaf and Farwa ibn LaqTt);
Bidaya, IX ,p . 17; * lb ar,lli,p p .33 4-6 ;3h ad h ara t. I ,p p .83 -4 .
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to meet the Kharijite threat. The caliph sent him six thousand Syrians, four
thousand under Sufyan ibn al-Abrad al-K alb i and two thousand under
_  _  _  ]
Habib ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman al-Hakam i.
•  *  •
The death of ‘ Attab and the defeat of his army encouraged Shabib 
to march on Kufa. On his way there he defeated an army of one thousand 
men under al-HarijT^ ibn M u‘ awiya ai-Thaqafi. Then Shabib made his camp 
in one of the Kufan suburbs, where he built a mosque, showing that he was 
there for a considerable time. Before the next decisive battle, ShabTb was 
able to k ill the mawali and slaves which a l-H a jja j had equipped to defend him. 
However , a l-H a jja j and his Syrian army made their camp in al-Sabkha, 
and soon a battle was joined. None of the Kufans who had been in the 
army of ’‘A ttab were allowed to participate in this battle, except for Khalid
the son of ‘ Attab, and Sawra ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn M ikhnaf, with a very
-  2 — 
small number of Kufans. However, contrary to all previous battles, Shabib
was strongly resisted by the Syrians,and began to retreat slowly. Meanwhile,
with the permission of a l-H a jja j, Khalid ibn ‘ Attab and some Kufans attacked
1. Ansab, fo l.47a  (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Tab., I I , p .943 (citing Abu Mikhftaf); 
KufT, I I,  fo 1.93a; Ghprar, fo l.49 ; Muruj, V ,p p .322-3; Kamil, IV ,p .339; 
M ir* a t, V I ,  fol ♦ 24b; Sharh. IV , p. 263; Waf ay at, l,p .3 1 4 ; DhahabT, III ,  p. 123; 
Bidaya, IX ,p . 14; ‘ ibar, Il l ,p .3 3 4 .
2. The narrative of ‘ Umar ibn Shabba in Tabari, however, tries to ignore 
completely the Syrian role in this battle. Ja b ., I I ,p p .962-9; Wellhausen, 
Die Religios Politischen Qppositiony&parteien im alten .Islam, p .46.
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Shabib's camp from the rear, killing his wife Ghazala and his brother
Masad, and setting fire to the camp. When Sh abib heard of this, he and
his followers took to flight followed by al-Hajjaj*s army (77/697). ^
•
A l-H a jja j sent Habib ibn ( Abd al-Rahman al-Hakm i with three thou- 
• “  * • *
sand Syrians in pursuit of Shabib. They met in al-Anbar but no decisive 
battle took place, and Shabib with his followers retreated to al-Ahw az
2
and then to Kirman where they stayed for some time for re lie f and recovery, 
A l-H a jja j dispatched against him in Kirman, Sufyan ibn al-Abrad al-KalbT 
witha.Syrian army. A l-H a jja j also ordered his deputy governor in Basra, a l-  
Hakam ibn Ayyub al-Thaqafi, to send a Basran army to assist Sufyan. 
Therefore, Ziyad ibn ( Amr a l-^A tk i and four thousand Basrans were sent 
to join Sufyan, but they arrived only after the latter had already engaged 
Shabib in battle. On the other hand, Shabib lost some of his followers who 
accepted the AmQ.n of a l-H a jja j. In order to meet Sufyan, Shabib crossed
] .  Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tari-kh., I, p .354; *Uyun, p. 152 (citing A b t/I
Yaqdan); Ansab, fols.47a-47b(citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); T a b ., II,p p . 955-61 
(citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, ll,fo ls . 93b-94a; Ghurar, fo ls .50 -1 ; Muruj ,
V ,  pp .221-2; K am il, IV ,p p .343-5; M ir*at, V I ,  fols. 25b-26a; Shark,~
IV ,p p .268-72; W afayat, l,p ,3 1 4 ; DhahabT, III, p. 123-4 (citing Abu M ikhnaf) 
Bidaya, IX , pp. 17—19; * Ibar, IU,ppT5i36-8; Shadharat, I,pp. 83 -4 .
2. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh ., I ,p .354; Ansab, fo l.47b  (citing Ibn al
KalbT); Y a ( qub7, I I ,p .328 (here as well as in Kuff and Ghurar, the 
name ‘ Alqama ibn f Abd al-Rahman is given); T a b ., II,p p . 969-72 (citing 
Abu M ikhnaf); Kuff, II,fo l.9 4 a ; Ghurar, fo l .51; Bagh., p .91; K am il,
IV , pp .345-6; M ir5at, V I,fo l.2 6 a ;  Sharfrf IV ,pp . 272-5; DhahabT, IN], 
p. 124;M bar, I I I ,p p .337-8 .
328.
the river Dujoii and came to a l-A h w a z , where hostilities began. Once
again Shabib could not meet the strong resistance of the Syrians and began
to retreat, crossing back over the river Dujail. He let all his followers
cross first, and while he in the rear was on the bridge, he fe ll in and was
drowned.  ^ This was probably at the end of 77 /697.
Different versions exist of the death of Shabib. According to one 
2
account, while he was crossing his horse *s foot went off the bridge, because
there was a mare in front of him, thus tossing Shabib in the river. Another 
3 _
account says that when Shabib was on the bridge, Sufyan ordered the bridge 
to be cut down, thus causing Shabib's death. Finally, there is a third account
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I , p .355; M a *a rif, p. 180; ‘ Uyun, p. 152
citing Abu'I-Yaqdan); Ansab, fols.47b (citing Ibn al-KalbT), 48a (citing 
al-Haytham ); Ya'qubT, II, p .328; Tab ., II,p p . 972-6 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); 
KufT, fT7fol.94g; Ghurar, fo l.5 1 ; M uruj, V , p . 322; Bagh. ,  p. 91;
M ila l ,  p .2 2 4 ;K a m il, IV, pp. 346-50; M ir* a t , V I, fo l. 26a; Sharh , iV  ^
p p .276-78; W afaydt, I, p .314; Mukhtagar, I , p . 208; Dhahabt, III,p p . 124-5  
Bidaya, IX ,pp . 19-20 (citing Ibn al-KalbT); ( Ibar, IiT^pp*338—40;
Shad bar at, I, p. 84; Theophanos, Chronographia, the year 6185.
2* Ansab, fo!.47b(citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Tab., I I , p . 974 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);
Muruj ,  V ,  p. 322; Kami I , IV , p. 349; Sharh , IV , p. 277(citing Farwa ibn 
LqqTt); W afayat, I,p .3 1 4 ; Dhahabt, I I I ,p . 125 (citing Abu Mikhnaf ); 
Bidaya, IX ,p p .19-20 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); * ibar, I I I ,p p .339-40.
3. Ansab, fols.47b,49a (citing al-Haytham); Y a 'q u b i, II ,p .3 2 8 ; Kufi,
I I ,  fo l.49a ; G hurar, fo l .51; Bagh., p. 91.
which reports that some of Shabib's own followers had already crossed before
Shabib and that they cut the ropes of the bridge which led to its collapse
t 1and the death of Shabib. What makes it difficult to decide in favour of
any of these narratives is that, while Abu Mikhnaf implies that the last
2  r  -  3
account is the right one, Ibn a i-A th ir and Ibn A bi'l-H ad id  prefer the .
first account. However, several reasons make us think that the third account
is the most convincing. Apart from the fact that the first account reads more
4 o
as a story than history, the second seems unlikely; for if Sufyan could cut the bridge,
would not it have been wiser to do so when Shabib had first crossed the River
Dujaif, saving himself the difficult task of fighting him? Cn the other hand,
Shabib had killed some of his own people (Banu Shaiban)as well as other tribes,
in his raids on those who did not follow him. This seemed enough to turn some of
his followers against him, especially those who did not profess Kharijism as such,
but had joined him out of fear, or to get material benefits as a result of his
1. Ansab, fo ls.47b, 149a; Tab ., 11, pp. 975-6 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil,
IV ,p .349; Sharh, IV ,p .277; Bidaya, IX , p.20(citing Ibn aI-KalbT)I
2. T a b ., II ,p . 976.
3# Kamil, IV / p .349; Sharh/ IV, p .277.
4 . Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositiorv£pqrteien im alten
Islam, p .47.
5. Ansab, fols.47a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), 49a (citing al-Haytham );Jab., II, 
pp.895(citing Abu M ikhnaf ), 915-16 (citing Abu MikhnafJJ 941 (citing 
Abu M ikhnaf), 975 (citing Abu M ikhnaf), 976-7 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); 
Kamil, IV ,p .322; Sharh, IV ,p . 277; B idaya,IX ,p .20 (citing Ibn al-KalbT);
* Ibar, I I I , p .326.
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brilliant m ilitary successes, or else to escape a l-H a jja j *s severe policies. ^
It should be added that disputes arose among his followers and also others felt 
jealousy towards him. It is reported that in the battle of al-Sabkha,
Masqaia ibn Muhalha! al-Dabbi with some of his followers deserted Shabib,
-  . ♦ 2
because the latter refused to show adherence to Salih ibn Musarrih. Some. • •
of Shabib's followers also were dissatisfied with him because at one time he
3showed mercy to his own people or old friends. F inally, according to a l -
-  4Haytham ibn ‘ A di, some of his followers accused him of being unjust and 
in giving a mare to one of his followers. It is very like ly , therefore, that 
Shabib had met his death at the hands of those malcontents among his followers. 
The fate of .Najda ibn ‘ Amir al-Hanafi and that of Q atri ibn a l-F u ja7a confirms 
this view.**
However, Shabib's death proved the turning point in the Sufriyya 
movement: his followers chose al-Bu.tain as their leader and continued to defy the
1. T a b ., l l ,p . 941 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); K am il, IV ,p . 338; M ir7 a t , V I ,  
fo l. 24b; Sharb/ IV , pp. 260-1 , 2 7 4 -5 ;" Ib a r , 111, p. 334.
2. T ab ., II,p . 967 (citing <Umar ibn Shabba).
» i
3. Ansab, fols.48 (citing al-Haytham ), 50a (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida); Tab.,
TTTpjpT927-S, 928 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba), 967-9 (citing ‘ Umar ibn 
Shabba ), 975 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamil, IV ,p p .328,333,349;
M ir7a t , V i ,  fo l.23b; Sharh, IV ,p p .252-4 .
4 . Ansab, fo l. 49a.
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government by seizing the Suq al-A hw az, but without great enthusiasm.
Sufyan ibn al-Abrad a l-K alb i with his army followed al-Butain and his 
followers and the two met in a battle; before long the Sufriyya asked Sufyan 
for Aman in return for thier submission, and al-Butain had to flee to save
i n i .  *
his life . He was soon seized, however, and put to death by an order of 
a l-H a jja j. ^
How had the movement'been able to sustain its success for so long?
At the height of its power under Shabib, it had never numbered more than 
a thousand supporters, and normally far fewer. This small army had been 
able to defy larger forces of the government, partly because of their 
skill in guerilla warfare, partly because of the help they received from the 
Christians in the area. But blame must also rest with a l-H a jja j:  in his 
impetuosity, he thought only to send larger and larger armies against them.
His thinking remained conventional: he never grasped the principle of 
adapting his strategy to meet guerrilla tactics. It was not until the arrival 
of Syrian troops that the Sufriyya began to experience reverses.
Another revolt against a l-H a jja j and the Umayyad rule came from 
a l-M ad a7in , led by M u tarrif ibn al-M ughira ibn Shu1 ba al-Thaqafi, the 
governor of a l-H a jja j there: whether or not it was a Kharijite revolt historians
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat , Tarikh, I ,p .355; Ansab, fo l*49b (citing M ada7 in i).
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disagree, but certainly it was associated with the Kharijites.
Cur information about this revolt comes from the narrative of Ibn a l -
Kalbi in Baladhuri and that of Abu Mikhnaf in Tabari. Apart from the details    »■ 1 *
provided by Abu M ikhnaf, which he reports on the authority of a l-N adr  
ibn Salih, a friend and a courtier of M utarrif, these two accounts are 
f undamentally the same; whick leads to the conclusion that either Ibn a l-  
Kalbi used Abu M ikhnafs account, or else they both utilized a common 
source.
M utarrif and his two brothers Hamza and *Urwa were considered among 
• •
the Ashraf of the time and enjoyed a reputation for good conduct. For these
reasons, and possibly also because of kinship with a 1 —HciQaj, they received
the latter’s favour;, he appointed M utarrif as governor of a l-M a d a ’ in,
♦
Hamza the governor of Hamadan, and ‘ Urwa his deputy in Kufa during
his residence in Basra.^
*
Thus Mutarrif was in authority over a l-M ad a, in in the year 77 /696 , 
while a l-H a jja j was busy fighting the Kharijite Shabib. When Shabib 
marched from Satidma towards Kufa, M utarrif wrote to a l-H a jja j informing
V
him of his advance and asking for re-inforcements to defend a l-M ad a ’ in. 
A l-H a jja j sent him four hundred men under Sabra ibn ( Abd al-Rahman ibn
1. Ansab, fo l.29b(citing Ibn al-Kalbi); Tab ., II,p p . 979-80 (citing Abu
Mikhnaf); Kamil, IV ,p .355; M ir ’ at, V I,fo l.2 8 a ; * Ibar, I I I , p .340.
Mikhnaf and ‘ Abdallah ibn Kunnaz. By this time Shabib had reached
]
Buhursir where he made his camp.
M utarrif, realising how close Shabib was, cut down the bridge which
•  i
connected a l-M ad a ’ in to Buhursir. He also wrote to Shabib asking him 
to send some trustworthy men among his followers "to examine their under-
standing of the Q ur’ an and to inquire about your preaching11 (
\j> J j j  I Our sources do not say whether this surprising 
request sprang from Mutarrif's sympathy to the K harijite  cause, or 
whether he intended to show them the error of their ways. Shabib agreed 
and his deputation told Mutarrif that their cause was "the Book of God and 
the Sunna of the Prophet; they opposed the appropriation of the Fay1, the 
disregard of the Hudud and the practice of oppression" ( i )
M utarrif agreed with a ll these aims and appeared to have thought of joining 
them. But he insisted that the caliphate should be an elective office 
restricted to the Quraishites. He believed that the Quraishite claim to the 
caliphate would rally the ‘ Arabs freely under their banner.^ Thus both his
1. T ab ., I I ,p p .946-7 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamil , IV ,p p .350-1 .
2. Ansab, fo l.29b  (citing .ibn a l-K a lb i); Tab., I I ,  p p .981-3 (citing Abu
MfkKhaf); K am il, IV , p .352; M ir ’ a t, IV ,fo l. 28a; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p .340.
3. T a b .; 11; p. 984 (citing Abu1 Mukhnaf).
4. Ansab, fol. 29a (citing Ibn al-KalbT); Tbb., 11,pp. 983-4 (citing Abu 
M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p .351; M ir ’ at, \?1, fol. 28a; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,p p .340-1 .
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insistence on a Quraishite caliph and his emphasis on an ‘ Arab following 
separated him from the Kharijites; the latter maintained that the most 
distinguished man should be elected caliph, regardless of his family or his 
tribal connections. Nor did they care whether their support was from ‘ Arab, 
mawla or slave. However, the interest M utarrif had shown in Kharijism 
encouraged Shabib to try again to win him over to his side. He sent some of 
his followers to M utarrif to convince him that Ouraish had no better claim to 
the caliphate than any other ‘ Arab; but without avail. Thus the negotiations 
between them, which had lasted for four days, ended without either side having 
come to terms.
In the event, a l-IJajjaj unintentionally profited from the situation.
For these four days of negotiations prevented Shabib from surprising on their 
way to Kufa the Syrian troops which ‘ Abd a l-M a lik  had sent to the aid of a l-  
Moreover, it gave time for ‘ Attab ibn Warqa* al-RiyahT to reach Kufa 
from Kirman. ‘ Attab was to command the army raised by a l-H a jja j against 
Shabib. ^
M utarrif now found himself caught between Shabib and a l-H a jja j;  
fearing attack from the former and punishment from the latter, he left al-Zviada’ in
] .  Ansab,fol.35b (citing Mada* ini); T ab ,, II,p . 947 (citing Abu Mikhnaf);
Sharh , IV f p .262; Kamil, IV ,p p .3*40-1.
2. See p.
*
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and went to al-Daskara. There, he gathered a council of the prominent 
men among his followers and for the first time told them of his intention 
to rebel. He declared the deposition of both a l-H a jja j and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
He gave his followers the choice of either following him or returning to 
their c ity . While some went back, the majority remained with him and 
swore homage to him according to "The Book of God and the Sunna of 
the Prophet; and the doctrine (hat the choice of a Quraishite caliph should 
be decided by a Shura". Among those who deserted him were Sabra ibn ‘ Abd 
al-Rahman ibn Mikhnpf and ‘ Abdallah ibn Kunnaz with their four hundred
r 2
men, where they took part with the Syrian army in the fighting against Shabib.
From al-Daskara, M utarrif went to Halwan, where Suwaid ibn ‘ Abd. •
al-Rahman a!-S a‘ dT was governor for a l-H a jja j, To put himself in favour with 
•  •  —
al-H aj.ja j, Suwaid went out with a small army against M u tarrif. But Suwaid
* —  f
was reluctant to fight M utarrif, perhaps out of sympathy with him, and asked
him secretly to leave Hulwan, which the latter did. He went to Hamdan
where his brother Hamza was governor. Cn his way, Mutarrif was interrupted
*  •
3by the Kurds, but defeated them in al-Thanya.
1. Ansab, fo l. 30a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), T a b ., 11,pp. 988-9 (citing Abu
M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV ,p p .351 -2 ; M i^at, V I,  fo l,28a ; * Ibar, I I I , p . 341.
2. See p.
3. Ansab, fo l.30a  (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), T ab ., II,p p . 989-91 (citing Abu
M ikhnaf); Kamil, IV , p. 352; M ir* at, V l ,  fo l. 28a; ‘ Ibar, i 11, p. 341.
When M utarrif approached Hamadan, he sent for his brother, asking
his help. The latter, although he would not join him, sent him money and
weapons. In order not to harm his brother, M utarrif did not enter
Hamadan, instead making his way to Isbahan where he pitched his camp. By
•
now his followers had increased, for people from al-Rayy and other districts
opposing a l-H a jja j's  severe policies, joined him. Consequently, al-Bara* ibn
Qabisa, the governor of Isbahan, wrote for a l-H a jja j asking for re-inforcements,
• • • —
The latter ordered ‘ Adi ibn W attad, the governor of al-Rayy, to join al-Bara’ , 
and sent other re enforcements to him. Their army, which now numbered six 
thousand, was placed under the command of ‘ Adi ibn W attad. A l-H a jja j had 
previously removed Hamza from Hamadan, lest he should join his brother. He 
chose as the new governor of Hamadan, Qais ibn Sa‘ d al~ ‘ i j l i ,  because the 
latter's tribe was the most powerful in Hamadan. Soon the two armies joined 
in battle, and after a severe struggle, M utarrif was killed and his followers 
dispersed. ^
Our authorities differ as to the nature of the revolt of M utarrif. Abu
9
Mikhnaf passes almost completely silent on his motives, without committing
2 t 3himself to any explanation. According to al-Haytham ibn ‘ A di, Mutarrif
1. Ansab,fols.30a-30b (citing ibn a l-K a lb i); T ab ., 11, pp. 992-1000 (citing
Abu M ikhnaf); Jamharat, p .255; Kamil, 1^ ,pp .352-3 ; M ir*a t, V I,  fo ls.28 
28b; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,p p .341-2.
2. There is, however, some indication which implies that it was not a
Kharijite revolt. Tab ., I I ,p p .987,992.
3. Ansab, fo l. 29a.
3.37.
was "opposing al-Munkcr* (moral atrocities) and did not go as far as the 
Kharijites". Baladhuri,^ however, in assessing Mutarrif's views, states that 
"some said that M utarrif held the Kharijite doctrine, but this is false. His 
views were the same as the Qurra’ who revolted with Ibn al Ash‘ ath".
2
Similarly, modern historians differ in their opinions on M utarrif. Weil
? 3considers him as a follower of Shabib, while Van Vloten thinks that his
revolt could be categorised with those of the Ashraf against the Umayyads.
Wellhausen, however, is not explicit about Mutarrif and his views and says
that "he had great Kharijite inclinations, but he refused either to be a
follower of Shabib or to fight against him"^. However, neither the
contacts which Mutarrif had with Shabib, nor his rigid attacks on the injustice
of the caliph and his governors, necessarily make him a K harijite . For while
the Kharijite sects assert strongly that every believer who is morally and
religiously irreproachable qualifies for election to the caliphate, "even if
he were a black slave", M utarrif restricted the claim to the Quraishites alone.
Moreover, neither the Kharijites nor Mutarrif's own followers referred to him
as a Kharijite,nor did he or his followers adopt the common Kharijite slogan
1. Ansab, fo l.30b .
2. W e il, History of the Islamic Peoples, p. 122, English translation by
S. Kh. Bukhsh  ^ Calcutta, 19]4 .
3. op. c it . , pp. 26 -7 .
4. Die Religios Politischen Qppositioq,£parteien im alten Islam, p .45.
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"La Hukma Ilia  Li'Llah". Furthermore, he left behind him no followers 
preaching a special doctrine. For all these reasons, it seems difficult to 
depict him as a Kharijite. He was rather a fanatic Muslim who wanted to 
reject the oppressors of the pious. One therefore can agree with a l-  
Baladhuri that his motivations were no doubt similar to the Qurra* *  ^ His 
contact with Shabib may have been an attempt to win him over to his 
side, since they were both agreed on opposing the existing regime and the 
brilliant m ilitary success of Shabib may well have encouraged M utarrif to seek 
to gain his support. But failing to do so, he also failed to emulate his success 
and his revolt was ineffectual and shortlived.
Apart from these major risings, there were also during the reign of 
<Abd a l-M a lik  other sporadic and shortlived Kharijite risings in a l-Jazira , 
Yamama, Bahrain and Basra. The suppression of Shabib's rebellion did not put 
an end to the risings in b a l-Jaz ira  region. Soon after Shabib's death, Abu 
Ziyad al-M uradi rebelled in Jukh a. A l-H a jja j sent eight hundred men against 
him under al-Jarrah ibn ‘ Abdallah al-H akm i, the governor of Babil and a l-  
Fallujatain. It was only after fierce fighting that Abu Ziyad and his followers
1. See Chapter V , p p .Z ^ I^ Z
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were massacred. In Jukha, another Kharijite rising occurred, that of
Hudba a l-T a ’ i with a small group of followers. But Saif ibn Hani* was
stationed there with his Maslahaf for the purpose of quelling Kharijite
2insurrections, and he succeeded in seizing Hudba and killing him. Another 
Kharijite rising came from Dara under Sakin al-Shaibani; but he was
seized by the cavalry of Muhammad ibn Marwan and handed over to a l-H a jja j,
3 “ 7who consequently executed him. Another Kharijite rising in the Jazira
region was that of Matar ibn * Imran in MatisM, who was also seized by the
'  . 4
cavalry of Muhammad ibn Marwan and handed over to a l-H a jja j. (All * •
Kharijites seized in the Jazira or in Syria were handed over to a l-H a jja j for
execution to prevent them from using these places as JIDar H igra"). Finally,
there was the rising of a l-K hattar al-N am ri in Radhan. The latter was
originally a Christian but converted to Islam and then adopted Kharijism. He
5met his death at the hands of Saif ibn H an i*.
One small Kharijite revolt broke out in al-Yamama in Suq Hajar, that
of Abu Harira from the Banu Hanifa. He was soon killed by the people there.
• »
1. Ansab, fo l.50b  (citing al-Haytham); Y a ( qubi, I I , p . 328.
2. Ansab,fol.45a;(citing Mada* in i).
3. Ib id ., fols.52b (citing Mada* in i), 53a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).
4 . Ansab,fol.52a (citing al-Haytham ). However, according to Mada* in i, Matar's
rebellion was before that of Salih ibn Musarrih. Ansab, fo l.52a .
.  * • —  1, .
5. Ansab, fo l.51b .
6. Ib id ., fo l. 52a (citing al-Haytham ).
Owing to its distance from the central government, al-Bahrain was
m
also a centre of Kharijite revolts. In the year 78 /697 , while a l-H a jja j
was still fighting the Azraqite, Qatri ibn a l-Fu ja ’ a , a Kharijite rebellion
broke out in al-Bahrain. The leader of this rising and his followers came from
the tribe of f Abd a l-Q a is . The governor, Muhammad ibn Sa*sa‘ a a l-K ilab i,
•  *  *
appealed to a l-H a jja j for help, but the latter was at this time short of men 
for the troops of Basra and Kufa were busy fighting the Azariqa with a l-  
Muhallab, A l-H a jja j, therefore, asked the caliph to order Ibrahim ibn ( Arabi, 
the governor of ai-Yam am a, to assist the governor of al-Bahrain. Ibrahim
t
marched on the rebels, defeated them and returned back to al-Yamama.^
In the following year 79/698 al-Rayyan a l-N akri revolted against 
Muhammad ibn Sa‘ sa‘ a a l-K ila b i. Al-Rayyan was soon joined by another 
Kharijite rebel, Maymun, who came from ( Uman. Muhammad ibn S a^a^a  
summoned the people of al-Bahrain to fight al-Rayyan and his followers, 
but the < Abd a l-G a is , because of their Kharijite sympathy, refused to take 
part in quelling the rebels. However, Muhammad sent an army under the 
Azdite ‘ Abdallah ibn *Abd a l-M a lik  a l - ‘ Awdhi against al-Rayyan, but it 
was defeated and the latter k illed . Shamed by this defeat, and afraid of the
1. Ib id ., fols, 50b-51a (citing M ada'in i).
hostility shown by the ‘ Abd al-O ais towards him, Muhammad left a l -
*
Bahrain to save his life . However, by this time a disagreement seems to have 
*
occurred between al-Rayyan and Maymun, for the latter left al-Bahrain only
forty days after Muhammad's departure, and returned to ‘ Uman. Muhammad,
* •
however, did not take advantage of this to return to the country and exploit 
the disagreement among his enemies. On the other hand, when he heard the 
news of these alarming events, a l-H ajja j dispatched Yazid ibn Abi Kabsha 
al-Saksaki with twelve thousand Syrians to help Muhammad, but they arrived 
after the latter had already left the country. Yazid and his army met a l-  
Rayyan with 1500 men in battle, and the latter was killed with a large number 
of his followers (80/699).^ Yazid had the bodies of al-Rayyan and his followers 
crucified, while their heads were sent to a l-H a jja j. The latter imprisoned the 
previous governor of al-Bahrain for his cowardice and inefficiency in handling 
the situation; he died in prison.
Soon after al-Rayyan's revolt, Dawud ibn Mihriz from ‘ Abd al-O ais  
also rebelled. He and his followers first buried the bodies of al-Rayyan and 
his followers, assisted by the people of al-Bahrain. Dawud, however, made 
a l-Q a tt f  his headquarters, and succeeded in putting to flight the first army 
sent against him under the police officer of a l-G a tif . He also defeated
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh,, I ,p p .358,360; Ansab, fo l*51a  
(cTting Madc?mT)i
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the Azdite * Abd al-Rahman ibn aI-Nu*m an a l-*  Aw dhi, which defeat,
however, had the effect of rallying the Azd with the people of a l-G a ti f
against Dawud and *Abd a l-Q ais . This alliance defeated Dawud and he and
his Kharijite supporters were killed . These continuous risings of Kharijites
from *Abd a l-O ais in al-Bahrain led a l-H a jja j to seize some of their chiefs,
» * **•
2
whom he punished severely by death, amputation and imprisonment.
In Basra, a Kharijite from *Abd al-Q ais called Abu Ma*bad al-Shanni
rebelled. Abu Ma*bad came originally from a I-Bahrain and chose Mawqu*,
*
a place in the outskirts of Basra, as his headquarters. He was, however,
«
3soon killed by the troops of al-Hakam ibn Ayyub the governor of Basra.» •
Even the last year of * Abd a l-M alik 's  reign did not pass without a Kharijite
rising (86/705), for in this year Dawud ibn a l-N u*m an, another of * Abd al-Q ais
originally from al-Bahrain, rebelled in Basra at Mawqu* of Abu M a*bad. Dawud
•  •
arrived in Basra with forty men, and was joined there by other Kharijites: he
•  11 "
probably chose Mawqu( as the centre of his rising, knowing that he could find 
Kharijite support there. A l-H ajja j's  deputy governor in Basra, al-Hakam ibn 
Ayyub, sent aginst him * Abd a l-M a lik  ibn al-M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra. After
1. Ansab,fol. 51a (citing Mada* in i).
2. Ibid. , fo ls.51a-51b (citing Mada* ini).
3. Ansab,fo l. 50b (citing Mada* in i); Ya *qubi, I I ,p p .328-9 ; Mu* jam , I I ,
p .688 (here, he is called Abu Sa*id).
343.
putting up strong resistance, Dawud and his followers, among whom was his 
own sister, were killed; this was the last Kharijite rising in the reign of 
* Abd a l-M a lik . ^
In sharp contrast to all these battles and rebellions of Kharijites
groups, was the behaviour of the I bad i Kharijite sect, which enjoyed a
friendly relationship with the caiiph from the time of their first leader,
Ibn Ibad, until the death of *Abd a l-M a lik . Ibn Ibad 's successor, Jabir
ibn Zaid, was not only friendly with the caliph, but even with his governor in
Iraq, a l-H a jja j, normally so bitter an enemy to the Kharijites. Jabir is said • —• ■
to have received a salary from a l-H a jja j.  It is not enough to explain this
«  “ “
friendship between the caliph and the IbadT leaders solely in terms of their
3Q u*ud (quietism), for the Sufriyya were also among the Qa*ada, yet they
fought *Abd a l-M a lik  repeatedly. But one can find another explanation in the
correspondence which took place between the caliph and ‘ Abdallah ibn Ibad.
The Ibadi chronicles preserve to us two letters of advice Nasa* ih from’
4‘ Abdallah ibn Ibad to * Abd a l-M a lik . The date of these letters is not known,
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p .348 (he gives the year 75 instead); Ansab, 
fols.52a-52b (citing MadcFTni).
2. Rubinacci, II, C aliffo  *Abd a l-M a lik  b. Marwan e gli Ibaditi, p. 105.
A IU O N , 1954; E J . 2, (A l-lbadiyya).
3. E. 1.2 , (A l-lbadiyya).
4 . Siyar, p .77 ; Barradi, pp> 156-7; Siyar al-*Um aniyya, pp .445-55.
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yet one can conclude that the first letter was written after the year 67 /686 , for it
contains a reference to the defeat of al-Mukhtar by Mus ( ab ibn a l-Zubair. ^
However, it is obvious that * Abd a l-M a lik  had taken the in itiative in starting
the correspondence, since the first letter is a reply of Ibn Ibad to an earlier letter
-  -  2from the caliph, through a certain Sinan ibn * As im. From this, bearing in 
mind the caliph's letter to Najda ibn 1 Amir, one can trace one of ‘‘Abd al 
M alik's methods of dealing with the Kharijites: bribery! Just as Najda was 
offered the governorship of al-Yamama, the leader of the Ibadi Kharijites was 
offered a pension; whereas the former refused the bribe, the latter appears to have 
accepted, as we find al-Hajjaj paying Jabir a salary.
( Abd a l-M a lik 's  approach was subtle: even if the bribe fa iled , the 
correspondence might well serve to divide the leader from his followers by 
arousing their suspicions (as in Najda's case); or, in the case of the Ibadi leader, 
it served to deepen the difference of opinion between the sect and other Kharijite 
groups, thus preventing them from uniting to form a common front against the 
caliph. < Abd a l-M a iik 's  successor, however, appears to have abandoned this 
policy, and the Ibadi sect was to take up the sword against him.
1. Rubinacci, op. c it• ,  p. 104, A IU O N , 1954;E. I. (AH Ibadiyya).
2- Siyar, p .77; Barradi, pp. 156-7; Siyar a l-* Umaniyya, p p .445-55.
‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's  success in suppressing all opposition movements by the 
end of his reign, gave a new political unity to the Empire, which together with 
his administrative reforms, laid a solid foundation for the more spectacular 
achievements of his son, a l-W a lid , in the expansion of the Islamic Empire.
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